
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Editor's Note

This issue of the Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization comprises of research papers presented at the 'International Conference on Islamic Civilization: Potentials and Challenges' held in March 2011. The papers have been selected on the basis of the breadth of issues that they cover and their relevance in meeting the challenges that Muslim and non-Mulsim intellectuals come across in academic circles, in formal and informal exchange of ideas and insights, and in the ongoing and important task of cultivating the minds of Muslim youth to help them realize that they too can become channels of knowledge generation rather than being mere passive receivers of relentless knowledge onslaught from the West. If the readers find this issue of the Journal helpful in answering the questions that arise in their minds, or if it helps them to ask more intellectually demanding questions, then the editors can rightfully feel that the effort in putting together this issue has borne fruit.

Dr. Muhammad Amin
Editor

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CIVILIZATIONAL CONNECTIONS: EARLY ISLAM AND LATIN-EUROPEAN RENAISSANCE

Dr. S. M. Ghazanfar

ABSTRACT

The paper discusses four interrelated themes. First, there is a description on the "lost paradigm" of Islamic connections to European Renaissance, followed by a discussion of evidence that this Renaissance depended crucially upon the intellectual armory acquired through prolonged contacts with early Islamic civilization. The influence of many Muslim scholars on Western Enlightenment also cannot be denied. The paper documents the influence of some key Islamic scholars such as Al-Kindi, Ibn-e-Sina, Al-Ghazali and in particular Ibn-e-Rushd, whose writings contributed hugely to the European Enlightenment. This is followed by a discussion of the various sources of transmission of that intellectual armory that enabled Latin-Europeans to exit from the Dark Ages and contributed towards medieval Renaissance as well as subsequent Italian Renaissance.

Keywords: Renaissance, Al-Ghazali, Civilization, West, Knowledge, Transmission

"Civilizations no longer exist as separate entities in the way they once did. But modern societies still bear the strong stamp of history, and still identify with each other along cultural fault lines. Among these fault lines, the one that generates the most discussion today runs between Islamic and Western societies" (UN General-Secretary, Kofi Annan, June 28, 1999).[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

The above quote is taken from a 1999 speech by the United Nations General Secretary in which he called for a "Dialogue among Civilizations," as a counter to the well-known "clash of civilizations" theme. His reference to the "stamp of history" and "cultural fault lines" provides some context for the present paper. The most significant among those "stamps" and "fault lines" were, of course, the Crusades.

Yet few problems in such discourses are as delicate as that of determining the extent of influence of one civilization upon another. This is especially true with respect to the links between early Islam and Latin-Europe. As Durant puts it, "civilizations are units in a larger whole whose name is history"[2]; they do not disappear. The past always rolls into the present; indeed, "transplanted ideas, no less than transplanted plants, tend to develop new characteristics in their new environment"[3].

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[1] Quoted from a speech, The Dialogue of Civilizations and the Need for a World Ethic, Oxford University Centre for Islamic Studies, June 28, 1999; see UN Press Release SG/SM/7049, June 28, 1999. On November 16, 1999, at the initiative of Iranian President Khatemi, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, proclaiming 2001 as the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. Also, for related discussion, see *Civilization: The Magazine of the Library of Congress*, (June-July 1999), 73-87 (special guest editor: Kofi Annan)

[2] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith*, Vol. 4. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), 343- 44.

[3] Philip K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History* (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 221.

Early Islamic civilization absorbed Greek Hellenism, Judaism, Christianity, Indian mathematics, and Chinese alchemy, and thus developed its own intellectual edifice. This is true also for the Western civilization. Indeed, "It was Islam that carried the light of learning through so many centuries, paving the way for European Renaissance." [4]

The mainstream literary-history paradigm, however, has tended to present the evolution of social thought as one straight line of events, moving almost entirely across the Western world, effectively denying history to the rest of the world. Thus, one observes a huge "literature gap" in discussions of 'medieval' history. This extends to just about every discipline.[5] During the "gap" period, several centuries prior to the emergence of Latin Scholasticism during the 12th-13th centuries, Islamic scholarship not only absorbed, adapted, and enlarged the re-discovered Greek heritage, but also transmitted that heritage ("as though in a 'corked' bottle," as one scholar puts it), along with its own contributions, to Latin Europe.

Thus was provided the stimulus for developing the human intellect further, for conveying a mold for shaping Western scholasticism, for developing empirical sciences and the scientific method, for bringing about the forces of rationalism and humanism that led to the 12th century Medieval Renaissance, the 15th century Italian Renaissance, and indeed, for sowing the seeds of European Reformation.[6]

Having thus set the tone, my purpose here is to discuss four interrelated themes. First, I briefly comment on the "lost paradigm" of Islamic connections to European Renaissance, followed by discussion of evidence that this Renaissance depended crucially upon the intellectual armory acquired through prolonged contacts with early Islamic civilization. Then, I will document the influence of some key Islamic scholastics, particularly Ibn Rushd, whose writings contributed hugely to the European Enlightenment. This will be followed by a discussion of the various sources of transmission of that Islamic intellectual armory that enlightened the European Dark Ages. I will conclude with some additional corroborative remarks concerning the main theme of this conversation as well as some comments as to the future challenges and potential for the Islamic world.

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[4] Quoted from speech by U.S. President Barack Obama, (Cairo, June 4, 2009)

[5] See S. M. Ghazanfar, "Scholastic Economics and Arab Scholars: The `Great Gap' Thesis Reconsidered" *Diogenes: International Review of Humane* Sciences 154 (April-June, 1991): 117-40.

[6] See Christopher Dawson, "The Origins of the Romantic Tradition, " *The Criterion*, 11 (1932):222-248; Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952); Christopher Dawson, Christopher. *The Formation of Christianity* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967); Etiene Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948); Charles H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1927); Charles H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1924); Charles H. Haskins, "Science at the Court of Emperor Frederick II." *American History Review* 27.4 (July, 1922): 669-694; Charles H. Haskins, "Arab Science in the Western World." *ISIS*, 17(1925): 478-85; George Makdisi, "The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its Origins in Law and Theology," *Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies* 49 (1974):640-661; George Makdisi, "Interaction between Islam and the West." *Revue des studes Islamique*. 44 (1976):287-309; George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*; 5 Volumes. (Baltimore, Maryland: Williams and Wilkins, 1927-48); George Sarton, *A Guide to the History of Science* (Waltham, Mass.; Chronica Botanica Company, 1952); George Sarton, *The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East, Library of Congress Lecture* (March 1950). (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951); R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

II. LITERARY HISTORY: PARADIGM LOST?

Some years ago, a professional colleague published a paper, entitled, "Paradigms Lost: Western Civilization and the Orient Unexpressed." Lamenting the "false" history encountered in her earlier intellectual life, she noted that she later discovered that her "paradigm had been created by Western Europeans, writing history teleologically as a progression leading only to themselves."[7]

There are several Western scholars who made such discoveries much earlier, yet the mainstream literary history is not quite accommodative. One such scholar was Harvard's Charles Homer Haskins, who, on the very first page of his magnum opus, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927), anticipates criticism by those for whom the 15th century Italian Renaissance is more significant. He argues that the "Middle Ages were less dark and less static and the (Italian) Renaissance less bright and less sudden than was supposed."[8] Then he insists that such a view ignores "the influx of new learning of the East, the shifting currents in the stream of medieval life and thought"[9]. Further, it was during the 12th century when Europe experienced "the revival of learning in the broadest sense" armed with "new knowledge of the Greeks and Arabs and its effects upon Western science and philosophy, and the new institutions of learning...."[10]. After the reconquest, "Spain's part was to serve as the chief link with the learning of the Mohammadan world..."[11] But, he says, "The story begins in Syria."[12] His reference is to the "first age of translations," from Greek to Arabic that began in Syria and then flourished during the 9th century in Baghdad's House of Wisdom (*Bait-al-Hikma*). He goes on, "To their Greek inheritance, the Arabs added something of their own. The reception of this science in Western Europe marks a turning point in the history of Western intelligence."[13] Others have talked similarly. Thus, "medieval scholars crossing the Pyrenees found the quintessence of all preceding science distilled by the theorists and practitioners of Islam. Historically, by entering the arena of Islamic civilization they had indeed entered the whole vast vibrant world of antiquity as well".[14] And, "What Islam had to offer them now was not only a spate of enlightening digests of the whole, long, rich evolution but an intelligent discussion of all its essential features, screened and refined through Islam's own intensive experience."[15]

While this "intensive experience" included Islamic world's own "philosophical battles between reason and revelation (thus originated the voluminous "scholastic" literature), similar battles were later ignited in Latin Europe through the transmission of that experience. Indeed, Western scholasticism was inspired by medieval Islamic scholasticism and takes shape beginning in the

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[7] Diane P. Thompson, "Paradigm Lost: Western Civilization and the Orient Unexpressed," *Northern Virginia Review*, no.10 (Fall, 1995): 8.
[8] Charles H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, vi.
[9] Ibid., 4.
[10] Ibid., viii-ix.
[11] Ibid., 11.
[12] Ibid., 281.
[13] Ibid., 282.
[14] Thomas, Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 98.
[15] Ibid., 102.

twelfth century, not by chance in regions in contact with the Islamic world, Arab Andalusia and the Sicily of Frederick II.[16]

Now, while Haskins emphasizes "continuity and change" as the hallmark of the Middle Ages, one typically observes "discontinuity" and almost universalization of the European Dark Ages in literary history in almost all branches of knowledge. Much of the literature, unlike Haskins' works, reflects painstaking efforts to minimize the significance of Islamic linkages; the Greek heritage becomes the primary emphasis. Such omissions in historiography persuade one eminent medievalist to argue that "the Arabic component of our paradigmatic view of the Middle Ages has always remained incidental; it has never been systemic" and the "myth of Westernness" is "too much shaped by cultural prejudices" that are "still quite powerful in the real world of literary historiography."[17]

Thus, Arab-Islamic scholarship is treated as nothing more than a holding operation .... as a giant storehouse for previously discovered scientific results, keeping them until they could be passed on for use in the West."[18] Further, we can readily agree on the more recent Western impact on the Islamic world, for we are our own witnesses. However, it becomes somewhat unsettling when we learn of the distant, far more significant impacts in reverse. Occasional references notwithstanding, what is almost endemic concerning Islamic heritage is the tone and style that is "other-oriented," exclusionary, remote, denigrating, or outright offensive. The names of a few medieval Islamic scholars are tolerated, but merely as "librarians," not original thinkers, and then as "transmitters" of the Greeks, as though Greek knowledge was kept in a freezer and then centuries later it was handed over to thaw in Europe—what I call the "freezer model" of transmission. Such posturing is "garbled falsification" and "colossal misrepresentation",[19] "a travesty of truth"[20], and "worse than a lie".[21]

Having narrated a bit of a background for this paper, I will now proceed to the main task: that is, to document some evidence as to the influence of a few prominent early Islamic scholars whose writings contributed to European Awakening, followed by a discussion as to the sources of transmission of that knowledge.

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[16] Samir Amin, *Eurocentricism* (translated into English by Russell Moore). (New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1989), 56; see also George Makdisi, "The Scholastic Method in Medieval Education: An Inquiry into its Origins in Law and Theology," *Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies* 49 (1974):640-661.

[17] Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 9, 13-14.

[18] Colin A. Ronan, *Science: Its History and Development among the World's Cultures* (New York: Facts on File Publishers, Hemlyn Publishing Group Limited, 1982), 203.

[19] Robert Briffault, *The Making of Humanity* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; and New York: The Macmillian Company, 1919), 189, 201.

[20] Colin A. Ronan, Science*: Its History and Development among the World's Cultures,* 203.

[21] George Sarton, *A Guide to the History of Science*, 27; see also Amin, Daniel, Dawson, Crombie, Southern, and others)

III. ISLAM-LATIN EUROPE LINKS: NATURE AND IMPACT [22]

Briefly now, what was the nature and impact of these influences? According to Goldstein, The effect was an intellectual stimulation without parallel. Virtually every aspect of European life from religion and philosophy to governmental institutions to architecture, personal mores, and romantic poetry, was profoundly affected ... and the fascination of the enemy culture that had ruled over the Iberian Peninsula had spread secretly and slowly since the 10th century. By the twelfth it attained the proportion of a cult.[23] Further, under the impact of this encounter, the West took the step toward the cultivation of specialized sciences, out of the original philosophical core. "*Every single specialized science in the West owes its origin to the Islamic impulse, or at least its direction from that time on. It was from Islam that the Middle Ages learned to look on nature as an infinitely varied reality, not as a philosophical idea*."[24]Haskins enumerates several disciplines in which Arab-Islamic knowledge flowed to the West: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, geography, astrology, medicine, veterinary medicine, zoology, botany, and, of course, philosophy and science, including the scientific empiricism.[25] Indeed, Haskins' "vision of a profoundly secular renaissance," with its emphasis on reason in human affairs and rationalism in understanding nature evolved through the influence of Arab-Islamic civilization whose own renaissance, including the 'secular-sacred' mix of the young Islamic faith, was stimulated by the Greeks.[26] Aside from other influences, the Crusades induced various influences, but, more importantly, they also saw the development of a new secular ideal of chivalry which seems the direct antithesis of St. Bernard's ideal of Christian Knighthood ... and at the same it was equally remote from the barbaric heroism of Northern feudalism.[27] Then this medievalist adds emphatically and says that new secular ideal "has no roots in the earlier medieval culture of the West. It is neither Christian, nor Latin, nor Germanic. It appears abruptly in Southern France about the time of the First Crusade without any preparation or previous development.... the origins of the new style [i.e., the secular ideal] are to

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[22] It is tempting to append here a partial list of several key Islamic "impactors" and Latin-European "impactees" -------- Some "**impactors**" Al-Kindi, d.873; Al-Razi, d.925; Al-Farabi, 950; Al-Khwarizmi, d.976; Ibn-Sina (Avicenna), d.1036; Ibn-Haitham, d.1039; Al-Biruni, d.1048; Al-Ghazali, d.1111; Ibn-Tufail, d.1186, Ibn-Rushd (Averroes), d.1198; Ibn-al-Arabi, d.1240; Ibn-Khaldun, d.1406; etc.
---Some "**impactees**" -- Robert Grossetteste, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, Raymund Lull, St. Thomas Aquinas, Domingo Gundisalvo, Duns Scotus, Siger of Brabant, Nicholas Oresme, Gerbert of Aurillac (later Pope Sylvester II, 999-1003), Abelard of Bath, Roger Bacon, Peter Adelard, John Peckham, Henry of Gant, William of Occam, Dante Aligheri, Rene Descartes, Nicholas Copernicus, Gailileo Galilei; etc.

[23] Thomas Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1988), 94; See also for pre-12th century connection Josiah C. Russell, *Twelfth Century Studies* (New York: AMS Press, 1978); Mary C. Welborn, "Lotharingia as a Center of Arabic Scientific Influence in the Eleventh Century" *ISIS.* 16 (1931):188-99; Diane P. Thompson, "Paradigm Lost: Western Civilization and the Orient Unexpressed," *Northern Virginia Review*, no.10 (Fall, 1995): 5-8; James W. Thompson, "The Introduction of Arabian Science into Lorraine in the Tenth Century," *ISIS.* 38:12 (May, 1929.) 184-193

[24] Thomas Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science*, 99.

[25] see Eugene A. Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1964); Mehdi Nakosteen, *History of Islamic Origins of Western Education A.D. 800-1350*, (Boulder, Col.: University of Colorado Press, 1964); D. M. Dunlop, *Arab Civilization to A.D. 1500* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) and others.

[26] Robert Benson, Robert and Giles Constable (Editors). *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* (Proceedings: 1977 Conference in commemoration of Charles H. Haskins' contributions). (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), xxiii.

[27] Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity (*New York:Sheed and Ward, 1952), 152.

be found in the rich and brilliant society of Muslim Spain.[28] And such contacts generated "that confidence in the power of reason and that faith in the rationality of the universe without which science would have been impossible."[29] Indeed, for factors such as suggested here, Southern calls the 12th century "The Century of Faith and Reason," the title of his chapter 2, preceded by a chapter on "the Age of Ignorance."[30]

Similar impact from contacts with the East is suggested by Ferruolo. He argues that the fact that "Western Europe experienced a renaissance in the twelfth century comparable to the Renaissance that began in Italy is an old and well-established idea among the medievalists."[31] However, Ferruolo suggests two key developments that distinguish the earlier renaissance from the other:

(i) the rise of humanism—human dignity, rationalism and reason, nature as comprehensible ("earlier, humanity was viewed as frail"); and (2) the discovery of the individual—"one of the most important developments in the years between 1050 and 1200," meaning self-discovery, individual expression, interest in human relations, and "a system of ethics judged by standards of inner intention rather than external action."[32]And how did these revolutionary and novel developments emerge? Ferruolo provides some clues as to their Arab-Islamic links. The Crusades were of central importance ... they helped to shape European attitudes, feelings, and values ... For more than two centuries, Western Europeans were preoccupied with the Greeks and the Saracens. The cultural advances they made during this time were undoubtedly influenced by the rediscovery of the classical past, but the greater stimulus probably came from the discovery of the Byzantium and Islam, two very different and hostile cultures that share the same past.[33]

While the preceding paragraphs provide a general picture of the cultural transformation and reorientation of Latin-Europe through contacts with the Islamic civilization, there is a plethora of publications that documents the specific, disciplinary contributions of Islamic scholars and their influence upon the European scholars (perhaps the most prominent name among the later being the Prince of Scholasticism, St. Thomas Aquinas [1225-1274] who studied at the University of Naples, established by Frederick II in 1224 for the specific purpose of promoting and absorbing Arab-Islamic knowledge). Consistent with the literature gap tradition, however, the pursuits of our ordinary scholar hardly ever encounter, or exposed to, such prolonged cross-cultural, civilizational links. On the other hand, there is hardly any work on early medieval literary history that does not provide some clues or evidence for the astute scholar as to the overwhelming multi-dimensional

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[28] Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity*, 153; also see Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948); Rose Wilder Lane, *The Discovery of Freedom: Man's Struggle against Authority* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970); George Sarton, *The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East. Library of Congree Lecture* (March 1950) (Washington: D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 1951); Henry G. Weaver, *The Mainspring of Human Progress* (New York: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1953); and others

[29] Christopher Dawson, "The Origins of the Romantic Tradition," *The Criterion*, 11 (1932):230.

[30] R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959); also see Toby E. Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Huff, especially his chapter 3, "Reason and Rationality in Islam and the West;" and Packard's chapter 3, "The World of the Mind in the Twelfth Century)

[31] preceding even Haskins' book, *12th Century Renaissance.*

[32] Stephen C. Ferrueolo, "The Twelfth Century Renaissance," in *Renaissances Before the Renaissance: Cultural Revival of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, Edited by WarrenTreadgold. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984), 123-128.

[33] Ibid., 137.

medieval encounters with the Islamic civilization that lurk vividly in the background, however minimally, disparagingly or distantly noted. An example of such literature is the 1878 book by Paul Lacroix, in which the author eloquently discusses the evolution of various specialized disciplines in Europe, and in each case, there are scores of references, though noted hesitatingly and in less than flattering terms, linking European scholars to their "pagan" Arab predecessors. And there are other similar works where Arab-Islamic influences loom large, and to the extent noted; done so as secondary and distant.[34] As Norman Daniel points out, we nowhere find admission that there was an alien source for the new ideas of Western Europe in the 12th century in the lay world,[35] for there tends to be "a cultural filter in acquiring knowledge from an alien source considered to be tainted."[36] Further, "Islam was at one and the same time the great enemy and the great source of higher material and intellectual culture."[37]

One of the most significant and comprehensive sources in this context is the scholarship of George Sarton, about the most prolific historian of the "history of knowledge" and a contemporary of Haskins at Harvard. His 5-volume, encyclopedic, *Introduction to the History of Science* (1927-48) is a treasure, as well as his *A Guide to the History of Science* (1952). However, there are numerous other publications which document the Islamic-Latin Europe connections.[38] Some of these references provide extensive bibliographies of their own—e.g., Chejne, Daniel, Menocal, Myers, Qadir, Southern, etc. Indeed, there are some very recent books, with interesting titles e.g., *The House of Wisdom; What Islam Did for Us; Lost History*, etc.written by Western scholars Lyons, Morgan, Wallace-Murphy, and others.

IV. SOME KEY ISLAMIC SCHOLASTICS AND THEIR IMPACT

Presently our task is to briefly explore the intellectual sources of medieval Islamic-European connections that gave rise to what Haskins called the "vision of a profoundly secular renaissance." That vision was inspired through the scholarship of medieval Islamic "giants" (as Sarton referred to them), such as Al-Kindi (801-873), Al-Razi (865-925), Al-Farabi (870-950), Ibn Sina (980-1037), Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), and, in particular, Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Europe of the late Dark Ages was receptive, but such a vision, as noted before, "had no roots in the earlier medieval culture of the West. It is neither Christian, nor Latin, nor German. It appears abruptly in Southern France about the time of the First Crusade, without any preparation and previous development

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[34] see Robert Benson and Giles Constable (Editors). *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century* Claggett, et al.; Jean Gimpel, *The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976); Jean Gimpel, *The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976); John E. Murdoch, and Edith D. Sylla (Editors). *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning* (1973 Conference Proceedings). (Boston, Mass.: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975); Sidney R. Packard, *12th Century Europe: An Interpretative Essay* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); Tina Stiefel, *The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Warren Treagold, (Editor). *Renaissances before the Renaissance: Cultural Revival of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages.* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984); and others

[35] Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and the Medieval West* (London: Longman Group, 1975-I), 105-106.

[36] Norman Daniel, *The Cultural Barrier: Problem in the Exchange of Ideas* (Edinburgh, England: Edinburgh University Press, 1975-II.), 87.

[37] W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Surveys: The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe* (Edinburgh, England: Edinburgh University Press, 1972), 172.

[38] (see the extensive bibliography)

...The origins of the new style are to be found in the rich and brilliant society of Muslim Spain."[39] Thus emerged, the "confidence in the power of reason and that faith in rationality of the universe without which science will have been impossible."[40]

The primacy of reason in pursuing human affairs was indeed the singularly unique and revolutionary attribute that the Islamic legacy bestowed upon medieval Europe. And reason emerged as a force to counter the authority of the Church, for the popes "judged all and could be judged by none."[41] It was this social environment and contacts with the Islamic civilization that persuaded twelfth century English heretic, Adelard of Bath, "trained (as he says) by Arab scientists," to assert, while addressing his nephew, "For I was taught by my Arab masters to be led only by reason, whereas you were taught to follow the halter of the captured image of authority."[42]

While Ibn Rushd's role in this "rational" evolution is acknowledged to be the most pronounced, there were others who not only influenced Ibn Rushd but also directly impacted subsequent Latin-European discourses. The task of introducing Greek philosophy into Islam and of underscoring its essential conformity with the Islamic worldview fell, first, to Abu Yusuf Al-Kindi. But there were also others.

(1) AL-KINDI (801-873 AD)

The founder of the Islamic Peripatetic School of philosophy and the author of 270 treaties ranging from logic and mathematics to physics and music, Abu Yusuf al-Kindi, in recognition of his tireless efforts to make philosophy acceptable to theologians, is known as the "philosopher of the Arabs." He is also the only great Muslim philosopher of antiquity. A thorough Mu'tazlite, he wrote that truth is universal and supreme, and that philosophy is but another form of the message which the prophets have carried.

Despite his philhellenic sympathies, Al-Kindi remained thoroughly committed to his Islamic heritage, as interpreted chiefly by the rationalist theologians of the 8th and 9th centuries, the Mu'tazilah. He was virtually alone in attempting to give philosophical support to the basic Islamic scriptural concepts. Al-Kindi's two treatises on geometrical and physiological optics were utilized by Roger Bacon (1214-1292), who was also influenced later by the works of Al-Haitham (d. 1039). His influence was so widely felt that the Italian physician-mathematician, Geromino Cardano (1501-1576) considered him "one of the twelve giant minds of history."[43]

(2) AL-RAZI (865-925 AD)

Known as the greatest physician of Islam, Muhammad Abu Bakr Zakariya Al-Razi earned the title of "Arabic Galen" and "most brilliant genius of the Middle Ages" for achievements in medicine, but also called the founder of philosophy of nature in Islam. He was a free thinker and an important philosophical figure who was even more radical than Al-Kindi in his attachment to Greek rationalism.

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[39] Christopher Dawson, *The Making of the Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity*, 153.
[40] Christopher Dawson, *The Formation of Christianity* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 230.
[41] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith*, Vol. 4, 954; Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Moderrn State* (Princeton., N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 8.
[42] Tina Stiefel, *The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century*, 71, 80.
[43] Eugene A. Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World*, 11.

Constantine the African translated into Latin two of Al-Razi's philosophical works and Gerard of Cremona translated his medical work, *Tib al-Mansouri,* under the title of *Liber Almansorius.* Al-Razi's greatest work, *Kitab al-Hawi* (*Liber de Continens*) was translated into Latin and was published several times.

(3) AL-FARABI (870-950 AD)

Muhammad Abu-Nasr Al-Farabi wrote extensively in different fields. He wrote the *Introduction to Logic* and *Abridgement of Logic*; his interest in natural science led to his commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* and on the movement of the celestial bodies. He also wrote *The Power of the Soul, The Unity and the One, The Intelligence and the Intelligible*, and a commentary on Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Animis*. His *The Model City* continues to be of sociological interest even today. However, Al-Farabi is best known for *The Encyclopedia,* a definitive account of all branches of sciences and art, and *The Political Regime,* also known as *The Book of Principles.*

The influence of Al-Farabi upon two of 13th century's most prominent Latin scholastics, Albertus Magnus and his student, St. Thomas Aquinas, is profound. Hammond documents the similarities by placing Al-Farabi's arguments "side by side with those of St. Thomas in order to aid the reader in comparing them."[44] Thus, "we see without doubt the influence of the former [Al-Farabi] on the latter [St. Thomas] but not vice versa."[45] Further, "Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas and others borrowed from him a great amount of material hitherto regarded by many as a product of their speculation, while in reality it is not."[46]

(4) IBN SINA (980-1037 AD)

Abu Ali Al-Husain Ibn Sina was another precocious genius of medieval Islam whose work spanned vast areas of knowledge. His magnum opus, *The Canon of Medicine* (*al-Qunan fil-Tibb*), remained the standard text—about like *Gray's Anatomy*—until the birth of modern medicine. He has been credited with at least 99 books on various topics. His *Kitab al-Shifa* (*The Book of Healing)* covered practical knowledge on civic affairs and theoretical knowledge on physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.

Having mastered the metaphysics of Aristotle, Ibn Sina's writings not only formed a bridge between the Greeks and Renaissance Europe, but also constituted a distinctive school known as Latin Avicennism in medieval Europe, led by William of Auvergne. Less well known than the school of Latin Averroism, it was an attempt to reconcile the ideas of St. Augustine with Aristoteleniasm.

Ibn Sina's influence reached out to make its mark on two great minds–Ibn Rushd and the eminent Jewish scholastic, Maimonides (1135-1204) and into Christendom to the various Latin-Scholastics (Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, John of Seville, and others). Roger Bacon called him "the chief authority in philosophy after Aristotle," and Aquinas spoke with as much respect of him as of Plato. "[47] Avicenna and Averroes were lights from the East for the Schoolmen, who cited them next to the Greeks in authority."[48]

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[44] R. Hammond, *The Philosophy of Alfarabi and its Influence on Medieval Thought* (New York: Hobson Press, 1947), 65.
[45] Ibid., 29.
[46] Ibid., ix; also see Sarton.
[47] Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World,* 34.
[48] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith,* Vol. 4, 342.

(5) ABU HAMID AL-GHAZALI (1058-1111 AD)

The most prominent of the early Islamic theologian-scholastics is Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, "acclaimed as the greatest … certainly one of the greatest" (Watt, 1963, vii). He exerted great influence upon Jewish and Christian scholasticism and succeeded in reconciling his pragmatic tendencies with strict Moslem orthodoxy" (Myers, 35). The most significant of his writings is the 4-volume *Ihya Ulum al Din* (*The Revival of the Religious Sciences*), which 'parallels' St. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*.[49] Incidentally, Al-Ghazali's works, including the *Ihya*, were translated into Latin before 1150 AD.[50]

Al-Ghazali's scholarship assumes its greatest significance in relation to the larger philosophical-theological controversies of the time. He challenged other Islamic scholastics, whose Aristotelian rationalism threatened Islam itself. His attempt at reconciliation appeared in his *Tahafat al-Falasifah* (*The Incoherence of Philosophers*), which was later challenged by Ibn Rushd, as we shall see.

As the works of Islamic rationalists, chiefly Ibn Rushd, reached medieval Europe, similar challenges were perceived even to Christianity, and there were fears of the "liquidation of Christian theology."[51]Thus, relying heavily on Al-Ghazali's synthesis, "St. Thomas was led to write his *Summas* to overcome that threat."[52] And, "since Ghazali placed science, philosophy and reason in position inferior to religion and theology, the Scholastics accepted his views, which became characteristic of most medieval philosophy."[53] Thus, "Europe as well as the Muslim East felt the impact of Al-Ghazali's teaching. Echoes of his voice are heard in the reflections of Blaise Pascal, and his work was paralleled by Thomas Aquinas in the discourse on Christian doctrine and in other portions of *Summa Theologica*." [54] His "teaching is quoted by St. Thomas and other scholastic writers"[55]; and it is generally known that St. Thomas' synthesis "was deeply influenced by Muslim philosophers, chiefly al-Ghazali."[56]

Further, the Spanish Dominican monk, Raymond Martin directly benefited from Al-Ghazali's texts in his books, entitled, *Pigio Fidei* and *Explanation Symboli*; and "the arguments have been taken exactly as they were in the originals."[57] St. Thomas used some texts of Al-Ghazali's in *Contra Gentiles*, either directly or through the mediation of Raymund Martin. St. Thomas, who had received his education from the Dominican order in the University of Naples, had known al-Ghazali's philosophy well, and used his arguments in attacks on Ibn Rushd and his Aristotelian commentaries. This university was established in 1224 by Frederick II, chiefly to assimilate Islamic philosophy and science.

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[49] Ibid., 950.
[50] Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World*, 39.
[51] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith*, Vol. 4, 954.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World*, 39-40.
[54] Jurji, Collier's Encyclopedia, 1979, 13:312-13.
[55] De Lacy O'Leary, *Arabic Thought and its Place in History* (New York: Kegan Paul, Tench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1922), 208.
[56] See also F.C. Copelston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 181; Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World*, 42; Nicholas Rescher, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy* (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 156.
[57] M. M. Sharif, (Editor), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 Volumes, (Weisbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966), 1361.

Incidentally, Al-Ghazali's *Ihya* included discourses on the discipline of economics, remarkably similar to those found in the writings of later European scholars, including Adam Smith.[58] It is encouraging to note that economic thought originating from Al-Ghazali and others is now incorporated in some American textbooks on the subject.

(6) IBN RUSHD (1126-1198 AD)

We now turn to the most influential intellectual of Cordoba, Ibn Rushd. The "heresies" of iconoclasts, such as Abul Walid Mohammad Ibn Rushd, generated unprecedented intellectual upheaval which forever transformed Western social thought, especially in medieval Latin-Christendom. Ibn Rushd (latinized 'Averroes') was the ultimate rationalist, the Aristotelian heretic of early Islam and Christianity. His singular influence in stimulating Western Renaissance is acknowledged "as the landmark in the history of Western civilization."[59] Along with Ibn Sina, he is "the greatest name in Arabian [Islamic] philosophy … whose influence spread, in many directions, through the duration of the middle ages, then in the epoch of the Renaissance up to the very threshold of modern times."[60] Indeed, "he was the greatest Muslim philosophers of the West, and one of the greatest of medieval times." [61]Roger Bacon ranked Ibn Rushd next to Aristotle and Ibn Sina.[62]

Trained as a lawyer and a physician, Ibn Rushd's role as advisor to the Caliph initiated him into philosophy. He wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle, and others. He also wrote a 7-volume medical encyclopedia, *Kitab al-Kulliyat fil-Tibb* (hence the Latin name Colliget, a corruption of the word "*kulliyat*," meaning "generalities"), used at European universities until the 18th century. Though his scholarship in medicine has been eclipsed by his fame as a philosopher, he was "one of the greatest physicians of the time."[63]



ST. THOMAS AQUINAS OVERCOMING AVERROËS

Ibn Rushd's philosophy was in the tradition of prevailing Islamic scholasticism, attempting to reconcile Islamic faith with reason in light of the available Greek heritage. His *Commentaries* on Aristotle were translated into Latin and Hebrew. There soon appeared super-commentaries on his commentaries—which itself is a testimony to his influence. The works of Aristotle and Ibn Rushd

[58] S.M. Ghazanfar, and A. Azim Islahi. "Explorations in Medieval Arab-Islamic Economic Thought: Some Aspects of Ibn Qayyim's Economics (691-751AH/1292-1350AD)," *History of Economic Ideas* (Italy) 1997. 5:1:7-25

[59] Etienne Gilson, 1938, 30.

[60] Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middke Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1955), 217.

[61] Sarton, II-1, 356.

[62] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith,* Vol. 4, 338.

[63] Sarton, II-1, 305.

in their Latin translations were used not only in the curriculum at Naples (where St. Thomas studied), but were also sent to the Universities of Paris and Bologna. Nowhere did Averroism strike deeper roots than in the Universities of Bologna and Padua, the latter became the "hot-bed" of Averroism.[64]

Like others before him, Ibn Rushd was criticized for suggesting that revelation must be guided by reason. In his view, the noblest form of worship was to study God through His works, using the faculty of the mind. For his rebuttal (*Tahafut al-Tahafut*, or *Incoherence of the Incoherence*) of Al-Ghazali's arguments, Ibn Rushd is rather well known. His dispute with Al-Ghazali provides a fascinating view of the issues which engaged the minds of early Muslim scholars. In Al-Ghazali's scheme, everything is the result of continuous divine intervention and the divine will; any causal link is secondary. But, for Ibn Rushd, while divine will may be the ultimate cause, "To deny the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things is sophistry...Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in the world can really be known" (*Tahafut al-Tahafut.* [65]

Once the rediscovery of Aristotle through Ibn Rushd's writings was complete, the philosophers and theologians alike found themselves in possession of the greatest intellectual reservoir ever developed up to that time. Ibn Rushd was "the Great Commentator." Influenced by his writings, philosophers and theologians split into two major groups: the "liberal," pro-Averroists, known as the Latin Averroists, with Siger of Brabant (1240-1280) at their head, generally identified with the Franciscan Friars (Peter Abelaard, 1079-1142; Adelaard of Bath, 1080-1152; Roger Bacon, 1214-1294; Duns Scottus, 1265-1308; and others); and the "conservative," anti-Averroists, Dominican Monks, led by St. Thomas Aquinas (along with Albertus Magnus, 1206-1274; Raymond Martin, d.1284; Raymund Lull, 1232-1315; and others). The issues were legion–metaphysical, philosophical, and practical. It may be noted, however, that even Ibn Rushd's critics, including St. Thomas, did not escape his influence, and their understanding of Aristotle was conditioned by Ibn Rushd's' interpretations. In 1852, Ernest Renan expressed this paradox very well, "St. Thomas is the most serious adversary that the Averroes doctrine has encountered, and yet one can go further to say, paradoxically, that he is the greatest disciple of the Great Commentator. Albert the Great owes everything to Avicenna; St. Thomas, as philosopher, but above all to Averroes."[66]

Etienne Gilson in his *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* accords Ibn Rushd the distinction of having established the "primacy of reason;" and for this, he regards Ibn Rushd as the "herald of rationalism" long before the Renaissance[67]. Rationalism was "born in Spain, in the mind of an Arabian philosopher, as a conscious reaction against the theologism of the Arabian divines."[68] Gilson adds that Ibn Rushd "bequeathed to his successors the ideal of a purely rational philosophy, an ideal whose influence was to be such that, by it, even the evolution of Christian philosophy was

[64] M. M. Sharif, (Editor). *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 Volumes, 1381.
[65] [translated by S. Van Dern Bergh; London, E.J. Gibb Memorial Series, Vol.1], 317, quoted in Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1991), 114.
[66] Majid Fakhri, *Averroes, Aquinas, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe* (Washington, D. C.: George town University, 1997), 5.
[67] Ibid., 34.
[68] Mjaid Fakhri, *Averroes, Aquinas, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe*, 6; Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revealtion in the Middle Ages*, 37.

to be deeply modified."[69] What became pivotal to St. Thomas' own philosophy, Gilson attributes to Ibn Rushd the recognition "that nothing should enter the texture of metaphysical knowledge save only rational and necessary demonstrations."[70] However, unlike some of his adversarial Latin Averroists, St. Thomas was not willing to concede that either Aristotle or Ibn Rushd were infallible.

Despite the enthusiasm for Ibn Rushd's Aristotelian *Commentaries* in Paris during the thirteenth century, serious questions arose as to the compatibility of Ibn Rushd's Aristotelianism with the Christian doctrine. And there were condemnations *en mass*—medieval "Mcarythism" ("Islamophobia?") and even a 13th century Papal Inquisition against the Christian-Averroistic "heretics". The targets were mainly Latin Averroists, led by Siger of Brabant, who were suspected of subscribing to the "double-truth" doctrine: some truths philosophical, others theological; and reason was superior to faith. St. Thomas in his *On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists* confirms this suspicion but denies the doctrine. Ibn Rushd himself did not subscribe to such a thesis; and according to Gilson and other medievalists, it is doubtful that even Siger himself did so. This doctrine, however, was a godsend for the scientifically-minded scholars in the West, who were condemned and persecuted by the Church and the State. For this reason, de Wulf calls Ibn Rushd the "doctor of anti-Scholastics."[71]

For Ibn Rushd, the primacy of reason is unquestioned but compatible with faith. In his *Harmony of Philosophy and Religion* (*Fasl al-M'aqal*), which was not available in Latin to St. Thomas, Siger of Brabant or their contemporaries, Ibn Rushd maintains a position which may be called the "parity" or "harmony" of truth, philosophical and theological. Thus, philosophical truth, although superior to religious truth, is not really incompatible with, or even different, from it. The only difference is the path to truth–philosophical and the theological. For any apparent conflict between the religious texts and the philosophical texts, it is the philosophers' duty to resolve the conflict by recourse to the method of interpretation, according to Ibn Rushd; after all, he would say, it is "they who are confirmed in knowledge."[72] Thus, in response to Al-Ghazali's charge of infidelity (*kufr*), Ibn Rushd argues that, if the inner meaning of the Qur'anic passages is understood, the position of the philosophers accords with that of the theologians.[73]

However, Ibn Rushd's Aristotelian commentaries and his own contributions rapidly became the ruling mode of social thought in the West. Scholars of medieval Europe were provoked and inspired by Ibn Rushd's writings. Whereas some Muslim scholars and their Latin successors tried to "Islamize" and "Christianize" Hellenism, Ibn Rushd's commentaries and rationalism seemed to excessively "hellenize" Islam and Christianity—or so he was accused. Thus, his Muslim contemporaries persecuted him and the Muslim posterity almost ignored him and allowed his works to be lost. Jews preserved many of them. In Latin Christianity, the commentaries were translated into Latin from the Hebrew, fed the heresies of Siger of Brabant and the rationalism of the Italian school of Padua, and threatened the foundations of Christianity. Relying on the more compatible Al-Ghazali, St. Thomas recognized that some dogmas of religion were beyond reason

[69] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revealtion in the Middle Ages*, 38.
[70] Majid Fakhri, *Averroes, Aquinas, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe*, 6; Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revealtion in the Middle Ages*, 79.
[71] M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 Volumes, 1380.
[72] Qur'an, Sura 3:5-6.
[73] Majid Fakhri, *Averroes, Aquinas, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe*, 33-34.

and must be accepted by faith alone. "The aim of his life was to reconcile Aristotelianism and Muslim knowledge with Christian theology"[74]; and "Thomas Aquinas was led to write his *Summas* to halt the threatened liquidation of Christian theology by Arabic interpretations of Aristotle ... indeed, the industry of Aquinas was due not to the love of Aristotle but to the fear of Averroes."[75] Thus, driven by this fear, the Latin Scholastic constructed the medieval "synthesis; "the Aristotelian-Averroistic heresies had been demolished and Ibn Rushd the 'infidel' had been humbled, and St. Thomas' followers celebrated his glory in this synthesis. So perceived, this conclusion is reflected in a medieval sketch that one medieval scholar reproduced in his book; the sketch is entitled "St. Thomas Aquinas overcoming Averroes," showing St. Thomas surrounded by angels and monks, displaying his "synthesis" to the vanquished Ibn Rushd lying at his feet.[76]

It was not to be so, however. During the l2th and l3th centuries Latin-Averroism had far-reaching consequences for medieval and modern social thought, hardly foreseeable by the medieval scholastics. It established "a tradition in which it became possible to question the status of religion"[77]; and from the end of the 12th century to the end of the l6th century. Averroism remained the dominant school of thought, in spite of the orthodox reaction it created first among the Muslims in Spain and then among the Talmudists, and finally, among the Christian clergy. These were the centuries that witnessed revolutions in the evolution of social thought, with early Islamic sources always lurking in the background. As the Greek heritage "had aroused the great age of Arabic science and philosophy, so now it would excite the European mind and inquiry and speculation ... would crack stone after stone of that majestic edifice to bring this collapse of the medieval system in the fourteenth century, and the beginnings of modern philosophy in the ardor of the Renaissance."[78] The results were monumental in Western history. Harold Nebelsick puts it rather succintly. He discusses the achievements of the Arab-Islamic scholars and how they "appropriated, appreciated and preserved Greek classical learning and built upon it,"[79] and "thus, laid the foundations for a quite unprecedented revival of learning in Europe."[80] And, "The results were the Renaissance in the thirteenth century, the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, and eventually the rise of modern science in the seventeenth."[81] Even in our own time, the contributions of those scholars, in the world of Islam and in the Christian West, represent the source of the most beneficent form of intellectual enlightenment.[82]

IV. SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSMISSION

The more critical question for us now is how this reservoir of Arab-Islamic knowledge, original and that built upon the Greek heritage, became available to Latin-Europe and which constituted the intellectual "roots" for Haskins' Medieval Renaissance as well as the subsequent Italian Renaissance? Before proceeding to this task, some relevant remarks are in order.

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[74] Sarton, II-2, 914.
[75] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith*, Vol. 4, 913, 954.
[76] See Walter Libby, *An Introduction to the History of Science* (New York:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 55.
[77] Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and the Medieval West* (London: Longman Group, 175-I), 107.
[78] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Faith*, Vol. 4, 913.
[79] Harold Nebelsick, *The Renaissance, The Reformation an d the Rise of Science* (Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T,Clark, 1992), 5.
[80] Ibid., ix.
[81] Ibid., 9.
[82] Majid Fakhri, *Averroes, Aquinas, and the rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe*, 7.

The late George Sarton, in his book, *A Guide to the History of Science* (1952) has a fascinating chapter entitled, "The Tradition of Ancient and Medieval Science." Like Haskins, he is critical of "men of science whose retrospective insight does not go much deeper than the last century..." and who have "no idea of the vicissitudes of tradition." And he continues, "in order to understand the true meaning of scientific tradition and its value one has to look backward more deeply..."[83]Then, overwhelmed by the contributions of the Arab-Islamic "giants" and their absorption and subsequent transmission of Greek classics, he emphasizes "the study of Arabic as the most promising method to increase our knowledge of Greek science."[84] Elsewhere, he talks in terms of the "Greek miracle" and the "miracle of Arabic science," and emphasizes the "birth of Islam as one of the most fruitful events in the history of mankind."[85] As another scholar suggests, this "eastern impulse...the Arab intervention literally saved Greek knowledge from being destroyed, added to that knowledge, and handed it on a silver platter to Western Christendom."[86]

Then, Sarton presents a graphical sketch of interconnecting lines, representing "history of traditions"– Greek, Egyptian, Babylonian, Iranian, and Indian, merging into the intermediate Arabic tradition. However, he asserts that "in spite of occasional contacts, Hindu culture, and even more so the Chinese culture, remained exotic, while the Arabic culture was inextricably mixed with the Latin one. When we try to explain our own culture we may leave out almost completely Hindu and Chinese developments, but we cannot leave out the Arabic ones without spoiling the whole story and making it unintelligible...The Arabic story helps us to understand our own because it is an intrinsic part of it".[87] The "roots" of Western intellectual development, he insists, lie in the Arab-Islamic tradition, which was "from the 9th to the 11th century, the outstanding stream, and remained until the 14th century one of the largest streams of medieval thought."[88] "The Arabs were standing on the shoulders of their Greek forerunners, just as the Americans are standing on the shoulders of their European ones. There is nothing wrong in that."[89] Indeed, the canvas of intellectual contours, extending over centuries, knows no geographic or cultural boundaries, as Sarton would argue. "... And if we have enough intelligence and grace we feel that we are like dwarfs standing upon the shoulders of giants." And several of the "giants of medieval times belonged to the Arab culture." Then, he enumerates the names of several ninth-twelfth century Arab "giants" and adds, the list "could be greatly extended."[90] Sarton's sentiments are echoed by many others; for example, "No historical student of the culture of Western Europe can ever reconstruct the intellectual values of the later Middle Ages unless he possesses a vivid awareness of Islam looming in the background.[91]

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[83] George Sarton, *A Guide to the History of Science* (Waltham, Mass: Chronica Botanica Press, 1952), 17-l8.
[84] Ibid., 20.
[85] George Sarton, *The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East, Library of Congress Lecture* (March 1950). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 15 and 17.
[86] Eugene Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World,*, 67.
[87] George Sarton, *A Guide to the History of Science*, 27-30; also see Thomas Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988); Joseph McCabe, *The Splendor of Moorish Spain* (London: Watts and Company, 1975); R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages (*New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959); R. W. Southern,*Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963) and others
[88] G eorge Sarton, *A Guide to the History of Science*, 27.
[89] Ibid., 28.
[90] Ibid., 28.
[91] Pierce Butler, "Fifteenth Century of Arabic Authors in Latin Translation, "in *The McDonald Presentation* Vol., (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, Inc., 1933), 63.

As to transmission of knowledge, it might be noted that during any historical epoch the dominant global civilization tends to have its own almost natural, direct and indirect, cultural influences and pressures across its borders, as does the West (identified with the U.S.) presently and as did the Islamic civilization during its "golden age." Gomez mentions the "undeniable" fact of a "flourishing Arab civilization...and a European culture, whose pioneers openly confessed Arab superiority. The influence of the one on the other seems unavoidable...and far more wide than had been suspected."[92]

We can identify several sources of "knowledge transfer" that was critical to "European Awakening," just as the recovery of the "Greek miracle" was critical to the "Arab-Islamic Awakening."[93] It might be noted that this "transfer" is quite parallel to what we observe today, from the West to the East, including the Islamic world, except that the earlier "knowledge reservoir," while built upon the Greek heritage, was "foundational," original, far diverse and the transfer process much longer in duration. Briefly we explain the following seven sources: travels, translations, oral tradition, trade and commerce, cultural diffusion, and perhaps most important, the Crusades, as well as some miscellaneous factors:

(1) **Travels:** During the 11th and early 12th centuries, several Latin-European scholastics traveled extensively to Arab-Islamic countries—to prosletyze and to learn; and they were especially successful in the latter. They learned Arabic, studied the works of Arab scholars, and brought back new knowledge. Among scores of such travelers, one was an eminent Englishman, Adelard of Bath, identified as "the pioneer student of Arabic science and philosophy in the twelfth century."[94] He goes out of his way to acknowledge methods of rational investigation to Arabs.[95]

During this period, "many students from Italy, Spain and southern France attended Muslim '*madrassas*' in order to study mathematics, philosophy, medicine, cosmography, and other subjects, and in due course became candidates for professorships in the first Western universities established after the pattern of Muslim seminaries." [96] "All they had to do was cross the Pyrenees, swarm into the Muslim places of learning, take the volumes from their shelves, blow off the dust, and settle down to study Arabic ... the Islamic legacy proved ready and waiting just when it was needed the most."[97]

And what about the intellectual inclinations of these "foreign" students? Latin-European priests were quite concerned; Alvaro, a Cordovan bishop lamented in the 9th century, all the young Christians who distinguish themselves by their talent, know the language and literature of the Arabs, read and study passionately the Arab books, and everywhere proclaim with a loud voice how admirable is that literature. And Alvaro had another anxiety; many of these students, he says, studied the Mohammadan theologians and

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[92] Eusebio Gomez, "Muslim Theology in its Bearing on Scholasticism," *Clergy Review* 6 (1933): 102, 105.
[93] see George Makdisi, "Interaction between Islam and the West." *Revue des studes Islamique*. 44 (1976):287-309.
[94] Charles H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, 20.
[95] Norman Daniel, *The Arabs and the Mideaval West*, 168.
[96] M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosphy*, 1367; also see Toby E. Huff, *The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Mehdi Nakosteen, *History of Islamic Origins of Western Education, A.D. 800-1350* (Boulder, Col.: University of Colorado Press, 1964) and others.
[97] Thomas Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science*, 93.

philosophers, but not always, he adds, with a view to refuting them.[98] He also complained about their command of the Arabic language and their inability to write letters in Latin.

Further, based on the knowledge brought back by these students and other travelers, halls of new learning – patterned after their observations from the Islamic world (like many post-war colleges and universities in less-developed countries, patterned after U.S. institutions of learning) were established in numerous European cities, e.g., Naples, Salamanca, Oxford, Montepeller, Paris, and others; and several of these were specifically established to learn and assimilate Arab-Islamic scholarship. Further, the Council of Vienne (1311) established several schools of oriental languages, at the request of Raymond Lull (1232-1315). Lull had traveled widely in the Arab world, knew Arabic, and also wrote several works, with the objective of engaging in "missionary work among Saracens and Jews."[99] It was "in the 12th century Europe discovered the wealth of Spain. Scholars descended upon Toledo, Cordoba, and Sicily and a flood of new learning poured up over Pyrenees to revolutionize the intellectual life of adolescent North"[100]; and "Sicily and the Italian south, still filled with Arabian traces today, were a major gateway to Islamic civilization."[101]Haskins devoted his *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (1924) "to study the first Christian scholars who went to the Moslem schools in Spain, and translated Arabic works on science entered Europe"[102]; and "the pioneers of the new learning turned chiefly to Spain, and the Arabs of Spain represented the primary source for the new learning of Western Europe."[103]

(2) **Translations**: From about the 10th through the 13th centuries and beyond, there were translations en mass of Arab-Islamic scholarship into Latin. "The stream whereby the riches of Islamic thought were poured into the Christian West was by translations from Arabic into Latin."[104] This second "age of translations," much longer than the first (which relates to the Arabic translations of the Greek heritage during the 9th-10th centuries, took place in Spain, Sicily, Italy, and France.[105] Some prominent "scholar-translators" were Constantine the African, Herman the German, Dominic Gundisilavi, John of Seville, Plato of Trivoli, William of Luna, Alfred of Sareshel, Adelard of Bath, and perhaps most important, Gerard of Cremona, and others. As to this source of transmission, Gerard—later to become Pope Sylvester—attributed "Europe's progressiveness to a large extent in a wise gathering of the fruits of Muslim culture."[106]

Many of these translators could read and write Arabic, including the Franciscan monk, Roger Bacon (1214-1294), who, like Adelard of Bath and others, often acknowledged his debt to his Arab precursors; he would say, philosophy is the special province of the

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[98] Robert Briffault, *The Making of Humnaity,* 198, 217.
[99] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization, The Age of Faith* Vol. 4, 979.
[100] Ibid., 909.
[101] Thomas Goldstein, *Dawn of Modern Science,* 111.
[102] Joseph McCabe, *The Splendor of Moorish Spain,* 184.
[103] Charles H. Haskins, *Studies in the Medieval Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1924), 4-5.
[104] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization, The Age of Faith* vol. 4, 910.
[105] Eugene A. Myers, *Arabic Thought and the Western World;* Charles H. Haskins, "Science at the Court of Emperor Frederick II." *American History Review* 27.4 (July, 1922): 669-694; Aziz Ahmad, *A History of Islamic Sicily* (Edinburgh, U. K.: Edinburgh University Press, 1975); M. I. Finley, Denis M. Smith and Christopher Dugan (Editors). *A History of Sicily* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1967); Abulafia, David. *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London: The Penguin Press, 1988); and others.
[106] Sarton, II, 279.

unbelievers (Saracens); we have it all from them[107]; Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas mentor, was also known to have similar views. And, "Roger Bacon was no more than one of the apostles of Muslim science and method to Christian Europe; and he never wearied of declaring that knowledge of Arabic and Arabian science was for his contemporaries the only way to true knowledge."[108] These "scholars from Europe were desperate to make all known scientific and technical books available in translation...and they produced Latin translations of not only of Greek works but also of original works by Arab scholars...."[109] Moreover, "The truth is that during the 12th century hundreds of students, Jewish and Christian, were busy translating Arabic scientific treatises, and Christian seekers of wisdom went from every country in Europe to study in Spain."[110]. Indeed, such contacts persuade Gordon Leff to suggest that 13th century was the "century of synthesis" and "Intellectually, the difference between 12th and 13th century was isolation from the Islamic world and contact with it."[111] Further, during 14th and 15th centuries, the European scholastics and others were also indirectly influenced by the writings of their European predecessors and contemporaries whose discourses had assimilated Arab scholarship.[112] Clearly, those influences reached numerous European scholars even beyond the 15th century.

And it deserves to be noted that while translations and other sources were engaged in providing the "roots" of European civilization, some in Islamic Spain were concerned about plagiarism, for an Andulisian Moslem of the late eleventh century, Ibn Abdun, alludes to the translating activity going on in Spain with a warning addressed to the faithful: you must not sell books of science to Jews and Christians ... because it happens that they translate these scientific books and attribute them to their own people and to their bishops, when they are indeed Moslem works.[113] Briffault suggests something similar concerning Arabic discoveries and inventions, for "discussions as to who are the originator of the experimental method, like the fostering of every Arabic discovery or invention on the first European who happens to mention it, such as the invention of the compass to a fabulous Flavio Gioji of Analfi, of alcohol to Arnold of Villeneuve, of lenses and gunpowder to Bacon or Schwartz, are part of the colossal misrepresentation of the origins of European civilization. [114]

(3) **Oral Tradition**: A third important link was through the oral tradition—something for which documentation is not as readily possible. While tracing such links, Chejne argues that "Al-Andalus was a fertile ground for cultural interaction and a natural link between Arabic, medieval Spanish, and European thought; also the process of transmission, particularly oral transmission, was an important factor, and that this is proven by internal

[107] Quoted by R. W. *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, 59.
[108] Robert Briffault, *The Making of Humnaity,* 201.
[109] Jean Gimpel, *The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), 175,178.
[110] Joseph McCabe, *The Splendor of Moorish Spain,* 243.
[111] Gordon Leff, *Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham* (Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, Inc. 1958), 141.
[112] A. C. Crombie, Medieval *and Early Modern Science* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963), 30.
[113] Marie-Therese d'Alverny, "Translations and Translators," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*. Edited by Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 440.
[114] Robert Briffault, *The Making of Humanity,* 201.

literary evidence in both Arabic and Western materials."[115]Further, Al-Andalus provided a "cultural environment in which people of different religions and ethnic backgrounds lived together for centuries. They were bound by geographical proximity, uninterrupted contact through marriage, conversion, commerce, and travel, all of which are conducive to intellectual interaction and borrowing. It was a melting pot and a laboratory, and it brought East and West much closer together."[116] And after the reconquest, "the Spanish Christians along with their supporters from abroad, came into immediate contact with Muslims and Arabized Jews and Christians, who entered the service of their new masters in the following capacities: administrators, tax-collectors, advisers, interpreters, and even as military commanders. Their role in the transmission of ideas, within and outside Spain was enormous."[117] Further, "oral transmission (was) achieved by a long and permanent contact between Muslims and Christians ... bilingualism in Spain was common. Eight or more centuries of such an intimate contact is, in itself, quite persuasive an argument for a cultural interaction and continuity ... It is from this vantage point that more weight should be given to oral transmission, which often extended well beyond the frontiers of Spain."[118]

In somewhat the same context, though the point is also relevant to other avenues of transmission, Hoyt suggests that "Because of the nearness to Europe – that mingling of languages beneath the veneer of Arabic and that contact of the Western Arabs with Europeans – there came a transmission of the culture of Islam to the West. It might not have been possible under any other circumstances."[119] And in discussing such influences, Gomez says, political influence was still more noticeable. The reigning house of Argon and Castile became allied by marriage with families of Moorish Kings. Moslem fashions and habits were introduced in every department of private life.[120]

(4) **Trade and Commerce**: Another channel through which ideas flowed to Europe was extensive trade and commercial activities before, during and after the Crusades. Several writers have shown how trade was carried on between the Arab world through Russia to Poland, the shores of Baltic seas, to Scandinavia, to north-central Europe and even Iceland.[121] With trade accompanied the diffusion of business practices common in the Islamic world, incentives for economic gain and improvement, as well as desire to own the fruits of one's labor. "Arab money was in use in the Christian kingdoms of the north, which

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[115] Anwar Chejne, "The Role of Al-Andalus in the Movement of Ideas Between Islam and the West, " in *Islam and the West: Aspects of Intercultural Relations*. Edited by Khalil I. Semaan, (Albany, N.Y.: University of New York Press, 1980), 111.

[116] Anwar Chejne, "The Role of Al-Andalus in the Movement of Ideas between Islam and the West," in *Islam and the West: Aspects of Intercultural Relations*, 113; also see Geoarge Sarton, *The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East. Library of Congress Lecture (March 1990)*,13.

[117] Anwar Chejne, "The Role of Al-Andalus in the Movement of Ideas between Islam and the West," 117-118.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Edwin P. Hoyt, *Arab Sciences: Discoveries and Contributions* (New York: Thomas Nelson, Inc., Publishers, 1975), 109.

[120] Eusebio Gomez, "Muslim Theology in its Bearing on Scholasticism," 102.

[121] see M. A. Cook, "Economic Developments," in *The Legacy of Islam*, 2nd Edition. Edited by Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1974); John W. Draper, *A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*, 2 Volumes, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1876 and 1904); Herbert Heaton, *Economic History of Europe*, Revised Edition (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1948); Phillip K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943) for example.

for nearly four hundred years had no coinage other than Arabic or French."[122] Further, in addition to coins, numerous techniques and methods of commerce, as well as the spirit of enterprise and adventure, spread to Europe.[123] "Muslim writers of this period do tend to be more sympathetic to mercantile activity than those of Christian Europe... much of early Islamic literature was in fact written in a mercantile environment."[124] The spirit of enterprise was further nurtured by Arab-Islamic scholars for whom the Islamic Scriptures mandated economic pursuits as part of the "calling."[125] Factories were established to produce silk and textiles, as well as other goods. "In Spain, they were in Almeria, Murcia, Seville, Granada, and Malaga...Even in Sicily, where the Arabs ruled for a long time, the tradition of state factories was preserved and in Palermo the *regium ergasterium* produced finely woven silk down to the thirteenth century."[126]

Relatedly, there is the well-known but controversial "Pirenne thesis" (proposed by the celebrated Belgian historian, Henri Pirenne, 1862-1935), which was based "upon the extent and nature of trade in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe from the fifth to the ninth centuries."[127] Pirenne argued that "it was the impact of Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries which, by destroying the unity of the Mediterranean, ended the Roman world and led to a strikingly different civilization in the Carolingian era."[128] Pirenne was most emphatic: "Without Islam the Frankish Empire would probably never have existed and Charlemagne, without Mohamet, would be inconceivable."[129] This thesis attributed a central role to Islam in European evolution, something that was not viewed favorably by historians, and subsequently, almost by consensus it seems, the Pirenne "heresy" has since been denigrated.

As to this source of transmission, while recognizing how ideas flow with trade and commerce, Haskins cautions us, however, concerning the subtlety of such influences. He says, "such results of trade are likely to be intangible and to have few immediate traces…If the intercourse of the Mohammadan East is mainly concerned with the wares of commerce, we must remember that it has been impossible to separate the interchange of wares from the interchange of knowledge and ideas." [130]

(5) **Diffusion of Institutions**: Another source of transmission was through cultural diffusion of institutions and practices into European societies, as trading and commercial links developed. Udovitch reports his discovery of a 15th century *commenda* ("*mudharibah*" in Arabic, a written contract whereby one partner provides financing, the other manages the business; both share risk and profit as agreed) between a Venetian and an Arab merchant in

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[122] Phillip K. Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History*, 144.
[123] M. A. Cook, "Economic Developments," in *The Legacy of Islam*, 2nd Edition. Edited by Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth, 219; also see Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History* especially chapter 11.
[124] M. A. Cook, "Economic Developments," in *The Legacy of Islam*, 2nd Edition. Edited by Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth, 226.
[125] See S. M. Ghazanfar, "Capitalistic Tradition in Early Islamic Civilization," *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* (Athens, Greece) 18, (2009): 139-157.
[126] Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam." *Journal of Economic History*. 29 (1969):87.
[127] Alfred F. Havighurst, Alfred F. (Editor). *The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism and Revision* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Company, 1969), viii.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Quoted by Havighurst in *The Pirenne Thesis: Analysis, Criticism and Revision* , iii.
[130] Charles H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*, 64.

Alexandria. The tradition of the *commenda* goes back to the days of the Prophet *SAW.*[131] Thus, the *commenda* and other partnership contracts were indigenous to the Arab-Islamic world and spread to Latin Europe through contacts and writings of Arab-Islamic scholars and jurists. Similarly, the emergence of various other instruments and institutions facilitated the development of commerce and trade in Europe, such as bills of exchange (*siftajah),* letter of credit (*hawala*), specialized trading centers (*funduq),* and an early private bank (*ma'una*).[132] "Of great significance for the medieval capitalistic trade of Islam was the establishment of the *funduqs*, specialized large-scale commercial institutions and markets which developed into virtual stock exchanges"[133] Further, Kramers traces the emergence of a debt instrument and mentions "the Arabic word *sakk*, from which the modern word cheque has been derived." He also traces the Arabic origin of several other commercial terms and discusses the "manifold ways in which commercial relations led to close cooperation between Muslims and Christians."[134] The origins of banking, among Muslims and Jews, is traced by one scholar in early medieval Islam, the term for early bankers being *jahbadh*, or "a money expert, experienced in most intricate affairs, very well versed in matters of cash."[135]

Further, given their worldwide trading links, the merchants of early Islamic world "became indispensable middlemen because of their contact with the West–either through the Mediterranean or the Baltic–and also the Far East."[136]And, "everywhere that Islam entered, it activated business life, fostered an increasing exchange of goods, and played an important part in the development of credit."[137] And, according to Briffault, "the English fiscal system, like the name it bears today–the Exchequer–was derived from Muslim Sicily."[138] Relatedly, and quite significantly, the prolonged contacts with the much advanced cultural environment of the Islamic world induced a powerful "demonstration effect" to its spheres of European contacts whereby not only commercial-technical knowledge spread, but also the tastes for a variety of consumer goods common in the Islamic regions.[139]

In the same general context, one prominent economic historian traces the evolution of 15th-century European Renaissance and, commenting on the 'disintegration of Thomistic reasoning,' he mentions two significant streams emanating from the Arab-Islamic world. Thus, "one stream originating in Italian cities, which in the wake of Crusades had established relations with the traders of the Near East and had adopted various institutions and processes which were at variance with the rigid patterns of the medieval social and economic organization. The other, far more important, stream started within the body of the

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[131] Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam," 91.
[132] see Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam," *Journal of Economic History*. 29 (1969): 79-96; J. H. Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," in *The Legacy of Islam*. Edited by Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume, (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1931)
[133] Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam," 85.
[134] J. H. Kramers, "Geography and Commerce," in *The Legacy of Islam*, 102.
[135] Walter Fischel, "The Origins of Banking in Medieval Islam: A Contribution to the Economic History of Jews in Baghdad in the Tenth Century," *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*. 3: (1933):341; also See S. M. Ghazanfar, "Capitalistic Tradition in Early Islamic Civilization," Journal *of Oriental and African Studies* (Athens, Greece) 18, (2009): 139-157.
[136] Subhi Y. Labib, "Capitalism in Medieval Islam, "80.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Robert Briffault, *The Making of the Humanity*, 212; Arabic equivalent word is "*Qaid*"
[139] See M. A. Cook, "Economic Developments," in *The Legacy of Islam*, 219; also see Hitti, *The Arabs: A Short History*.

Scholastic Theologians, who derived their intellectual armory from the works of the Arabian philosophers."[140]

(6) **The Crusades**: Another major source of transmission–one that runs about parallel with others—has to be the Crusades that lasted about two centuries, from 1095 to 1292. The Crusades have been interpreted variously:

(i) a holy war directed by God through His Vicar on earth, the Holy Pontiff;

(ii) an outburst of fanaticism and bigotry, as viewed by rationalist philosophers;

(iii) a migratory movement from West to East in search of more opulent terrain; and

(iv) Europe's eastward expansion, a form of colonization and imperialism, necessitated by the pressures of growing population and meager resources. "In the century under review French and Spanish feudal barons extended their domains south of the Pyrenees at the expense of the Moslems...after all the [Crusades represented the] most influential expansionary movement of the 12th century."[141]Conscious of such pressures, "Pope Urban II in his address of [November 27th] 1095 AD, referred to Palestine as a land where rivers of milk and honey flowed freely."[142] Regardless, however, their central importance, as noted earlier, is "not because they facilitated cultural interchange (as virtually all historians now agree they did not), but because they helped to shape European attitudes, feelings and values. The achievements of the twelfth century renaissance owe a great deal to the Crusades...."[143] As for the influences through "cultural interchange," a dissenting perspective becomes evident from Atiya and others."[144]

The Crusades brought East and West more closely together, notwithstanding the violent fanaticism they engendered. The Crusaders who settled in the Levant were in daily contacts with the Arabs upon whom they depended for their needs of every-day life. Furthermore, Arabs and Franks were drawn together at popular gatherings, festivals, tournaments, and other public events. Fanaticism was softened and gave room to mutual tolerance and appreciation. The difference between the resident

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[140] Karl Pribram, *A History of Economic Reasoning* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 21.

[141] Hilmer C. Krueger, "Economic Aspects of Expansionary Europe," in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society,* Edited by Marshall Claggett, Gaines Post and Robert Reynolds, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Madison Press, 1961), 59-60; also see Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[142] Aziz S. Atiya, *Crusades, Commerce and Culture* (Bloomington, Ind. Indiana Press, 1965), 18; also see Aziz S. Atiya, Atiya, "The Crusades: Old Ideas and New Conceptions," *Journal of World History* 2 (1954):470-7; Hilmer C. Krueger, Hilmer C. "Economic Aspects of Expansionary Europe," in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*.

[143] Stephen C. Ferruolo, "The Twelfth Century Renaissance," in *Renaissances Before the Renaissance: Cultural Revival of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, 136.

[144] See Aziz S. Atiya, *Crusades, Commerce and Culture* (Bloomington, Ind. Indiana Press, 1965), 18; also see Aziz S. Atiya, Atiya, "The Crusades: Old Ideas and New Conceptions." *Journal of World History* 2 (1954):470-7; also Philip K. Hitti, *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah Ibn-Munqidh.* Translated from Original. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929); Francisco Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969); Nejla Izzedin, *The Arab World: Past, Present, Future* (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1953); Amin Maalouf, *The Crusades through Arab Eyes* (Translated by Jon Rothschild). (New York: Schocken Books, 1985); and others.

Crusaders and new arrivals from Europe in their attitude toward the Muslims is noted in contemporary Arab sources, as for example, *The Memoirs of Usamah Ibn Munqidh*.[145]

Moreover, the Crusaders found in the Levant a culture in most respects superior to their own. Life on the whole was richer, fulfilling, and more varied. The land produced a rich variety of crops and fruits, many unknown to the Europeans. Markets and bazaars were stacked with all manner of goods, some imported from distant lands. The influence of contacts through the Crusades is evident in the public steam baths which began to make their appearance in Europe, and the foundation of hospitals on the patterns of those established by the Orders of the Holy Land. The Crusaders were "the strongest influence on the development of medieval trade and industry.[146]

They stimulated the activities of the great commercial city-states of Italy: Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and others. They promoted "the capitalistic cycle of capital, investment, profit, and reinvestment of profit for further profit and capital and initiated a money economy which threatened and certainly modified the old land economy of Western Europe."[147] And, above all, "the Crusades stimulated the intellectual life of Europe and its literary output by broadening the horizons of knowledge and imagination; they … were an inspiration to artists, poets, and singers for many generations."[148]

(7) **Miscellaneous Factors:** It should be clear that the various sources of transmission that we have discussed operated more or less simultaneously. However, the "turning point" to Europe's Enlightenment through Arabic-Islamic knowledge involved numerous other factors as well. We can note five such relatively minor factors:

(i) **Monasteries:** These were the great literary centers, having libraries with collections of translated works; as oldest type of intellectual centers, "for centuries, monasteries stood like scattered islands in an area of ignorance.[149]

(ii) C**athedral Chapter Schools:** During the 11th and 12th centuries, the cathedral schools were at their peak, often drawing excellent teachers who had traveled to Spain and Sicily and brought back Arab-Islamic knowledge to impart to their students. Alongside the monastery as a center of culture was the cathedral school…to them was brought most of the science and philosophy recovered by the West from the Byzantines and the Saracens.[150]

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[145] Nejla Izzedin, *The Arab World: Past, Present, Future*, 41.

[146] Hilmer C. Krueger, "Economic Aspects of Expansionary Europe," in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, 72.

[147] Ibid., 73.

[148] Nejla Izzedin, *The Arab World: Past, Present, Future*, 42.

[149] Frederick B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages, AD 200-1500: An Historical Survey* (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 1953), 229.

[150] Frederick B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages, AD 200-1500: An Historical Survey*, 229; also see Josiah C. Russell, *Twelfth Century Studies,* (New York: AMS Press, 1978); Josiah C. Russell, "Hereford and Arabian Science in England about 1175-1200," *ISIS.* 18:1 (July, 1932) 14-25; Mary C. Welborn, "Lotharingia as a Center of Arabic Scientific Influence in the Eleventh Century," *ISIS.* 16 (1931):188-99; Diane P. Thompson, "Paradigm Lost: Western Civilization and the Orient Unexpressed," *Northern Virginia Review*, no.10 (Fall, 1995): 5-8; James W. Thompson, "The Introduction of Arabian Science into Lorraine in the Tenth Century," *ISIS.* 38:12 (May, 1929.) 184-193.

(iii) **Royal Courts:** These courts often included men of learning. The Norman court of Palermo (Sicily), especially under Emperors Roger II and Frederick II a century later--was as brilliant and refined a center of Arab learning as any in the Middle East or in Spain. And Frederick II used to send for Arab savants and translators to come to his court…where Arabic was not only one of the four official languages but the monarch's native language.[151] And in his court, the Greek element is of little significance … on the other hand, Arabic influence was stronger...[152] "Arabic was as widely spoken as any other language in some of the courts of Christian Kings, and their doctors, counselors, and courtiers were often Arabs."[153]

(iv) M**issionarie:** Islamic culture was known in Europe partly through the commercial contacts, sometimes through the travels of Christian missionaries in the East …"[154]; and "the Mendicant Orders, Franciscan Gray Friars, Dominican and Preaching Brothers sent forth as her representatives, contributed in no small degree to these triumphs in natural history"[155]; his reference is to missionary contacts with the "Saracens;" and

(v) C**ities:** As Henri Pirenne had argued, many European cities and towns, especially in South France and Italy, originated in the footsteps of trade … and this trade chiefly depended upon close encounters with the Mediterranean Arab-Islamic world; 'faubourg', communities of merchants outside the castle walls of cities, evolved in this environment. And the economic factors and forces existent and operative in the expansion of the city and plains were significantly present in the more extensive, overseas countries into the Near East. Similarly, these economic forces were at work for a long time before the 12th century.[156]

V. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Given the broad nature of our topic, this paper has covered several interrelated themes. First, I commented on the "lost paradigm" of Western literary history, replete with "gaps" in just about every field of knowledge, with little or no acknowledgment of the critical role of the Islamic civilization. Secondly, after noting the nature and impact of the influence of Islamic scholarship, I discussed the influence of a few prominent Islamic scholars—Ibn Rushd's role a bit more in detail, for his works, once transmitted and assimilated, generated unprecedented upheaval—and transformation--in Latin-European social thought. This was followed by coverage of the various sources through which knowledge from the early Islamic world transmitted to the Latin-West. Indeed, the Western civilization is the product of Judeo-Christian-and-Islamic heritage, with Greeks in the background—a very mixed ancestry, indeed.

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[151] Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 74-75.
[152] Charles H. Haskins, "Science at the Court of Emperor Frederick II," *American History Review* 27.4 (July, 1922): 671.
[153] Eusebio Gomez, "Muslim Theology in its Bearing on Scholasticism," 102.
[154] Jean Sauvaget, (Editor). *Introduction to the History of the Muslim East: A Bibliographic Guide.* 2nd Edition (recast by Claude Cahen) (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1965), 228.
[155] Paul Laroix, *Science and Literature in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1878 reprinted 1964), 113.
[156] Hilmer C. Krueger, "Economic Aspects of Expansionary Europe," in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, 69.

Having pursued these tasks, we can conclude with noting additional corroborative comments from three eminent medievalists:

(1) We are so accustomed to regard our culture as essentially that of the West that it is difficult for us to realize that there was an age when the most civilized region of Western Europe was the province of an alien culture (i.e., Islam)…At a time when the rest of Western Europe was just emerging from the depths of barbarism, the culture of Moslem Spain had attained complete maturity and surpassed even the civilization of the East in genius and originality of thought…All of this brilliant development of culture is completely ignored by the ordinary student of medieval European history. It is as though it were a lost world which had no more to do with the history of our past than the vanished kingdom of Atlantis.[157]

(2) George Sarton calls the Arab-Islamic impact on Europe as "the miracle of Arabic science, using the word miracle as a symbol of our inability to explain achievements which were almost incredible. There is nothing like it in the whole history of the world…Some historians have tried to belittle those immense achievements by claiming that there was nothing original in them and that the Arabs were nothing but imitators. Such a judgment is all wrong…The achievements of the Arabic-speaking people between the ninth and twelfth centuries are so great as to baffle our understanding.[158]

(3) Islam is the parent that beget and nourished European civilization…We may be sure that those who accuse Moslem scholars of lack of originality and of intellectual decadence have never read Averroes or looked into al-Ghazali, but have accepted second-hand judgments. The presence of doctrines of Islamic origins in the very citadel of Christianity, the *Summa* of Aquinas, is a sufficient refutation of the charge of lack of originality and sterility.[159]

Yet, most contemporary literary discussions of the evolution of social thought continue to reflect the persistent and stubborn Eurocentric "blind spot." Thus, for the sake of ensuring "continuity and change," as Haskins and others would want, and for the sake of doctrinal objectivity that is incumbent upon all scholars, there is this plea from an eminent Yale University scholar: Can the Western Europeans somehow overcome the great difficulty in considering the possibility that they are in some way seriously indebted to the Arab world, or that the Arabs were central to the making of medieval Europe?[160] Resistance is deep-rooted, however.

And I should add that in the post-9/11, Islamophobic environment of the West, there are well-organized forces that are nurturing this resistance even deeper and stronger than ever. Thus, the need for "the dialogue of civilizations" that I noted at the outset from Kofi Annan's 1999 speech is ever greater—the dialogue of the civilized, rather than the Hungingtonian "clash" of the uncivilized. That is the contemporary civilizational challenge, to be pursued with humility, not arrogance, by all; and there lies also the enormous potential for universal good.

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[157] Christopher Dawson, "The Origins of the Romantic Tradition," *The Criterion* 11 (1932): 230-231.
[158] George Sarton, *The Incubation of Western Culture in the Middle East. Library of Congress Lecture* (March 1950), 1951, 27, 29, 35.
[159] Alfred Guillaume, "Philosophy and Theology," in *The Legacy of Islam.* Edited by Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume, (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1931); quoted in Bertram Thomas, 190.
[160] Maria Rosa Menocal, *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History: A Forgotten Heritage*, xii-xiii.

In a more immediate sense, however, there are transformational challenges for the Islamic world. Rationalism from early Islam sparked the Latin-European exit from its Dark Ages and contributed to the making the modern West. Given the state of affairs of the contemporary Islamic world, here is a plea, shared globally by numerous Muslim scholars: Can rationalism of early Islam come full circle? Can there be a renewal of *Ijtihaad* that can launch another "Islamic Awakening," more dynamic than that of the Golden Age? Can the Islamic world move forward to the 21st century—modernizing, yet not necessarily 'westernizing,' without losing the essence of its pristine Islam? That indeed is the challenge for Muslim intellectuals. And there lies also the great potential.

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RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN ISLAM

Dr. Adnan Aslan

ABSTRACT

This paper is aimed at enumeration of some of the Quranic principles to suggest an account of 'Islamic pluralism'. The Quran accepts plurality as a natural phenomenon. Allah *SWT* states in the Quran: "O Humankind! Verily we have created you of a male and female; and we have distributed you in nations and tribes that you might know one another and recognise that, in the sight of God the most honourable of you is the most pious. Verily God is wise and all knowing" (49:13). The aim of Islam is to integrate such diversity into unity through the sacred principles of the Quran; it explains the reason and purpose for such racial and religious multiplicity.

After arriving in Medina, the Holy Prophet *SAW* introduced a new structure and value system which was connected through religion and citizenship instead of tribal links. He formed the constitution of Medina which stated the terms of relationships with Jews of Medina. The Prophet *SAW* extended the act of citizenship and co-operation to the Christians of Najran. The paper glances through Islamic history in order to identify a common official attitude of Muslim authority towards non-Muslim subjects.

Key words: Pluralism, Religious, Quran, Proposition, Medina

In this paper, I would like to first enumerate some of the Quranic principles with regard to the issue of religious pluralism as propositions, with the aim to give an account of 'Islamic pluralism'. I will formulate these propositions on the basis of Quranic verses which suggest a pluralistic attitude as against argument to those which suggest an inclusivist attitude. At the end of this presentation, I will offer an evaluation of these propositions and consider them the guidelines of an 'Islamic pluralistic account.

Proposition I: *The universality as well as the diversity of God's revelation to humankind is affirmed.*

Islam explicitly endorses the universality of God's revelation which plays a significant part in the Islamic understanding of other religions. The God of the Quran is not only the God of the Muslim people but the God of all humanity. The Quran illustrates this point by stating: 'Unto Allah belong the East and West, and whithersoever you turn, there is Allah's countenance. For Allah is All-Embracing, All-knowing'.[1]

The implication of seeing history as a ground upon which the heavenly messages are revealed is that all religions in one way or another are inter-related and therefore share a common purpose. Islam in this respect is the name of the latest version of the message which has been displayed throughout history. That is to say, one heavenly religion cannot be but an ally of another heavenly religion. Therefore, in Islam the notion of the universality of God's revelations has always played a key role in constituting an Islamic theology of religions. Hence, as a result of adopting such a

[1] Al Quran, 2:115.

belief, Muslims are able to participate in the essence and the 'religious proximity' of other traditions.

God of all mankind did not leave any nation in the dark, rather He illuminated them by sending messengers.[2] The logic of sending every nation a messenger is that people should not justify the rejection of the faith in God by arguing that they did not receive any message.[3] A logical consequence of such a line of thinking is that if a nation or community did not receive a messenger, they would not be held responsible and therefore would have to be exempted from punishment.[4] Although God sent a messenger to every nation, He did not mention all of them in the Quran.[5] Therefore Muslims received a Quranic sanction which enables them to expand an Islamic account of prophecy in such a manner that it could include those messengers who are not mentioned in the Quran, including Gautama the Buddha, the avatars of the Hindus. Although all the messengers spoke about the same reality and conveyed the same truth, the messages they delivered were not identical in their theological forms. That is simply because the message was expressed in the specific forms which should accord and make sense for the culture it was sent to. Thus, a messenger is to speak within the cultural context of the community to which the message is revealed.[6]

Proposition II: *Multiplicity of races, colours, communities and religions are regarded as the signs of God's mercy and glory exhibited through his creatures.*

Plurality in this sense is accepted as a natural phenomenon. The Quran states: "O Humankind! Verily we have created you of a male and female; and we have distributed you in nations and tribes that you might know one another and recognise that, in the sight of God the most honourable of you is the most pious. Verily God is wise and all knowing."[7] But what Islam aims to do is to integrate such diversity into unity through the sacred principles of the Quran; it explains the reason and purpose for such racial and religious multiplicity. God created such religious racial and other forms of diversity in order to distinguish those who can appreciate the majesty of God and see His purpose from those who ignore the signs of God as such. Otherwise God could have created only one nation.[8]

One of the prime tasks of Islam is to eliminate discrimination based upon race or colour by proposing a single Islamic brotherhood which aims to unite all the different people under one faith. It has partly achieved this during its history. Beyond this, Islam even managed to establish a unity among all the subjects including the Christians and Jews that it governed. Furthermore, one might even claim that diversity, whether religious or racial, is considered in the Quran as the

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2 The Quran states: "To every nation (was sent) a messenger (10:47); and verily we have raised in every nation a messenger, (proclaiming) serve Allah and shun false gods (16:36); there is not a nation but a warner had paseth among them (35:24)".

3 Again it is stated: "(We sent) messengers of good cheer and warning that mankind might have no arguments against Allah after the messengers (4:165)".

4 The Quran says: "We never punish until we sent a messenger (17:15)".

5 It says: "Verily we sent messengers before you, among them those of whom we have told you, and some of whom we have not told you. (40:78)".

6 The Quran endorses this view: "We sent not a messenger except in the language of his own people in order to make things clear to them (14:4)".

7 Al Quran, 49:13.

8 The Quran simply states this point: "If your Lord had so willed, he could have made mankind one nation: but they will not cease to dispute (11:118).

means to unity. In the *Sufi* strand of Islam, a unity in this sense has already been realised. Rumi illustrates a state of unity in which he saw himself:

> What is to be done, O Muslims? for I do not recognise myself.
>
> I am neither Christian, nor Jew, nor Gabr, nor Muslim.
>
> I am not of the East, nor of the West, not of the land, nor of the sea,
>
> I am not of Nature's mint, nor of the circling heavens.
>
> I am not of earth, nor of water, nor of air, nor of fire:
>
> I am not of the empyrean, nor of the dust, nor of existence, nor of entity.
>
> I am not of India, nor of China, nor of Bulgaria, nor of Saqsin:
>
> I am not of the Kingdom of Iraq, nor of the country of Khorasan.
>
> I am not of this world, nor of the next, nor of Paradise nor of Hell;
>
> I am not of Adam, nor of Eve, nor of Eden and nor of Rizwan,
>
> My place is Placeless, my trace is Traceless;
>
> It is neither body nor soul, for I belong to the soul of the Beloved.
>
> I have put duality away. I have seen that the two worlds are one;
>
> One I seek, One I know, One I see, One I call.
>
> He is the First, He is the Last, He is the Outward, He is the Inward.[9]

Proposition III: *Every revealed religion can be named as Islam, when it is seen as 'a state of submission to God' (literally Islam).*

Expanding the term *Islam* in a manner that could envelope all other revealed religions is not something produced in order to counter the quest for a pluralistic approach. It is a Quranic endeavour which aims to show all revelations as part and parcel of God's plan. Muslims believe that *Islam* is the name of the basic mission of all prophets throughout history. Hasan Askari illustrates the point:

> *Islam* now was the quality of all those, irrespective of the religion they practice, who are humble before God's Transcendence and submit to him as their Creator and Lord. While Muslims judged others, they came under their own judgment, for now the word *Muslim* could be extended to any point in the past and any point in the future. This was the revolution which the Quran introduced into the religious history of humanity, and as such an universal revolution: now a Noah an *Abraham*, a *Moses*, a *Jesus*, a *Muhammed* are all 'Muslims'…[W]hoever among Jews and Christians and the people of other religions, surrenders to God, the One and only God, and does not explicitly and implicitly associate gods (race, religion and any other 'signs' and 'manifestations' of) with God, is a '*Muslim*'. [10]

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9 Jalalu'ddin Rumi, *Divan-i Shamsi Tabriz*, trans. R. A. Nicholson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898), 125.

10 Hasan Askari, "Within and Beyond the Experience of Religious Diversity," in *The Experience of Religious Diversity* ed. John Hick and Hasan Askari (Aldershot and Brookfield: Gower, 1985), 199.

The Quran itself promotes such a notion by stating:"Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a Christian; but he was true in faith (*hanif*) and bowed his will to Allah's, (*Muslim*) and he joined not gods with Allah"[11]; [Abraham in his prayer says] Our Lord! make us *Muslims*, bowing to your (will) and of our progeny a people *Muslim*, bowing to your (will).[12]

According to the Quran, *Islam* is not a name only given to a system of faith or religion but it is also a name of an act of surrendering to the will of God. Any thing which bows to God's will voluntarily or even involuntarily is qualified as *Muslim*. Only human beings who have the freedom of faith can go against God's will and reject *Islam*, while all other creatures affirm it.[13]

Proposition IV: *There is no compulsion in religion.*

This is one of the unique principles of the Quran which was initiated in order to regulate freedom of religious belief in Islam. The Quran reads: "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects Evil and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that never, breaks. And God hears and knows all things";[14] Say 'The Truth is from your Lord': let him who will, believe, let him who will, reject (it);[15]If it had been the Lord's Will, they would all have believed - All who are on earth! Will you then compel mankind against their will to believe![16]

Many commentators cite some events in which the Prophet *SAW* himself implemented the requirements of verse 2:256 and prohibited his companions to compel people to accept Islam. For instance, Tabari mentions that when the two Jewish tribes of Qaynuqa and Nadr were expelled from Medina, they had in their charge children of the Ansar who had been placed with Jewish families. The biological parents asked the Prophet's permission to take their children back and raise them as a Muslims, but the Prophet *SAW* said 'there is no compulsion in religion'. Tabari mentions another event which indicates how this verse worked in practice. A Muslim named Al-Husayn had two sons, who having been influenced by Christian merchants, converted to Christianity and left Medina to go to Syria with these missionary merchants. Al-Husayn pleaded with the Prophet *SAW* to pursue the convoy and bring his sons back to Islam. But the Prophet *SAW* once again said 'there is no compulsion in religion', that is let them follow the religion of their choice, even though it is not Islam.[17]

This verse itself has functioned as a law by safeguarding the freedom of religious belief throughout Islamic history.[18] It was such Quranic injunctions which have provided a rationale for

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11 Al Quran, 3:67.

12 Ibid., 2:128.

13 The Quran simply states this point: "Do they seek for other than the Religion of Allah? while all creatures in the heavens and on earth have, willingly and unwillingly bowed to his will (accepted Islam) and to Him shall they all brought back (3:83).

14 Al Quran, 2:256.

15 Ibid., 18: 29.

16 Ibid., 10: 99.

17 Muhammad bin Jarir al- Tabari, *Jami' al-Bayan an Te'wil al-Quran* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1954), vol. 5, 407- 416.

18 Vardit Rispler-Chaim compares the verse 2:256 with the other verses in the Quran that speak of the regulation of war and concludes that the verse that propagates religious tolerance was not intended in the first place. It was a *taqiyya* and initiated for a strategic purposes in order to establish the Islamic community. When the community was established it was not tolerance but military campaigns that decided the destiny of Islam. See "There is no compulsion in Religion (Quran 2,256); "Freedom of Religious Belief in the Qur'an" *The Bulletin of Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies*

the religious tolerance that has characterized Islamic history. As Lewis points out, religious persecution of the members of other faiths was almost absent; Jews and Christians under Muslim rule were not subject to exile, apostasy and death which were the choices offered to Muslims and Jews in re-conquered Spain. And also, Christians and Jews were not subject to any major territorial and occupational restrictions such as were the common lot of Jews in pre-modern Europe.[19]

It would, however, be wrong to say that Muslims consider Judaism and Christianity as authentic as Islam in leading to the truth. Like every religion and ideology, Islam considers itself superior to other religions when it presents the truth. But what makes Islam different from other religions and ideologies is that it tolerates the existence of other religions *while it is in power*. As a result of such a principle, although Islam ruled for some thousand years over Christians and Jews, it did not encourage a systematic 'islamization' of the adherents of these faiths.[20] Like any other religion, Islam aims to propagate its beliefs. But what makes it different from other religions is that it did not establish an organization or institution for its propagation. In its history, Islam did not have missionary societies or institution. The work of *da'wa* is always left to an individual effort.[21]

Proposition V: *The religion before God is Islam.*

Alongside those verses that indicate a form of 'Islamic pluralism', there are also some verses that indicate a form of Islamic exclusivism. In this context, the Quran states: "The religion before God is Islam (submission to His Will);[22] If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah) never will it be accepted of him; in the hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (All spiritual good).[23]

But the interesting thing here is that the verses that point to an exclusivist attitude in Islam are ambiguous and open to interpretation; they can be interpreted from the perspective of an 'Islamic pluralism' as well as that of an Islamic exclusivism. These verses can be interpreted as stating that Islam means *istislam*, i. e., submission to the Will of Allah; it is not meant to point to the specific Quranic revelation. For instance, Sheikh al-Maraghi interprets Islam in the first verse as *istislam* (surrender) or *ta'a* (obedience), hence equating Islam with *iman*, religious belief in general. He also goes on to say that a true 'Muslim' is anyone who is free from all traces of paganism and

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11 (July-Dec., 1992): 19-32. In response to Rispler-Chaim, I argue that the mere existence of such a sacred injunction is sufficient to show the intention of the Quran. If Risper-Chaim really wants to bring out the actual position of Islam with regard to religious tolerance, he must compare it with historical Christianity and Judaism. No Muslim, however, claims that Islam can satisfy the requirements of the liberal values of the secular culture. But, its own history proves that Islamic power has tolerated other religions within its own realm.

19 Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 8.

20 Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, *In The Preaching of Islam: A History of Propagation of the Muslim Faith* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961); T. W. Arnold presents a historical account of the spread of Islam and concludes that Islam has expanded through persuasion and preaching rather than force and compulsion.

21 For instance, the Quran lays down the principles of propagating Islam: "Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for your Lord knows best, who have strayed from His Path, and who received guidance" (16:125).

22 Al Quran, 3:19.

23 Ibid. 3:85.

devoted in his deeds, regardless of the religious community to which he belongs or the period in which he lives.[24] Yusuf Ali, however, favours a pluralistic interpretation of these verses:

> The Muslim position is clear. The Muslim does not claim to have a religion peculiar to himself. Islam is not a sect or an ethnic religion. In its view all Religion is one, for the Truth is one. It was the religion preached by all the earlier prophets. It was the truth thought by all the inspired Books. In essence it amounts to a consciousness of the Will and Plan of Allah and a joyful submission to that Will and Plan. If anyone wants a religion other than that, he is false to his own nature, as he is false to Allah's Will and Plan. Such a one cannot expect guidance, for he has deliberately renounced guidance.[25]

Proposition VI: *Those who believe in God and the Last Day and work righteousnesly (a'mila salihan) will be saved.*

An Islamic notion of salvation cannot be equated with Buddhist or Enlightenment liberation or Christian salvation. Nor can it correspond to Hick's notion of human transformation from self-centredness to Reality-centredness. The Islamic notion of salvation is simple and uncomplicated. It believes that human beings were born into this world as a *tabula rasa*, sinless but with innate religiosity (*al-fitrah*). In addition to this, God made known His will through messengers. If one follows his or her innate religiosity and accepts the message, and works righteously, he or she will be saved in the hereafter. Anyone who did good or evil, will be rewarded or punished accordingly.[26] Contrary to what is assumed, Islam affirms that Jews, Christians and Sabians can also attain salvation. The Quran simply states: "Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, - any who believe in Allah and the Last Day and work righteously, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve;[27] Those who believe (in the Quran), those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians - any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteously - on them shall be no fear nor shall they grieve;[28] Whoever works righteously - man and woman, and has Faith, verily, to him We give a new life and life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on their reward according to the best of their actions.[29]

The question of the possibility of salvation of non-Muslims according to Islamic belief is a matter of crucial importance, not only because the Quranic eschaton might well be the only possible destiny of humankind but also because the answer to this question is the cause of the Muslim's attitude towards non-Muslims. As has become quite clear, Islam does not have a motto of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*; the exclusivism was not an official approach of Islam. It has always accepted the possibility of salvation outside its borders; it affirms the religious truth of Judaism and Christianity. Isma'il Raji al-Faruqi illustrates the point:

> The honour with which Islam regards Judaism and Christianity, their founders and scriptures, is not courtesy but acknowledgement of religious truth. Islam sees them in the world not as "other

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24 Sheikh al-Maraghi, *Tafsir al-Maraghi* (Cairo: 1962),119 quoted in Vardit Rispler-Chaim, "Freedom of Religious Belief", 24.

25 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary* (Maryland: Amana Corporation, 1989), 150.

26 The Quran says: "Then shall anyone who has done an atom's (*zarra*) weight of good see it. And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it (99:7-8)."

27 Al Quran, 2:62.

28 Ibid., 5:69.

29 Ibid., 16:97.

> views" that it has to tolerate, but as standing *de jure* as truly revealed religions from God. Moreover, their legitimate status is neither sociopolitical, nor cultural or civilizational, but religious. In this, Islam is unique. For no religion in the world has yet made belief in the truth of other religions a necessary condition of its own faith and witness.[30]

Although the Quran explicitly states that those Jews, Christians and Sabians who believe in God and the Last Day and work righteously will attain salvation, Muslim scholars generally have related salvation of the non-Muslims with the recognition of the Prophet by referring to the overall attitude of the Quran towards non-Muslims. Even if this might be the case, they still maintained that salvation has always remained possible outside the borders of Islam. Muhammad al-Ghazzali, a spokesman of Islamic orthodoxy in his *Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa* states this:

> The above concerns the Community of Muhammad - God's blessing and peace be upon him - in a special way. But I go on to say: The divine mercy will embrace many of the bygone nations, even though most of them will be exposed to the Fire either slightly, even for a moment or for an hour, or for a period of time, so that one may apply to them the expression of "the delegation of Fire". Nay more' I would say: Most of the Christians among the Byzantines [Greeks] and Turks in this time of ours will be embraced by the [same] mercy, If God the Most High wills. I mean those who are among the remote Byzantines and Turks whom the Call [to Islam] has not reached.[31]

From an Islamic point of view, what is crucial for one's salvation is not one's formal affiliation to a religion but the personal inner decision when one has been confronted with the call of the Prophet Muhammad *SAW*. But the question is this: In what circumstances can one be considered as the person who received the call of Islam. Ghazzali argues that there are three conditions under which one can be considered as a person who *has* received the Call. He maintains one can only be regarded as an unbeliever and therefore exempted from salvation i) if one has heard the Prophet's *SAW* name and description in a manner such as the Muslim has received it (al-Ghazzali says if someone is given inaccurate portrayal of the Prophet SAW as being a liar and deceitful, and believes so, he or she is not obliged to believe in the Prophet *SAW,* and therefore can be saved even though he or she did not believe him); ii) if one has also seen 'the miracle manifested in his regard' and yet has deliberately refused to consider and reflect on the issue; iii) if one has suppressed a motive for inquiry that possibly could lead to truth in the matter, or the motive arose but was not pursued.[32]

One of the distinct qualities of the Quran is that it always refrains from making a general judgment about a particular group of people. For instance, it does not say that Muslims will be saved, Christians or Jews will not; rather it 'personalizes' and directs its criticism or praise to specifically qualified people. For instance, it says those who believe in so and so and do so and so will be saved and those who do not believe so and so and do so and so will be punished. From a Quranic perspective, it is quite clear that being a Muslim by no means guaranties salvation. In addition to having faith, one not only has to be vigilant in performing good deeds but also must seek the

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30 Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, "Towards a Critical World Theology," in *Towards Islamization of Disciplines.* ed. The International Institute of Islamic Thought, (Heindon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1989), 435-436.

31 Muhammad Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, *Freedom and Fulfilment,* trans. Richard Joseph McCarty (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), 170.

32 Ibid., 172.

utmost to accomplish a perfect moral life. Even if a person has done his or her best to achieve salvation, he or she cannot and should not be certain about the end. The Prophet *SAW* himself did not behave as if he was totally confident that he would be saved. The ideal position for a Muslim in this respect is to adopt an attitude of placing himself between *khawf* (fear) and *raja* (hope). In other words, a Muslim should neither be absolutely optimistic nor be absolutely pessimistic about his or her own personal salvation. It is, I believe, this ambiguous position with regard to salvation that has been a strong motive behind the desire to accomplish a sound moral life. It was such a belief and commitment that functioned as an impulse for the desire for perfection (*kamāl*).

In classical Islamic literature, faith is defined as 'confession by tongue and assent by heart' (*al-iman iqrarun bil-lisan wa tasdiqun bil-qalb*), though confessing by tongue is not the condition of faith. This is a very interesting definition. According to this definition, it is possible to think that although a person declares that he or she is a Muslim and performs five daily prayers and all the other Islamic duties, there is still a possibility that he or she might not be Muslim in fact.[33] The opposite to this is also the case. For instance, a person because of the circumstances in which he or she lives, who declares that he or she is not Muslim and lives accordingly still has the possibility that he or she might be Muslim in his or her inner being. Vahiduddin explains what I have in mind:

> ...[W]hat counts at the deepest level in religion is the spirit of the faith not only formal affiliation. This means that even in Islam one may speak in a way of 'anonymous' Muslims in faiths other than the Islamic, of persons who breathe the spirit of Islam in truth, though officially belonging elsewhere.[34]

From an Islamic perspective, the resolution of the problem of salvation is easy and uncomplicated. Faith is an assent by the heart between God and the individual; it is *an inner act*, no one can have access to it except God. This means, at the end of the day, no one can really know who will be saved. This was the reason why the question of establishing an attitude towards other faiths has not arisen as a theological question, but a question of law, i. e., how Muslim authorities should deal with the affairs of non-Muslim subjects.

The argument I have offered so far supports the conclusion that from an Islamic point of view, it is possible to argue that those people who are outside the Islamic faith might possibly be saved if firstly they accomplish the ethical and religious requirements of their own traditions, and secondly, if when the truth is revealed to their inner being, they do not deliberately and consciously cover up – [35] that truth, because of the social and economic pressure of their environment. I also believe that it is possible to maintain such a conclusion if one takes 'the spirit of the Quran' into account.

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33 In Islamic literature there is another category, called *munafiqun*. These people, although they were not Muslim in their heart, pretended to be Muslim in their daily affairs. In his time, the Prophet SAW himself was informed about these people by revelation. He did not publicly identity them, but made them known to some of his close friends.

34 Syed Vahiduddin, "Islam and Diversity of Religions," *Islam Christian and Muslim Relations* 1 (No.1 1990): 9.

35 It is interesting to note that kafir which is generally translated in English as infidel in Islamic literature, literally means the person who covers. *Kafir* means also farmer or peasant because he or she plants the seed and covers it with soil. In a sense it indicates that an infidel is a person who knows the truth but consciously covers it up.

HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THE "PLURALIST" PRINCIPLES

Having drawn up a theoretical framework for a plausible 'Islamic pluralism', I would like to offer a brief historical survey to exhibit the practical implementation of those theoretical propositions. Let me start with the time of the Holy Prophet *SAW* himself. When the Prophet *SAW* arrived in Medina, he demolished the current structure of that society and introduced a new structure. Instead of tribal relations and tribal values, he established a relation and value system which connects people through religion and citizenship. Immediately after he settled in Medina, the Prophet *SAW* formed a constitution, a treaty which regulated the affairs of all the inhabitants of Medina, including the Jews.[36] The document itself is a concrete example of how the principles of 'Islamic Pluralism' worked in practice. It begins with this introduction:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

> "This is a writing of Muhammad, the prophet between the believers and Muslims of the Quraysh and Yathrib and those who follow them and attached to them and who crusade (*jahadu*) along with them."[37]

The document contains 47 articles. I will only cite those related to our topics. They are as follows:

Article I: They are a single community (*ummah*) distinct from (other) people.

Article 16: Whoever of the Jews follows us has the (same) help and support (*nasr, iswah*) (as the believers), so long as they are not wronged (by him) and he does not help (others) against them.

Article 25: The Jews of *Banu 'Awf* are a community (*ummah*) along with the believers. To the Jews their religion (*din*) and to the Muslims their religion. (This applies) both to their clients and to themselves, with the exception of anyone who has done wrong or acted treacherously; he brings evil on himself and on his household. [Articles 26 to 31 repeat this rule for six other Jewish tribes of Medina at that time.]

Article 37: It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Muslims to bear their expenses. Between them (that is to one another) there is help (*nasr*) against whoever wars against the people of this document. *Between them is sincere friendship and honourable dealing, not treachery*. A man is not guilty of treachery through (the act of) his confederate. There is help for the person wronged.[38] (The italics are mine.)

The Prophet SAW extended the act of citizenship and co-operation to the Christians of Najran. His letter to the inhabitants of Najran can give us an idea about the relation between the Prophet of Islam and the Christians of that time. It reads:

> "This is a letter from Muhammad the prophet, the Messenger of God, to the people of Najran. Najran and their followers have protection (*jiwar*) of God and the *dhimmah* of Muhammad the Prophet, the Messenger of God, for themselves, their community, their land, and their goods,

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36 This document as a whole is cited in Ibn Ishaq's *Sira al-Nabi* and translated by Muhammad Hamidullah into English. He published this document together with the Arabic text under the provocative title *The First Written Constitution in the World* (Lahore: Sh Muhammad Ashraf, 1968).

37 W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1956], 1977), 221.

38 Ibid., 121-124.

> both those who are absent and those who are present, and for their churches and services (no bishop will be moved from his episcopate, and no monk from his monastic position, and no church-warden from his church-wardenship) and for all, great or little, that is under their hands."[39]

In Islamic culture, the term *al-dhimma* defines the status of Jews and Christians who lived within the Islamic political domain. *Al-dhimma*, grants Christians and Jews an equal status with Muslims in religious, economic and administrative domains. In return, they are asked to pay *jizya*, poll-tax. Although the *al-dhimma* status itself was initiated for Christians and Jews, it was also applied to Zoroastrians when Persia was conquered and to Hinduism and Buddhism when India came under the rule of Islam.[40]

As Ahmad points out, the constitution of Medina and other covenants of the Prophet *SAW* with Jews and Christians laid down the principles for building a multi-cultural and multi-religious community. These fundamental rules that the Prophet *SAW* established have been practised throughout Islamic history. Islam has given *dhimmies* of the Islamic community equal religious and cultural rights alongside Muslims. In other words, their autonomy, internal affairs and freedom to practise their religion were guaranteed by Muslim authority.[41]

The term *ummah*, contrary to its conventional usage by the Muslim so far, was historically used in a manner that includes *dhimmies* who lived within the Islamic community. In the constitution of Medina, the Prophet *SAW* defined the Jews as *ummah*, thereby integrating them into the already formed Muslim community. Later, this term was applied to Christians. Now, it is possible that the term *ummah* can be applied to all the adherents of major traditions. One of the main aims of the constitution of Medina was to create a community spirit between different tribal and religious segments of the society. It was not only a formal treaty but also a code of practice which encourages sincere and honourable friendship between the various functions, as stated in article 37.[42]

After Prophet Muhammad *SAW*, the four rightly guided caliphs and the rulers of Ummayyads and Abbasids always maintained the rules and regulations established by the Quran and the *sunnah* of the Prophet *SAW*. For instance, when Jerusalem came under the rule of Islam, Omar the second caliph signed a pact with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, which granted security for them and their

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39 Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 44 (tr.108), quoted in Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, 359-360.

40 Al-Faruqi states: "Following the conquest of India by Muhammad bin Qasim in 91/711, the Muslims faced new religions which they had never known before, Buddhism and Hinduism. . . Muhammad bin Qasim sought instruction from the caliph in Damascus on how to treat Hindus and Buddhists. . . The judgment was that as long as Hindus and Buddhists did not fight the Islamic state, as long as they paid the jizya or tax due, they must be free to worship their gods as they please, to maintain their temples, and to determine their lives by the precepts of their faith. Thus the same status as that of the Jews and Christians was accorded to them". Al-Faruqi, "World Theology", 447.

41 Barakat Ahmad, *Muhammad and the Jews: A Re-examination* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1979), 47.

42 Al-Faruqi explains the importance and impact of this constitution to Jewish life: "For the first time in history since the Babylonian invasion of 586 B.C., and as citizens of the Islamic state, the Jew could model his life after the Torah, and so legitimately, supported by the public laws of the state where he resided. For the first time, a non-Jewish state put its executive power at the service of rabbinic court. For the first time, the state-institution assumed responsibility for the maintenance of Jewishness, and declared itself ready to use its power to defend the Jewishness of Jews against the enemies of Jewishness, be they Jews or non-Jews." Al-Faruqi, "World Theology", 445.

property. It recognized rights of the Jews and Christians of Jerusalem to practice their religion freely; their churches and synagogues were respected and left intact.[43]

Under Islamic rule, non-Muslims have always been encouraged to participate in and contribute to the intellectual and political life of the community. Christians and Jews were welcome to hold posts in public offices. Several of them became ministers, especially in the period of the Abbasids. For instance, most of the palace physicians in Baghdad were Christians, whereas the Jews were good at money exchanging, and they contributed to the welfare of society as tanners and gold and silver-smiths. During the Memluke era, a number of able Christians from the Copts of Egypt were appointed as state secretary.[44]

Such religious tolerance was well observed by the Muslim rulers of Christian Spain. At that time, in Spanish cities like Cordova, Seville and Toledo (the ancient capital of the Goths) Christians, Jews and Muslims lived in peaceful coexistence.[45] Christian communities had their own judges who settled their disputes in accordance with Gothic law. Those '*arabized*' Spanish Christians played a remarkable role in transmitting Christian culture in the Islamic world, and also the Islamic civilization to the Christian world. Among them there were very distinguished scholars and philosophers, the most famous of whom was Moses Maimonides.[46]

During the middle ages, the Ottoman Sultans fully observed the right of the sizeable numbers of Christians and Jews as well as other non-Muslims who lived within the Ottoman provinces. For instance, when Spain was reconqured by Christians, in 1492, Sultan Bayezid II permitted and even encouraged a great number of Jews from Spain and Portugal who were expelled from their own

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43 Historically this document played a very important role in safeguarding the rights of *dhimmis* throughout Islamic history. It reads as follows: "This is what has been given by the servant of God, Omar ibn Al-Khattab to the people of Aelia. He gave them security for themselves, their property churches and crosses, the invalid and health and other co-religionists: that their churches shall not be inhabited nor destroyed nor damaged, nor their confines be encroached upon, nor their cross be molested, nor their property be infringed, nor shall they be forced to abandon their religion, nor shall anyone of them be hurt, nor shall Jews live with them in Aelia" Abu Ja'far Muhammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, *Tarikh al-Rusul wal-Muluk*, Vol. 3, 609, quoted in Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Khatib al-Tameemi "Pluralism and Its Limits in the Holy Quran" in *Proceedings of the 6th Muslim - Christian Consultation*, held in Istanbul 11-13 September, 1989, 40.

44 Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani, "Religious Pluralism and its Limits through History" in *Proceedings of the 6th Muslim - Christian Consultation*, held in Istanbul 11-13 September, 1989, 105.

45 The principles of 'Islamic pluralism' have played a vital role in maintaining Jewish identity in history. Al-Faruqi explains the importance of such Islamic rules for Jewish survival: "After centuries of Greek, Roman, and Byzantine (Christian) oppression and persecution, the Jews of the Near East, of North Africa, of Spain, and Persia, looked upon the Islamic state as a liberator. Many of them readily helped its armies in their conquest and co-operated enthusiastically with the Islamic state administration. This co-operation was followed by acculturation into Arabic and Islamic culture, which produced a dazzling blossoming of Jewish arts, letters, sciences, and medicine. It brought affluence and prestige to the Jews, some of whom became ministers and advisors to the caliphs. Indeed, Judaism and its Hebrew language developed their "golden age" under the aegis of Islam. Hebrew acquired its first grammar, the Torah its most highly developed jurisprudence, Hebrew letters their lyrical poetry; and Hebrew philosophy found its first Aristotelian, Musa ibn Meymun (Maimonides), whose thirteen precepts, couched in Arabic first, defined the Jewish creed and identity. Judaism developed its first mystical thinker as well, Ibn Gabirol, whose 'Sufi' thought brought reconciliation and inner peace to Jews throughout Europe. Under 'Abd al-Rahman III in Cordoba, the Jewish prime minister, Hasdai ben Shapirut, managed to effect reconciliation between Christian monarchs whom even the Catholic Church could not bring together. All this was possible because of one Islamic principle on which it all rested, namely, the recognition of the Torah as revelation and of Judaism as God's religion, which the Quran attested and proclaimed". Al-Faruqi, "World Theology", 445 - 446.

46 Al-Dajani, "Religious Pluralism", 103.

homelands to settle in the Ottoman realms to rebuild their lives.[47] Depending upon the Quranic and Prophetic injunction as well as the tradition which they received through their forefathers, the Ottomans developed a *millet* system through which the society was divided into estates each of which was expected to function according to a given position by tradition.[48]

Now, I would like to cite an Ottoman *ferman*, (decree) issued by Sultan Mehmed III, dated March 1602, which demonstrates a typical attitude of the Muslim rulers towards the non-Muslim subjects. It reads as follows:

> Since, in accordance with what Almighty God, the Lord of the Universe, commanded in His Manifest Book concerning the communities of Jews and Christians, who are the people of the *dhimma*, their protection and preservation and the safeguarding of their lives and possessions are a perpetual and collective duty of the generality of Muslims and a necessary obligation incumbent on all the sovereigns of Islam and honorable rulers, Therefore it is necessary and important that my exalted and religiously inspired concern be directed to ensure that, in accordance with the noble Sharia, every one of these communities that pay tax to me, in the days of my imperial state and the period of my felicity-encompassed Caliphate, should live in tranquility and peace of mind and go about their business, that no one should prevent from this, nor anyone cause injury to their persons or their possessions, in violation of the command of God and in contravention of the Holy Law of the Prophet.[49]

My aim, however, here is not to enumerate the selected historical documents and practices, most of which support the argument which I am proposing, but it is to glance through Islamic history in order to identify a common official attitude of Muslim authority towards non-Muslim subjects. It is not, indeed, within the scope of our paper to present a well-documented or meticulously surveyed historical account of 'Islamic pluralism'. Nor do I intend to demonstrate that Islam both theoretically and practically can match the norms of liberalism of modern time; the concepts such as tolerance and equality as understood by the liberals of our time were not known. In a Muslim's eyes, undefined and purposeless tolerance was not virtue and vague intolerance was not a crime. [50]

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47 Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 50.

48 Niyazi Berkes points out how unity was realized between different ethnic and religious groups during the Ottoman era: "Through the application of certain principles implied in this concept of society, a great degree of unity was realized over a long period of time. Disorder broke out only when the principles ceased to be applied or to be applicable and the various groups began to develop tendencies that were incompatible with these principles. . . Each [estate of the society] was recognized by the ruler and possessed privileges granted by his favor. In each there was some authority recognized as partial delegate of the supreme holder of power. For example, heads of the guilds or of Christian and Jewish millets had administrative and juridical rights and duties. (The Turkish system found a place for non-Muslim communities in its medieval structure, without segregating them into ghettos or resorting to expulsion or extermination, by according to right of jurisdiction to their respective ecclesiastical authorities a method which invited praise from Arnold J. Toynbee)". Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 11-12.

49 Quoted in Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 43-44.

50 The concepts such as tolerance, intolerance are extremely ambiguous and culture specific concepts. One action or state of affairs can be seen as quite intolerant according to the norms of one culture, whereas appropriate according to others. The objective of the Muslim rulers throughout Islamic history was not achieve tolerance religious or otherwise, but order and unity of the subjects from different religions and races. They believed that like laws of God in the nature (*sunnatu-llah*), i. e. laws of nature in modern sense, there are the sacred laws issued by God in order to establish a unity in the society. They saw themselves as the ruler appointed by God to achieve such unity.

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ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AT CROSSROADS: THE CHOICE BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND CONTEXT-DRIVEN APPROACH TO POLITICS. CASE STUDY ON THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Dr. László Csicsmann

ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to analyse the ongoing transformation process within the Islamist movements using the example of the moderate Islamic Action Front party in Jordan. The dilemma of participation in the 2010 general elections raised tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, and between doves and hawks of the same organizations. Internal debate on the future has started recently among different groups within the Islamist movement in Jordan.

The research is based on the author's recent field experience in Jordan (April–July 2010, Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship at the American Centre of Oriental Research, Amman, Jordan). The author also conducted research in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, where several interviews were carried out with leading and lower level Islamist politicians. The dynamic changes within Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan and its relation with the regime has been used as reference point. The main question of the research was aa how the changing political and regional context shapes decisions of the Islamist with special attention to the acceptance of democratic values and human rights, political participation, and the meanings of Islamic values in the 21st century, possible cooperation with secular parties/movements/the regime.

Keywords: Islamist Movements, Democracy, Political participation, Moderation, Post-Islamism, Political inclusion, Arab World, Ideology, Islamic Action Front, Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Jordan

THE DUALITY OF ISLAMISM AND POST-ISLAMISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST

The last two decades have brought fundamental political changes within Middle Eastern autocracies.[1] After the collapse of the bipolar world order, several circumstances led to the so-called *vicious circle* of liberalization and de-liberalization. In most of the autocratic republics, a more open public space began to emerge at a certain degree with a public discourse more concentrated on political and economic mismanagement of the country. The Islamist movements[2] in the Middle East have been playing on the advantages of the growing unpopularity of

[1] The author would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the American Center of Oriental Research (ACOR) in Amman, which made field research possible between April-July 2010 and April-July 2007.

[2] In this paper we use the term Islamist groups borrowing the definition used by Omar Ashour: "Islamist groups… are sociopolitical movements that base and justify their political principles, ideologies, behaviors and objectives on their understanding of Islam or on their understanding of a certain past interpretation of Islam." Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists. Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 4.

governments and asking for further political liberalization. The regimes themselves and the Islamist movements are at crossroads on political participation accepting the current, non-democratic rules of the game. Many Western politicians argue against the integration of Islamist movements within the existing political framework using the example of the election victory of Hamas in 2006 as a negative reference point. Many other experts believe in political inclusion as a tool of moderation, alarming us that exclusion may strengthen the possibility of re-radicalization. Both experts and politicians often neglect the fact that these Islamist movements are not homogenous entities, as serious internal differences on the future exist endangering the cohesion of these organizations. A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has started among different political fractions within Islamists.

Recent literature on Middle Eastern political developments shows a certain kind of transformation within Islamist movements, what the French scholar, Olivier Roy called as "Post-Islamism". The religious-oriented political movements have begun to emphasize the unresolved national problems instead of focusing only on the international scene. National integration and political participation became a viable alternative of a radical, military interference into the political life of the state. Most of the leaders of these moderate organizations accept the peaceful coexistence with the ruling elite, 'postponing' the primary goal of implementation of an Islamic state based on *Sharia* at the same time. As Roy pointed out, the main ideological commitment of Islamists is not politics, but society: "The contemporary religious revival in Islam is targeting society more than the state..."[3] More and more Islamist organizations have started to give up the military struggle against the infidel authoritarian regime, which was the ultimate answer in the 1970s by many armed movements (e.g. Islamic Jihad, *Takfir wa-l Hijra)*.

Islamist movements have embedded more deeply into the national environment. Roy notes: "The mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s have failed to produce anything resembling an 'Islamist International' along the lines of the Communist International (or Comintern)."[4] The case of Hamas and *Fatah* as rival organizations can help to understand the impact of national interests on political movements. Islamic symbols are not only used in the Palestinian Authority by Hamas, but also by the more nationalist party, *Fatah*. And *vice versa*, *Fatah* gains popularity by relying on Islamic ideals, which clearly shows that a pragmatist approach is more beneficial than relying on a dogmatic ideology without flexibility. Another example of the nationalization of Islamist movements is the Shiite *Hezbollah*, which was viewed by many experts as the right hand of the Iranian theocratic regime. Recent articles have shown a different picture. The so-called "libanonization" of *Hezbollah* started in 1992 with participation in the Lebanese government and with the gradual rejection of armed struggle.[5]

Peter Mandeville, offering a critical evaluation of Roy argument shows that Islamist movements differ in their main goals. Some organizations especially those that are at odds with the regime, seek for capturing the state. Mandeville summarizes the term Post-Islamism with five characteristics: [6]

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[3] Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), 4.
[4] Roy, *Globalised Islam*, 62.
[5] Graham E. Fuller, "The Hezballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance," *The Washington Quarterly*, 30 (2006-2007): 143.
[6] Peter Mandeville, *Global Political Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 343.

1. Islamist movements are nationalist in orientation.
2. Following an Islamist path does not have any strategic importance as the international community favours spreading democratic values over religious ideologies.
3. Muslims do not vote according to religious beliefs, but rather their political conviction.
4. The political participation of Islamist movements involuntary helps in the secularisation process of their home country.
5. Individualistic religious approaches have taken preference over collective practices ("The privatization of religion").

In Asef Bayat's understanding, the term Post-Islamism is a condition and a project simultaneously. On one hand, Post-Islamism is an existing reality, but on the other hand, it is a plan under discussion among Islamists on how to combine Islam with the values of modernity (democracy, liberalism, human rights, etc.).[7] Some Islamist parties embrace the idea that modern values are inherent in Islam, rejecting what several Western scholars and politicians argue that Islam is a backward religion and Islam and democracy are incompatible.

It must be underlined that with the presence of a Post-Islamist trend, classical Islamism is not a phenomenon of the past. "But the advent of post-Islamism, as a trend, should not be seen necessarily as the historical end of Islamism" – wrote Bayat.[8] According to his interpretation of current trends in the Middle East, the Egyptian *Wasat* Party, the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the Indian Jami'at-i Islami belong to the category of Post-Islamism. Movements like the Palestinian Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Jordanian Islamic Action Front represent (classical) Islamism. However, in my opinion there is no clear dividing line among different types of movements, especially because the new movements usually split from the mother organization, as was the case with the Egyptian Wasat Party. The existence of divergent fractions within the Islamist movements must be taken into consideration.

Politicians and experts often show Islamist movements as static political actors with never-changing political agenda. It is often neglected that an intensive debate on the future started between members belonging to the different political wings (and different generations) of these popular societal movements. The main disagreement among political fractions is about participation in the general elections and the commitment to the original ideology of the founding fathers. On one hand, the usually called "dovish members" think that a *Sharia*-based society and political system is the best solution for the contemporary challenges of their host country. However, at the same time they also noticed that the implementation of the ideological principles is not possible in the 21st century. These moderates show a willingness to form ad-hoc coalitions with secular parties and cooperate with the regime on issues with shared interests. On the other hand, the conservatives ("hawkish") see any kind of political participation as a legitimization

[7] Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic, Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), 11.
[8] Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic*, 13.

given to the oppressive policies of the regime. The existing political fractions often correspond with members belonging to different generations.[9]

THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Many Islamist movements consider the opportunity cost of exclusion higher than political participation. However, political inclusion is not only a decision of Islamists themselves, but usually it is the privilege of the ruling elite. A minimum level of mutual understanding and an acceptance of the existence and political activity of the other is necessary, but not satisfactory precondition for political inclusion. The compromise between Islamists and the regime usually touches upon the rules of the political game. These non-democratic arrangements are used as the safety valves of the political elite, minimizing the possibility of the evolution of a popular political party in the opposition. Despite the authoritarian structure of the state, many of the moderate Islamists are still convinced of the advantages of manoeuvring into the political labyrinth, which offers no real influence on political decisions. Some moderate movements are legally licensed political parties (e.g. Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan, Justice and Development Party in Morocco, Islah Party in Yemen), while others belong to the semi-legal (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), or illegal categories (Muslim Brotherhood in Syria).

A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has started among different political fractions within the ranks of the Islamists. These political wings often coincide with members belonging to different generations. Khalil Anani, an expert on Islamist movements, analyzed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and found four generations of members very different aspirations, with very different experiences.[10] Some of the members who were among the founding fathers are still alive and they are the more conservative element. The other generation lived under the Nasser years witnessed the radicalization of the movement, and they are loyal to the more radical interpretation of Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged by Nasser. The youngest generation is the most interesting; they live in a very different political environment than their predecessors. We were told that Islamist movements are backward political actors in the post-modern society. It is not true. The youngest generation has access to the latest technology, they communicate among the members through blogs and chats. As most of the blogs (like *Ana Ikhwan*) are in Arab language, these blogs are not exclusively Egyptian or Jordanian, but Arab. The youngest generation is very skeptical about the old guard and usually they are in the middle (*wasat*). Sometimes they try to break away from the parent organization and form a new political party (Wasat Party). They are in the middle between the doves and hawks. The same story is valid in the case of Hamas, which after the outbreak of the second *intifada* started a debate on participation in the upcoming elections. Hamas shows the major dilemma of inclusion or exclusion. The moderate wing led by Ismail Haniyya argued in favor of participation, accepting the non-democratic rules of the game, while the more radical element – Khaled Meshal in Damascus – stressed the importance of the armed struggle. Most of the moderate movements in

[9] Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzavy and Marina Ottaway, "Islamists Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Herbert-Quandt Stiftung. *Middle East Series*, 67 (March 2006): 7.

[10] Khalil al-Anani, "The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path," *Current Trends in Islamic Ideology*, 9 (2009), Hudson Institute, online: http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-young-brotherhood-in-search-of-a-new-path (accessed 01 September 2010).

the Middle East face the same dilemma: participation or re-radicalization. The result of the international isolation of the Hamas government led to re-radicalization in the Gaza strip. More radical movements belong to the Al-Qaeda, Jihadi Salafism emerged as a response to the failure of Hamas. They totally ban music and one of their political leaders even called for an Islamic Emirate in Gaza. Hamas killed most of the members of this organization. It shows us that Islamist movements cannot be analyzed as static political actors who never change. The other general question about the future of the Islamists is whether they are committed more to the founding ideology and to establishing an Islamist state on the base of *Shariah* or they are more pragmatic and open to hear the needs of their voters (context driven). Several studies have shown that many Islamist movements dropped their primary goal to establish an Islamic state and realized the opportunity to participate in elections and forming coalition with other non-Islamist parties or even more committed to certain kind of cooperation with the regime.

"Inclusion leads to moderation" hypothesis should be tested in a more careful manner. Th much criticized transition paradigm believes in the inclusion of radical groups in the democratization process.[11] If the alternative cost of participating in the election process is higher than keeping the radical tone of the movement, then acceptance of the democratic and non-violent method will prevail. In the Middle East, however, the rules of the game are usually undemocratic, which means that enforcing the democratic principle does not mean the possibility of challenging the regime.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE JORDANIAN POLITICAL MILIEU

In a recently published article, Tamara Cofman Wittes has analysed three different groups of Islamist movements regarding the possibility of engaging them politically.[12] The first category used by the author is a small group of radical organizations linked to the so-called global *jihad*. The most prominent example for that category is Al-Qaeda, or second generation of Al-Qaeda type organizations targeting mainly Western interests. Engaging them is not possible on the short-run. A recent survey in the Islamic World carried out by Gallup has showed the weakness of such radicals. According to the data, only 7 percent of 1.5 billion Muslims support any kind of violence, while there is a 'silenced majority' who rejects the use of force.[13]

Within the second category, we found Islamists focusing mainly on national or local issues combining peaceful and militant methods as well. Hamas in the Palestinian Authority or *Hezbollah* in Lebanon are the most prominent examples of this group. As Wittes said: 'they can always use bullets to cancel ballots (…) and they seldom want to give up the privileges that the gun brings them.'[14] Participation in politics is not a positive step toward democratizing autocratic regimes.

The third category of Islamists are the peaceful, local, nationalist ones who see participation in the political process as the sole legitimate method for challenging the regime. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front Party, or Turkey's AKP are the most important Islamist

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[11] Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation, Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11-18.

[12] T. Cofman Wittes, "Islamist Parties. Three Kinds of Movements," *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (2008): 7-13.

[13] J. L. Esposito and D. Mogahed, eds., *Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think*, (New York: Gallup Press, 2007), 69.

[14] T. Cofman Wittes, *Islamist Parties*, 8.

organizations accepting the formal rules of the game. If certain conditions are met, these non-radical groups are the best example for inclusion within the political space.

GLOBAL JIHAD IN JORDAN

In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, all of the three above-mentioned types of Islamist movements exist. Organizations linked to global *jihadi* activity were never popular in Jordan. The Jordanian society has strongly condemned the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, and the government officially expressed its commitment to Washington in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, close political ties with Washington has made Jordanian public opinion suspicious about foreign policy initiatives of the King or government. According to the poll conducted by Pew, 43 percent of the Jordanian population supported terror attack against civilians in order to defend Islam in the summer of 2002. The sympathy toward suicide bombing however dropped to 29 percent in 2006.[15]

Mentioning just a few examples of names and organizations with links to global jihad, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, al-Maqdisi and the radical movement called *Hizb ul-Tahrir* (HT) are of special importance. The root of every kind of Islamist activity, whether peaceful or violent, is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which officially came into existence in 1945. According to many sources, the MB started its activity during the 1930's under the patronage of the Egyptian MB. Even Abdullah Azzam, who was at the forefront of the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet Union, came from the Jordanian MB. As Shmuel Bar in his article on the history of the Jordanian MB has noted, the radical wing led by Abdullah Azzam, which left the country for Afghanistan during the 1980's, was unique in Jordan. Azzam and his followers were not satisfied with the peaceful strategy of the leadership; they wanted a more rapid political and societal change through armed *jihad.*[16] While Azzam died in Afghanistan in 1989, several of the so-called Arab Afghans (Maqdisi, Zarqawi) returned to Jordan, participating in the recruitment of new Salafis. The agglomeration of Amman, especially Zarqa (where Zarqawi was born) and Salt, became a centre of radical Islamists. After several years in prison, Zarqawi joined the Taliban in 1999 with several hundreds of Jordanian followers. Until the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, radical *jihadi* activism was on a low level in the Kingdom. Maqdisi was also imprisoned in 1996.[17]

However, the outbreak of the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 made the Kingdom a target for suicide bombers. Abu Musab al-Zarkawi soon became the leader of the so-called Iraqi Al-Qaeda, planning attacks against Jordanian interests. The mass influx of Iraqi refugees from March 2003 also made the Kingdom vulnerable. Jordan hosts around one million Iraqi refugees, who settled mainly in and around Amman. The Iraqi uprising had its immediate consequences on the security of Jordan: the suicide attack on 9 November 2005 demonstrated the existence of illegitimate Iraqi armed groups in the country headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.[18] The regime responded with an illiberal counter-terrorism law, which enlarged the powers of the security services. It is greatly

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[15] "*The Great Divide. How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other? Europe's Muslims More Moderate"*, Pew Global Attitude Project' June 2006. [Online:] http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253 (accessed 10 June 2009).

[16] S. Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1998), 31.

[17] Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 202-203.

[18] Many Jordanians share the conviction that Jordan will not be able to avoid the impacts of the security situation in Iraq. The suicide bombings against Amman's 5-star hotels in 2005 were the first step toward a worsening security prospect.

feared in Jordan that the infiltration of terrorist groups will subvert the societal harmony of the Kingdom. Zarqawi was killed in Iraq by American forces in 2006.[19]

The international community expressed its recognition of the commitment of the Kingdom to condemn religious extremism and terrorism. This policy is echoed with the Amman Message launched in November 2004 by King Abdullah II, whose goal was to promote a moderate form of Islam in the region and to win the loyalty of the religious opposition.[20] The promulgation of the Amman Message coincided with the growing fear about the spillover of Iraq's civil strife in Jordan, especially after the suicide attacks at Amman's hotels in 2005.

Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) was founded by a Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Nabahani in 1952, a former student of al-Azhar in Cairo. His views on the role of the centrality of the Palestinian issue in *Jihad* and on the establishment of an Islamic state on the principle of *Khilafa* had differed severely from the standpoint of the leadership of the MB.[21] Nabahani had tried to register his movement as a political party in the Kingdom, but it was refused by the regime several times. HT as an illegal organization attempted to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan, but the movement denied this fact. Today, HT is not a significant political group in the Kingdom; its main area of operation is Central Asia and the Muslim communities in Western Europe.

THE MODERATE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE REGIME

As mentioned before, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood originated in the 1930's, when the writings of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, influenced Muslims around the Middle East. In 1945, Emir Abdullah himself delivered the inauguration speech of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which marked the beginning of a positive approach by the Hashemite dynasty toward Islamists. The regime played the *Islamist card* in order to balance the powerful secular-nationalist wave calling for revolution. Only the radical *Hizb al-Tahrir* (HT) was banned during the Cold War years and the Brotherhood remained a political party and civil organization. The Muslim Brotherhood won only 8.3 percent of the votes in the 1956 election, which showed the limited popularity of Islamism at that time.[22] From 1957 till 1992, all political parties were banned in Jordan; the Muslim Brotherhood was a semi-legal political organization focusing on non-political issues (charity).

In this short paper, it is not possible to go into details about the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it must be noted that at historical turning points (1957, 1970) members of the *Ikhwan* supported the controversial policies of the regime. In 1957, when leftist revolutionary forces challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite dynasty and the monarchy, the MB – despite differences over the dismissal of Glubb Pasha during the early 1950's – backed the decision of

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[19] See on recent Salafi activism in the Kingdom, J. J. Escobar Stemmann, "Islamic Activism in Jordan", *Athena Intelligence Journal*, 3 (2008): 16-17.

[20] The Amman Interfaith Message. [Online:] http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=54&lang=en (accessed 15 April 2007).

[21] Schwedler, Faith in Moderation, 200.

[22] E. Lust-Okar, "The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?" *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 33 (2002): 545-569.

King Hussein striking down the Nasser-backed political forces in the Kingdom.[23] In 1970, when the civil war broke out between the Palestinian fighters and the monarchy (Black September), the Muslim Brotherhood again proved its loyalty to the regime.

From the beginning of 1980's, the relations between the regime and the *Ikhwan* started to change. The main controversial issue behind the worsening relationship was the support for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970's and early 1980's. The Jordanian branch of the *Ikhwan* helped their Syrian counterpart in order to overthrow the secularist republic of the Alawite minority in Syria, which caused tensions between the Hashemites and the Asad-regime in Damascus. However, the crackdown of the Syrian Brotherhood in Hama in 1982 forced King Hussein to pressure the Jordanian Islamists on terminating the ties between the Syrian and the Jordanian *Ikhwan*.[24]

The economic crisis of the 1980's in the Kingdom and the growing unpopularity of the regime, placed *Ikhwan* on the opposite side of the government. Despite the fact that all political parties were banned until 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood had chosen to participate in the 1989 elections and Islamists (members of MB and independents as well) won 33 seats in the Lower House of Parliament. A fragmented opposition—consisting of leftists and Islamists—dominated the Kingdom's first quasi-freely elected Parliament. The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front Party was founded as a political party in 1992 and it participated in the 1993 elections.[25]

INTERNAL DEBATES WITHIN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE ROLE OF THE HAMAS FACTOR

The Jordanian monarchy is a unique example of political engagement of moderate Islamism in the Middle East. This paper shows that the participation of moderate Islamists in the political process is one of the most effective ways to pacify the radicals. The political evolution of the Hashemite Kingdom is quite different from other Middle Eastern countries, but the experience on the history of Islamism in Jordan is vital for our understanding of other regime types.

From the beginning of 1990's, the Islamist Action Front became the most popular political party in the monarchy. Generally, political parties are very weak in Jordan. The election system favours independent leaders affiliated with a tribe supporting the dynasty. The election law in force was drafted in 1993, months before the elections (in 1993) to marginalize the vociferous critics of the regime, the Islamic Action Front, which dominated (as independent candidates) the legislature from 1989 till 1993. The 1993 election law was based on the *one man, one vote system*, whereby eligible citizens can cast only one vote per district. The authorities changed the size of voting districts in favour of tribal areas, thereby playing on personal relations and loyalties. The voting system evidently placed parties at the margin of political life appealing to the neo-patriarchal arrangement of the state.[26] In the Hashemite Kingdom, usually tribal leaders have been elected as

[23] P. Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 99-102.
[24] S. Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, 38.
[25] R. Curtis, *Jordan in Transition. From Hussein to Abdullah* (London: Lynee Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2002), 22.
[26] F. Schirin, *Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a 'Safety Valve',* 'Middle Eastern Studies' Vol. 41, No. 6, (2005): 889-898.

MP. Political parties are viewed as suspicious institutions, potentially influenced by foreign powers.

When the leaders of the *Ikhwan* decided to establish a political party, the assumption was to fill 40 percent of the Islamic Action Front with independent Islamists, and the rest (60 percent) with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In reality, the Muslim Brotherhood has been dominating by the Islamic Action Front Party and independent Islamists have been marginalized from the beginning. This initiated a debate among members of the party on participation in the election process, the role of women in politics, the meaning of the dreamed Islamic states in the 21st century, etc. A major transformation process has started within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has become a Western-like political movement. As Anne Sofie Roald noted in her article: 'the three religious concepts, *shura*, 'Islamic state', and 'female leadership' have all turned in a secular direction in the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood, as *shura* has become 'western democracy', 'Islamic state' has become 'civil state', and 'Islamic leadership' has, to a certain extent, started to involve even women in the pattern of gender equality.[27]

The *old guard* of the Muslim Brotherhood (e.g. Ishaq Farhan) emphasized its opposition to allow the participation of the *Ikhwan* in the election process from 1989. They argued that the current political regime in Jordan is not democratic, and with participation in the election process, the Muslim Brotherhood would be a party to the oppressive actions of the government. It must be noted that most of the *Ikhwan* members were in favour of participatory politics in 1989 instead of boycotting elections.[28]

Islamic Action Front participated in general elections in 1993 but boycotted the 1997 elections. The normalization policy with the State of Israel and the peace treaty in 1994 marked the beginning of a radicalization process within the ranks of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF as well. The IAF with several other parties in the opposition have started an anti-normalization campaign criticizing the foreign policy of the King.

After the 11th September terror attack and failure of the Oslo peace process, the Islamic Action Front party has attracted more citizens, especially from the Palestinian community in and around Amman. The support for the Palestinian Hamas has been growing since the mid 1990's. Historically, the relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood started after World War II. The older founding fathers of Hamas were members of the (Jordanian) Muslim Brotherhood and shared a common vision of Islamization of the society. In 1988, the Muslim Brotherhood helped Hamas members to compose the Charter of Hamas, which called for *jihad* in historical Palestine. Hamas has maintained an office within the building of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which proved the strong political ties between them. A *modus vivendi* has developed between the leaders of Hamas and King Hussein tolerating the operation of the Islamic Resistance Movement in the Kingdom. However, in 1999 King Abdullah II chose to shut down the office of Hamas in Amman and expelled its leaders due to security reasons.

The elections held in June 2003 witnessed the return of the Islamic Action Front to electoral politics after boycotting participatory politics in 1997, despite its heavy criticism of the regime.

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[27] Anne Sofie Roald, "From Theocracy to Democracy? Towards Secularisation and Individualisation in the Policy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan", *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, 8 (2008): 106-107.

[28] J. Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 158.

Contrary to all expectations, the Islamic Action Front performed poorly, winning only 17 parliamentary seats, despite the fact that the outbreak of the war against Iraq enlarged its support base. Also 5 independent Islamists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, won seats in the Chamber of Deputies.[29] The results of the 2003 elections did not challenge the status quo: independent tribal leaders dominate the 14th Parliament. Jordanians of Palestinian origin are under-represented in the new legislation. They secured only between 17 and 25 seats, which prove the imbalances in voter districts.[30]

The Hamas victory in the Palestinian national elections held in March 2006 caused growing fears in Amman of an Islamist takeover of the Hashemite dynasty. Officially, King Abdullah labelled Palestinian elections as democratic, and he raised his voice against any interference into the internal affairs of the country. Hamas maintains close ties with the main Jordanian Islamist organization, Islamist Action Front. Zaki Bin Arsheed, a politician close to Hamas, was elected in March 2006 as the secretary general of the party. The outcome of the Palestinian election affected political harmony between Islamists and the regime: specifically the MP's of IAF called for further political liberalization and the adoption of a new election law with equal opportunities for all political parties. In 2006, the intelligence service discovered a secret armoury operated by Hamas members in Jordan.

In 2007, Islamists boycotted municipal elections. They participated in the 2007 general elections, but the outcome of the elections was a political disaster for the Islamic Action Front Party. Only 6 of its 22 candidates won a seat in the Parliament, which was a major setback for the party. The main reason behind this negative performance was a miscalculation of the popularity of the organization among voters. They were sure that all of the 22 candidates would win a seat, as it was in the previous elections. However, the situation was different. Why did they fail? One of the answers was the political marginalization of the Islamist movement by the regime. As the relations between the regime and the IAF worsened, especially in the post 9/11 contexts, Islamists were ousted from university campuses, from NGOs, etc. Only professional unions were open for them. A strict control started, especially at the University of Jordan, among student organizations active in campuses. One of the techniques to oust professors affiliated with the MB was not to renew their contracts or simply ask them to leave the university. The regime accused MB of playing in the hands of the '*Shia crescent*'. The Jordanian King was the one who introduced the term *Shia* Crescent after the outbreak of the Third Gulf War (2003), referring to the cooperation between Iran-Syria-*Hezbollah* and the *Sunni* Hamas. The other thing equally important was that the IAF could not reach to the ordinary Jordanian audience, and kept focusing mainly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to CSS polls, the Transjordanian cast their ballots according to their tribal affiliation and not their political ideology.[31] Tribal affiliation is not a top priority among Palestinian citizens. The current crisis within the movement started in the middle of the election campaign. While the MB wanted to boycott completely both elections, the IAF members preferred participation. For the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood participation meant

[29] R. R. Curtis and J. Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in Jordan", *Middle East Policy*, 11 (2004): 138-151.

[30] Ch. Parker, "Transformation without Transition: Electoral Politics, Network Ties, and the Persistence of the Shadow State in Jordan," in *Elections in the Middle East. What Do They Mean?*, ed. I. A. Hamdy, (Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004), 156.

[31] See the various polls conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan (http://www.css-jordan.org/subDefault.aspx?PageId=36&PollType=2) , accessed 10 November 2010.

contributing to the legitimization of the oppressive methods of the regime. IAF members argued that they lost more in boycotting the elections. The moderate wing, doves, within IAF wants to be more independent from the parent organization, and an internal struggle has started. Participating in the general elections served the interest of the moderates. In 2008, a hawkish politician, Hamam Said replaced Salam Falahat in the general leader position of MB. Hamam Said, who is sceptical about political participation has frequently criticized the regime, and called for new election law.

In August 2008, for the first time the Jordanian *mukhabarat* met with several Hamas officials from Beirut and discussed a new *modus vivendi* between the regime and the Islamist organization. It seems that the Jordanian government accepted the fact that Hamas is a political reality in the Middle East and ignoring it is contra productive. Officially Hamas has no relations with IAF.

The visit of Pope Benedict XVI to Jordan in 2009 caused tensions between the regime and the IAF. Zaki bin Irshaid said in an interview that Pope Benedict XVI must apologise to Muslims first before his visit to the Kingdom pointing to the controversial Pope's Regensburg speech in 2006.

In May 2009, Zaki bin Irshaid, the leader of the IAF resigned from his post due to internal debate within the party. One of the members of the old guard, a dove, Ishaq Farhan was elected as new interim Secretary General.[32]

The regional factor is very important for understanding the rise of the less moderate elements within the movement. The Islamist movement politically benefited from the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip organizing demonstrations against Israeli blockade, which started in 2007. The Operation Caste Lead, the military intervention of Israel against Hamas in Gaza at the end of 2008, and January 2009 has contributed to the sympathy towards Palestinians. Islamists, who control the professional unions organized demonstrations immediately after the Gaza flotilla attack in Amman (4th circle). Several thousand attended the demonstration. As the general public opinion is very negative about Israel, the King has started to co-opt an anti-Israeli rhetoric. In his interview with Wall Street Journal, he criticized the current Israeli government and told the American audience that Israel endangered its existence due to its politics (settlement policy issues).[33] And right after the Gaza flotilla raid, the King brought to Jordan most of the Muslim citizens who were aboard the Turkish ship, offering them medical treatment and helping them to go home. The strategy of the King worked very well; the regime, using a part of the rhetoric of the Islamist movement, distanced the population from Islamists.

A general election within the IAF organization is expected this spring. After the first meeting, which elected the Shura Council, the main decision-making body of the IAF, a major split surfaced within the movement and it was propagated widely in the media causing frustration for the Islamist movement. As usual, the Shura Council of the parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood is the body responsible for the nomination of the next Secretary General of the party, and they nominated Zaki bin Irshaid, the former secretary general who resigned in 2009. The doves did not accept this decision and boycotted the session, which was supposed to elect Zaki bin Irshaid. However, Zaki bin Irshaid withdrew his nomination and Hamam Said disclosed that a

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[32] "*Jordan's Islamic Action Front picks up new leadership"*, 1 June, 2009. [Online:] http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=20288&SectionID=70 (accessed 10 June 2009)

[33] "Interview with Jordan's King Abdullah II." *The Wall Street Journal*, April 5 2010. Online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304017404575165993793337612.html (accessed 5 June 2010).

kind of reconciliation had started within the movement. The global leadership of the movement from Egypt visited Amman to arrange a settlement of the dispute. The doves did not nominate a new person for the position, leaving the job open to the doves, who nominated several candidates. On 26th June, in a meeting of the Party's council, Hamzah Mansour was elected the General Secretary. The election of Hamzah Mansour – a member of the moderate fraction – is a compromise between the doves and the hawks.

The hawks prefer election boycott, while the doves prioritize participation. The executive director of the IAF issued an announcement before the beginning of the registration process calling the members to register themselves for the upcoming elections, but it does not mean participation. The probability of a boycott of the next elections was very high, especially after the King endorsed the new election law. The election law keeps the "one man, one system", which is politically unacceptable for the Islamists. In 2010, Islamists started a discussion with secular parties about the election law and a joint boycott of the next election to draw the attention of the international community to the oppressive nature of the regime. According to the polls conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies, the popularity of the IAF is very low, much less than 10% among voters. Finally, IAF called for a boycott of the elections, which was held in November 2010. In 2011, IAF accepted a new strategic document for enlarging the members of the party, which was estimated around 3000 by experts.

The generalization of the Jordanian model is not possible because of the unique historical context and political circumstances. The Islamic Action Front Party is a popular, but politically marginalized movement. The example of the Islamic Action Party shows that legalized Islamist parties are not inevitable winners of general elections in the Middle East, and they can be co-opted by the autocratic (or semi-democratic) regime successfully. However, the future of the Islamists' participation in politics of the Kingdom is still an open question. Post-Islamism is not a strong force in Jordan (as in Egypt), it is a rather marginalized fraction cooperating with the regime, and (classical) Islamism has also lost popularity in recent years.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMISTS: GENUINE VALUE PLURALISM OR DEMOCRATIC WINDOW-DRESSING?

Ms. Gillian Kennedy

ABSTRACT

During the 1990s, Egyptian society faced an upsurge of violent Islamist attacks by various jihadist inspired groups in which over a thousand people died. In the midst of increasing government suppression and public disgust at these terrorist attacks, other Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) sought to re-orientate their dialogue and strategy towards a more pluralistic rhetoric. Concepts such as human rights, political pluralism and democracy were intermingled with the traditional Islamist narrative. The Egyptian experience, especially in relation to the transformation of the MB is worth discussing in order to address genuineness of this Islamist reorientation towards a new political agenda. Questions relating to positive democratic development and political pluralism need to be ascertained to assess whether the MB's transformation is mere democratic window-dressing brought about to gain power, or it is a realisation that a true alternative Egyptian hegemon must adapt to changing times amidst the face of a pluralistic populace. While the Egyptian experience is still being played out, there are indications that suggest the MB is in the midst of organisational change, yet with generational struggles constraining it. This paper shall utilise numerous political theories to produce a theoretical framework for examining power relations in the context of cultural currency and value norms in Egyptian society and how this can harness the ability to build a broad based consensual hegemon throughout Egypt. These emerging issues are replacing old power dynamics based on traditional hierarchical structures, and material capabilities such as military dominance and economic tribalism. Thus, central to this paper is highlighting the methodological framework necessary to explore the democratic credentials within the Egyptian Islamist counter-hegemonic movement.

Keywords: Egyptian Society, Gramsci, Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist, Democratic

CULTURAL HEGEMONY: A NEW TYPOLOGY TO TEST POLITICAL ISLAM

Finding a coherent typology for the different ideological positions within Egyptian Islamism is not something new on the research agenda. Indeed it is something that has increasingly been discussed across scholarly circles over the past decade, especially since 9/11. The binary labels of traditionalist/modernist are labels that blur the distinguishable differences across the spectrum of political Islamism because they frame the analysis around the restricting question of how compatible political Islamism is with democracy.

Whilst some try to answer this question with research analysis in the direction of Samuel Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" thesis, aiming to explain the democratic deficit within political Islam as an inherent civilizational problematic,[1] others have instead focused on

[1] Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

either the economic underdevelopment of Arab society as an explanation or indeed historic factors[2] as the answer to this democratic deficit. These, however, are limited frameworks of analysis because 'democratization' as a term to test and define political Islam as an ideology does not work. Firstly, 'democratization' or indeed 'democracy' as a term of analysis is steeped in the Western liberal notion of democracy, which is underpinned with the values of the European Enlightenment, that is, the separation of church and state, a free market capitalist economy and the rights of the individual.

However with the experience of colonial rule and post-colonial state nationalism, political society in the Arab world has developed in a direction that lies outside of the Western liberal democratic modern tradition. On a global level, the problematic issue with the liberal democratization analytical approach is that, 'in the current research agenda there is a lack of a theory regarding the relationship between individual agents (like Islamists) and global ideological structures. There is a disconnection between the structural theories and the international system and the micro practices of the individual actors involved in the promotion of normative agenda in world politics.[3]

Whilst it is true that there is a gap in research analysis aiming to understand political Islamism as an alternative global ideology, the same conclusion can be drawn when examining political Islamism on a micro level.

This paper aims to use an alternative theoretical approach for assessing the various ideological strands of political Islamism in Egypt. Instead of formulating an assessment of the Egyptian Islamist movement through the prism of 'democratization', the objective here is to provide a critical account of the different ideological schools within Egyptian political Islamist thought, by putting them in their correct historic context and by highlighting the inherent contradictions in their programme for cultural hegemonic consent.

LOOKING THROUGH THE METHODOLOGICAL LENS OF HEGEMONY

To discuss cultural hegemony, we can't look anywhere else but within the writings of Antonio Gramsci, who developed this concept. Gramsci was an Italian Marxist who clarified his ideas whilst he was imprisoned by Mussolini's fascist government in the 1920s. He wrote more than thirty notebooks. They addressed subjects ranging from Italian nationalism to gender relations, though his most famous concept was his development of a cultural hegemonic theory. With this theory, Gramsci sought to explain why the inevitable socialist revolutions that were propagated by his own Italian Communist Party, had not occurred in Italy as they had in Russia in 1917. From this, he devised a strategy of cultural hegemony, which can be defined as:

> 'a situation whereby the subordinate group (in this case study the Islamists) secures hegemonic control of the State by obtaining consent from the masses as opposed to just dominating through purely coercive tactics i.e. ruling through the use of the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary.[4]

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[2] John Esposito, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

[3] Fiona Adamson, "Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review*, 7 (2004): 548.

[4] References in the text to the *Prison Notebooks* are taken from Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), hereafter referred to as *PN*, 78.

The Gramscian model fits here for a number of reasons. Gramsci had lived in Italy at a period of (relatively) early capitalism combined with an authoritarian rule, and a relatively less developed civil society. For many countries today in the Arab world, this is distinctly familiar. His pertinence to Egypt may also be attributable to his exceptional sensitivity to cultural issues which is also extremely important in Egyptian society.

Using the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony as a framework for assessing this political Islamist movement allows this research to circumnavigate the essentialism embedded in the limits of a Western liberal conception of democracy. Gramsci understood popular consent as cultural hegemony, not as a dominant ideology which simply shut out all alternative visions or political projects, but rather as a fragmentary hegemony, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of different kinds of social visions and political projects.[5]

As a Marxist theorist, his work is useful as an alternative framework for analysing the Egyptian Islamist movement because it provides us with the conceptual tools for building an emancipatory cultural hegemonic project that does not reject Western capitalist modernity, but instead provides an alternative modernity based around cultural consent and a plurality of value systems. Modernity is seen as the development of industrial capitalist society. It is characterized alongside these materialist concerns with a value system based around the powers of science and reason, as well as a basic scepticism towards divinity.[6] This value system is steeped in the ideals of the European Enlightenment philosophers;[7] though too many to mention here, the main ideals of individual freedom, human reason and democracy are the nuts and bolts of this value system.

Yet what does this have to with the Egyptian Islamist movement? The typology of political Islamism cannot be examined without looking at modernity, because the worldviews that the political Islamists possess are both simultaneously a product of the historical process of modernity and a response to the Western liberal capitalist hegemonic project that went hand in hand with the experience of Egyptian society from colonialism to post colonial.

Since the various strands within political Islamism have emerged under this process, it is beneficial to construct a typology based around the various responses to modernity. The three schools of political Islamism can be defined by their response, whether that be rejection, reaction, or reconciliation. The notion of modernity in the form of Western capitalist hegemony cannot be sidelined; however the congruent value system with it is not a universal belief system to test the pluralist credentials of Egyptian intellectuals whose culture and history is defined by Islam, not secularism.

The underlying issue here is that the development of Western capitalism has resulted in a materialist capitalist structure but has not been accompanied by the universalisation of Western Enlightenment values in post colonial Egypt. This is because there is an inherent contradiction between the discourse of Western liberal democracy and the exploitative practices of the capitalist

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[5] Mark Rupert, Reading Gramsci in "an Era of Globalisation and Capitalism," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 8 (2005) : 93-94.

[6] Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (London: Harper and Row, 1989)

[7] The most prominent of the Enlightenment philosophical ideas in this context can be found in the writings of Montesquieu, Locke, Hobbes, and Kant.

mode of production towards Arab societies as well as a negation of understanding towards Islamic cultural norms.

Egypt here acts as an example to point to an alternative value system that has evolved in three distinguishable intellectual directions within the political Islamist movement under the process of modernization over the past century.

Gramsci was an intellectual who viewed his role as an organic one in which his position is to relate to the populace and disseminate their pluralist message in a consensual manner. It is in his alternative intellectual discourse that a new mode of modernity and democracy can be found, which helps in examining Islamist intellectual discourse.

It is possible to categorize the worldviews of the three schools of political Islamism in Egypt by firstly, defining their framework for hegemonic rule that is their implementation of Shariah as a mode of governance. Secondly, by assessing their response to social and moral pressures brought about by modernity, such as gender issues and the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic society. This is of particular importance to Egypt, since 10% of its populace are Coptic Christians.

One can classify these three Islamist schools here as a literalist school, a conservative school, and lastly a reformist school. The first is the literalist school, which can be exemplified by the later works of Sayyid Qutb, in particular his most influential book, *Milestones*, published in 1966.

The second school is the conservative Islamists, as personified by the Muslim Brotherhood under the General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi. Hudaybi was the author of the infamous refutation to Qutb's *Milestones,* with his *Preachers, not Judges,* in 1971. Hudaybi and other intellectuals in the Muslim Brotherhood have shifted their hegemonic discourse away from the literalist inspired jihadist approach, yet they remain controlled by an 'old guard' within the organisation that conceives of the world from a traditionalist conservative vantage point as exemplified by its modern spiritual leader, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and also by its more recent policy papers.

Lastly, the final school to be examined shall be the reformist school. This last approach has its roots in the early 20th century reformers such as Ali Mohammad Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. Following the subsequent decline of this school during the Nasser and Sadat years, this approach can now be exemplified by intellectuals such as Hasan Hanafi and Adil Hussein.

OVERCOMING OLD OBSTACLES: SHARIAH LAW

One aspect of the cultural hegemonic project that Gramsci proposed is that if a political group based its mode of rule around a purely coercive and rigid doctrine it would result in becoming a mere bureaucratic device or in his own time, a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' The literalist worldview of Sayyid Qutb is based around a totalizing system of Islam alone, and anything outside of this, is steeped in *jahilliya or ignorance*. But if this is so, what exactly defines an *ignorant* society when looking at a mainly Muslim populated country such as 20th century Egypt? According to Qutb, 'this *ignorance* is based on anything against God's sovereignty. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty.[8] The literalist worldview states that all those who do not live under God's sovereignty, i.e., do not live under Qutb's understanding of what a literalist *Shariah* ruled state is, are therefore living in ignorance. This hegemonic platform

[8] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Indianapolis: Kazi Publications, 1983), 30.

would later result in the Sayyid Qutb inspired jihadist groups in Egypt such as Al Jihad, which judged everyone except themselves to be living in a state of *ignorance* as unbelievers. Ultimately the best expression of this approach can be demonstrated by *Adel Salam Faraj* assassination of President Sadat for being a *kafir* in 1981.

In Qutb's understanding, God has overlooked nothing in the creation of the *Shariah*, and therefore according to him, 'we should not despair in the ability of the *Shariah* to govern modern society. If we consider this concept of God's sovereignty alone through the comparative prism of the Gramscian model, some serious theoretical shortcomings begin to surface. As was mentioned earlier, Gramsci sought to rediscover the means by which to construct a unified coalition consisting of diverse value systems. In doing this, Gramsci aimed to overcome the exclusionary limitations of Orthodox Marxism in his own context. Yet if we look at the literalist hegemonic model, which demands an implementation of God's sovereignty alone; whilst neglecting other value systems we can say that Qutb dismisses all alternative viewpoints and implicitly rejects political pluralism. Indeed, how can a strict adherence to a literalist interpretation of *Shariah* rule convince a multi-ethnic populace, with 10% Coptic Christians, to consent to its counter-hegemonic programme, never mind different Islamic denonimations and secularists?

Qutb's condemnation of all who live outside God's sovereignty is a call for the rejection of Western modernity, but more worringly it castigates his own Egyptian society to the same world of *ignorance* for its un-Islamic behaviour from his perspective. What Qutb is demanding is not to Islamicize the state but in essence he wants to overthrow the whole state and civil society with it, by insisting on no human reasoning or dialogue with his contemporaries in the political system. This politics of rejection barely fulfils the Gramscian hegemonic programme with its call for a construction of ideology imbued with the character of the people; when clearly it is a reactionary response that was conceived in the context of isolation and alienation that dominated Qutb's historical context in 1960s Egypt.

In truth, whole examining both the conservative and reformist schools of political Islamism in Egypt, the abundance of legitimate inadequacies that the literalist school espoused can be clearly underlined. For example, the conservative school of Islamism in Egypt finds the notion of God's sovereignty alone as a benchmark for hegemonic rule decidingly. An example of how the conservative Islamists differ from this concept was outlined by Hasan al Hudaybi when he attacked the notion of *hakimiyya* as a distortion because it does not appear in either the Quran or the teachings of the Prophet.[9]

Additionally, the notion of God's sovereignty is not only a hinderance to gaining consent from the masses; but there are two other elements of this ideology that have had far reaching consequences for the generations that followed Qutb's death. In language not too dissimilar to the assumptive Orthodox Marxist stance that Gramsci refuted, Qutb proposed that while the material success of the regime tended to obscure its failings, in fact its creative period was over and that it actually stood on the edge of the abyss.[10] There is an obvious affinity here with the presumptive stance of the Orthodox Marxists when they spoke about the inevitable fall of capitalism and the imminent ascent of the spontaneous revolt of the masses in favour of Marxism.

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[9] Yvonne Y. Haddad, *"Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,"* in J. Esposito, *Voices of the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 27.

[10] S. Qutb, *Milestones*, 3-4.

Reformist Islamists in Egypt have countered this assumption that once the literalist understanding of God's sovereignty is implemented, all of Egyptian society's woes shall miraculously disappear as purely naive. Indeed, Egyptian intellectuals such as Adil Hussain and Hassan Hanafi have argued that the application of Sharia under God's sovereignty has never historically guaranteed reforms that solve the problems society faces.[11]

The dilemma here is that the literalists unanimously maintain strict adherance to the Will of God, ensuring that any dissenting practice would not rupture the harmony established. But what sort of cultural hegemonic harmony can be established when the concerns of individuals are shelved in place of a unilateral disposition with the Will of God as the singular underlying factor? Indeed Gramsci's work specifically answered this conceptual dilemma when he focused on the *reciprocal* [emphasis added] relationship between the intellectuals of a movement and the people; and how it attained consensual unity among the masses. I would go as far as to say that Qutb's concept of *hakimmiya*, and the proceeding school of literalist heirs in Egypt post 1967, have produced a counter hegemonic project, that at its kernel is ultimately contradicatory. It concentrates on community harmony, but its persistance on unformity is akin to De Tocqueville's *Tyranny of the Masses*.[12]

With regard to the conservative school of thought, and in particular the MB's governmental platform, there is fear of the possibility of the imposition of *Shariah* law in the same way as expressed by the literalists, but this would be a mistake to judge them as the same. Similarities exist, but the implementation of *Shariah* is certainly different. The Brotherhood has been pressed again and again on how it envisions translating its stress on implementation of the *Shariah* into a practical political and legal program. Its leaders have given a variety of signals, both on what they wish to see implemented and how it might be done.

In their 2005 policy platform, they opted for reforming statements seeking to downplay differences with other social actors. The Brotherhood has spoken increasingly of an Islamic frame of reference and less of the implementation of *Shariah* law. Successive MB general guides have spoken on the need for *ijtihad* or human reasoning when speaking about the implementation of *Shariah*. In recent years, the Brotherhood has included an Islamic element in their governmental programme, but they have tended to emphases instead a long list of political reforms, which have been demanded by a broader spectrum of Egyptian political society. There is agreement within the movement with the idea that the people's elected representatives in parliament are generally the ultimate arbiter, no matter what political grouping they come from. Besides providing provisions for political reform in the 2005 platform, the MB also focused their statements on limiting the role of the state and promoting a greater role for civil society. The 2005 platform is indicative of how much the MB has shifted towards acceptance of a value pluralistic agenda, in promoting a variety of political perspectives instead of a purely Islamist doctrine.

However**,** it must be noted that their platform also glosses over differences within the movement concerning how much respect to pay to existing constitutional structures and how much of the *Shariah* code should be interpreted through the democratic process. The dilemma in this analysis is that the Brotherhood is currently speaking with several different voices, making it tricky to

[11] Abu Rabi. M. Ibrahim, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in theMmodern Arab World* (New York: State University of New York, 1996), 256.
[12] Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Signet Classics, 1991)

make concrete conclusions on its' decision making process. Yet there is no denying that there has been transformation in its' governmental platform over MB over the past 30 years. Long gone are the vague slogans of 'Islam is the solution.'

As was mentioned previously, the literalists in Egypt aimed at uniformity in their interpretation of *Shariah*. Both Qutb and Farag failed to address other value systems. Here the conservative school of political Islam differs again, especially if we look at how they have pursued value pluralism in both their hegemonic mode that is their implementation of Sharia but also in their response to rights of non-Muslims and gender issues. Their response to these issues can be described as reactionary at times and pragmatic at other times as opposed to the literalist response which can be characterized as utter rejection. How the MB conduct themselves with other political actors in Egyptian society demonstrates their transformation into a movement that respects value pluralism.

Gramsci had noted that for a movement to succeed in building a cultural hegemony, it needed to prepare the political consciousness of the masses so that people could inform the ideology of their own government, thereby ruling with the consent of multiple views. In his own time, Gramsci saw how this could work with the creation of Factory Councils in Italy; which would prepare the political consciousness of the masses.[13] If cultural hegemony according to Gramsci is achieved through a grassroots process of education and consent like the Factory Councils; then the MB's success in capturing the professional syndicates in 1980s can surely work as parallel example. During the 1980s, they sought to re-establish themselves as a political actor, instead of a passive social movement which they had previously been. A new younger generation within the MB came of age at this time and aimed to penetrate the professional syndicates. They achieved successive victories throughout the eighties and nineties. These new younger Brothers became syndicate leaders, and helped to map out a new Egyptian identity, no longer subservient to the demands of 'westernization' that had little to offer the common man on the Arab Street. At the same time, they shattered the corrosive myth that Islamists were bent on recreating a medieval 'Arabian paradise.'[14]

Essentially, these younger Brothers modernized their methods by providing practical initiatives that appealed to various value systems in Egyptian society. For example, in 1987, the MB successfully campaigned to win control of the doctors' union on a platform of health care reforms based on increasing state production of medicine and encouraging the government to retain subsidies for drugs. Their platform was so appealing that Coptic Christian doctors defied unprecedented demands by Pope Shenouda, the Coptic patriarch, to vote against the MB, which resulted in the Brothers winning control of the doctors' union.[15]

Additionally, they managed to capture the lawyers union which for years had been a predominantly secularist syndicate. Another significant moment for the MB, was in gaining victory of the pharmacists' syndicate. An estimated 30 percent of its members are Coptic Christians, yet in 1994 the MB won a landslide victory in the election.[16] From the professional syndicates to electoral alliances, the MB have transformed their strategy over the last 30 years. In 1984, they formed their first political alliance with their old secular enemy, the Wafd Party. This

[13] Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1987), 193.
[14] Abdo, Geneive, *Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 103.
[15] Geneive, *Egypt and the Triumph of Islam*, 100.
[16] Ibid., 101.

election was a historic decision for the MB. Though their alliance was short lived, it nevertheless established them as a leading political player who had joined with the opposition to form a broad based coalition for reform.[17] So does this mean that the conservative brothers have transformed themselves into a truly value pluralistic movement?

A example of concrete action from the Brotherhood to back up its democratisation rhetoric can be demonstrated in their participation with *Kifaya* movement in 2005.

This was a broad based coalition calling for political reforms, including an independent judiciary.[18] Not only does this indicate that the MB are committed to essential elements of a democratic state such as an independent judiciary, it also highlights the movement's rapprochement with secular opposition forces in establishing a value pluralistic coalition. At this time, previous General Guide Akef outlined a response to calls that he wanted to impose a theocratic state by declaring that,'the Brotherhood seeks to create a civil party with an Islamic reference, established in *harmony* [emphasis added] with Article 2 that pertains to *Sharia* law of the constitution.'[19]

Although the Brotherhood entered the political system in order to change it, it has ended up being changed by the system. Leaders who were elected to professional syndicates engaged in sustained dialogue and cooperation with members of other political groups. By the early 1990s, many within the Brotherhood were demanding internal reform. Some pushed for revising the Brotherhood's ideology, including its positions on party pluralism and women's rights. These divisions are a healthy development. All political movements have their hawks and doves, and the MB is no different. Internal dialogue shows that there are contesting views and that these multiple views can be consistent with a pluralist discourse. Internally, the conservative Islamists have changed in their implementation of *Shariah*, but they have also moderated their views towards non-Muslims and women.

Previous General Guides have made two points clear on the status of women and Coptic Christians in Egyptian governance. They have said that this is not a matter for the MB, but it is for *Shariah* law. Experts in Islamic law say that a state cannot have anyone as its head of state except a Muslim. It cannot have a woman as its head. This is a legal interpretation but MB leaders have made it clear that it is for their individual members to choose the conservative legal interpretation, but that it does not bind others. It is their position only. It does not bind all Egyptians on what they are to believe and they have stated that the ballot boxes decide that. Importantly, there has been a distinct shift in the conservative stance on gender issues since the 1970s. Previously, MB Sheikhs insisted that the principle of guardianship of a man over a woman was reserved for men in both the public and private sphere. Yet Sheikh Qaradawi in recent years has stated that the principle of guardianship relates to the private sphere only and that women are allowed to hold a variety of positions in parliament, including ministerial positions. This is indicative of a transformation towards gender issues, and also in distinguishing the conservatives from the literalists.

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[17] Mona El-Gobashy, 'The Metamorphisis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,' *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2005) 37, 379.

[18] Michaelle Browers, 'The Egyptian movement for change: Intellectual antecedents and generational conflicts', *Contemporary Islam* (2007):1, 72.

[19] M. Browers, 'The Egyptian movement for change: Intellectual antecedents and generational conflicts', 81.

In contrast, if we look at some of the reformist attitudes to women and non- Muslims, as well as their hegemonic mode of Sharia governance, we can see another distinct strand within the Egyptian Islamist movement. Adil Hussain, a leading ideologue for the Labour Party in Egypt, insisted that women were allowed to hold the office of president, as could non-Muslims. Yet Hussain was a not a secularist. Indeed, he made two points clear: that *Shariah* must be the basis for a strong public morality, but that it must be applied in a way that is conducive with the 21st century.

In his book, '*Towards a New Arab Thought,'* Hussain went on to note that a multiparty system that stressed value pluralism is indispensable to avoid stagnation in political thought and he linked this to political Islamism specifically. Like Hasan Hanafi, Adil Hussain spoke of himself as both an Islamist and a modernist. Significantly, intellectuals like Hussain have allied themselves with conservative MB members. Though for the reformists, political Islamism is reconciled with the pressures of modernity, such as gender issues and the rights of non-Muslims. *Shariah*, for them is seen not so much as providing the answers to problems or as an implicit mode of governance. Instead *Shariah* is seen as a moral force which will unite the population, but with emphasis on economic and social issues in Egypt.

Egypt's reformists have transformed themselves into a new type of Islamism. In many ways, they represent a third way Islamism. They make the use of community aspects that are prominent in an Islamic value system, such as social solidarity, whilst simultaneously offering a credible alternative to Egyptians of different value systems by concerning themselves first and foremost with social justice concerns.

In this, the reformists represent the key strand of Egyptian Islamism that has transformed itself into a value pluralistic ideology because it rests its moral outlook on traditional Islamic values of community solidarity, but is elastic enough to reconcile itself more cohesively with the pressures of modernity. Nevertheless, the reformist strand within Egyptian Islamism remains weak. It is clear that the conservative school remains the strongest strand within the movement.

CONCLUSION

In assessing the conservative's transformation, it is crucial to remember the divergent ideological strands that remain within the party. Often the older generation of the MB use hostile rhetoric against both Israel and the U.S, to placate the hardliners in the movement. In contrast, the younger generation of the MB who have a lot in common with reformist intellectuals like Hanafi and Hussain, are the generation of student activists and professional syndicate leaders who have come of age seeking dialogue with the U.S and Israel. They support the election victory of Hamas, but also argue for a democratic solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, as opposed to pursuing the path of all out war. These internal divisions within the MB are a significant drawback to their democratic credentials. They have hampered the evolution of the MB's platform over its 80 year history. Divisions between liberal and conservative Islamists, are similar to other Islamic Parties throughout the world, such as the Islamic Party of Malaysia and the PJD of Morocco, who have also suffered from divisions between conservative and moderate approaches.

Like any political movement, factionalism is a problem that the MB needs to overcome so as to cement its position as a coherent political movement.

The MB has come a long way since their early days of the 1930s, when parts of its organisation were involved in violent secret societies. In forming alliances with secular and leftist parties it has moderated its agenda. There is no doubt that there are staunchly conservative elements in the MB, their rhetoric is testament to that.

Throughout the 19th century, Christian political movements struggled to integrate their religious beliefs with a modern political system. After World War II, Pope XII issued a decree deeming democracy as a lawful practice. Soon after, the democratic Christian parties started to emerge. It ushered in a new era of Christian democracy across Europe. Similarly, Islamic movements such as the MB are now taking a pluralist approach to political participation. The conservative brothers are not the same as the literalists out to dominate the world with their dogmatic interpretation of Islam. They have transformed themselves into a value pluralist political movement which is seeking to enter the political process.

What is happening right now in Egypt is the opening up of a unique opportunity for the MB. Over the last 30 years, the MB have demonstrated their ability to listen to other political voices in Egypt. Their support with a diverse range of social actors in the present protests shows that they are seeking a free and democratic Egyptian political process, and not some Islamic theocracy.

Having laid the foundations for a Gramscian cultural hegemony, this paper can state with the utmost confidence that this analytical framework supports the argument presented here that the transformation of certain ideological strands into a genuine value pluralistic group is proven by their implementation of concepts that are embedded in the construction of a cultural hegemonic programme for governance.

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ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: KEY ISSUES AND DEBATES

Dr. Branislav Radeljić

ABSTRACT

The founding fathers of the European Union – Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman – were all Christian Democrats and devoted Catholics. At that time, this aspect was understood as a solid basis for a united Europe and European identity. Since then, however, things have significantly changed as the growing presence of Muslims in the EU has challenged its initially imagined outlook and, accordingly, various issues focusing on Islam, European identity and inclusion of the Muslims continue to penetrate numerous debates and question peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Europeans. While primarily elaborating on the post-September 11 dynamics, this paper concludes that coexistence is possible, but only, under certain circumstances.

Key words: Islam, EU, Islamophobia, European Identity, Coexistence.

DOES THE PAST MATTER?

Numerous academic conferences, public talks and informal meetings seek to address the growing presence of Islam in the European Union and, to begin with, many of them question whether the current situation could be better understood if the historical dimension is taken into account. Although the foundations of the then European (Economic) Community and present European Union "are undeniably Christian-Democratic, a capacious political tradition that accommodates temperate offshoots of conservative political Catholicism as well as a social Catholicism,"[1] it is true, as well, that in the 1950s, the presence of Islam in the EU was almost invisible, as rare mosques and occasional gatherings in suburbs of European capitals did not represent a matter worthy of public discussion.

However, in the 1960s, the trend changed rapidly as the economic growth of European countries combined with low birth rates implied that an additional labour force was needed in order to maintain this progress. In this respect, France became a host country for many Muslims from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In his study, Milton Esman explains that the French maintained that most immigrants were not part of their society and that they would probably never become so – an attitude that inspired immigrants' growing attachment to Islam: "They were told by religious leaders, most of whom were trained and imported from their homelands, that religion and government, church and state, cannot, under Islamic law and practice, be separated. Islam, as they preached it, is incompatible with the infidel, amoral, secular cultures of contemporary Europe."[2]

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[1] Jeffery T. Checkel, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Politicization of European Identities," in Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14.

[2] Milton J. Esman, *Diasporas in the Contemporary World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 24.

In West Germany, after the erection of the Berlin Wall, the government signed bilateral agreements with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963 and Tunisia in 1965, all of them permitting the entry of cheap labor. Immigrants gathered at their homes, rather than in public, in order to practice their religious values and this clarifies why the Germans saw immigration "exclusively as working migration in which an ever fluctuating and always renewed population of workers would be involved. The cultural, and thus religious, dimension of immigration was not deemed important enough to warrant any special attention."[3] Finally, in the United Kingdom, although not a member state of the European Union until 1973, the first large-scale Muslim immigration began in the late 1950s. The Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962[4] and 1971[5] did not manage to restrict immigration and, in fact, any new intention to limit it "generated an inflow of migrants in larger numbers, because of the already existing networks of migration – the 'chains' of migration in which seamen and soldiers acted as the first links."[6]

The experience of the above-mentioned European countries shows that both Europeans and Muslims found themselves in a rather unpredictable situation. Throughout this period, Western Europeans, or at least their political authorities, for the sake of economic advancement of their respective countries, ignored the religious denomination of the European Community and its immigrants. More precisely, the religious otherness did not matter as long as the economic benefit was there. In response to the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent economic recession, many European governments decided to provide funding to immigrants to return to their homelands, as there was no longer an economic need for them. This policy was not successful and it became clear even then that the ambition to have a Christian European Union was going to face serious challenges.

Aware of this complexity, Europeans insisted on further strengthening of European identity, seeing it often as a powerful tool to address the presence of Islam. The successive waves of immigration and the proliferation of Muslim associations in France and Germany in the 1980s[7] increased the relevance of Islam to the extent that it became "an agent in the discourse of action or reaction."[8] This performance made a clear division between the two identities, European and Islamic, which was evident in the 1989 headscarf affair in France, when three girls came to their public school wearing headscarves. It served to demonstrate that Islamic identity in the EU was in the process of construction. In her account, Riva Kastoryano looked at the outcome of this event that challenged the relationship between the state, religion and public opinion, and concluded that "[m]obilizations around the headscarf issue have strengthened the leadership of Islamic associations as representatives of a community taking shape around Islam."[9]

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[3] Özkan Ezli, "The Development of Turkish Islam in Germany," Internet: http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/ezliapr07.aspx, 01/07/2010.

[4] "Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962," Internet: http://www.britishcitizen.info/CIA1962.pdf, 02/07/2010.

[5] "Immigration Act 1971," Internet: http://www.britishcitizen.info/IA1971.pdf, 02/07/2010.

[6] Konrad Pêdziwiatr, "Muslims in Europe: Demography and Organizations," in Yunas Samad and Kasturi Sen (eds), *Islam in the European Union* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 28.

[7] Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France, Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutchland and Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion.

[8] Riva Kastoryano, "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3, (2004): 1238.

[9] Riva Kastoryano, "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany," 1240.

For the advocates favoring the European Union as a Christian-Democratic organization, the collapse of Communism provided a new opportunity for additional support from East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Catholic Church played an important role in overthrowing the regime. With regard to this period, Edward Mortimer talks about two mutually inclusive subjects: Christianity and the Western media. He was quite happy to see "Christianity in vogue" and the Western media to promote it, but, more importantly, he saw media power in a position to deliberately identify "a new threat" to European stability – possibly Islam.[10] In his view, Europe needed "to define itself in terms … of Christian heritage, and to emphasize as sharply as possible the distinction and the frontier between itself and the world of Islam."[11]

Apart from an increasingly evident religious aspect, some other authors identified some new problems. For example, Marcelo Suárez-Orozco talks about important economic and social patterns that could hardly be appreciated in the European Union. For example, he argues that remittances from the immigrants "feed billions of dollars into the peripheries" and "Islamic marriage and divorce patterns and gender relations are disturbing both legally and socially to the host groups."[12] All these patterns have served to stress the diversity between the Muslims and Christians across the EU and, in fact, have been successful. As Suárez-Orozco concludes, "Islamic culture is perceived by some as not 'quite compatible' with European culture" and it is exactly this perception that began to dominate the discussions about the immigration across the EU.[13] However, the question of immigration should not be analyzed as exclusively one-directional. Accordingly, here Samuel Huntington, while admitting that "European societies generally do not want to assimilate immigrants or have great difficulty doing so," insists that "the degree to which Muslim immigrants and their children want to be assimilated is unclear."[14] This statement is justified, regardless of Huntington's hardly acceptable intention to demonize Islam. Since its foundation, the EU has been an attractive immigration destination. Even if, at various points, some of its member states wished to see immigrants go back to their country of origin, this did not happen. On one hand, while disappointed by the immigrants' decision to remain, the EU developed a standpoint that was often interpreted as a policy of marginalization or exclusion. On the other hand, the immigrants often wanted to see the process of assimilation conducted under their own terms and conditions, such as keeping dual citizenship illegally or rejecting European values while enjoying European benefits. However, where most academic and non-academic accounts agree is that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, encouraged reconsideration of every possible aspect of Islam and its presence in the West or, more relevantly for us here, in the European Union.

CURRENT DEBATES

Ibrahim Kalin's account of the Euro-American perception of the September 11 attacks maintains that the whole event was "interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a

[10] Edward Mortimer, "Christianity and Islam," *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 1, (1991):10.
[11] Ibid.,13.
[12] Marcelo M Suárez-Orozco, "Migration, Minority Status and Education: European Dilemmas and Responses in the 1990s," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1991):101.
[13] Ibid., 103.
[14] Samuel P.Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Free Press, 2002), 204.

clear intent to destroy Western civilization."[15] The Western media and policy-makers often presented Islam as a potential threat to non-Muslim countries. The result, as warned by Michael Humphrey, has been the following:

Contemporary Muslim experience in the West has contributed to the emergence of a globalized Islam, a de-culturalized and de-territorialized neo-fundamentalist 'pure-Islam.' Diaspora Islam has been transformed by the experience of marginalization and the loss of social authority of their cultures and religion. But the way public safety wars have targeted Islam/Muslims as a potential source of dangerous global circulation has had the consequence of locking them into an endless symbiotic relationship because the former can never guarantee security, it can never control the dangerous global circulation of risks.[16]

In order to show the relevance of the above noted issues, I identify various topics that have dominated debates about Islam in the European Union. First, as already envisaged, Islam is presented as a threat to security. In 2003, EU officials adopted the *European Security Strategy*, which identified terrorism and Islamic political radicalism as key threats, although without making any reference to religion.[17] However, the ideas in this document were primarily discussed among the EU officials, while the public consciousness was shaped by the media that talked about Muslims as potential terrorists, extremists and radicals. Some of them tried to justify the threatening aspect of Islam by looking into the future. For example, *The Daily Telegraph* accused the British government and the rest of the EU of "ignoring a demographic time bomb … including millions of Muslims [who] will change the continent beyond recognition over the next two decades."[18] These words surely question the work performed by the EU policy-makers. Indeed, apart from their initial engagement with the *European Security Strategy* and, to the lesser extent, the European Neighborhood Policy, Brussels officials have not offered any substantially improved document in regard to Muslim presence in the EU.

The main reason behind the European attitude is that it had already committed itself to the Muslim community by deciding to accept Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership during the Helsinki Summit of 1999.[19] The summit confirmed the EU's readiness to support diversity within its own borders, thereby contradicting the original perception of the European polity as exclusively Christian-Democratic. In addition, acceptance of the Turkish candidacy encouraged greater expression of the Muslim network across the EU. In her study, Kastoryano examined the supporting role of international organizations interested in Islam in Europe and noted that these organizations "mobilize resources to allow Muslims to go beyond the national diversity in the various countries of the European Union and to create a single religious identification and a

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[15] Ibrahim Kalin, "Roots of Misconception: Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and After September 11," in Joseph E. B. Lumbard (ed), *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition* (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2009),149.

[16] Michael Humphrey, "From Diaspora Islam to Globalised Islam," in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (eds), *Islam and Political Violence* (London: IB Tauris, 2010), 123.

[17] Council, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World," Internet: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 06/07/2010.

[18] Adrian Michaels, "Muslim Europe: the Demographic Time Bomb Transforming our Continent," *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 August 2009.

[19] Helsinki European Council, "Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999," Internet: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, 05/07/2010.

transnational solidarity based on this diversity."[20] By saying so, it appears that Europeans have had a problem with Islamic unity and, moreover, due to their own incapacity to achieve greater European unity, perceive Muslims as a threat.

The second topic about the Muslims in the European Union, although continuously used to justify the first one, concentrates on the conflicting nature of Islam. Here, both the Western media and the public have unintentionally promoted what is Huntington's understanding of the relations between Islam and Christianity. While seeing them as "stormy," he noted that "[t]he 20th century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity."[21] The complexity of this relationship is further confirmed by the fact that some Islamic states, such as Turkey and Iran, took part in the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo by openly protecting and supporting the local Muslims against the local Christians. However, this transnational involvement is important as it contributes to the previously mentioned points about the construction of a unifying identity among all the Muslims. Thus, regardless of their country of origin, their collective interest transcends boundaries, ignores diversity among their homelands and, most relevantly, leads to Islam's representation and recognition within the society.

Finally, the third topic focuses on what I call visual otherness. The 1989 headscarf affair in France indicated that Muslim fashion is perceived differently across the European Union. For example, the *Courrier International* reported that not all EU member states reacted in the same way: "In France, the classroom is the ideal place to transmit lay, republican values. Every girl who dares to wear her headscarf in class thus risks sparking a national scandal. In Germany, little girls are left in peace".[22] However, it did not take long for the Germans to reconsider their approach. In September 2003, the constitutional court ruled: "While the state of Baden-Württemberg had no grounds to ban … an Afghan-born teacher from wearing a headscarf in school, it was free to enact legislation to this effect."[23] Understandably, the debates about the Muslim outfit in France and Germany spread among the rest of the EU.

What we as the public get to know about Islam often depends on the media's decision on what to offer us. In his 1997 book, Edward Said explored Western media coverage of Islam and listed a number of relevant consequences that usually followed:

> One is that a specific picture – for it is that – of Islam has been supplied. Another is that its meaning or message has on the whole continued to be circumscribed and stereotyped. A third is that a confrontational political situation has been created, pitting 'us' against 'Islam.' A fourth is that this reductive image of Islam has had ascertainable results in the world of Islam itself. A fifth is that both the media's Islam and the cultural attitude to it can tell us a great deal not only about 'Islam' but about institutions in the culture, the politics of information and knowledge, and national policy.[24]

Each of Said's five points finds a place in current, post-September 11 debates about Islam in the EU. For example, his notion of a specific picture of Islam could relate both to its visual expression

[20] Riva Kastoryano, op. cit., 1251.
[21] Samuel P Huntington,, op. cit., 209.
[22] "France Sees Headscarves as a Veiled Threat," *Courrier International*, 29 September 2003.
[23] Bertrand Benoit, "Do any other European States Feel the Same Way?," *Financial Times*, 4 November 2003.
[24] Edward W. Said,, *Covering Islam* (London: Vintage Books, 1997), 44.

through habits and outfits or general perception of Islam as a threat. While Muslims do not have a problem with praying in the middle of their Western-style shopping malls, Westerners find it strange or, even, intimidating. While the majority of Muslim women choose to wear *burqas*, Europeans often feel sorry for them. Over time, being different and being seen as a potential threat have reinforced stereotyping about Islam and further division between 'us' and 'Islam' or vice-versa. If not minimized, this division could affect any coexistence negatively. In addition, a reductive image of Islam has opened questions about Muslim identity and as a result has led to its greater expression. Finally, Said is right when noting the power of the media in presenting Islam and shaping public opinion.

Indeed, the media face no obstacles in their intention to approach the public. For example, in relation to Islam and terrorism, one scholar analyzes the rapid development and power of the media and underlines that "the more recent forms of terrorism are aimed not at specific and limited enemy objectives but at world opinion. Their primary purpose is not to defeat or even weaken the enemy militarily but to gain publicity and to inspire fear – a psychological victory."[25] This is exactly what consolidates the concept of Islamophobia. In its 1997 report, the Runnymede Trust, a well-known non-governmental organization, published eight points that are related to the concept of Islamophobia.[26] In short, these points indicated that there was a serious problem with the perception and acceptance of Islam. These points warned that an obvious presence of Islamophobia could widen the gap between the EU and its Muslim communities. Nonetheless, Islamophobia became a matter of serious discussions only after the terrorist attacks against the USA and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005. Following these attacks, the Council of Europe presented its definition of Islamophobia as "the fear of or prejudicial viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion".[27] Thus, although less broad, the post-September 11 definition is relevant for two reasons in particular: first, it linked Islamophobia to violations of human rights and, second, it underlined the linkage between Islam and social cohesion.

A question of who is to blame for Islamophobia has two answers. The first answer sees the Western media as an unbeatable force to 'promote' Islamophobia. Indeed, following the events of September 11, "certain specific and often predictable [media] sources have been actively incorporating the most explicit expressions of Islamophobia into their coverage deeming their actions irresponsible, prejudicial, inciteful and more directly, extremely dangerous."[28] Thus, while

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[25] Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam* (London: Orion Books, 2004), 125.

[26] These points are: "1. Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change; 2. Islam is seen as separate and 'other.' It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them; 3. Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist; 4. Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a clash of civilizations; 5. Islam is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage; 6. Criticisms made of 'the West' by Islam are rejected out of hand; 7. Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society; 8. Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal" ("Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All," quoted in European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, "Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia," 61;
Internet: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf, 09/07/2010).

[27] Ingrid Ramberg, *Islamophobia and Its Consequences on Young People* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2005), 6.

[28] Christopher Allen, "Islamophobia in the Media since September 11," paper presented at the University of Westminster, School of Law, (London, 29 September 2001), 3.

it is not difficult to agree with this observation and many similar ones that accompanied the attacks in the US and Europe, Islamophobia has primarily been understood as a Western prejudice against Islam and rejection of everything that has something to do with it.

The second answer sees Muslim communities as responsible for Islamophobia themselves. Various terrorist groups have decided to provide the media with video footage explaining their intentions and goals. By deciding to do this, they have provoked greater Islamophobia in the West. Understandably, the public will always react to these sorts of statements. After conducting a survey about Muslims, the EU summarized the findings:

> On average 1 in 3 Muslim respondents were discriminated against in the past 12 months, and 11% experienced a racist crime. The highest levels of discrimination occurred in employment … thousands of cases of discrimination and racist crime remain invisible ... People without citizenship and those who have lived in the country for the shortest period of time are less likely to report discrimination. Regarding the reasons for not reporting incidents, 59% of Muslim respondents believe that 'nothing would happen or change by reporting' ... Ethnicity is the main reason for discrimination … Only 10% stated that they thought the discrimination they experienced was based solely on their religion.[29]

The above figures are important not only because they show that being Muslim in the EU can be rather difficult, but because they question some of the aspects of the Union it has boasted about, such as the respect for diversity and inclusion. Discriminatory policies in employment lead to a conclusion that the EU is not as open as it claims itself to be. Ethnic background and dress often have primacy over educational background and professional expertise. More alarming is the fact that many Muslims believe that reporting discrimination seems pointless. Such a belief implies that the European leaders who deal with these highly sensitive issues maintain dual standards, shifting from favoring diversity and inclusion to ignoring them, depending on occasion.

In his 2009 book, Christopher Caldwell questions whether Europe can be the same with different people in it. He argues that the initial idea of a united Europe did not take immigration into consideration: in the 1950s and 1960s, "European tolerance of other cultures was sincere, particularly among elites, but not even they anticipated that such tolerance would mean the establishment, entrenchment, and steady spread of a foreign religion on European soil."[30] Indeed, for a long time, Europeans were busy with their ever expanding European project, primarily inspired by economic cooperation and progress, whereas any religious aspect of the Community was ignored. As noted earlier, Muslims were allowed to come to Europe based on various bilateral agreements, but as soon as their help was not needed, the host countries across Europe expected them to leave. Although this did not happen, Caldwell notes that even "when Islam became Europe's main religious problem, almost nobody dared to say so."[31]

However, the European Union opted for a strategy that is nowadays criticized for trying to bring two rather contrasting dimensions together. The first dimension is all about the European ambition to see the EU as united in its diversity. In this respect, European elites call for greater inclusion of the Europeans coming from new member states as well as existing non-Europeans in the EU.

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[29] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, "Data in Focus Report: Muslims," 8; Internet: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf, 09/07/2010.
[30] Christopher Caldwell, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 91.
[31] Ibid., 161.

What remains unclear is whether the elites do so for the sake of their own self-promotion in the EU and highly attractive benefits or they really want to see a diverse EU. For example, while there is an evident interest in Turkish EU membership, both sides perceive it as a complex puzzle that still lacks many of its pieces.

The second dimension is about the European ambition to push for a greater European identity as many Europeans have realized that both integration and progress of the European Union will depend on the existence of a strong European identity. While not having offered any clear idea regarding Muslims living across the EU and their role in the whole process, the strengthening of a European identity could not be interpreted as a European intention to combat Islam, but to integrate it under certain, - its own - conditions. Accordingly, numerous additional questions have emerged relating to the mechanisms of the EU to address Muslims within its borders and the power of Islam to affect or even dismantle the whole concept of a European identity or, even more, the EU. These still require answers.

FORTHCOMING DILEMMAS

Discussions about the future take numbers seriously. For example, France, Germany and the United Kingdom together have more than ten million Muslims and more than 6000 mosques.[32] The number of Muslims in the European Union is likely to increase. The officials in Brussels claim to be committed to the non-EU countries that have already been granted candidate status or wish to apply and eventually become full EU member states. This means that if Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo become members of the EU, its Muslim population will amount for over 100 million. But are the Brussels decision-makers ready to face a more obvious presence of Islam in the EU? In his analysis, Caldwell shows that the importance of Islam in Muslim communities in Europe is on the rise: "In France, 85 percent of Muslim students describe their religious beliefs as 'very important,' versus 35 percent of non-Muslims. In Germany, too, religiosity is more widespread among Muslim immigrants than among natives – 81 percent of Turks come from a religious background, versus 23 percent of Germans."[33] These percentages are likely to be even higher with more Muslims in the EU.

However, the lack of well-defined policies to address Islam in the EU equals an emergence of new challenges. For example, the accession of Turkey to the EU would be a good test to understand the relationship between the Union and Islam. In his study, Erik Zürcher correctly argues that Turkey's accession to the EU "would confront the Union with a state whose historical development has left it with ties between religion and the state that go further than those of any other member" – an aspect that would surely change in the long term due to the unavoidable democratization process characterized by greater religious plurality.[34] Indeed, Brussels officials are aware of the existing differences between the two parties. In 2005, one of the reports revealed:

> Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments centers on cultural and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognizes and respects diversity, supporters of Turkey's EU bid believe that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant. The EU

[32] Statistics offered by European Commission's Eurostat and Network of European Foundations.
[33] Christopher Caldwell, op. cit., 143.
[34] Erik J. Zürcher, *The European Union, Turkey and Islam* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 54.

> member states' concerns over Turkey's human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey's prolonged application process.[35]

Although optimistic about the EU-Turkey cooperation, this statement warns about complexities accompanying Turkey's path towards the EU. Still, if cultural and religious differences are given priority, the extent to which both parties are ready to compromise is worthy of consideration. While both the EU and Turkey are proud of their cultures, religious beliefs and prejudices, it will be difficult to abandon these as substantially irrelevant. Moreover, it is the EU which has insisted on greater European identity as a valid counter objection to Islamic identity within the Union. Finally, different understandings about human rights may be conflicting, as both sides have long-established records in this field.[36]

With regard to the other, above-mentioned potential EU member states, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take the first example, is rather unstable.[37] The religious composition of the country has always mattered and in the case of any new conflict, the parties involved could easily ask for and receive support from countries with a shared religious belief. This was already the case in the past and there is no reason to doubt its repetition. In fact, the period following the end of the war and division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 has been characterized by further accentuation of religious differences among the country's constituent peoples. Alongside this, Tone Bringa noted a dual relevance of Islam for Bosnian Muslims: first, it brings and binds them closer together as opposed to Serbian or Croatian, thus Orthodox or Catholic and, second, it connects them to Muslims worldwide as opposed to non-Muslims.[38] This notion is important in relation to the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the EU. Apart from being perceived as a tool to improve the overall economic and political performance of the county, it is questionable whether EU membership would manage to bring Bosnian peoples together or if Muslims would prioritize the establishment of greater links with other Muslim communities in the EU, thus supporting greater Islamic identity.

In predominantly Muslim Albania, Islam has gained a fuller relevance since the collapse of Communism. Contrary to expectations, American and, more importantly, European investment did not materialize instantly – an important aspect that inspired the slogan "Towards Europe or Islam." In her study, Miranda Vickers summarized the outcome: "In the months that followed [the fall of Communism] an Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank was established in Tirana and around 20 Arab Islamic foundations were opened throughout the country. Foreign Islamic organizations began a country-wide mosque construction program and even funded the expenses of those Albanians wishing to travel to Mecca for the annual Hajj pilgrimage."[39] However, two decades after, it is difficult to believe that strong connections already established between Albania and some Arab countries will be fully ignored when discussing the accession of Albania to the EU. In

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[35] "EU-Turkey Relations,"
Internet: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678, 26/07/2010.

[36] For an analysis of human rights, see, for example, Arikan, Harun, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?*, (Hampshire, Ashgate, 2006), 111-157.

[37] Bosnia-Herzegovina is the sixtieth and the only European country listed in "The 2010 Failed States Index" of the 60 most troubled countries in the world (*Foreign Policy*, July/August 2010, 76).

[38] Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way* (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 197.

[39] Miranda Vickers, *Islam in Albania* (Shrivenham, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008), 2.

fact, as observed by Vickers, "[s]ome Albanians believe that one reason Europe appears to be in no rush to embrace Albania as a member of the European Union, is that the majority of the population come from a Muslim background."[40]

Finally, in Kosovo, a country that has faced numerous problems regarding its international recognition, Islam has been one of the most important dividing characteristics between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, thus Christians and Muslims. However, some EU member states, such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom, although having openly claimed to have occasional problems with their own Muslims, never abandoned the Muslims in Kosovo in their fight for independence. Brussels officials seem to have ignored the religious aspect of Kosovo and the idea that an independent Kosovo will possibly create greater links with Muslims across the EU and further undermine the efforts surrounding European identity. Again, here double standards seem to penetrate some significant decisions related primarily to the present EU policy-making and the future European identity. In fact, the case of Kosovo can easily be interpreted as the EU's readiness to reconsider its project about a European identity or even abandon it.

One scholar examines the state of affairs across the European Union and notes that "the accession of Muslim countries and the rise of far-right mobilization and violence can only be addressed effectively under a broad consensus among its members. Across Europe, however, the citizens are split regarding its cultural identity and social model."[41] This split is even more accentuated by the fact that immigration and the Islamization of immigrants in the EU is regulated by the individual member states, not the Union. Accordingly, extreme differences between Germany and the Netherlands in relation to the legal status of Islam represent an additional challenge to the idea about European identity.[42] Furthermore, a reconsideration of the European identity will imply a reconsideration of Western values. In this respect, Zürcher has a valid point when saying: "The many Muslims in the EU member states also mean that European identity and civilization can no longer be defined in purely Western terms."[43]

The present European Union struggles with tolerance. According to Michael Ignatieff,

> [t]he essential task in teaching 'toleration' is to help people see themselves as individuals, and then to see others as such – that is, to make problematic that unthought, unconsidered fusion of personal and group identity on which racism depends. For racism and intolerance are, at a conceptual level, procedures of abstraction in which actual, real individuals in all their specificity are depersonalized and turned into ciphers or carriers of hated group characteristics.[44]

If looking closer at the concept of European tolerance, "with its philosophical foundations and political aims, [it] was the result of persistent efforts by different and quarrelling peoples who

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[40] Ibid., 5.

[41] Juan Díez Medrano, "The Public Sphere and the European Union's Political Identity," in Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106.

[42] In Germany, the state and religious institutions are not separated; while the Jewish community, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church are all recognized by the state, Islam is not. In the Netherlands, the state and religious institutions are separated; the Dutch system allows all religions to establish their own institutions, including Islam.

[43] Erik J. Zürcher,, op. cit., 74.

[44] Michael Ignatieff, "Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences," in Ronald Beiner (ed), *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999), 101.

basically were not tolerant at all."[45] For example, with regard to Muslims, apart from seeing the *burqa* as a symbol for "the repression that women can suffer in Islam" and a threat to "security, sexual equality and secularism," some European governments would like to see it banned although "banning it altogether would be an infringement on the individual rights which their culture normally struggles to protect."[46] Out of 5 million Muslims in France, only about 2000 cover their face fully. This micro-minority was enough for the National Assembly to pass a draft law on 13 July 2010 stating that "no one can, in the public space, wear clothing intended to hide the face."[47] By becoming law, the ban is expected to apply both to the residents and visitors in France and offenders will face penalties, fines or prison.[48] Thus, while the French leaders justify the ban as the right way to fight all forms of religious extremism, they cannot predict possible reactions. Indeed, if talking about consequences of the ban, the most dangerous aspect seems overlooked: the French leadership has ignored the fact that the decision to ban *burqas* "may stigmatize Islam and create a defensive reaction" across the EU.[49]

CONCLUSION

The presence of Islam in the European Union represents a growing concern both for the Muslims and the Europeans who, while having to understand that the days when the Union was exclusively Christian are gone, will have to integrate their Muslim communities. In this respect, I addressed some of the present issues and debates. In the future, new enlargements of the EU will bring more Muslims into the Union. Accordingly, policy-making should focus on the process of inclusion and less on the ideas to strengthen European identity that, intentionally or not, could lead to exclusion or to the emergence of an ever stronger Islamic identity across the EU. The media and the public are aware of the complexity of the subject and are ready to discuss the future. Indeed, while some contributions manage to inspire further Islamophobia by questioning whether Europe will become "a new 'Eurabia'," [50] others try to transmit what many European Muslims see as the cosmopolitan nature of Islam and its readiness to coexist with the others.[51] But under what conditions?

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[45] Evyatar Friesel, *The Days and the Seasons* (Detroit, MI, Wayne State University Press, 1996),102.

[46] "A Bad Idea," *The Economist*, 15 May 2010, 18.

[47] Quoted in Bobby Ghosh, "The Moment," *Time*, 26 July 2010, 7.

[48] David Gauthier-Villars, "France Advances Ban on Some Islamic Veils," *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 (July 2010), A15.

[49] "Running for Cover," *The Economist*, Internet: http://www.economist.com/node/16113091/print, 26/07/2010.

[50] For example, one discussant noted: "What will Europe be like in 20 or 30 years we simply cannot know for sure. The dominant cultures may rise up in reaction to an increasing Islamization of their population. One thing for sure, look for some major cultural conflicts in the future. Will Europe quietly pass into the night and increasingly transition into a new 'Eurabia'? Maybe. I am praying and hoping for a Christian revival to spread across the face of Europe once more and bring thousands of Muslims to Christ—that too would bring a major change to Europe and beyond" ("The Islamization of Europe," Internet: http://answersforthefaith.com/2009/08/08/the-islamization-of-europe/, 10/07/2010).

[51] As Maisami put it: "Islam's future depends upon its ability to wed Western-style modernism with Islamic principles, or, in other words, whether it can develop an Islamic-style modernism. The challenge is to engage in modernity without sacrificing Muslim values or undermining Islamic principles. 'As we are only slowly realizing, Islam is truly a world religion, increasingly visible in Europe and the United States as well as Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.' It is significant for the future of Islam that 'the capitals and major cities of Islam are not only Cairo, Istanbul, Mecca, but equally Paris, London, New York'" (M. Maisami, "Islam and Globalization," *The Fountain*, Summer 2003).

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SCHELER AND GHAZĀLĪ: EXPLORATIONS OF THE FINALITY OF KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Ms. Zora Hesová

ABSTRACT

The paper explores ways in which Islamic tradition in general, and Islamic philosophy in particular, contributes to a constructive rethinking of modernity in a dialogue between Western and Islamic thought. In modern Western thought, ethics and rational speculation came to be largely disconnected. Knowledge is conceived as instrumental to human empowerment and reduced to naturalised representation and information management. Ethics and values become problematic as ethical motivation could not be satisfactorily rationalised in the modern context. A series of European thinkers consider this disconnection as a major flaw of modern consciousness and address the question of modern moral wilderness.

In Islamic philosophy, as well as in the pre-modern European tradition, on the other hand, knowledge has always had an ethical goal. Knowing and ethical becoming are indissociable. The moral dimension of knowledge is grounded in a specific anthropology, an epistemic concept of practical and experiential knowledge and a teleological frame of thought.

After exposing the problem, the paper will concentrate on the ethical dimension of knowing as it is expressed in the work of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. In third part it will look at the different ways in which modern Muslim thinkers from diverse backgrounds — Allama Iqbal, Mahdi Ha'iri Yazdi, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and others — have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view of knowledge in modern terms. The paper will seek to characterise and analyse the multiplicity of approaches: metaphysical, analytical and traditionalist and show echoes of corresponding undertakings in Western philosophy.

Keywords: Hamid al-Ghazali, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Scheler, Ethics, Knowledge

Ali Allawi, an Iraqi politician and Islamic thinker, who has written the well-informed and critical book on the American occupation of Iraq has also completed a work titled *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization*. He explains that during the last 200 years the Islamic countries were faced with a triple challenge: the inescapable processes of modernisation, colonisation and globalisation. While modernity is not necessarily anti-Islamic per se, none of these processes came from within Islamic societies. Ali Allawi takes up the task to define the crisis of Islamic civilisation as an inadequate – too narrowly political and too defensive – response to these modern processes, failing to take into account the breadth of the Islamic tradition. He then tries to point to what he believes needs to be recovered from the tradition and the spirit of Islam, in two words, "wellsprings of Islamic ethics" and the "sense of the sacredness." Ali Allawi did not define some new political tract but asked what makes modernity really different from the tradition. He speaks a language familiar to some critiques of modernity in the West.

Modernity is a challenge for the Western thought as well and not only the modernity of Islam on which the West so often likes to speculate. Modernity is a challenge for Western modern civilization itself.

There is, in my view, a fundamental philosophical question for which the Islamic tradition is a source of inspiration and which stands close to Ali Allawi's concerns. One of the defining aspects of modernity - questioned from the beginning of twentieth century onward - are modern forms of knowledge and their specific ends. A continuous criticism of modernity helped to highlight a big gap between pre-modern thought and European modernity: the disappearance of ethical dimension previously ascribed to knowledge. A closer look at the two traditions suggests that European modernity and Islamic thought do markedly diverge *in their perspective on the finality of knowledge*. While in the post-Cartesian Western tradition of thought, knowledge stands for an instrument of practical action, in the medieval Islamic thought knowledge is conceived of as serving a distinct, a higher purpose. In the former perspective, it makes little sense to ask to what end we seek and produce knowledge, because there are innumerable partial ends. In the latter, the unity of ends makes all the difference.

The "finality of knowledge" is also a vast subject. German philosopher Max Scheler suggested a distinction that allows us to approach the question without much speculation. Scheler distinguished between *forming*, *salvific* and *instrumental* forms of knowledge. A close look at these shows that we can only make sense of them by looking into the tradition, or even into the neighboring tradition of Islam - the reason why Max Scheler called for a cultural exchange between West and East in order to compensate the Western conceptual loss.

I want to explore the Schelerian criticism and his exhortation idea in four brief steps: Basing myself on Scheler's distinction (1) put into a historical perspective (2), I want to follow his footsteps and show that there is, indeed, a thought and tradition in Islam containing the forms of knowledge neglected in the Modern West in the work of Abu Hamid al-Ghazālī (3) and that this particular form of knowledge has proved to be a rich subject for both Western and Eastern thinkers to reflect upon modernity (4) and conclude with examples of parallel, Eastern and Western endeavours, to work with tradition (5).

1. Different types of knowledge

2. Two traditions and circumventing the paradigm shift

3. Al-Ghazālī's notion of knowledge

4. Challenging the narrow conception of knowledge

5. Conclusion: Modernity and tradition, East and West

1. DIFFERENT TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

Is there a finality to knowing? To what end do we seek knowledge? The question seems superfluous. Knowledge is obviously something valuable in itself. Knowledge generally increases our efficiency in the world and our understanding of it. Yet, the question becomes a fit subject for inquiry when we assume there are different ways to know things and different objectives attached to them. German philosopher and founder of philosophical anthropology Max Scheler (1874-1928) distinguished between the following types of knowledge or knowing: *instrumental* knowledge, *formative* knowledge and *redemption* knowledge.[1] Every type of knowing has specific motivations, aims and proper knowledge acts.

[1] In: Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft *Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens*. Francke, 1980, first published in 1926

Instrumental knowledge (*Leistungswissen)* is all that opens the world for human action, and makes action possible and efficient. Scientific and technological knowledge, most of the knowledge offered in universities, is of this kind of knowledge, animated by the practical concerns. Next to instrumental knowledge, Max Scheler defines a (self-) formative knowledge (*Bildungswissen*), that is, values and orientations that build and cultivate a human personality. Formation of cultivation (*Bildung*) is not a category of knowledge as it does not refer to a level of education or instruction. It is a category of being, a form of a personality. To that, Scheler adds a third form (*Heilswissen*), redemption knowledge, that is knowledge that brings about the overcoming of tensions and contradiction related to the being in the world.

While it is quite clear what Scheler meant, in his famous lecture of 1925,[2] by the critical notion of the instrumentality of knowledge, it is much less obvious to what cultivation and redemption forms of knowledge he referred. This difficulty was not only due to a short space given to their explanation by Scheler, but also to a great deal of anthropological theory that was necessary for Scheler to develop and explain them.

Yet Scheler's distinctions are of interest for a simple reason: Only the first kind of knowledge is one that takes a familiar, clear, "objective" form. When we seek knowledge about the world around us, we generally mean to learn facts, discover regularities and formulate their laws. The types of knowledge involved are natural laws and verified facts, products of observation and systematisation. Intersubjective methods of verification and justification make this knowledge objective. The finality of the instrumental knowledge is obvious: Knowledge is information gathered for the practical goal of action in the world. It is the knowledge sought by the Arendtian *homo faber*.[3] Its finality is the achievement of a particular goal of an action. Knowledge for achievement does not have a finality of its own. It is pure "information," a transmission of facts and factual pieces of knowledge, serving the goals of individual actions.

That is why Scheler's distinction is markedly critical. Being *instrumental* to something is like having finality subservient to the goal of a different, independent thing, like the mastery of nature. Purely instrumental knowing has no finality of its own; it is deprived of a *telos* and an epistemology without teleology.

Scheler's critique consists in saying that this most prevalent type of knowing is value-free. In order to highlight what he understands by value and knowledge, Scheler suggests two other types of knowing: that of personal cultivation (*Bildung*) and knowing towards salvation or integrity (*Heil*). Personal development (being and becoming someone of value) and "salvation" are indicators of a purpose of knowing. It situates values and purpose within the human self, and within a human existential horizon. These two value-laden forms of knowledge are responsible for the transmission of values and virtues, and helpful in overcoming the contradictions and conflicts related to worldly life.

Yet, the notion of cultivating *virtue* and the concept of *salvation* have lost their unique content in modernity. Seeking a value-laden knowledge in cultivating virtue and in salvation does not

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[2] F. Cohen, *Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung* (Bonn, 1925)

[3] Latin for "Man the Maker" or the working man or the creative man. An expression coined by Hannah Arendt and Max Scheler to describe humans as primarily seeking control of their environment and lives through the production of tools. See Max Scheler: *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928) and Hannah Arendt: *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben* (1958).

immediately reveal to what kind of knowledge it actually is. The West has long viewed knowledge as *facts* and *information.* Since the beginning of the Scottish Enlightenment, philosophers have argued that facts (that is, "information") cannot ground values, that is, virtue and salvation.

Scheler does not elaborate on the topic: he limits himself to pointing out that there are other human activities (formation, education, cultivation) and needs (integrity, salvation) that also employ learning and knowing, only of a different, unrecognized kind.

My thesis, aiming to expand Scheler's critique, is as follows. Scheler's and Western inability to think values and knowledge together marks a difference between two traditions of thought. Western, post-Cartesian thought is governed by the instrumentalisation of knowledge and ascribes finality only to action to which knowledge is instrumental. Yet it does make sense in other, earlier traditions. In Latin West and Islam, the idea that attaining knowledge has a distinctive finality – such as personal cultivation and salvation – is fully intelligible. Let us first see what makes them differ on account of knowledge, bearing in mind those three forms.

2. TWO TRADITIONS AND THE PARADIGM CHANGE

By *modern Western thought* I understand philosophical perspectives on science that draw on post-Cartesian rationalist thought. It is based on a specific notion of nature as a mechanistic universe and a non-metaphysical positivism. In modernity, knowledge has been historicised and deprived of a *telos*. Since Kant, we know that science describes the world by means of symbolic representation in which the objects of science are historical: evolving and a construction. With Thomas Kuhn we learnt that the subject of science is historical as well – a community of scientists working with evolving paradigms. With Hannah Arendt we realised that the use of most knowledge is limited to production. The great amounts of knowledge produced by natural and social sciences have no special purpose other than the plurality of aims of diverse actions they serve. Accordingly, there is no place for a higher kind of knowledge, elevated above others. A piece of knowledge contained in the representation is of greater or lesser information value, it is more or less probable, it is better or worse justified but it is never more than that.

Medieval Islamic tradition, on the other hand, does ascribe value and purpose to knowledge. As such, there is a hierarchy of types of knowing and knowledge has a metaphysical dimension. Islamic thought has two main sources: the Islamic Revelation and Aristotelian Philosophy. The centrality of revelation gives all abstract thought – be it in Islamic East or in Latin West – a determination: a religious purpose. The second pillar, Aristotelianism, is a conceptual apparatus helping to explain the working of a teleologically structured world. Here, human life and human action have an ultimate end, a finality. The end can be formulated either in religious terms, or in Aristotelian ones respectively: as a fulfillment of a religious destiny of man, mostly conceived of as a preparation for the hereafter, and in search of perfection and fulfillment of human nature. Human existence is seen as created with a purpose; it is a frame for all action and also determines the use of knowledge. In this context, knowledge proper can be defined as knowledge of matters divine, that is, as knowledge of the end-determination of human life and of the path to its fulfillment or perfection.

There is an underlying analogy between what can be known about human ends and what can be known about the universe. Unlike the modern mechanistic universe, the teleological world as a whole has an end and humans are a part of it. Knowledge thus has two dimensions: epistemological and ontological. First, knowledge is the perspective of a knowing subject through

which he grasps objective and general structures of the world in its totality. Then there is a second, ontological or ontic perspective. By knowledge man does not only represent the world but also the structure of his own being that guides its living towards preset purposes. An understanding of the world directly leads to the knowledge of purposes of a person's own being, or existence. Thus knowing and being are intimately related; one seeks to know in order to connect or partake in being.

This all too short a description shows that there is a difference in the *the metaphysical basis of epistemology* between the two worldviews: teleological and mechanical, non-metaphysical. Historically, this difference corresponds to a change. From the Western perspective, a modern epistemic paradigm has replaced the Aristotelian one. Beginning with Galileo and Descartes, science works with a wholly different idea of what is to know nature and its laws. This modern paradigm has proven immensely successful: it has brought about modern physics and great and incredibly swift progress in technology. The transition from the Aristotelian and teleological metaphysical paradigm to the scientific, positivist one occurred between 16th and 17thcenturies in science and in the 19th century in philosophy and has proven irreversible. European thinking does not subscribe to any kind of higher purpose than those negotiated socially and politically, even after a great number of attempts to theorise such a purpose has failed. One could say that a process of immanentisation and secularisation of thought[4] has made the teleological metaphysical frame and its epistemological presuppositions a matter of the past. Along with it also all type of knowledge which seeks to connect knowledge and being has lost intelligibility.

This change is generally considered a positive one, a progress. If we think only about the success of modern science and the relative lack of success in explaining the physical world of the Aristotelian paradigm, we could easily come to this conclusion. There is no going back and there is nothing really interesting, epistemologically, in pre-modern worlds.

Yet, the progress in question is undisputed only in natural science. Philosophy, moral sciences and value systems do not, on the other hand, bring about undisputed progress, only a change. There are no general, common-sense criteria to measure progress in thought. There can and should be criticism. With Max Scheler, we could argue that the science model does not represent any superior kind of knowing, only one model which has come to dominate the *homo faber*' technical culture.

Scheler's criticism, though, would be valid if his notions of cultivation and redemption knowledge were more than vague ideas but real, identifiable and distinct types of knowledge. While they intuitively seem interesting or plausible, it is difficult, for reasons explained above, to give them substance within post-Cartesian epistemology. Scheler could not do more than use them as critical concepts, in order to highlight that which lacks in the instrumental dimension of knowledge.

This is one of the reasons why the medieval tradition with its pre-modern paradigm is of interest to us today. It is as a reservoir of alternatives, if we can find them. Not for its scientific concepts, but because it contains among others, a different view of knowledge. In my view, there are most interesting examples of Scheler's *cultivation* and *redemption* knowledge. Especially, the Islamic

[4] Recently Charles Taylor has attempted a conceptually balanced and historically broad account of that process in *A Secular Age* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2007)

thought contains not only examples, but elaborate theories and description of a tradition of knowledge that is not instrumental. One of them we find in al-Ghazālī.

3. AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S PURPOSEFUL KNOWLEDGE

The Islamic tradition does indeed have a concept of non-discursive knowledge in which epistemic and ethical aspects of knowledge merge. Moreover, I want to argue, it is more than a metaphysical idea that could be dismissed once the metaphysical assumptions in question come into question. It is also a *kind* of knowing and a type of knowledge that defies simple description precisely because its purpose is larger than simply to state the truth and inform.

There is a host of related notions to the knowledge form in question: *ma'rifa*, knowledge by tasting (*dhawq*), knowledge by presence (*'ilm Hudūrī*), etc. This non-discursive kind of knowledge was made subject to explanations by theoretical epistemology (e.g. by Ibn Sīna, Suhrawardi). The most interesting approach towards *ma'rifa*, showing that it is as a distinct *kind* of knowing, is by a thinker who puts forward its practical side.

In his autobiography *Deliverer from Error* (*Munqidh min al-ḍalāl),* Abu Hāmid al-Ghazālī distinguishes between three sources of knowledge: *authority* (*taqlīd*-learning from teachers, books, tradition and hear-say), *inference* (reflection, conceptual work and rational justification) and *tasting*. The last form is the "highest": full certainty and confusion-free guidance comes only in the form of experiential states of the heart. Ghazālī proposes an alternative epistemology. It does not exclude learning and rational reflection; rather, it adds something to discursivity: personal experience and insight. Only, this experience is not to be thought of as some fleeting mystical vision, but rather as a product of a long and strenuous process of cultivation of virtues of character and virtues of distinguishing perception (in al-Ghazālī's words, purification of character and states of the heart).

To sum up Ghazālī's 40 volumes of the *Ihyā al-ulūm al-dīn* in a few words, only those who learn and habituate themselves to apply religious prescriptions (that al-Ghazālī has seen as medication for the soul) and both transmitted and rational knowledge in their practical (devotional as well as ethical) life-conduct, will be able to make their "selves" (*nafs*, *qalb* – their souls and hearts) instruments of knowledge capable of grasping (capable of tasting and of insight) the meaning of elementary religious concepts (such as creation, divine agency, divine power, etc.) so that they give a form to their lives and fulfill them (in a lasting happiness).

This "higher" type of knowledge has a specific finality: one learns for the sake of human fulfillment, that is, perfecting oneself in that which defines humanity and for the sake of attaining this happiness; there is a distinction between useful knowledge (serving human fulfillment) and useless knowledge (serving other ends); there is a hierarchy of knowledge or insight along with an idea of ascent in both knowledge and being (Ghazālī's *maqām*, or stations, on the wayfarer's path); knowledge is a path from elementary knowledge of the masses to the more captivating and delightful type of insight of the few; knowledge is practical - something becomes really known only when fully incorporated into acts and being. Knowledge of this type does not reside in books, but in a form of life.

The important aspect of Ghazālī's thought is that he did not seek to explain what this kind of knowledge of unveiling (*'ilm al-mukāshafa*) is, but wrote a series of books of diverse lengths about the practical ways to attain it (*'ilm al-mu'āmala*). Rather than theorising on 'Being' in a metaphysical way, al-Ghazālī shows a practical way of connecting knowledge, ethical

perfectionism and human fulfillment, that is, of connecting the realm described by epistemology, ontology and ethics in speculative philosophy. As the objects of knowledge are the elements of a religious outlook, divine names, it is clear that the content is a kind of non-discursive, experiential grasping of the createdness of the universe and man's place in it, of course in an Islamic way. The way to this teleological knowing is not intellectual only, crucially, it is a practical path.

Ghazālī bases himself not only on metaphysical arguments, but on experience and tradition of a kind of religious practice. As such, his account of knowledge escapes the damage done by a loss of teleological concepts and remains comprehensible until today.[5] Moreover, there are aspects of Ghazālian epistemology that directly mirror Scheler's distinctions.

Cultivation knowledge

For Ghazālī, real knowledge comes from the practical action of self-cultivation. The reason is explained in anthropological terms borrowed from Islamic Philosophy and Sufism. Both the instrument of knowledge and the specific capacity for knowing are present in man as potentials and need to be cultivated and developed.

Ghazālī bases his non-discursive, experiential knowledge in the concept of self (*nafs*) or in the synonymous heart (*qalb*). In the Aristotelian and also Quranic Philosophy, the human self is a dynamic system in which governance of reason and balance of "passions" needs to be established. It is only then that the immaterial soul's capacity for knowing can be deployed. Ghazālī thus sets a preparation as a prerequisite of knowledge and this preparation is of a moral kind. A reform of character through moral discipline and spiritual struggle seeks to establish a *nafs* of a rational and virtuous character, liberated from the distractions of its lower, material parts. Self-control and capacity of self-fashioning are prerequisites to knowing the good because the self is both the place of understanding and of realization of the good. The idea that unprepared soul is incapable of the higher knowledge of purposes (of "the good") is a general late antique trope.[6] The underlying theory is Aristotelian functional psychology, developed further in Islamic literary (*adab)* thought into a system of virtue ethics[7] and in Islamic philosophy metaphysics centered on the notion of the immaterial intellect.[8]

Ghazālī has added a second prerequisite, a Sufi variation on the theme of higher knowing. He developed the Quranic notion of tasting (*dhawq* – 'tasting' death, punishment, justice, joy) into a technical epistemic notion of an experiential knowing. It is an inner sense, akin to the talent for music and poetry, more or less present as talents are among people, and always cultivated through practical training. It is like a practical realization, in both senses of the word, of that which one

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[5] This fact is relatd to Ghazālī's intention. He was not isolated in his epistemic views, in fact, he gave expression to a scheme of things that existed, in different forms, in almost the whole spectrum of Islamic thought, including philosophy. Mostly, he targeted an audience familiar with philosophy. It is this audience that he sought to bring back to a certain kind of religious practice; he did not have to convince them about teleology, only about the imperative to seek better knowledge and happiness in religious practice. This is why his discourse, aimed at his-days philosophers, is very explicit on the underpinnings of his thought and on the status of practice. For the "practical" intentions of his thought, see the first preface of *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, tr. Michael E. Marmura (Brigham: Young University Press, 1997).

[6] Analysed by Pierre Hadot in his *Philosophy as a Way of Life* and by Michel Foucault in his *Hermeneutics of a Subject*.

[7] See Ibn Miskawayh's *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq.*

[8] Especially Avicennian philosophy. See Herbert Davidson , *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and the Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)

knows. As tasting the savor of honey or sweetness of love is not equivalent to their mere description (experience is needed), it refers to a type of knowing involved in such cases. The analogy does not consist in the momentary psychological experience of knowing (Williams) but refers to a life-long cultivation of this other epistemic sense. In a non-religious example, being capable of recognizing and appreciating a sonata by Brahms also demands a long direct experience and a cultivation of a sense for "the wine of music." Only those "initiated" by long practice can evaluate and appreciate the beauty of interpretation.

The training in question is the *Sufi* path adapted for a general public. In the forty Volumes of the Revival of Religious Sciences (*Ihyā al-ulūm al-dīn*) Ghazālīs says that this kind of training consists in the acquisition of virtues of character and beyond that in a cultivation of *Sufi* virtues (conversion, patience, gratitude, *tawḥīd*, God-reliance, love). Those virtues always have an intellectual basis and practical habitus; their deepening leads the adept to experiential realization of a deeper sense contained in them. The noetic dimension refers to deepening the sense of Islamic teachings (*tauba* - concentration on the hereafter; *tawḥīd* - apprehension of the world seen in the perspective of oneness; *tawakkul* – trust in Allah, *mahabba* - appreciation of the miraculous nature of world as creation, etc.) The adept is helped by a series of auxiliary virtues containing spiritual exercise (introspection, control of one's progress, sincerity, meditation on death and creation, remembrance).

These are in fact, methods of internalization of the various aspects of a teleological frame. To the Hellenistic idea of a perfectible self and a preparation for knowledge, Ghazālī added a detailed, practical and concrete picture of the process of cultivation: its stages, mechanisms and aims. He made the process and the noetic dimension of ethical cultivation entirely comprehensible even outside the pre-modern frame.

Redemption knowledge

Finally, knowledge has a goal it shares with the goal of human life. The life's aim in the philosophical tradition is happiness – the Aristotelian *eudaimonia*, the *sa'āda* of Miskawayh and Ibn Sīna. Contentment, happiness and contemplation of good and beauty stem from the mere exercise of good and beautiful, from virtuous form of life. That is, knowing what is good leads to doing the good and finding a full satisfaction in one's exercise of rational freedom. The "substantial good" in question has to be seen as one grounded in the perfected self - not in just an idea.

Ghazālī added the preparation for the hereafter. Both Ibn Sīna and Ghazālī talked about salvation, *najāt,* and redemption virtues, *munjīyāt*. Knowledge was the way to salvation for both: contemplation for Avicenna, living out the experiential knowledge through the cultivation of virtues for Ghazālī. The implication of salvation is both religious and non-religious. The primary motivation for Ghazālī is of course religious. Yet *najāt* does not only have sense of redemption in the afterlife. Already in this life, prophetic knowledge and rational governance of one's practical life are synonymous to healing (the Avicennian *shifā'*) through a right epistemic stance and "unworldly happiness" and spiritual delights that accompany it. This is a widespread topic in Islamic philosophy, from ar-Rāzī to Miskawayh, and from Ibn-e-Sīna to Ghazālī.

Moreover, if we understand Ghazālī's higher knowing as the internalization of the teleological frame, we have given another dimension to what Scheler describes as the overcoming of contradiction of human existence.

To sum up: Ghazālian epistemology presents specific forms of knowing. They can be said to correspond to Schelers' cultivation knowledge *(Bildungswissen)* and redemption knowledge (*Heilswissen*). As such they support the Schelerian alternative to the narrower concept of knowledge mentioned earlier.

The focus on practice makes Ghazālī stand out among others, Muslims and Christians, who reflected upon the teleological knowing. He tries to explain why a modern mind will not be able to fully accept the contents and be persuaded by this sort of *Bildungswissen* and *Heilswissen*: not because it makes no sense but because it consists in the practical preparation of the self which cannot be put aside.

4. CHALLENGING THE NARROWNESS OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE

Where do we go from here? A look into the Islamic past shows that there are indeed strong examples of other ways of relating to knowledge than the prevalent instrumental one. A Western philosopher could argue that the Ghazālian example is of limited interest – that is, only of historical interest. Islamic tradition to which Ghazālī and Ibn Sīna both belong is still a part of the pre-modern, Aristotelian world. We can only make sense of Ghazālian knowledge in an Islamic or an Aristotelian context. It rests on a teleological anthropology and thus on an overall scheme of things no longer prevalent in the modern West; its study is only a glance into Europe's intellectual past.

There are two objections to arguments relegating Islamic thought and this specific view on knowledge, to the past.

First: Rather than an epistemological theory, Ghazālian rendering of the experiential knowledge is a description of a *practice* and an inquiry both into its conceptual and practical structure. The kind of knowing, being a wide-spread practice in Ghazālī's times, had an existence outside theory and outside the books, in a long religious tradition until modernity. It would not be very difficult to show how Ghazālian virtuous knowing has lived on, particularly in *Sufi* poetry, in the Iranian Shiraz School of thought and further until today in texts and practices of a number of Islamic authors and groups. This continuity, for the sake of this short exercise, is an interesting subject of study and one aspect of the importance of Islamic civilization today.

Secondly, the critical thought of Max Scheler has not been unique in the West. The narrowness of the technical, control- and technology-driven knowledge production has been, in various ways and with various conclusions, a subject of a large number of studies from phenomenology (Edmund Husserl), anthropology (Hannah Arendt) to critical studies (Michel Foucault) and moral philosophy (Alisdair MacIntyre). They constitute a critical engagement with European modernity and attempts to think beyond the fetters of hitherto powerful modern paradigm.

Some of these works explicitly call for a return to the previous Aristotelian paradigm. Their aim, surely, is not to take it back, but to use it as an inspiration of different form of thinking, in order to renew modern Western thought. Others directly suggest learning from ways of thinking beyond Europe's limits - Islam, India, China, etc.

In the following paragraphs, I will give a brief overview of the ways in which a glance into the depths of a philosophical tradition has been useful and important from a critical and a systematic

point of view. "Forms of knowledge" stand here for the most general and also most striking aspect that comes up in studying tradition.

(a) As a contrast

As Max Scheler would have noted, the reminder from the past, be it Latin or Islamic, functions as a foil to the one prevailing conception of knowledge – the impersonal, objective methodically justified information – through an example of a different way of knowing: the fulfilling acquaintance with ideal forms of a human life and character. It is this reminder that makes the limitations and narrowness of the instrumental *episteme* apparent. As such, a "cultural exchange" is beneficial especially to the West who has "forgotten" about the other forms of knowledge and has difficulties in understanding societies and cultures. The foil of the past proves important e.g. in anthropology. Understanding modern Islamic practice, benefitting from cultural exchange would be impossible for the West without it.[9] Equally, stepping out of the orientalist mindset as well as the narrow secularist paradigm requires a larger understanding of one's past too.

It seems further that while generally sidelined by hard facts and naturalistic knowledge, there is a void and a need to fill it. Our common concepts have roots and we are reminded of them by simply using those certain words. Wisdom, the focal point in philosophy, and science, comes from the Latin *sapere*, which also means *tasting*, similar to *dhawq.* As I have attempted to show, al-Ghazālī's knowing by tasting is such a reminder of this forgotten relation to knowledge. The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has further pointed to the importance of the practical aspect of every language act and to the fact that language and knowledge have concrete, practical forms without either of them being hegemonic. This reminder of voids helped immensely to direct further inquiry in the philosophy of language, moral philosophy and pragmatism. We can expect that others will follow.

(b) As a historical context of modernity

Michel Foucault, the historian of social sciences, is of the view that awareness and study of previous forms of knowledge and of relationship between the subject of knowing and regime of truth, or discourse, is crucial when we want to grasp modern ways of thinking. Many concepts and ideas seem powerful and immutable, like the idea of truth. These had in fact evolved with time and they had a different meaning in pre-modern times. In Foucault's view, the changes in intellectual perspectives on "truth" are secondary to the fact that our ways of relating to the truth and their forms of knowledge have gone through much more consequential transformations. While working on a genealogy of subject, Foucault wrote a history of forms of knowledge. In the *Hermeneutics of Subject* and *The Care of the Self*, he gave a lot of space to a knowledge form close to the Ghazālian *ma'rifa.* Above all, he made it accessible to a modern reader by explaining the most important and most readily lost aspect – the specific relation to knowledge that makes value-laden knowing possible.

Michel Foucault has explained that the relationship to truth was different in pre-modern times. This is in line in the philosophy of Pierre Hadot. Truth, taken as synonymous to a verified fact or substantiated argument, used to have a different meaning altogether. "Truth" is knowledge that organizes a subject, makes the subject of a particular "regime of truth" reach a state of intellectual,

[9] Talal Asad and Saba Mahmoud are two of the proponents of a critical anthropology of Islam in the US.

ethical development in which he or she can "see", realize, taste that truth. In Hellenistic Antiquity, truth is the expression of a normative, regulative cultural or religious system. It makes little sense for some modern Europeans, but a lot more sense in a religious perspective. Foucault's work in fact is like translating an ancient paradigm into a modern language. As a theoretician of intellectual change and a critique of modernity, Foucault actually bridged the gap between antiquity and modernity.

(c) As a basis for a renewal of modern thought

The moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has built a far stronger and more direct criticism of modern moral thought on his knowledge of the Aristotelian episteme.

The disconnectedness of the "is" and "ought," between the description of the world on the one hand, and norms and ethics on the other, has found critics in the West itself. As expressed in MacIntyre's diagnosis, this disconnectedness equals the loss of a concept of teleology. While the teleological paradigm in natural sciences was replaced by a more practical concept of nature, in moral thought it has not been the case. The loss of teleology in MacIntyre's words, resulted, in moral wilderness, in which discursive philosophy seeks to ground anew, the binding force of "ought" and "good" and finds them either in the feeling and emotions about good and evil (the so called emotivism of Hume), or in rational prescriptions of the logic of mutual recognition of autonomous agents (Kant). There is in the modern moral thought, a lack of of the original impetus towards ethics. Moral motivation is generally the weakest point in modern ethics, because it can hardly flow from an argument.

We could sum up his argument in saying that Western thought has lost the intelligibility of certain notions of human good and perfectible human nature in which virtue was a value per-se and cultivating one's self made full sense. As we have seen in Ghazālī's example, the very sense of learning was to perfect oneself. Perfectible human nature belonged to the Aristotelian, pre-Cartesian concept of nature and man; in the mechanical universe of modern science and technological action, men do not have a nature to fulfill or an ethical state of being to achieve. Men do not seek knowledge in order to be more perfect or simply more virtuous but only to act more efficiently.

5. CONCLUSION: TRADITION AND MODERNITY – EAST AND WEST

It is of course impossible to go back to a pre-modern metaphysical paradigm, as it is impossible to continue speaking of tradition once our conceptual instruments have changed. But MacIntyre suggests revisiting the tradition, especially the concept of teleology, and to find ways to adapt its final thought to modern forms of argumentation.

In conclusion, I want to point to ways in which contemporary thinkers actually make use of tradition. Most interestingly, there are such efforts both in the East and in the West, in modern, secular thought and in religious, Islamic thought, and they often appear as parallel. On both sides, a traditional "content" is moulded into modern "discourse" or concepts and form of expression. The subject of knowledge forms stands in the centre of many of these efforts.

There are three "classes" of thinkers who defend the traditional way of knowing: those who seek a super-tradition, those who intend to reformulate the tradition in modern ways and those who want to modernize the tradition.

The first is *traditionalism* or *perennial philosophy* – a view that there is a common, unchanging structure to human thought, especially visible in most cultures' mystical tradition. Its main proponents are Henry Corbin, [10]a French orientalist and Seyyed Hossein Nasr,[11]a Persian, both with a personal religious stance. They make common intercultural features of religious traditions into a general structure of human thought. Their main basis is the contents of mysticism – Eastern and Western – that is, the forms of knowledge free of modernity and changes but present across all cultures. Because their conceptual tools are beholden to their traditional sources, they remain difficult to approach for those who do not share their view.

Secondly, there are the *modern traditionalists*, those who endeavor to reformulate tradition in modern ways. They are traditional religious men educated both in modern Western and in traditional Aristotelian philosophy. Its two main proponents are French Catholic Jacques Maritain and Iranian Mehdi Haeri Yazdi. Both concentrated their work on tradition and modernity on forms of knowledge. Jacques Maritain studied the concepts of human nature and its epistemic faculties. He coined the concept of *knowledge by connaturality* in an effort to formulate philosophically the concept of knowledge rooted in human nature.[12] Mehdi Haeri Yazdi attempted in his "*Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy*" to formulate in modern philosophical vocabulary the concept of knowledge by presence (*al-'ilm al-ḥuḍūrī al-ishrāqī*). To this end, he used all philosophical tradition from its Greek origins to most recent theories in analytical philosophy, philosophical language and logic.

The modern traditionalists in fact do not do so much work on tradition as they *translate* it into philosophical discourse to make the tradition accessible and usable. In the words of Reza Hajatpour, they not only seek to salvage tradition, but also "to give philosophy a place in the spiritual life of men" because for them "philosophy is a free space for thinking, a meeting place for men and traditions."[13]

Thirdly, there are those who try to *revive tradition from within modernity* – here, the forms of knowledge and teleology, as found in the tradition – within the modern, philosophical paradigm, without a systematic recourse to religious concepts. The landscape of these efforts is vast. I will mention two names to illustrate these endeavors. The Scottish Catholic Alasdair MacIntyre is one: a moral philosopher who works the instruments of philosophy to make them "think" anew, critically and freely, and to conceive of values and ends as rooted in human practice rather than in theories. A Muslim counterpart immediately comes into mind: Allama Iqbal also thought of a renewal of a philosophy of the *khudi* as a way of thinking in modern, philosophical ways, the "possibility of religion" and "his thoughts on non-conceptual modes of approaching reality" a new.

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[10] See e.g. *En Islam Iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques* (4 vols.). Gallimard, 1971 3; *Swedenborg and Esoteric Islam*. (Swedenborg Foundation, 1995).

[11] See e.g. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred* (1989)

[12] Jacques Maritain, *The Range of Reason* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1952); *The Degrees of Knowledge* (NewYork, 1959); See Douglas A. Ollivant, *Jacques Maritain and the many ways of knowing*, (Americain Maritain Association, 2002)

[13] Reza Hajatpour, *Mehdi Hairi Yazdi interkulturell gelesen* Introduction. (Bautz, 2008)

These are examples of efforts parallel in East and West, that should be carried further. Knowing and learning from others can only enrich us and possibly diffuse the contrast between modernity and tradition: traditions are living forces and even modern thought seeks to evolve and recreate a lost dimension for itself.

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ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE AND THE PROSPECT OF ITS REVIVAL TODAY

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the meaning of Islamic architecture and some of its salient characteristics. The discussion is divided into the following sections: (1) The meaning of Islamic architecture; (2) Islamic architecture as a means, not an end; (3) Two examples: the Islamic house and the mosque; (4) Pragmatism and Islamic architecture today; (5) Towards the revival of Islamic architecture. The paper seeks to enhance the awareness, both of the professionals and general readership, as to the importance of correctly conceptualizing and practicing Islamic architecture. The nature of the paper, along with its content, methodology and conclusions, is conceptual and philosophical, rather than empirical. The paper concludes that Islamic architecture is an architecture that embodies the message of Islam. It both facilitates the Muslims' realization of the Islamic purpose and its divine principles on earth, and promotes a lifestyle generated by such a philosophy and principles. At the core of Islamic architecture lies function with all of its dimensions: corporeal, cerebral and spiritual. The role of the form is an important one too, but only inasmuch as it supplements and enhances function.

Keywords: Islamic Architecture, Islam, Muslims, Islamic House, Mosque, Form and function

1. THE MEANING OF ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE

Much has been written and said about the meaning of Islamic architecture. Nonetheless, scholars considerably differed -- and they still do -- in their verdicts as to whether there is an architecture that can be called "Islamic", and if there is, what is the meaning, as well as main characteristics, of such an architectural tradition. To many such people, Islam as a religion is seen irrelevant to architecture, and the latter as one of life's biggest necessities is seen too sophisticated and actual to need a religion as a point of reference.

The answer to the above quandary is that Islamic architecture, as both a concept and sensory reality, exists. Saying otherwise would do a great deal of injustice to both the religion of Islam and its peoples who strove hard for centuries to realize it in their thought, deeds and words. Islam is a comprehensive worldview and a complete way of life. No segment of existence that Islam has neglected. Practicing Islam inevitably means the creation of a comprehensive culture and civilization that carry the imprints of Islamic values, teachings and principles, in some aspects more and in other aspects less. Islam signifies not only prescribed rituals at appointed times, but also comprehensive articles of faith, philosophy, ideology, culture, civilization and all life's systems: personal, family and societal. The subject of architecture is no exception to this tenet. Islamic beliefs shape the ways the Muslims build.

However, it must be borne in mind that it is the nature of Islam that provides humanity with basic rules of morality and guidelines of proper conduct in those spheres of life which are not related to prescribed ritual worship, such as the spheres of art and architecture, for example. Upon such general principles and guidelines people can establish systems, regulations, views and attitudes in

order to comprehend and regulate their worldly life in accordance with their time, region and needs. Since every age has its own problems and challenges, the solutions and perceptions deduced from the fundamental principles and permanent values of life have got to be to some extent different. Their substance, however, due to the uniformity and consistency of the divinely given foundation and sources from which they stem, will always be the same. Islam is based on essential human nature, which is constant and not subject to change according to time and space. It is the outward forms which change while the fundamental principles, the basic values and the essential human nature together with men's basic needs remain unchanged.

So what would be the most proper understanding of Islamic architecture?

Islamic architecture is an architecture whose functions and, to a lesser extent, form, are inspired primarily by Islam. Islamic architecture is a framework for the implementation of Islam. It facilitates, fosters and stimulates the Muslims' *'ibadah* (worship) activities, which, in turn, account for every moment of their earthly lives. Islamic architecture only can come into existence under the aegis of the Islamic perceptions of God, man, nature, life, death and the Hereafter. Thus, Islamic architecture would be the facilities and, at the same time, a physical locus of the actualization of the Islamic message. Practically, Islamic architecture represents the religion of Islam that has been translated into reality at the hands of the Muslims. It also represents the identity of Islamic culture and civilization.

Ibn Abdun, an Andalusian judge from the 12th century, is reported to have said, as quoted by Stefano Bianca: "As far as architecture is concerned, it is the haven where man's spirit, soul and body find refuge and shelter."[1] In other words, architecture is a container of people's lives.

Also, Ibn Qutayba, a Muslim scholar of the 9th century, compared the house, as quoted by Afif Bahnassi, to a shirt, saying that just as the shirt should fit its owner, the house too should suit its dwellers.[2] That is to say, the aesthetic and utilitarian ends of the house must correspond to the needs and capabilities of its users. The two must perfectly suit each other.

Central to Islamic architecture is function with all of its dimensions: corporeal, cerebral and spiritual. The form divorced from function is inconsequential. This, however, by no means implies that the form plays no role in Islamic architecture. It does play a prominent role, but its relevance is a supportive one supplementing and enhancing function. The form is important, but in terms of value and substance it always comes second to function and its wide scope. There must be the closest relationship between the ideals that underpin the form of buildings and the ideals that underpin their function, with which the users of buildings must be at ease. A rift or conflict between the two is bound to lead to a conflict of some far-reaching psychological proportions in buildings users.

We emphasize the word "function" simply because Islam is a religion not only of a faith and abstract philosophy but also of deeds, action and concrete life strategies. The term "*islam*" means "*submission*", which in itself implies a continuous and comprehensive action. Islam is not a

[1] Stefano Bianca, *Urban Form in the Arab World* (London; New York: Thames and Hudson, 2000), 22.
[2] Afif Bahnassi, *The Islamic Architecture and its Specificities in Teaching Curricula*, http://www.isesco.org.ma/pub/Eng/Islarch/P2.htm

religion of symbols, slogans and rhetoric. It strikes a fine balance between the exigencies of the material and spiritual aspects of existence, between the conditions of this world and the Hereafter, and between the requirements of personal, family as well as societal development.[3] Islam means having a strong and complete faith in God and the other required realities from the spiritual and corporeal worlds plus performing good deeds under all circumstances. Possessing either aspect of Islam without the other is insufficient for attaining salvation. The two must be integrated in a whole that is called "Islam", which, in turn, must be interwoven with the life-force of the notion of comprehensive excellence or *ihsan*. Normally, what a believing person does first is securing the belief aspect, which then causes him to do good deeds. The relationship between the two is a causal one the former always being the cause and the latter the effect. There is no person who has faith but does not perform good deeds. Likewise, there is no person who does deeds sanctioned by Islam and in the name of Islam but has no Islamic faith. A strong relationship between faith and good deeds are the only way towards comprehensive excellence.

Certainly, herein lies the actual importance of Islamic architecture, in the sense that it not only meets the requirements of living the Islamic lifestyle by just enveloping or framing it, but also by facilitating it, as well as promoting its worth and encouraging Islamic architecture users and observers to give such a lifestyle its due consideration and respect. Islamic architecture is both a field for the implementation of Islam and a vehicle for its promotion and advancement.[4] This is done at all planes of architecture: its perception, visualization, planning, execution and utilization. This is done, furthermore, through inspired and innovative practical plans, designs and structural solutions, which, as a matter of fact, can never be exhausted due to the countless opportunities presented by the integration of the Islamic religion into all life's segments, or by the unison between the material and spiritual domains, and between the heavens and the earth. Islamic architecture is a style that glorifies God and His revelation. Likewise, it humbles man in his capacity as a worldly creature. At the same time, however, it celebrates man's honorable position as God's vicegerent on earth and his most respectable mission.

The total image of Islamic architecture is thus like everything else that validly bears the title "Islamic", such as the notions of "Islamic city", "Islamic arts", "Islamic dwelling", "Islamic state", "Islamic university", and so on. The projected functions of all these phenomena epitomize, either completely or mainly, the ethos of Islam. In other words, they are microcosms of the Islamic doctrine. The multifaceted roles that such phenomena play in society, though ingenious, modern, dynamic and applicable, always remain in full accordance with the divine inspiration and guidance. Their holistic outlook on countless life's challenges stems from a symbiosis between the Islamic faith and an unprejudiced, pragmatic and brave approach to life.

Having said this, it follows that it is grossly inappropriate to use the adjective "Islamic" before such entities or phenomena as they only partly and superficially represent the Islamic doctrine and its value system. Such usage may lead to confusion and the creations of misconceptions about

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[3] Oleg Grabar, *Art and Culture in the Islamic World*, in "*Islam: Art and Architecture"*, edited by Markus Hattstein & Peter Delius, (Cologne: Konemann, 2000), 35-43.

[4] Ernst J. Grube, "What is Islamic Architecture?", in *Architecture of the Muslim World*, edited by George Michell, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987), 11-14.

Islam and its peoples. It is inappropriate, for example, to advance such concepts as "Islamic tiles", "Islamic patterns", "Islamic costume", "Islamic door", "Islamic window", and so on.

2. ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE AS A MEANS, NOT AN END

Islamic architecture exists because of the existence of Islam. Moreover, in so many ways it serves the noble goals of Islam. Islamic architecture serves Muslims too, in that it aids them to carry out successfully their vicegerency (*khilafah*) mission on earth. Islamic architecture aims to help rather than obstruct Muslims in fulfilling that which they have been created for. Islamic architecture is Islam manifested. Islamic architecture, Islam and Muslims are inseparable. Islamic architecture originated with the advent of Islam on the world scene. It never existed before, even though the peoples that became instrumental in molding and perpetuating its conspicuous identity lived where they were for centuries before embracing Islam and possessed the cultures and civilizations of their own. Indeed, studying Islamic architecture by no means can be separated from the total framework of Islam: its genesis, history, ethos, worldview, doctrines, laws and practices. Any approach by anybody and at any point of time to disconnect Islamic architecture from that which held sway over its conception and formation would result in failure and, worse yet, may lead to a distortion of the real picture of the entire subject matter and with it the picture of Islam.

While exemplifying Islamic beliefs and teachings through the hierarchy of its diverse roles and functions, Islamic architecture evolved a unique soul. Such a soul is best recognized and appreciated only by those whose own lives are inspired and guided by the same sources as is Islamic architecture. Furthermore, it stands to reason that if one wanted to genuinely understand and value Islamic architecture, one, first and foremost, must possess an intimate knowledge of Islam whose precepts and values it exemplifies. Next, one should disengage himself for a moment and as much as he could from whatever he has formerly perused or has been told about Islamic architecture, exerting himself an effort to experience it in its totality and as if he is one of its users. One is to try hard via one's hands-on experiences if one wanted to feel the spiritual and sensory aura that Islamic architecture exudes within its realm. Not to one or a few of its aspects, and not to a single and static moment of time, should one's comprehension and appreciation of Islamic architecture be restricted. Rather, one's thoughts and interest are to encompass all its aspects and dimensions, honoring in the process its remarkable spiritedness and dynamism which were conditioned by neither the time nor space factors. Finally, whatever one's approach in studying Islamic architecture might be, one should never try to extricate it from the contexts which governed its commencement, rise, dominance and survival. Islamic architecture ought to be viewed as a revolutionary world phenomenon as universal, omnipresent, perpetual and revealing as the standards and values that gave rise to it. It was as responsive to the climatic, geographical and cultural requirements as any other architectural tradition, nevertheless, it never treated them apart from the exigencies of a higher order. By means of skills, creativity and imagination, on the one hand, and by its distinctive combination of aesthetic and utilitarian ends, on the other, Islamic architecture never, even by a whisker, separated man's physical, psychological and spiritual needs, treating some sets of needs at the expense of the others.

Due to all this, Alfred Frazer, as reported by M. A. J. Beg, said about the fundamental nature of Islamic architecture: "The architecture of Islam is the expression of a religion and its view of the world rather than that of a particular people or political or economic system."[5]

In the same vein, Titus Burckhardt also wrote that it is not surprising, nor strange, that the most outward manifestation of Islam as a religion and civilization reflects in its own fashion what is most inward in it.[6] The same author further remarked: "If one were to reply to the question 'what is Islam?' by simply pointing to one of the masterpieces of Islamic art such as, for example, the Mosque of Cordova, or that of Ibn Tulun in Cairo, or one of the *madrasahs* in Samarqand….that reply, summary as it is, would be nonetheless valid, for the art of Islam expresses what its name indicates, and it does so without ambiguity."[7]

Afif Bahnassi wrote on the relationship between Islam and Islamic architecture and to what extent the former influences the latter: "Islamic faith shaped Islamic architecture both on the artistic and technical planes, and gave it that uniform personality that has characterised it all through the ages. However, the diverse traditions, languages, and cultures of the peoples who converted to Islam throughout the world, from China in the east to the Atlantic, in the west, gave variety to the architectural enterprise, while sticking all to the principle of functionality. Greeks and Romans, for instance, had a standard style for all kinds of buildings, while Islamic architecture always strove to make the shape of the building fit its function. The architecture of the mosque is different from that of the school, the cemetery, the hospital, or the house, and it is very unlikely that the function of a building be mistaken from its architectural form. Rather, the value of a building is proportional to its capacity to fulfil the function set for it. A house is perfect when it carries out its mission; that of ensuring protection and peace."[8]

It would also be appropriate to quote Le Corbusier who was very eloquent about the extent architecture can hold sway over our senses, experiences and thoughts: "The Architect, by his arrangement of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an acute degree and provokes plastic emotions; by the relationships which he creates he wakes profound echoes in us, he gives us the measure of an order which we feel to be in accordance with that of our world, he determines the various movements of our heart and of our understanding; it is then that we experience the sense of beauty."[9]

Although Le Corbusier meant no particular style or school of architectural thought, it is clear he meant that every architectural representation is pervaded with an ideology which through its physical expressions connects with the users and greatly influences their feelings. It is thus expected that there always exists an intimate relationship between people and their architecture.

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5 *Fine Arts in Islamic Civilization*, edited by M.A.J. Beg, (Introduction), (Kuala Lumpur: The University of Malaya Press, 1981), 16.

6 Titus Burckhardt, *Art of Islam* (London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Company Ltd., 1976), 1.

7 Ibid., p. 1.

8 Afif Bahnassi," The Islamic Architecture and its Specificities in Teaching Curricula," http://www.isesco.org.ma/pub/Eng/Islarch/P2.htm.

9 Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture*, translated from the thirteenth French edition with an introduction by Frederick Etchelles (Oxford: Reed Educational and Professional Publishing Ltd, 1989), 1.

Consequently, it is said and rightly so, as reported by John S. Reynolds, that "when people lose their emotional connection to the buildings they occupy, all architecture ends".[10]

Based on the contents of his autobiographical memoirs,[11] Sinan, the chief architect of the Ottoman golden age and for many one of the greatest architects in Islamic civilization, is believed to have had an exuberant emotional connection with the buildings he had designed and built hoping that the people will do the same. He said, for example, about his masterpiece, the Suleymaniye Mosque, which still proudly stands and captivates its worshippers and tourists alike in Istanbul, Turkey: "Upon examination, its pleasing arches, like the vault of heaven and the eyebrows of beauties, amazed the eyes of perfect experts. Each of its variegated marbles was renowned to the horizon and came as a token from a (different) land…And each of its artistically fashioned doors and wood-carved fittings filled with ornament and decoration of mother-of-pearl is like a leaf of the *Erjeng* (a famous Persian book containing paintings described as having been unequaled in the subtlety of their art), such that they are admired by the grandees of the time and esteemed by the people of all lands. And that canopy-shaded pulpit and pillared throne is a keepsake of a skillful master that stands as a model to the world. Among the revolving spheres its like has not been seen nor shall it be seen. And the domes of that noble Friday mosque are ornaments like the bubbles of the sea of elegance, and its highest dome is like the revolving heavens. And the golden finial shining upon it is like the brilliant, gleaming sun. And the minarets and dome are like the Chosen Beloved (Prophet Muhammad *SAW*), the canopy of Islam, and of the Four Friends (the four rightly-guided caliphs). And the ornamented windows, which are without like or equal, resemble the winds of Gabriel. When they are illuminated with the sun's radiance, they are like an embellished rose garden of the springtime, and the rays of the azure vault reveal their chameleon-like iridescent designs. Ruby, cinnabar, lapis, and verdigris were lavished on this transcendent exemplar of ornament and design, and beautiful, heart-attracting designs were fashioned, the elegance of which confounds the eyes of those endowed with sight."[12]

Islamic architecture means a process that starts from making an intention, continues with the planning, designing and building stages and ends with achieving the net results and how people make use of and benefit from them. Islamic architecture is a fine blend of all these stages which are interlaced with the tread of the same Islamic worldview and Islamic value system. It is almost impossible to single out a tier in the process and regard it more important than the rest. It is because of this conspicuous spiritual character of Islamic architecture, coupled with both educational and societal roles, that the scholars of Islam never shied away from keenly addressing a number of issues pertaining to various dimensions of residential, mosque and communal architecture within the scope of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh islami*). The relevant issues are discussed under different headings such as: legal rulings in connection with neighbours and neighbourhoods (*ahkam al-jiwar*), reconciliation (*al-sulh*) between immediate neighbours and all the people in a neighbourhood, people's individual and collective rights, prohibition of inflicting harm (*darar*), legal rulings pertaining to building (*ahkam al-bina'*), and public services and facilities (*al-marafiq*). All these issues undoubtedly play a significant role in shaping the identity

[10] John S. Reynolds, *Courtyards: Aesthetic, Social, and Thermal Delight* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, INC, 2002), 41.
[11] *Sinan's Autobiographies, Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, introductory notes, critical editions and translations by Howard Crane and Esra Akin, edited by Gulru Necipoglu, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006), 53-158.
[12] Ibid., 123, 124.

of Islamic architecture. They are either directly or indirectly related to conceiving, designing, forming and using Islamic architecture. Since architecture is people's art greatly influencing their moods and the day-to-day life engagements, the same issues concerning architecture are studied as part of exhaustive encyclopaedic works on Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh islami*).

In addition, there are more than a few works also on Islamic jurisprudence written by some famous jurists but which are dedicated solely to the issues pertinent, one way or another, to building. The two among most famous titles of this type of works are: "*Explaining the Rules of Building*" by Abu Abdullah Ibn al-Rami (d. 1334), and "*The Book of Walls*" by Husamuddin 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Bukhari (d. 1141). Both books are on Islamic jurisprudence exclusively focusing on legal rulings which are directly or indirectly related to building and public services and facilities.

The referred to encyclopaedic works on Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh islami*) discuss virtually everything that Muslims might do, including matters about building, thus giving them a clear life orientation and guidance. This way a powerful message is given, that is, neither from the Islamic spirituality nor from the people's actual life challenges and problems can Islamic architecture be separated, one side existing in a world and the other side existing in another completely different world. What's more, Islamic architecture is to be alive, real and dynamic, playing an active role in overcoming people's challenges and solving their problems. Architecture is not to be for society's elite only, serving a limited spectrum of interests. It must belong to all the strata of society attending to their vast and diverse interests and needs. Architects and structural engineers, it goes without saying, are the humble servants of society. They must be completely and exclusively answerable to their people. The people, in turn, are to function as the best judges on whether their architecture is good or bad, effective and conducive to their life activities or not, functional and friendly or otherwise. And architects must listen if they are to hang on to their professional credibility and social standing. Doing otherwise will be tantamount to betraying the profession of architecture as well as people's trust placed on architects. It follows that a very close and responsible relationship is to exist between architects and the people due to the close relationship between them. This entitles people to play an active and participative, rather than a passive or indifferent or acquiescent role when it comes to their architecture for they are its immediate customers and clients.

For all these reasons, surely, some vital issues concerning several dimensions of Islamic architecture are often discussed within the compass of the *hisbah* institution as well.[13] This institution is both religious and social in nature aiming to protect the interests of the members of society regardless of whether such interests are connected to pure religious matters or to some other worldly concerns. The *hisbah* is an institution "under the authority of the state that appoints people to carry out the responsibility of enjoining what is right, whenever people start to neglect it, and forbidding what is wrong, whenever people start to engage in it. The purpose of this is to safeguard society from deviance, protect the faith, and ensure the welfare of the people in both religious and worldly manners according to the Law of Allah. Allah has made it obligatory upon

[13] Walid Abdullah al-Munis, *Al-Hisbah 'ala al-Mudun wa al-'Umran* (Kuwait University, Kuwait: 1995), 65-108.

all Muslims to enjoin good and forbid wrongdoing to the extent of their knowledge and abilities."[14]

Islamic architecture accepts no rigidity, formalism and literal symbolism, especially in relation to its structural domains. If the religion of Islam presents Muslims with a conceptual framework for architecture, which encompasses the Islamic worldview and Islamic fundamental teachings and principles, this in no way implies that the creativity and design freedom of Muslims are thus killed off, at worst, or stifled, at best. On the contrary, they are very much stirred and encouraged to thrive through the same means, with the only difference that certain divine precepts now preside over their development and use, lest some people's imagination and enthusiasm, at some point, become disoriented and misleading, hence perilous to man's well-being.

What makes an architecture Islamic are some invisible aspects of buildings, which may or may not completely translate themselves onto the physical plane of built environment. The substance of Islamic architecture is always the same, due to the permanence of the philosophy and cosmic values that gave rise to it. What changes are the ways and means with which people internalize and put into operation such philosophy and values to their own natural and man-generated circumstances. Such changes or developments could simply be regarded as most practical "solutions" to the challenges people face. For example, the mosques that Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) built carried the same meaning and essence as the mosques that were built in history and that we build today, despite the major differences in form. The spirit of the housing schemes that Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) carried out was likewise the spirit of any other Islamic housing scheme that was implemented at any point of history and in any part of the world, despite their vast differences in terms of sophistication and building technology and engineering. The same can be said about any other aspect of Islamic built environment.

Stefano Bianca remarked on the extent to which Islamic spirituality influences Islamic architecture: "Compared with other religious traditions, the distinctive feature of Islam is that it has given birth to a comprehensive and integrated cultural system by totally embedding the religious practice in the daily life of the individual and the society. While Islam did not prescribe formal architectural concepts, it molded the whole way of life by providing a matrix of behavioral archetypes which, by necessity, generated correlated physical patterns. Therefore, the religious and social universe of Islam must be addressed before engaging in the analysis of architectural structures."[15]

Islamic architecture thus promotes unity in diversity, that is, the unity of message and purpose, and the diversity of styles, methods and solutions. Certainly, this renders Islamic architecture so relevant and dynamic, and so consistent and adaptable. It is such a fascinating subject to study, for doing so is not about sheer art and architecture. It is more than that: it is about beholding the Islamic ideology and creed at work. It is about witnessing a microcosm of Islamic society, civilization and culture. Islamic architecture is about Islam taking up a manifest form.

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[14] *Hisbah Institution*, http://islamic-world.net/economics/hisbah.htm.
[15] Stefano Bianca, *Urban Form in the Arab World*, 22-23.

The identity and vocabulary of Islamic architecture evolved as a means for the fulfilment of the concerns of Muslim societies. Islamic architecture was never an end in itself. It was the container of Islamic culture and civilization reflecting the cultural identity and the level of the creative and aesthetic consciousness of Muslims. Architecture, in general, should always be in service to people. It is never to be the other way round, that is to say that architecture should evolve into a hobby or an adventure in the process, imposing itself on society while forsaking, or taking lightly, people's identities, cultures and the demands of their daily struggles. Architecture, first and foremost, should remain associated with functionality. It should not deviate from its authentic character and stray into the world of excessive invention and abstraction.[16]

Finally, when asked what architecture is, Frank Lloyd Wright, one of the most famous American architects during the first half of the 20th century, while replying, echoed somewhat the Islamic notion of architecture, i.e., to be relevant, pragmatic, and both people and environment friendly. Architecture is life; it is life taking up a form. Frank Lloyd Wright's perception of architecture was epitomized in his words: "What is architecture anyway? Is it the vast collection of the various buildings which have been built to please the varying taste of the various lords of mankind? I think not. No, I know that architecture is life; or at least it is life itself taking form and therefore it is the truest record of life as it was lived in the world yesterday, as it is lived today or ever will be lived. So architecture I know to be a Great Spirit.... Architecture is that great living creative spirit which from generation to generation, from age to age, proceeds, persists, creates, according to the nature of man, and his circumstances as they change. That is really architecture."[17]

3. TWO EXAMPLES: THE ISLAMIC HOUSE AND THE MOSQUE

To clarify further the previous points, we shall briefly discuss the examples of the Islamic house and the mosque.

3.1. THE HOUSE

Islam did not instruct Muslims how to build houses, but it did instruct them how to carry out a number of tasks directly or indirectly associated with the house and housing phenomena. Some of such tasks are: privacy protection against the outside world, among the family members, and between the family members and visitors, respect for the rights of guests and visitors, respect for the rights of neighbours, the relationship between men and women, the implications of carrying out religious obligations, cleanliness, peaceful coexistence with the natural environment, safety, security, recreation and modesty. Islam's aim is to preserve the life, religion, mental and psychological strength, descendants and wealth of its people.

The net result of this strategy is that there are many types of the Islamic house, such as those in the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, Turkey, Iran, the Islamic West (*al-maghrib al-Islami*), etc., but the soul and fundamental nature of all these housing types are always the same, and are easily recognizable by those familiar with the character of Islam and the character of its civilization. What those different-yet-same, or same-yet-different, houses represent are, in fact, people's solutions to the challenges of living their family lives in line with their religious guidelines while,

[16] Ibid.
[17] *What is Architecture?*, http://architecture.about.com/library/blarchitecture.htm.

at the same time, complying with the requirements of the climate, geography, traditions, economy and building technology of the places where they live. While creating Islamic architecture, Muslims betray neither their religion nor their living conditions. This challenge Muslims see as a source of motivation, ingenuity and strength. They do not see it as a problem, hindrance or an impediment. They see it as a service to Islam, society and mankind as a whole.

Eventually, what came to be known as the language of Islamic residential architecture, such as the courtyard, partly or fully screened windows, raising windows above the eye level, bent entrances, double circulations inside houses, inward looking designs, guest rooms near main entrances and away from houses' core, certain decorative systems, etc., such must be seen as sets of best solutions that people have evolved over centuries for themselves. They are to be seen as no more than that. Such structural solutions must not be seen as the prescribed language of Islamic residential architecture that cannot be revised, enriched, improved, altered and even abandoned, to a certain extent or completely, if necessary and in favour of some other equally or more viable solutions presented by advances made by science and technology, and generally by the implications of the time and space factors. Likewise, such structural solutions are not to be held as religious symbols with some ontological significance.

However, there is only one thing that must be honoured at all times and that cannot be compromised under any circumstances in housing, that is, the sanctified functions of the house which render it a place to rest, relax the body and mind, enjoy legitimate worldly delights, worship, teach, learn and propagate the message of Islam, and which makes the house a restricted sanctuary where privacy, protection, safety and security are ensured. In other words, the house is to function as an institution with a potential to take up the role of an educational and training center able to produce, in concert with other societal establishments, individuals capable of transforming the whole communities they belong to. If the family is the basic and most important societal unit, then the same can be said about the house which is the physical locus of the former. Indeed, without the two, the total realization of the divine purpose on earth becomes impossible.

3.2. THE MOSQUE

Another example is concerning the mosque institution, by far the most easily identifiable element of Islamic architecture. Islam did not instruct the Muslims how to build mosques, but it did instruct them to build mosques and to make them function as places of collective worship and community development centres. The Prophet (pbuh) built quite a number of mosques in Madinah, which was the prototype Islamic city and played the role firstly as the city-state and later as the capital of the ever-expanding Muslim state. The functions performed by mosques built by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), particularly his mosque in Madinah, were so powerful that they epitomized the multifaceted societal dimensions of Islam. The primary aim of all the mosques built afterwards was to emulate the Prophet's example in this regard.

Nevertheless, the form of the mosques built during the Prophet's era was very simple. His mosque in Madinah, for example, when firstly built consisted of an enclosure with walls made of mud bricks and an arcade on the *qiblah* side (towards Makkah) made of palm-trunks used as columns to support a roof of palm-leaves and mud. There were initially three entrances in the east, west and southern walls. The fourth, i.e., the northern wall, was the *qiblah* side facing the al-Masjid al-Aqsa, the first *qiblah* which lasted about one year and a few months. However, as the *qiblah* was

changed to face south towards Makkah, the southern entrance was subsequently bricked up and a new one on the northern side constructed. Before the *qiblah* changed, there was, in all likelihood, no roofed area in the mosque, but after it, an arcade on the southern side facing Makkah was created.

The Prophet's *SAW* mosque had a few rudimentary facilities. However, before the Prophet's *SAW* death and as the Madinah community and its needs considerably grew, the shape of the mosque underwent more than a few notable structural modifications, such as its enlargement, the introduction of the pulpit (*minbar*) and illuminating the mosque by oil lamps. Thus, the impact that changes in human living conditions can have on the form of architecture has duly been recognized. This causal relationship between the evolution of the language of mosque architecture and Islamic architecture, in general, and the improvement of the living standards of Muslims went on till Islamic civilization attained its apogee and with it the language of Islamic architecture achieved its conspicuous sophistication and excellence.

However, when the rich and versatile language of mosque architecture evolved, the new developments signified people's answers and solutions to the challenge of maintaining mosques to function as the centres of Islamic collective worship and as the centres for community development, while, at the same time, conforming to the requirements of the climate, geography, traditions, economy and building technology of the places where they lived. The net result of this approach is that there are many ways of building mosques, such as those in the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, Turkey, Iran, Morocco, Malaysia, China, etc. but the soul and fundamental nature of all those mosque types are always the same and are easily recognizable by those familiar with the character of Islamic worship and the character of Islamic cultures and civilization.

Eventually, what came to be known as the language of mosque architecture, such as the minaret, courtyards, the *minbar* (pulpit), the *mihrab* (praying niche), domes, arches, *iwans*, certain decorative styles, etc., must be seen as the best solutions and facilities that people have evolved over centuries for themselves so that the projected roles of mosques are ensured. Such solutions and facilities must not be seen as religious symbols containing some ontological bearing. Nor are they to be held as the prescribed language of mosque architecture that cannot be revised, enriched, improved and adjusted, thus accommodating the provisions presented by the advances made by science and technology, and generally by the implications of the time and space factors. After all, what matters most is making the mosque institution with its demanding civilizational mission as effective, dynamic, relevant and attractive as possible through various means and methods. This is exactly what Muslims were up to while evolving the rich and colourful language of mosque architecture, in particular, and Islamic art and architecture, in general.

4. PRAGMATISM AND ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE TODAY

Islam is a complete way of life. Its values and teachings, together with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad *SAW*, whose primary task was to explain to mankind and put into practice the precepts of Islam, are universal and timeless. The significance of Islamic architecture is universal and permanent too, in that the philosophy that it embodies is the Islamic one. However, such is the nature of Islamic architecture that it is receptive to both advances in science and technology and the dictates of people's living conditions.

It is an imperative that Muslim architects always remember this verity while trying to revive and sustain the concept of Islamic architecture. In so doing, Muslim architects are bidden to; firstly, identify the general Islamic guidelines and principles pertaining to the enterprise of building. Next, they must be fully aware of the implications of the dilemmas and challenges their time and the diverse regions in which they live. They cannot be trapped in a historical episode, overly romanticizing it and attempting to emulate the architectural solutions the Muslims of that particular period successfully evolved. If something was the norm during a period and in a particular ecological setting, such by no means can be the same in every subsequent period and in different ecological settings. Technological advancements rapidly change; demands of different eras fluctuate, even under the same ecological conditions; climate exigencies must be painstakingly heeded; and, lastly, human psychology also changes with the change of time and space, posing a number of exigencies of its own. No architectural plan and design which served as a solution for an age and place can be simply "parachuted" to another age and place without properly modulating it to its rigorous environmental and socio-cultural requirements. To do that is to betray the dynamic spirit of both the common sense and the perpetual message of Islam. Blind and ignorant imitations and following, even in sheer religious matters, are categorically rebuked by Islam.

While taking hold of the general Islamic guidelines and principles with reference to creating an Islamic architecture, on the one hand, and while studying the needs of different times and situations so that the former can be accurately understood and applied, on the other, Muslim architects in reality perform a degree of *ijtihad*, i.e., forming an independent opinion or judgment within the framework of an available text. In doing so, if one excels, one receives two rewards from God, but if one for whatever reason fails to deliver, after he had tried his best, one is bound to receive one reward from God, as propounded by the Prophet *SAW* in one of his traditions.[18] Based on this tradition, in no way can a serious, enlightened, accountable and willing person be a loser as far as the execution of matters ordained by God is concerned. Verily, this divine assurance should serve to the Muslim architects and designers as a starting point to look carefully and critically at the state of architecture and how buildings in the Muslim world are planned and designed, as well as to start contemplating the prospects of finding much better solutions which will be inspired by and infused with the values of Islam, and will be responsive to the exigencies of different times and regions.

At the start, Muslim architects ought not to be bound by a single historical structural model, device or solution. The past is to be viewed all the time as such, i.e., the past. It is to be neither excessively venerated or idealized nor completely disregarded. The past must be put in its true perspective with such notions as wisdom, pragmatism and practicality leading the way. In their daunting search for contemporary Islamic architecture, Muslim architects and designers must be driven by a clear principled vision, a free spirit and an insatiable thirst for ingenuity, which must be shrouded in strong determination, self-belief and quest for excellence. However, should some modern structural devices or solutions appear to bear a resemblance, partly or totally, to the ones used in the past, one is not to shy away from reviving them within the existing contexts. The history of Islamic architecture is not to be looked down at as entirely outmoded and worthless. As we are against blind and ignorant imitation of the past, we are likewise against disengaging

[18] Al-Bukhari, *Sahih al-Bukhari*, Kitab al-I'tisam bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, Hadith No. 6805.

ourselves from it and completely ignoring the numerous lessons that we can learn therefrom. Indeed, much can be learned from history because the protagonists of any historical episode while solving their problems possessed the same vision and objectives as we do today while solving the problems on our own. On the other hand, however, we have to be extremely mindful and selective as to how exactly to benefit from history, in which areas and how far we are to emulate our predecessors, because most of their problems were the product of the circumstances under which they operated, whereas our problems are the product of the circumstances under which we operate. Hence, seldom can their solutions be utterly ours.

There is no such thing as a standardized Islamic architecture which can be reproduced anytime and anywhere. If truth be told, there is nothing as such in the whole body of the Islamic built environment. Therefore, Muslim architects and designers should not hesitate to unleash their burning Islamic spirit, desire, imagination and creativity in order to conceive and create such an architectural tradition that will be compatible with the requirements of both the religious message and modernity. Undoubtedly, the given solutions will have to vary from one region to another, somewhere more and somewhere less. But the essence of all the possible designs, including those adopted as the best solutions in history, will remain one, because of the same worldview and the same religious spirit and foundation that underpin the presence of Muslims and bind all the Muslim peoples regardless of their different geographical locations, cultures and historical appearances. Whatever conception and form are eventually given to such an architecture, the same is absolutely qualified to be branded as "Islamic". On account of its location, sheer exterior, or association with a historical moment, no building can be more Islamic than others. What matters, imperatively, is the total function and utility, that a building is imbued with the soul and purity of Islam, and that it stands for an embodiment of the Islamic values and principles insofar as the fulfilling of a building's functions and roles is concerned.

The authors of the website *www.islamicart.com* wrote, relying on an essay "*Building in the Middle East Today – in Search of a Direction*" written by Garry Martin, that "Islamic architecture was in harmony with the people, their environment and their Creator. Yet no strict rules were applied to govern Islamic architecture. The great mosques of Cordoba, Edirne and Shah Jahan each used local geometry, local materials, local building methods to express in their own ways the order, harmony and unity of Islamic architecture…But in the 20th century, the Islamic concepts of unity, harmony and continuity often are forgotten in the rush for industrial development. Martin lists three directions contemporary Islamic architecture has taken:

1. One approach is to completely ignore the past and produce Western-oriented architecture that ignores the Islamic spirit and undermines traditional culture.
2. The opposite approach involves a retreat, at least superficially, to the Islamic architectural past. This can result in hybrid buildings where traditional facades of arches and domes are grafted onto modern high-rises.
3. A third approach, Martin notes, is to understand the essence of Islamic architecture and to allow modern building technology to be a tool in the expression of this essence. Writes Martin, 'Architects working today can take advantage of opportunities that new materials and mass production techniques offer. They have an opportunity to explore and transform the possibilities of the machine age for the enrichment of architecture in the same way that craftsmen explored the nature of geometrical and arabesque patterns...'

The forms that would evolve from this approach, adds Martin, "would have a regional identity, a stylistic evolution and a relevance to the eternal principles of Islam."[19]

In an extremely frank manner, Mahbub ul Haq wrote about pragmatism in Islamic architecture and how it must serve its people. He rightly argues that Islamic architecture must not be seen as an elitist enterprise. It is a pursuit that aims to ensure the welfare of all Muslims, in the process reflecting the essential spirit and universal value system of Islam. Islamic architecture must be practical in the sense that it is affordable, accessible, functional and tackles the issues and problems concerning all Muslims, many of whom are unfortunately poor today. Thus, a form of Islamic architecture that we aim to revive today must not be discriminatory, elitist, impractical, fanciful and utopian. Mahbub ul Haq reflects: "If Islamic architecture is to become a living reality in modern times, it must respond to the needs of the poor people who are the overwhelming reality in the Muslim world. It cannot afford to become an elitist concept. Islamic architecture must be unlinked from the popular image of kings' palaces and old castles and overflowing gardens and ornamental monuments. It can certainly borrow its essential designs, concepts, indigenous technology, functional features of drainage and cooling systems, etc., from the past, but it must translate them into a wholly new architecture which reflects the essential spirit and value system of Islam: equality, accessibility, mass participation and cost-effectiveness.

In other words, there are two fairly clear choices. We can proceed from a study of architecture to the needs of the people; or we can reverse the relationship, and proceed from the needs of the people to the relevance of Islamic architecture to those needs…"I do not believe in art for the sake of art; I believe that art must be for the sake of life. And I certainly do not believe in Islamic architecture merely for the sake of Islamic architecture; I believe that a revival of Islamic architecture must correspond to the needs of the poor people of Islam…It should be possible to engineer a happy blend, a proper fusion between the functional needs of our poor people and the aesthetic needs of an architecture which truly reflects our Islamic culture, traditions and history."[20]

Thus, perceiving and creating Islamic architecture is a very serious task. It is about giving people some of their fundamental rights, executing a religious obligation, and contributing to an appropriate or an otherwise implementation of the message of Islam. The corollary of all this is that Muslim architects, and all the other professionals in the field of built environment at large, must enhance considerably their knowledge of Islam: its *Sharia'h* and worldview. This may appear as a daunting task to many, however, needless to say that it is incumbent upon every Muslim, male and female, to know the rulings of Islam pertaining to the obligations and teachings they have to adhere to in their life.

While Islamizing the notion of architecture in both theory and practice, Muslim architects and engineers can draw on their own familiarity with the rulings of Islam, provided the same is adequate. Otherwise, trustworthy religious scholars, who are both qualified and broad-minded, should be consulted and engaged as many times as needed. It goes without saying that unremitting inter and cross-professional studies and research activities appear to be inevitable. This is bound to lead gradually to narrowing down the glaring gap separating the religious scholars and their fields

[19] *The Future of Islamic Architecture*, http://www.islamicart.com/main/architecture/future.html

[20] Mahbub ul Haq," Islamic Architecture and the Poor People of Islam," in *Places of Public Gathering in Islam*, edited by Linda Safran, (Philadelphia: Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1980), 126-127.

of interest from the secular ones and their own fields of interest. This way, every scholar will become aware as to his/her role in society and his/her obligations toward society, nature and God. Certainly, the religious scholars will have to widen their interests and concerns, becoming what they are actually always meant to be: the guardians of societies. But to secure that accolade they ought to reevaluate themselves and their undertakings, striving to be a more practical, approachable, people-friendly, and less dogmatic and idealistic. Whereas the secular scholars will have to think of Islamizing their knowledge, wherever there is a conflict of interests and as much as possible, realigning their scientific goals and aspirations with the goals and aspirations of the Muslim community to which they belong.

Certainly, it is a high time that a serious and scientific initiative of integrating the Islamic worldview and value system into architecture takes off in the Muslim world. However, such a scheme ought to constitute but a segment of a broad Islamization project aimed at bringing about a total harmonization between the education systems of Muslims and the teachings of Islam. It is not only that architecture should be targeted by the scheme, but also the whole of built environment professions. The process of integration will yield best results if it were embarked on gradually, after people have become convinced of its relevance and urgency.

In universities and colleges where students undertake architecture programs, some in-depth and deemed most needed programs on Islamic studies can be taught. Lecturers and tutors must be well-educated, well-trained and must lead by example. Their role is critical. The mission of Islamization is a massive and complex one so students will always look up at their teachers for inspiration and guidance. The programs can be taught independently or they can be integrated into the syllabus of other courses. The latter option is an excellent one, as it is spontaneous and natural, hence more effective. Due to the obvious relevance and applicability of the integrated subject matter, the students will have little or no reasons to develop any aversion to what they are subjected to. The former option, however, if applied alone is not really a helpful one, as it is suggestive, nominally though, of perpetuating the existing rift between the religious and architectural sciences. At best, the same can be seen as just an addendum to the existing curriculum, to which the students are bound to develop much indifference. Definitely, the best and most workable solution would be a feasible combination of both options. In the process, either option can be given more emphasis at the expense of the other, subject to the dictates of different situations. However, no matter what model is eventually developed, this aspect of Islamization process can become effective only if students are constantly urged to incorporate what they have learned in the classroom into their practical work in studios and laboratories. Above all this, furthermore, intensive workshops, seminars and trainings can be periodically organized for those who have already graduated and are actively involved in construction sector professions, so that continuity is ensured and if considered necessary for some professionals, enthusiasm for the mission renewed.

It would be even better if education systems of Muslims are such that all students come to colleges and universities with a reasonable amount of knowledge about Islam and its culture and history, which they have obtained beforehand at the lower levels of their study. What would then transpire in colleges and universities is that no time will be wasted on clarifying basic concepts and on dealing with introductory issues. Rather, straight from the beginning the core issues could be seriously approached from perspectives that suit the level of students' study, aptitude and interest. It could be then hoped that within the prescribed timeframe which students spend in colleges and universities, a significant set of objectives with respect to Islamization and

integration of knowledge can be successfully achieved. Then, the whole enterprise will in due time become a serious, sought-after and productive scientific project, rather than a superficial, superfluous and decorative diversion.

At any rate, however, it all boils down to the systems of education that a community adopts, and to what extent the same community is ready and willing to embrace that which is best for preserving its identity and reinvigorating its cultural and civilization prospects. Indeed, it is essential that people start realizing that by creating buildings a framework for the lives of people is created. To a large extent, people's lives are thus directed and influenced. Hence, the two, i.e., the framework with its character and services and the exigencies of people's lives, must be compatible. It is only then that people's welfare will be ensured, and that architecture will become more than just a process of designing and erecting buildings. Such indicates, within the context of Islam and Islamic architecture, that it is very difficult to live delightfully applying the values of Islam in an architectural world which is alien to the same values and its divine philosophy.

5. TOWARDS THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE

Islamic architecture is a fine blend of loads of conceptual and practical factors which are interwoven with the threads of the belief system, teachings and values of Islam. In order to expedite and give more sense to the process of reviving, revitalizing and Islamizing the architecture of Muslims today, the following observations and suggestions could be taken into account:

- Reviving Islamic architecture is an extremely serious and demanding task. It requires major contributions and high-spirited concerted efforts of many parties from across the wide spectrum of society: government, educators, practitioners, professional bodies, NGOs, members of the business community, students and the general public. Certainly, relevant governmental departments, colleges and universities, private architectural firms and institutions are identified as the most relevant agencies and their people as the most important protagonists in spearheading and managing the Islamization of the architecture project. The responsibilities of these parties are the biggest on account of their roles in society. It follows that in case of failure, especially if such happens due to deliberate mediocrity, lack of interest and apathy, their share of blame will be the biggest one as well.
- Defining and clarifying the necessary concepts and terminology such as "Islamic and Muslim architecture", "Muslim architect", "Islamic aesthetics", "Islamic built environment", "Islam and building", "the Qur'an and the Prophet's *sunnah* as the sources of Islamic architecture", "Islam and the environment", "*ihsan, itqan* or excellence", "man as *khalifah* or the vicegerent on earth", "Islam as a comprehensive way of life", "Islam as the final and universal revelation", "Islam and culture", "Islam and civilization", "Islam and society", "Islam and history", etc. A great many problems in the Muslim world today stem from a lack of understanding of some fundamental religious and civilizational concepts and ideas and how they are related to each other.
- Developing a comprehensive code of conduct for Muslim architects based on general Islamic ethics and teachings. It can be called "Islamic architectural ethics".
- Expounding and invalidating the popular errors and misconceptions about all the aspects of Islamic architecture. The causes of such errors and misconceptions are be carefully

investigated so that the conditions conducive to breeding confusion and misunderstanding towards Islamic architecture are forever done away with.

- History of Islamic architecture, commencing with the time of Prophet Muhammad *SAW* till the present, to be critically surveyed and examined. This is so because in order to properly diagnose the present predicaments plaguing Islamic architecture and to be able to chart a better future course with regard to the same, the Muslims must be acquainted with the history of their Islamic societies in general, and the history of Islamic architecture, in particular. History of Islamic architecture is to be neither excessively venerated nor totally discarded. A middle path is thus to be pursued and adopted. History is to serve as a source for shaping a better present and for forecasting a better future. Indeed, ignorance about history presages ignorance about the present and doubting and insecurity about the future. Moreover, ignoring one's history portends compromising one's identity which in turn sets in motion forfeiting one's chances of having an impact on what happens around and to one's self. It's no wonder then that the colonizers of the Muslim lands sought out most to discredit much of Islamic history and to keep its peoples either ignorant or completely indifferent towards it. Finally, people alienated from their history, stripped of their intrinsic identity, are not in a position to think independently. They likewise lack a disposition or penchant to lead with poise. Following and imitating others, due to the inferiority complex deeply embedded in their minds and souls, is everything they know. Genuine inventiveness, creativity and courage have long since been removed from their phrase book.
- Developing and advancing an Islamic architectural theory based on the most authentic sources of Islam: the Qur'an and *sunnah*, i.e., revelation.
- Studying and paying due respect and appreciation to all the Muslims who excelled in architecture from the dawn of Islam till the present. The roles, reputations and contributions of those persons to society, in their respective local, regional and international contexts, are to represent the crux of this type of studies.
- Comparative studies between Islamic architecture and other architectural systems and theories to be undertaken. Unifying and diverging points to be clearly spelled out and scrutinized.
- Since the religion of Islam is the foundation and moral fiber of Islamic culture and civilization–including architecture–Islam likewise is to be the foundation and moral fiber of Muslim educational systems. It is only with a genuine Islamic mindset, passion and purpose that Islamic culture and civilization– including architecture–can be revitalized and restored. Thus, Muslim educational systems must aim to produce generations whose members will be acquainted with, feel affection for, practice, care and live for Islam: its ideology, peoples, history, culture and civilization. Only in such a dynamic, conducive and engaging intellectual environment, genuine Islamic architecture can be taught and learned. Islamic education must produce honorable, moral and visionary men and women, rather than materialistic, disoriented and superficially cultured professionals and citizens.
- Encouraging, facilitating and supervising a quality research culture on various issues in relation to the theme of Islamic architecture. This is in order to significantly enrich libraries and bookshops with genuine references on the subject in question so that propagating, teaching and practicing Islamic architecture becomes a viable proposition. The problems of Muslims today, primarily, rest at the epistemological plane. The problems are related to the mind and ideas. They are about the lack of quality, not quantity.

- Promoting architecture as a multidisciplinary branch of learning and a profession much wider than routinely believed.
- Encouraging and promoting creative, critical, global, unbiased, unprejudiced and tolerant thinking.
- Advocating strict following in religion, in matters where unreserved following is due, and unbound inventing in architecture, where inventing and concocting are due. Parallel with this, reviving the notion of *ijtihad* in architecture and with it the science of the *fiqh al-'umran,* ought to take off.
- Promoting the concept of unity in diversity in Islamic architecture, i.e., the unity of spiritual message, civilizational soul, identity and purpose, and the diversity of artistic and scientific styles, methods and solutions.
- Muslim colleges and universities, the Islamic worldview, the belief system, ethics and other relevant teachings and values of Islam, to be felicitously integrated into the architecture curriculum at both the theoretical and practical levels. The relevant religious and architectural technical components are to be viewed as the equivalent parts of a whole with no clear demarcation lines separating them. This way, students will have little or no reasons to develop any aversion to the notion of integration between the religion of Islam and architecture. Relevant religious components if properly integrated will not be deemed as an addendum to the existing curriculum, or as an extra burden imposed on students. Both religion and architecture will thus be seen in their true light. Islamic architecture must be presented and taught as a revolutionary world phenomenon, as universal, abiding and revealing as the standards and values that gave rise to it. True, Islamic architecture is as responsive to the climatic, geographical, cultural, economic and technological requirements as any other architectural tradition. Nevertheless, it never treats them away from exigencies of a higher order. By means of skills, creativity and imagination on the one hand, and by its distinctive combination of aesthetic and utilitarian ends, on the other, Islamic architecture never draws a wedge between man's physical, psychological and spiritual needs. Certainly, it is for this spiritual dimension that Islamic architecture entails that Mimar Sinan (d. 1588 CE), the chief architect of the Ottoman golden age, called architecture an "estimable calling" and then said that whosoever is engaged in it must be, first of all, pious.
- As regards the implementation of the Islamization of architecture project, policy-makers in particular should prepare measures and mechanisms for the implementation and to develop indicators of performance.

CONCLUSION

Islamic architecture is not concerned about the form of buildings only. Islamic architecture signifies a process in which all the phases and aspects are equally important. It is almost impossible to identify a phase or an aspect in that process and consider it more important than the others. The Islamic architecture process starts with having a proper understanding and vision which leads to making the right intention. It continues with the planning, designing and building stages, and ends with attaining the net results and how people make use of and benefit from them. Islamic architecture is a subtle balance of all these factors which are interwoven with the threads of the belief system, principles, teachings and values of Islam.

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RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

SOME OBSERVATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ISLAM–WEST ENCOUNTER

Suheyl Umar

ABSTRACT

The paper investigates how the West engaged with the idea and practice of tolerance as it had manifested in other religions and cultures and how does it relate to the historical trajectory through which it became established in the West. The current unquestioned right of freedom of religious belief and worship in the Western world is thus not simply a corollary of secular thought; it is a principle inspired, at least in part by the influence of Islam.

Tolerance is a multi-faceted concept comprising moral, psychological, social, legal, political and religious dimensions. The dimension of tolerance addressed by this essay is specifically religious tolerance, such as this principle finds expression within Islamic tradition, and how it came to be enshrined in Western thought after the Enlightenment.

The Islamic tradition in principle, as well as in practice, provides compelling answers to many questions pertaining to the relationship between religious tolerance and practice of one's own faith. The lessons drawn from the Islamic tradition reveal that tolerance of Other is in fact integral to the practice of Islam – it is not some optional extra, some cultural luxury, and still less, something one needs to import from some other tradition.

Key words: Tolerance, Allama Iqbal, Secular, Liberal, Transcendence

Soiling one's tongue with ill-speech is a sin
The disbeliever and the believer are alike creatures of God.
Humanity, human respect for human reality:
Be conscious of the station of humanity.
...
The slave of love who takes his path from God
Becomes a loving friend of both disbeliever and believer.[1]

Thus sang the sage, Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, in his magnum opus, the *Javid Nama* (Pilgrimage of Eternity). He was not the sole spokesman. In the years immediately before and after the First World War, the Western world was hearing to three poetic voices. The first was Tagore;[2] the

[1] *Javīd Nāma* in *Kulliyāt i Iqbal* (Persian) (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1994), 672-673.

[2] He received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913. The Preface written by W. B. Yeats to the anthology of Tagore highlighted the mellowness of his voice and the representation of the Indians as a humble and harmless race.

second voice was of T. S. Eliot;[3] the third voice was that of Iqbal.[4] In the late stage of secular modernity, when Iqbal pondered over the problems of his age, melancholy had become a collective mood. Melancholy used to afflict individuals who felt rejected and exiled from the significance of the cosmos. By Iqbal's day it had turned into a cultural malady deriving from a world that has been drained of all meaning and which had come to cast doubt on all traditional sources– theological, metaphysical and historical. The dominant mood of Iqbal's time was "**A desperate search for a pattern**". The search was desperate because it seemed futile to look for a pattern in reality. In terms of its mindset or worldview, the modern world was living in what has been called the *Age of Anxiety*, and Iqbal, feeling the pulse of the times, was trying to look beyond symptoms to find the prime cause. Through his studies and observation of the modern world, Iqbal had come to realize that there was something wrong with the presiding paradigm or worldview that his age had come to espouse. What was that which generated the feeling that something had gone wrong with the world and the Time was again out of joint? East and West both seemed to face a predicament!

فکرِ فرنگ پیشِ مجاز آورد سجود
بینای کور و مستِ تماشای رنگ و بوست
مشرق خراب و مغرب از آن بیشتر خراب
عالم تمام مرده و بی ذوق جستجوست [5]

Iqbal was seriously thinking about the grave question.

من از ہلال و چلیپا دگر نیندیشم
کہ فتنۂ دگری در ضمیر ایّام است

I am no longer concerned about the crescent and the cross,
For the womb of time carries an ordeal of a different kind. [6]

In Iqbal's view, the crisis that the world found itself in as it swung on the hinge of the 20th century was located in something deeper than particular ways of organizing political systems and economies. In different ways, the East and the West were going through a single common crisis

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[3] Whose "Love Song of G. Alfred Prufrock" appeared in 1915. It was a view of pessimism and boredom.

[4] His *Secrets of the Self* appeared in Persian the same year, although his Urdu poem had been common recitals in India for more than ten years by then. His book was translated into English in 1920. It was clear that out of these three new voices, his was the voice that the West was going to ignore. Ironically, this was the only voice in that age which was inviting its listeners to get real, and do something to change the world to a better place.

[5] *Zubūr i 'Ajam,* in *Kulliyāt i Iqbāl,* (Persian), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1994), 376.

[6] **I am... kind**. By "the crescent and the cross" is meant the historic confrontation between Islam and Christianity that took the form of the Crusades in the Middle Ages. Iqbal is saying that, unlike many other Muslims, who remain mentally imprisoned in the past, allowing their thought and action to be determined by certain crucial events of former times, he is more concerned about the momentous developments taking place in the present age. Iqbal does not specify what he means by "an ordeal of a different kind" (*fitnah-i dīgarī*)—whether he means a particular major development, like communism, or whether he uses the singular "ordeal" in a generic sense to refer to several major and decisive developments taking place on the world stage. The main point of the verse, in any case, is that the issues of the present and the future have greater claim on one's attention than issues belonging to a past that may have no more than historical or academic importance. In the second hemistich, "the womb of time" is a translation of *damīr-i ayyām*, which literally means "in the insides of time." See M. Mir, (ed.), *Iqbāl-Nāmah,*, Vol. 5, no. 3-4, (Summer and Fall, 2005): 3-6.

whose cause was the spiritual condition of the modern world. That condition was characterized by loss– the loss of religious certainties and of transcendence with its larger horizons. The nature of that loss is strange but ultimately quite logical. When, with the inauguration of the scientific worldview, human beings started considering themselves the bearers of the highest meaning in the world and the measure of everything, meaning began to ebb and the stature of humanity to diminish. The world lost its human dimension, and we began to lose control of it. In the words of F. Schuon:

> The world is miserable because men live beneath themselves; the error of modern man is that he wants to reform the world without having either the will or the power to reform man, and this flagrant contradiction, this attempt to make a better world on the basis of a worsened humanity, can only end in the very abolition of what is human, and consequently in the abolition of happiness too. Reforming man means binding him again to Heaven, re-establishing the broken link; it means tearing him away from the reign of the passions, from the cult of matter, quantity and cunning, and reintegrating him into the world of the spirit and serenity, we would even say: into the world of sufficient reason.[7]

In Iqbal's view, if anything characterizes the modern era, it is a loss of faith in transcendence, in God as an objective reality. It is the age of the eclipse of transcendence. No socio-cultural environment in the pre-Modern times had turned its back on Transcendence in the systematic way that characterized Modernity. The eclipse of transcendence impacts our way of looking at the world, that is, forming a worldview, in a far-reaching manner. According to Iqbal's perspective, Transcendence means that there is another reality that is more real, more powerful, and better than this mundane order. The eclipse of transcendence impacted our way of looking at the world, that is, forming a worldview. It was an issue of the greatest magnitude in Iqbal's opinion. He was convinced that whatever transpires in other domains of life– politics, living standards, environmental conditions, interpersonal relationships, the arts– was ultimately dependent on our presiding worldview. This is what was wrong with the presiding paradigm or worldview that his age had come to espouse (فتنۂ عصر ِ روان). In Iqbal's view, Modern Westerners, forsaking clear thinking, allowed themselves to become so obsessed with life's material underpinnings that they wrote f science a blank cheque; a blank cheque for orscience's claims concerning what constituted Reality, knowledge and justified belief. This was the cause of our spiritual crisis. It joined other crisis as we entered the new century–the environmental crises, the population explosion, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor.

دو صد دانا درین محفل سخن گفت

سخن نازک تر از برگِ سمن گفت

ولی با من بگو آن دیده ور کیست؟

کہ خاری دید و احوال ِ چمن گفت

The Man who saw a thorn and spoke of the garden?...[8]

That science had changed our world beyond recognition went without saying, but it was the way that it had changed our worldview that concerned Iqbal. More importantly, the two worldviews

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[7] F. Schuon, *Understanding Islam*, reprinted, (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004), 26.

[8] *Armaghān i Hijāz*, in *Kulliyāt i Iqbāl,* Persian, (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1994), 860.

were contending for the mind of the future. The scientific worldview is a wasteland for the human spirit. It cannot provide us the wherewithal for a meaningful life. How much, then, was at stake? That was the fundamental question; and it surfaced again and again throughout his prose and poetry. The overarching question that occupied Iqbal at that time related to the view of Reality; of the *WORLDVIEWS: THE BIG PICTURE*. It was of great consequence to ask as to WHO WAS RIGHT ABOUT REALITY: TRADITIONALISTS, MODERNISTS, OR THE POSTMODERNS (which he anticipated)? The problem, according to his lights, was that somewhere, during the course of its historical development, Western thought took a sharp turn in a different direction. It branched off as a tangent from the collective heritage of all humanity and claimed the autonomy of reason. It chose to follow reason alone, unguided by revelation and cut off from its transcendent root.[9] Political and social realms quickly followed suit. Autonomous statecraft and excessive individualism in the social order were the elements that shaped a dominant paradigm that did not prove successful.[10] Iqbal struggled with the conflicts that existed between the scientific and traditional worldviews. There were five places where these contradicted each other.

- According to the traditional, religious view, spirit is fundamental and matter derivative. The scientific worldview turns this picture on its head.
- In the religious worldview, human beings are the less who have derived from the more. Science reverses this etiology, positioning humanity as the more that has derived from the less; devoid of intelligence at its start, evolving and advancing to the elevated stature that we human beings now enjoy.
- The traditional worldview points toward a happy ending; the scientific worldview does not. As for the scientific worldview, there is no way that a happy ending can be worked into it. Death is the grim reaper of individual lives, and whether things as a whole will end in a freeze or a fry, with a bang or a whimper is anybody's guess.
- This fourth contrast between the competing worldviews concerns meaning. Having been intentionally created by omnipotent Perfection–[11] or flowing from it "like a fountain ever on,"– the traditional world is meaningful throughout. In the scientific worldview, meaning is minimal if not absent. "Our modern understanding of evolution implies that ultimate meaning in life is nonexistent."[12] Science acknowledges that "the more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it seems pointless."
- In the traditional world people feel at home. Nothing like this sense of belonging can be derived from the scientific worldview which is the dawning of "the age of homelessness."

Iqbal realized that an age comes to a close when people discover they can no longer understand themselves by the theory their age professes. For a while its denizens will continue to think that

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[9] See Martin Lings, "Intellect and Reason" in *Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions*, rpt. (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1988), 57-68; F. Schuon, *Gnosis Divine Wisdom* (London: J. Murray, 1978), 93-99; S. H. Nasr, "Knowledge and its Desacralization" in *Knowledge and the Sacred* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 1-64; Huston Smith, *Forgotten Truth* (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 60-95. Also see his *Beyond the Post-Modern Mind* (Wheaton: Theosophical Publishing House, 1989).

[10] See René Guenon, "Individualism," in *Crisis of the Modern World* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1981), 51-65; Also see Social Chaos" in the same document.

[11] less anthropomorphically described in Plotinus's wording

[12] As John Avis and William Provine have said.

they believe it, but they feel otherwise and cannot understand their feelings. This had now happened to his world.

Even today, when traditional peoples want to know where they are– when they wonder about the ultimate context in which their lives are set and which has the final say over them– they turn to their sacred texts; or in the case of oral, tribal peoples (what comes to the same thing), to the sacred myths that have been handed down to them by their ancestors. *Modernity* was born when a new source of knowledge was discovered, the scientific method. Because its controlled experiment enabled scientists to prove their hypothesis, and because those proven hypotheses demonstrated that they had the power to change the material world dramatically, Westerners turned from revelation to science for the Big Picture. Intellectual historians tell us that by the 19th century, Westerners were already more certain that atoms exist than they were confident of any of the distinctive things the Bible speaks of.

This much is straightforward, but it doesn't explain why Westerners aren't still modern rather than Postmodern, for science continues to be the main support of the Western mind. By headcount, most Westerners probably still *are* modern, but I am thinking of frontier thinkers who chart the course that others follow. These thinkers have ceased to be modern because they have seen through the so-called scientific worldview, recognizing it to be not scien*tific* but scien*tistic*. They continue to honour science for what it tells us about nature or the natural order/natural world, but as that is not all that exists, science cannot provide us with a worldview– not a valid one. The most it can show us is half of the world, the half where normative and intrinsic values, existential and ultimate meanings, teleologies, qualities, immaterial realities, and beings that are superior to us do not appear.[13]

In his second lecture, "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience", in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbal has made a very perceptive remark:[14]

> There is no doubt that the theories of science constitute trustworthy knowledge, because they are verifiable and enable us to predict and control the events of Nature. But we must not forget that what is called science is not a single systematic view of Reality. It is a mass of sectional views of Reality– fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together. Natural Science deals with matter, with life, and with mind; but the moment you ask the question how matter, life, and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of these sciences, taken singly, to furnish a complete answer to your question. In fact, the various natural sciences are like so many

[13] This important point is not generally recognized, so I shall spell it out. The death-knell to modernity, which had science as its source and hope, was sounded with the realization that despite its power in limited regions, six things slip through its controlled experiments in the way sea slips through the nets of fishermen:
1. *Values*. Science can deal with descriptive and instrumental values, but not with intrinsic and normative ones.
2. *Meanings*. Science can work with cognitive meanings, but not with existential meanings (Is X meaningful?), or ultimate ones (What is the meaning of life?).
3. *Purposes*. Science can handle teleonomy– purposiveness in organisms– but not teleology, final causes.
4. *Qualities*. Quantities science is good at, but not qualities.
5. *The invisible and the immaterial*. It can work with invisibles that are rigorously entailed by matter's behaviour (the movements of iron filings that require magnetic fields to account for them, e.g.) but not with others.
6. *Our superiors, if such exist*. This limitation does not prove that beings greater than ourselves exist, but it does leave the question open, for "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence".

[14] Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (referred to as *Reconstruction*, here after), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan/Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1989), 26.

> vultures falling on the dead body of Nature, and each running away with a piece of its flesh. Nature as the subject of science is a highly artificial affair, and this artificiality is the result of that selective process to which science must subject her in the interests of precision. The moment you put the subject of science in the total of human experience, it begins to disclose a different character. Thus religion, which demands the whole of Reality and for this reason must occupy a central place in any synthesis of all the data of human experience, has no reason to be afraid of any sectional views of Reality. Natural Science is by nature sectional; it cannot, if it is true to its own nature and function, set up its theory as a complete view of Reality.

Where, then, do we now turn for an inclusive worldview? Postmodernism hasn't a clue. And this is its deepest definition.[15] The generally accepted definition of Postmodernism now that, Jean-Francois Lyotard fixed in place decades ago in *The Postmodern Condition* is "incredulity toward metanarratives."[16] Having deserted revelation for science, the West has now abandoned the scientific worldview as well, leaving it without replacement. In this it mirrors the current stage of Western science which leaves *nature* unimaged. Before modern science, Westerners accepted Aristotle's model of the earth as surrounded by concentric, crystalline spheres. Newton replaced that model with his image of a clockwork universe, but Postmodern, quantum-and-relativity science gives us not a third model of nature but no model at all. Alan Wallace's *Choosing Reality* delineates eight different interpretations of quantum physics, all of which can claim the support of physics' proven facts.[17] A contemporary philosopher described the situation as *"the Reality Market Place"*– you can have as many versions of reality as you like.

Another analogy can pull together all that we have just said and summarize the difference alluded to in these remarks. If we think of traditional peoples as looking out upon the world through the window of revelation (their received myths and sacred texts), the window that they turned to look through in the modern period (science) proved to be stunted. It cuts off at the level of the human nose, which (metaphysically speaking) means that when we look through it our gaze slants downward and we see only things that are inferior to us.[18] As for the Postmodern window, it is boarded over and allows no inclusive view whatsoever. In the words of Richard Rorty, "There is no Big Picture." This analogy is drawn from the works of one of the traditionalist writers, namely, Huston Smith, who is by far the easiest to understand. It is fascinating to note that Iqbal not only mediates between these conflicting views in exactly the same manner by pointing out to the shortcomings and achievements of all the three paradigms objectively but– and that is remarkable– uses the same analogy. Smith or Iqbal never met or read each other! Iqbal agrees that there is a Big Picture and his writings give us to understand that the Postmodern view of the self and its world is in no way nobler than the ones that the world's religions proclaim. Postmoderns yield to their dilapidated views, not because they like them, but because they think that reason and human

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[15] Ernest Gellner defines Postmodernism as relativism–"*relativismus über Alles*" (*Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*)– but relativism is not an easy position to defend, so postmoderns do everything they can to avoid that label; Clifford Geertz's "anti-antirelativism" is a case in point. The T-shirts that blossomed on the final day of a six-week, 1987 NEH Institute probably tell the story. Superimposed on a slashed circle, their logo read, "No cheap relativism". By squirming, postmoderns can parry crude relativisms, but sophisticated relativis is still relativism. Postmoderns resist that conclusion, however, so I shall stay with their own self-characterization.

[16] Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* (Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press, 1984), xxiv, 3ff.

[17] Alan Wallace, *Choosing Reality* (Boston and Shaftsbury, Shambala, 1989).

[18] No textbook in science has ever included things that are intrinsically greater than human beings. Bigger, of course, and wielding more physical power, but not superior in the full sense of that term which includes virtues, such as intelligence, compassion, and bliss.

historicity now force them upon us. Iqbal would argue that it is not necessarily the case and the present predicament is the result of a tunnel vision that we have adopted but which really is not the only option for us. Here is Iqbal's depiction of the conceptual shift that the enlightenment project and modernity's worldview had brought in the human thought, the damage that it had done to the academia. Cultures and their worldviews are ruled by their mandarins, the intellectuals and they, as well as their institutions that shape the minds that rule the modern world are unreservedly secular. The poem is addressed to our present day intellectual mandarins, the leaders of the academia.[19]

شیخ مکتب سے

شیخ مکتب ہے اک عمارت گر جس کی صنعت ہے رُوح انسانی

نُکتۂ دلپذیر تیرے لیے کہ گیا ہے حکیم قاآنیؒ

"پیش خورشید بر مکش دیوار

خواہی ار صحن خانہ نورانی''

To the Schoolman

The Schoolman is an architect

The artefact he shapes and moulds is the human soul;

Something remarkable for you to ponder

Has been left by the Sage, Qā'ānī;

"Do not raise a wall in the face of the illuminating Sun

If you wish the courtyard of your house to be filled with light"

What does the metaphor of خورشید (the illuminating Sun) in this analogy try to convey which, in the parallel analogy used by Huston Smith, is depicted by the stunted/slanted window of Modernity that resulted in a truncated, tunnel vision and the Postmodern window, boarded all over, thus precluding the possibility of any worldview what so ever! And this is intimately connected to our initial remarks about (فتنۂ عصر ِ روان), the challenge posed by the modern age of secular modernity and materialism, which Iqbal, like Rūmī, takes up.

The most important question that concerned Iqbal in this period related to the conceptual shift that the enlightenment project and modernity's worldview had brought in the human thought, the damage that it had done to the academia, and the means of repairing the ills. Iqbal's contemporary discourse was marked by incredulity. 'Incredulity toward metaphysics.' There was no consensual worldview. The incredulity took many forms that grew increasingly shrill as they proceeded. Minimally, it contented itself with pointing out that "we have no maps and don't know how to make them." Hardliners added, "and never again will we have a consensual worldview!" In short, Iqbal's contemporary discourse was filled with voices critiquing the truncated worldview of the Enlightenment, but from that reasonable beginning it plunged on to argue unreasonably that worldviews (or grand narratives) are misguided in principle. Wouldn't we be better off if we

[19] "Shaykh i Maktab" *Kulliyāt i Iqbāl,* Urdu, (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1994), 494.

extricate ourselves from the worldview we had unwittingly slipped into and replace it with a more generous and accurate one that shows us deeply connected to the final nature of things? Iqbal contemplated.[20] He had realized that a world ends when its metaphor dies, and modernity's metaphor– endless progress through science-powered technology– was dead. It was only cultural lag– the backward pull of the outgrown good– that keeps us running on it.

Already at the opening of the last century, when Postmodernism had not yet emerged on the scene, Yeats was warning that things were falling apart, that the centre didn't hold. Gertrude Stein followed him by noting that "in the twentieth century nothing is in agreement with anything else," and Ezra Pound saw man as "hurling himself at indomitable chaos"— the most durable line from the play *Green Pastures* has been, "Everything that's tied down is coming loose." T. S. Eliot found "The Wasteland" and "The Hollow Men" as appropriate metaphors for the outward and the inward aspects of our predicament.[21] Poetry of first magnitude or great poetry itself works as a bridge and with inevitable particularities always carry an aspect of universality. It brings you face to face with questions that are truly perennial human questions and not just Muslim or Christian or Hindu questions; who am I? What does it mean to be human?? Where have I come from? Where am I going? What is this universe and how am I related to it? Great poetry may seem grounded in a certain particular idiom or a specific universe of discourse but it always opens out onto the universal.

While Iqbal's cotemporaries were lamenting the state of the world with its shaky institutions and rudderless situation with the dominant mood of melancholy, without suggesting a viable alternative, Iqbal had a message of hope. The conclusion is that if for the survival of humanity it is necessary for man to respect his fellow-men; in the same way it is necessary for him to learn to respect religions other than his own. It is only through the adoption of this moral and spiritual approach that, borrowing Iqbal's phrase, "man may rise to a fresh vision of his future." And this brings us to the opening point of our discourse, "*Be conscious of the station of humanity*" which is intimately related to the question of the "Other"– religious, cultural, political– which, in turn, subsumes the issue of "tolerance" that we wish to address in this paper from the point of view of **Kinship of Thought between Islam and the West**. It, however, calls for a few remarks of a different order as our point of departure.

I would allow Robert Whittemore to make the point. He had observed: [22]

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[20] The views about the prevailing human predicament converged. Fresh "infusions" were needed. The opinions about the nature and origin of these fresh "infusions" that could rectify or change it for the better were, however, divergent. Some of Iqbal's cotemporaries tried to find an alternative from within the dominant paradigm. Others suggested the possibility of a search for these fresh "infusions" in a different direction: different cultures, other civilizations, religious doctrines, sapiential traditions. What could it be?

[21] It is not surprising, therefore, that when in her last interview Rebecca West was asked to name the dominant mood of our time, she replied, "A desperate search for a pattern." The search is desperate because it seems futile to look for a pattern when reality has become, in Roland Barth's vivid image, kaleidoscopic. With every tick of the clock the pieces of experience come down in new array.

[22] In his 1966 article, referring to Iqbal, Robert Whittemore, "Iqbal's Panentheism" had remarked, if we seek through the pages of most modern European and American philosophy for a mention of his name, Iqbal is unknown even to the compilers of philosophical dictionaries and encyclopaedias. (One prominent exception was Hartshorne & Reese's *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago, 1953), 294-97. The situation has changed since. In the last few decades, Iqbal has been studied by a number of scholars in the West. And, to be sure, he is now being mentioned and discussed in philosophical encyclopedias, dictionaries, and handbooks published in Western countries. For example, in Robert L.

> Examine Western philosophy from an Islamic standpoint and one characteristic of it is inescapable: from Thales to Wittgenstein Western thought has been for the most part invariably insular, insufferably parochial. European and American thinkers, in so many ways so diverse, have been from the time of their Greek forebears virtually as one in their provincial assurance that such ontological, cosmological and theological speculation as is worthy of their notice is a product of their Western culture.

The philosophy of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) affords a notable case in point. In the world of modern Muslim thought he stands alone. His *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* aspires to a place akin to that occupied by al-Ghazali's *Ihya Ulum al-Din* ("Revivification of the Religious Sciences"). His philosophical poetry is regarded by many Muslim scholars as a worthy postscript to the *Diwan* and *Mathnavi* of Jalaluddin Rumi."

This echoes the views expressed earlier during the century by the French metaphysician René Guénon as a prelude to his masterly study *Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines*.[23] Guénon had termed it "The Classical Prejudice" leading to "intellectual myopia." The attitude manifested itself in a different mode after the advent of Modernity when the Western cultural imagination turned away after its encounter with the stunning variety of cultural worlds that appeared for the first time in the Age of Discovery. This inward turn sparked the appearance of all sorts of imaginary realities and was responsible for the withdrawal of the Western thinkers of Enlightenment from the whirling world of cultural values into an utterly imaginary world of 'objective' forms of knowledge.[24] It was specifically a Modern phenomenon as, during the Middle Ages, despite the outwards conflicts and even protracted wars, intellectual exchange had continued at a deeper and more meaningful level. In this regard, it is useful to investigate how the West engaged with the idea and practice of tolerance as it had manifested in other religions and cultures and how does it relate to the historical trajectory through which it became established in the West.

Arrington's edited volume *A Companion to the Philosophers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), Iqbal is one of the eight philosophers included in the section on Islamic and Jewish philosophers, and he is in respectable company in Diané Collinson, Kathry Plant, and Robert Wilkinson's *Fifty Eastern Thinkers* (London: Routledge, 2000).

[23] René Guenon, "The Classical Prejudice", *Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines* (NY: Sophia Perennis, Hillsdale, 2004), 19. The book was originally written in French and appeared in its first English edition in 1925.

[24] Those interested in learning more about some of the criticisms we have in mind might begin by looking at the books cited by Lawrence E. Sullivan in his masterly study, *Icanchus Drum: An Orientation to Meaning in South American Religions* (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 884-85. What he says in the passage leading up to the suggested reading applies also to Western perceptions of Islam: "One of the great disservices to our understanding of South American religions [read: Islam] has been the perception of tribal peoples [read: Muslims) as slavishly dedicated to an unchanging order revealed in the images of myth and handed down unquestioned and unmodified from one generation to the next. This attitude accompanies the evaluation of 'myth' as a banal and inane narrative. Tribal peoples (representing 'archaic' modes of thought) childishly cling to their myths, infantile fantasies, whereas mature contemporaries jettison myths with the passage of 'historical time' and the entrance' into 'modernity. 'It would be fascinating to study these and other justifications proffered for avoiding a serious encounter with the reality of myth [read: Islamic thought) and symbolic acts.... This is, however, not the place to carry out a history of the 'modern' ideas of myth and religion. It is enough to suggest that the Western cultural imagination turned away when it encountered the stunning variety of cultural worlds that appeared for the first time in the Age of Discovery. Doubtless this inward turn sparked the appearance of all sorts of imaginary realities. The Enlightenment, the withdrawal of Western thinkers from the whirling world of cultural values into an utterly imaginary world of 'objective' forms of knowledge, and its intellectual follow-up coined new symbolic currency. These terms brought new meanings and new self-definition to Western culture: 'consciousness/unconsciousness,' 'primitive/civilized,' 'ethics/mores,' 'law/custom,' 'critical or reflective thought/ action."

TOLERANCE– RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR

Tolerance is a multi-faceted concept comprising moral, psychological, social, legal, political and religious dimensions. The dimension of tolerance addressed by this essay is specifically religious tolerance, such as this principle finds expression within the Islamic tradition, and how it came to be enshrined in the Western thought after the Enlightenment. Further to that we would try to look at the shared legacy of the idea that suffered a diverse destiny in the West. Religious tolerance can be defined in terms of a positive spiritual predisposition towards the religious Other, a predisposition fashioned by a vision of the divinely-willed diversity of religious communities. If the diversity of religions is seen to be an expression of the will of God,[25] then the inevitable differences between the religions will be not only tolerated but also celebrated: tolerated on the outward, legal and formal plane, celebrated on the inward, cultural and spiritual plane. As is the case with secular tolerance, here also one will encounter a positive and open-minded attitude, one capable of stimulating policies and laws of a tolerant nature towards the religious Other, but the root of this attitude derives from a principle going beyond the secular domain: the tolerant attitude emerges as the consequence of a kaleidoscopic vision of unfolding divine revelations, a vision which elicits profound respect for the religions of the Other, rather than reluctantly, begrudgingly or condescendingly granting mere toleration.

Tolerance born of a divinely ordained imperative cannot but engender respect for the religious Other. But the converse does not hold: one can be tolerant in a secular sense outwardly and legally, without this being accompanied by sincere respect for the religion of the Other. Moreover, the purely secular approach to tolerance carries with it the risk of falling into a corrosive relativism of the 'anything goes' variety. It can lead to the normativity and particularity of one's own faith being diluted, if not sacrificed, for the sake of an abstracted and artificial social construct.

The Islamic tradition, in principle as well as in practice, provides compelling answers to many questions pertaining to the relationship between religious tolerance and the practice of one's own faith. The lessons drawn from the Islamic tradition reveal that tolerance of the Other is in fact integral to the practice of Islam– it is not some extra optional, some cultural luxury, and still less, something one needs to import from some other tradition. This being said, one needs to take note of an irony: the essential sources of the Islamic faith reveal a sacred vision of diversity and difference, plurality and indeed of universality, which is unparalleled among world scriptures; the practice of contemporary Muslim states, however, not to mention many vociferous extra-state groups and actors, falls lamentably short of the current standards of tolerance set by the secular West. In consequence, it is hardly surprising that many argue that what the Muslim world needs in order to become more tolerant is to learn to become more modern and secular, and less traditional and 'visionary.' This kind of argument, however, ignoring and belittling the vast treasury of ethical and spiritual resources within the Islamic tradition, will succeed only in making Muslims more, rather than less, intolerant, by provoking defensive backlashes. But we would come back later to the issue of this apparently more intelligible demand that we must pass through an

[25] The fundamental message of the Qur'an as regards all previous revelations is one of inclusion not exclusion, protection and not destruction. Arguably the most important verse in this regard is: 'We have revealed unto you the Scripture with the Truth, to confirm and protect the Scripture which came before it ... For each We have appointed a Law and a Way. Had God willed, He could have made you one community. But that He might try you by that which He has given you [He has made you as you are]. So vie with one another in good works. Unto God you will all return, and He will inform you of that wherein you differed' (5:48).

Enlightenment, voiced by the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn when he wrote that "Christianity and Judaism have gone through the laundromat of humanism and enlightenment, but that is not the case with Islam."[26]

A more fruitful approach would be to encourage an honest acknowledgement by Muslims that, as regards the practice of religious tolerance, the secular West has indeed set high standards, albeit at the price of a corrosive relativism, a price which is becoming increasingly apparent to many with the passage of time. Instead of being seen as contrary to the Islamic vision, however, such tolerant codes of conduct can be seen as formal expressions of the universal principle of tolerance inhering in the vision of Islam itself. In this sacred vision, the plurality of paths to the One is viewed as a reflection of the infinitude of the One; tolerance of diversity and difference on the human plane thus flows as a moral consequence of this divinely willed plurality, becoming thereby not just a social ethic, but also an expression of the wisdom of the One, being ordained first 'from above', and then here below. Tolerance within the framework of a divinely ordained schema expresses both an obligation and a right: a moral obligation to permit people of different faiths to manifest their own specific ways of embodying and radiating these universal values, and the spiritual right to benefit from the specific manifestations of these universal values oneself. This accords with the very purpose of diversity as envisioned by the Qur'an: *'O mankind, We have created you male and female, and We have made you into tribes and nations in order that you might come to know one another. Truly, in the sight of God, the most honoured amongst you is the most pious amongst you.'*[27]

The Prophet SAW was asked: 'which religion is most loved by God?' His answer can be seen as a succinct commentary on the above verse. Instead of referring to such and such a religion, he highlights the key character trait which should be infused into the soul by all religions, or by religion as such; whichever religion is most successful in producing this trait becomes 'the most beloved' religion to God: "The primordial, generously tolerant faith" (*al-hanafiyya al-samha*). This strongly authenticated saying highlights the centrality of tolerance to the religious endeavour as such; it also implies, as does verse 49:13, the absolute equality of all believers, the sole permissible hierarchy within humanity being that based on intrinsic piety, not on such extrinsic factors as gender or affiliation to tribe or nation, race or religion. Given this view of equality on the human plane, and the Islamic belief in universal and cyclical revelation–no community being deprived of authentic divine revelation and guidance–intolerance of the Other is reprehensible both morally and spiritually.

TOLERANT ISLAM OR THE LIBERAL WEST? WHICH CAME FIRST?

Before directly addressing the principle and practice of tolerance in Islam, let us ask ourselves the question as to what is the provenance of the secular concept of tolerance in the West, for this

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[26] Fortuyn's religious views are detailed in his book *Against the Islamisation of our Culture*, published in 1997 [cited in Angus Roxburgh, *Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right* (London, 2002), 163] to celebrate Israel's fiftieth birthday. He believed that Islam, unlike his own strongly-affirmed Christianity, is a 'backward culture', with an inadequate view of God and an inbuilt hostility to European culture. He called for massive curbs on Muslim immigration, and for greater stress on Holland's Christian heritage. A prominent homosexual activist, Fortuyn also condemned Islam's opposition to same-sex marriage. Cited in Angus Roxburgh, *Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right* (London, 2002), 163.

[27] Al Quran, 49:13.

provides some important–and ironic–lessons in this domain. In 1689, John Locke, one of the founding fathers of modern liberal thought, wrote a famous text, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration'. This letter is widely viewed as instrumental in the process by which the ethical value of religious tolerance was transformed into a universal ethical imperative, as far as individual conscience is concerned, and into a legal obligation, incumbent upon the upholders of political authority, as far as the state is concerned. It is evident from this letter that Locke was deeply struck by the contrast between tolerant 'barbarians'– the Muslim Ottomans– and violently intolerant Christians. The contrast was compounded by the fact that Muslims exercised more tolerance towards non-Muslims than Christians did to each other, let alone non-Christians. In his letter, Locke ruefully reflected on the absurdity that Calvinists and Armenians were free to practice their faith if they lived in the Muslim Ottoman Empire, but not in Christian Europe: would the Turks not 'silently stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians?'

Locke passionately proclaimed the need for 'universal tolerance', whatever one's religious beliefs, and, indeed, in the prevailing Christian climate, *despite* one's beliefs. Following on logically from this secular principle of tolerance was the right for non-Christians to live unmolested in the state of England, and be accorded full civil and political rights: '…neither pagan nor Mahometan nor Jew ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the Commonwealth because of his religion.' This strict separation between religion and politics, church and state, so often viewed only as part of the evolutionary trajectory of Western secularization must also be seen in the light of the historical interface between mutually intolerant Christian states and denominations, on the one hand, and a vibrantly tolerant Muslim polity, on the other. The current unquestioned right of freedom of religious belief and worship in the Western world is thus not simply a corollary of secular thought; it is a principle inspired, at least in part, by the influence of Islam.

The spectacle of Muslim Ottoman tolerance was something to which Christendom was used: 'Better the turban of the Sultan than the mitre of the Pope,' was a well-worn saying among Eastern Orthodox Christians, acutely aware of the fact that their rights were more secure under the Ottomans than under their Catholic co-religionists. Ottoman conquest was followed almost without exception by Islamic tolerance of the conquered peoples. 'Tolerance', according to (Reverend) Dr Susan Ritchie, 'was a matter of Ottoman policy and bureaucratic structure, and an expression of the Ottoman interpretation of Islam, which was in most instances stunningly liberal and cosmopolitan.' She argues convincingly that this Ottoman tolerance decisively influenced the process leading to the famous Edict of Torda in 1568, issued by King John Sigismund of Transylvania (which was under Ottoman suzerainty), an edict hailed by Western historians as expressing 'the first European policy of expansive religious toleration.'[28] It is thus hardly surprising that Norman Daniel should allow himself to make the simple–and, for many, startling–claim: 'The notion of toleration in Christendom was *borrowed* from Muslim practice' (emphasis added).[29]

Ottoman tolerance of the Jews provides an illuminating contrast with the anti-Semitism of Christendom, which resulted in the regular pogroms and 'ethnic cleansing' by which the medieval Christian world was stained. Many Jews fleeing from persecution in central Europe would have

[28] Susan Ritchie, "The Islamic Ottoman Influence on the Development of Religious Toleration in Reformation Transylvania", in *Seasons*—Semi-annual Journal of Zaytuna Institute, vol.2, no.1 (2007): 62, 59.

[29] Norman Daniel, *Islam, Europe and Empire* (Edinburgh, 1966), 12.

received letters like the following, written by Rabbi Isaac Tzarfati, who reached the Ottomans just before their capture of Constantinople in 1453, replying to those Jews of central Europe who were calling out for help: 'Listen, my brethren, to the counsel I will give you. I too was born in Germany and studied Torah with the German rabbis. I was driven out of my native country and came to the Turkish land, which is blessed by God and filled with all good things. Here I found rest and happiness … Here in the land of the Turks we have nothing to complain of. We are not oppressed with heavy taxes, and our commerce is free and unhindered … every one of us lives in peace and freedom. Here the Jew is not compelled to wear a yellow hat as a badge of shame, as is the case in Germany, where even wealth and great fortune are a curse for the Jew because he therewith arouses jealousy among the Christians … Arise, my brethren, gird up your loins, collect your forces, and come to us. Here you will be free of your enemies, here you will find rest …'[30]

At the very same time as the Christian West was indulging in periodic anti-Jewish pogroms, the Jews were experiencing what some Jewish historians themselves have termed a kind of 'golden age' under Muslim rule. As Erwin Rosenthal writes, 'The Talmudic age apart, there is perhaps no more formative and positive time in our long and chequered history than that under the empire of Islam.' One particularly rich episode in this 'golden age' was experienced by the Jews of Muslim Spain. As has been abundantly attested by historical records, the Jews enjoyed not just freedom from oppression, but also an extraordinary revival of cultural, religious, theological and mystical creativity. Such great Jewish luminaries as Maimonides and Ibn Gabirol wrote their philosophical works in Arabic, and were fully 'at home' in Muslim Spain. With the expulsion, murder or forced conversion of all Muslims and Jews following the *reconquista* of Spain–brought to completion with the fall of Granada in 1492–it was to the Ottomans that the exiled Jews turned for refuge and protection. They were welcomed in Muslim lands throughout north Africa, joining the settled and prosperous Jewish communities already there.

As for Christians under Muslim rule in Spain, we have the following interesting contemporary testimony to the practice of Muslim tolerance, from within the Christian community itself. In the middle of the 10th century, embassies were exchanged between the court of Otto I of Germany and court of Cordoba. One such delegation was led by John of Gorze in 953 who met the resident bishop of Cordoba, who explained to him, how the Christians survived: [31]

> We have been driven to this by our sins, to be subjected to the rule of the pagans. We are forbidden by the Apostle's words to resist the civil power. Only one cause of solace is left to us, that in the depths of such a great calamity, they do not forbid us to practise our own faith … For the time being, then, we keep the following counsel: that provided no harm is done to our religion, we obey them in all else, and do their commands in all that does not affect our faith.

Even so fierce a critic of contemporary Islam as Bernard Lewis cannot but confirm the facts of history as regards the true character of Muslim-Jewish relations until recent times. In his book, *The Jews of Islam*, he writes that even though there was a certain level of discrimination against Jews and Christians under Muslim rule, 'Persecution, that is to say, violent and active repression, was rare and atypical. Jews and Christians under Muslim rule were not normally called upon to suffer martyrdom for their faith. They were not often obliged to make the choice, which

[30] Quoted in S. A. Schleifer, 'Jews and Muslims—A Hidden History', in *The Spirit of Palestine* (Barcelona, 1994): 8.
[31] Richard Fletcher, *The Cross and the Crescent—Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation* (New York/London, 2004), 48.

confronted Muslims and Jews in reconquered Spain, between exile, apostasy and death. They were not subject to any major territorial or occupational restrictions, such as were the common lot of Jews in premodern Europe.'[32] This pattern of tolerance characterised the nature of Muslim rule vis-à-vis Jews and Christians until modern times, with very minor exceptions. As the Jewish scholar Mark Cohen notes: 'The Talmud was burned in Paris, not in Cairo or Baghdad … Staunch Muslim opposition to polytheism convinced Jewish thinkers like Maimonides of Islam's unimpeachable monotheism. This essentially 'tolerant' view of Islam echoed Islam's own respect for the Jewish "people of the Book".[33]

WHENCE THE SACRED VISION OF ISLAM?

The intrinsic nature of the Muslim polity is derived from the Prophet's SAW embodiment of the Qur'anic revelation. His acts of statesmanship should not be seen in isolation as a series of historical events, but as a series of symbolic acts which, more powerfully than words, uphold the inviolability of the religious rights of the Other and the necessity of exercising a generous tolerance in regard to the Other. The seminal and most graphic expression of this sacred vision inspiring the kind of tolerance witnessed throughout Muslim history is given to us in the following well-attested episode in the life of the Prophet SAW. In the ninth year after the Hijra (631), a prominent Christian delegation from Najrān, an important centre of Christianity in the Yemen, came to engage the Prophet SAW in theological debate in Medina. The main point of contention was the nature of Christ: was he one of the messengers of God or the unique Son of God? What is important for our purposes is not the disagreements voiced, nor the means by which the debate was resolved, but the fact that when these Christians requested to leave the city to perform their liturgy, the Prophet invited them to accomplish their rites in his own mosque. According to Ibn Ishaq, who gives the standard account of this remarkable event, the Christians in question performed the Byzantine Christian rites.[34] This means that they were enacting some form of the rites which incorporated the fully-developed Trinitarian theology of the Orthodox councils, emphasising the definitive creed of the divine sonship of Christ–doctrines explicitly criticised in the Qur'an. Nonetheless, the Prophet SAW allowed the Christians to accomplish their rites in his own mosque. Disagreement on the plane of dogma is one thing, tolerance–indeed encouragement–of the enactment of that dogma is another.

One should also mention in this context the tolerance that is inscribed into the first Muslim constitution, that of Medina. In this historic document, a pluralistic polity is configured. The right to freedom of worship was assumed, given the unprejudiced recognition of all three religious groups who were party to the agreement: Muslims, Jews and polytheists–the latter indeed comprising the majority at the time the constitution was drawn up. Each group enjoyed unfettered religious and legal autonomy, and the Jews, it should be noted, were not required at this stage to pay any kind of poll-tax. The Muslims were indeed recognised as forming a distinct group within the polity, but this did not compromise the principle of mutual defence which was at the root of

[32] Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, 1984), 8.
[33] Mark Cohen, 'Islam and the Jews: Myth, Counter-Myth, History', in *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no.38, (1986):135.
[34] A. Guillaume (Tr.) *The Life of Muhammad*—A Translation of Ibn Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford, 1968), 270-277.

the agreement: Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document. They must seek mutual advice and consultation, and loyalty is a protection against treachery.'[35]

To sum, the record of tolerance in Muslim history must surely be seen as the fruit of the prophetic paradigm, which in turn derives from and is a commentary upon, the vision revealed by the Qur'an, to which we should now turn. Not withstanding the many verses critical of earlier religious traditions, the fundamental message of the Qur'an as regards all previous revelations is one of inclusion not exclusion, protection and not destruction. Arguably the most important verse in this regard is: 'We have revealed unto you the Scripture with the Truth, to confirm and protect the Scripture which came before it ... For each We have appointed a Law and a Way. Had God willed, He could have made you one community. But that He might try you by that which He has given you [He has made you as you are]. So vie with one another in good works. Unto God you will all return, and He will inform you of that wherein you differed.'[36]

This verse, supplemented by a multitude of other proof texts (given in the endnotes), establishes four crucial principles that enshrine the Qur'anic Vision which both fashion and substantiate an open-minded approach to all religions and their adherents and inculcates the attitude that if God is the ultimate source of the different rites of the religions, no one set of rites can be legitimately excluded from the purview of authentic religion:

- the Qur'an confirms and protects all divine revelations;[37]
- the very plurality of these revelations is the result of a divine will for diversity on the plane of human communities;[38]
- this diversity of revelations and plurality of communities is intended to stimulate a healthy 'competition' or mutual enrichment in the domain of 'good works';[39]

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[35] F. E. Peters, *Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, vol.1, (Princeton, 1990), 217.

[36] Al Quran, 5:48.

[37] 'there is no compulsion in religion' (2:256); 'Permission [to fight] is given to those who are being fought, for they have been wronged … Had God not driven back some by means of others, then indeed monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques–wherein the name of God is oft-invoked–would assuredly have been destroyed (22: 39- 40).

[38] The plurality of revelations, like the diversity of human communities, is divinely-willed, and not the result of some human contingency. Universal revelation and human diversity alike are expressions of divine wisdom. They are also signs intimating the infinitude of the divine nature itself: *'And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the differences of your languages and colours. Indeed, herein are signs for those who know* (30:22).' Just as God is both absolutely one yet immeasurably infinite, so the human race is one in its essence, yet infinitely variegated in its forms. The *fitra*, or primordial nature, is the inalienable substance of each human being and this essence of human identity takes priority over all external forms of identity such as race and nation, culture or even religion: *'So set your purpose firmly for the faith as an original monotheist, [in accordance with] the fitra of God, by which He created mankind. There can be no altering the creation of God. That is the right religion, but most people know it not'* (30:30). The diversity of religious rites is also derived directly from God, affirmed by the following verse: *'Unto each community We have given sacred rites (mansakan) which they are to perform; so let them not dispute with you about the matter, but summon them unto your Lord* (22:67). *For every community there is a Messenger* (10:47). *And We never sent a messenger save with the language of his people, so that he might make [Our message] clear to them* (14:4). *Truly We inspire you, as We inspired Noah, and the prophets after him, as We inspired Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and Jesus and Job and Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and as We bestowed unto David the Psalms; and Messengers We have mentioned to you before, and Messengers We have not mentioned to you* (4:163-164). (emphasis added) *And We sent no Messenger before you but We inspired him [saying]: There is no God save Me, so worship Me (21:25). Naught is said unto you [Muhammad] but what was said unto the Messengers before you* (41:43).

[39] The ultimate goal in such a competition between religious believers is salvation. The performance of 'good works' (*khayrat*) is intended not only to establish moral conduct on earth but also to grant access to that grace by which one

- differences of opinion are inevitable consequences of the very plurality of meanings embodied in diverse revelations; these differences are to be tolerated on the human plane, and will be finally resolved in the Hereafter.[40]

In our times, the secular principle of separation between church and state derives much of its legitimacy from the religious tolerance which fidelity to these principles fosters and protects. As stated earlier, this cannot be disputed on empirical grounds. However, what must be recognised

attains salvation in the Hereafter. One of the key sources of religious intolerance is the exclusivist notion that one's religion, alone, grants access to salvation, all others being false religions leading nowhere. This exclusivism is summed up in the Roman Catholic formula *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*: no salvation outside of the Church. This kind of exclusivism has no place in the Qur'anic worldview, as is clearly demonstrated by such verses as the following: *'Truly those who believe, and the Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabeans–whoever believes in God and the Last Day and performs virtuous deeds–surely their reward is with their Lord, and no fear shall come upon them, neither shall they grieve* (2: 62; repeated almost verbatim at 5:69). The only criteria for salvation according to this verse are belief in the Absolute, and in accountability to that Absolute, conjoined to virtue in consequence of these beliefs. Given this clear expression of the universality of salvation, any lapse into the kind of religious chauvinism which feeds intolerance is impermissible. This is made clear in the following verses, which explicitly mention forms of religious exclusivism which the Muslims had encountered among various communities of the 'People of the Book': *'And they say: "None enters Paradise unless he be a Jew or a Christian". These are their vain desires. Say: "Bring your proof if you are truthful". Nay, but whosoever submits his purpose to God, and he is virtuous, his reward is with his Lord. No fear shall come upon them, neither shall they grieve* (2:111-112). In other words, the Muslim is not allowed to play the game of religious polemics. Instead of responding in kind to any sort of chauvinistic claims or 'vain desires' aimed at monopolising Paradise, the Muslim is instructed to raise the dialogue to a higher level, and to call for reasoned debate: 'bring your proof'. The Qur'anic position is to affirm the universal salvific criteria of piety, accessible to all human beings, whatever be their religious affiliation. This position is further affirmed in the following verses: *'It will not be in accordance with your desires, nor with the desires of the People of the Book. He who does wrong will have its recompense ... And whoso performs good works, whether male or female, and is a believer, such will enter Paradise, and will not be wronged the dint of a date-stone.* (4:123-124) One can read this verse as implying that insofar as the Muslim 'desires' that salvation be restricted to Muslims in the specific, communal sense, he falls into exactly the same kind of exclusivism of which the Christians and Jews stand accused. It should be noted that the very same word is used both for the 'desires' of the Jews and the Christians, and the 'desires' of the Muslims, *amaniyy* (s. *umniyya*). The logic of these verses clearly indicates that one form of religious prejudice is not to be confronted with another form of the same error, but with an objective, unprejudiced recognition of the inexorable and universal law of divine justice, a law which excludes both religious nationalism and its natural concomitant, intolerance.

[40] Given the fact that '*there is no compulsion in religion'* (2:256), it follows that differences of opinion must be tolerated and not suppressed. This theme is not unconnected with the principle of divine mercy: just as God's mercy is described as *encompassing all things* (7:156), so divine guidance through revelation encompasses all human communities. The Prophet SAW is described as a *'mercy to the whole of creation'* (21:107), and his character is described as merciful and kind in the Qur'an (9:128); in the traditional sources the trait which is most often used to define the essence of his personality is *hilm*, a forbearance compounded of wisdom and gentleness. The tolerance accorded to the Other by the Prophet is thus an expression not only of knowledge of the universality of revelation, but also of the mercy, love and compassion from which this universal divine will to guide and save all peoples itself springs. Seen thus, the spirit of Islamic tolerance goes infinitely beyond a merely formal toleration of the Other; it is the outward ethical form assumed by one's conformity to the very nature of the divine, which encompasses all things '*in mercy and knowledge'* (40:7). It is also a mode of emulation of the prophetic nature: '*Say [O Muhammad]: If you love God, follow me; God will love you*' (3:31). To follow the Prophet means, among other things, to be gentle and lenient to all, in accordance with the *hilm* which defined his character: '*It was a mercy from God that you are gently disposed to them; had you been fierce and hard-hearted, they would have fled from you*' (3:159). In regard to the disbelievers, then, the Muslim is enjoined to let them go their way unmolested, to let them believe in their own 'religion': '*Say: O you who disbelieve, I worship not that which you worship, nor do you worship that which I worship. And I shall not worship that which you worship, nor will you worship that which I worship. For you your religion, for me, mine* (109:1-6)'. Returning to the duty to deliver the message and no more, there are a number of verses to note; for example:
'If they submit, they are rightly guided, but if they turn away, you have no duty other than conveying the message ... (3:20)' 'If they are averse, We have not sent you as a guardian over them: your duty is but to convey the message (42:48).'

and resisted is the temptation to universalise the particular historical trajectory by which tolerance became established in the West, and apply (or impose – as observed in the representative trend manifesting in the Mr. Fortuyn's observation) this trajectory normatively to the Muslim world. Political analysts are fond of pointing to examples of religious intolerance in contemporary Muslim world and attribute this absence of tolerance to the 'backwardness' of Islam, and in particular to the insistence by Muslims that religion must dominate and fashion the whole of life, that restoring God to the public and the private sphere is non-negotiable and essential. This refusal to separate 'mosque' from 'state', such analysts conclude, is one of the main reasons why the Muslim world lags behind the West as regards both the principle and practice of religious tolerance.

This type of analysis is not only simplistic and erroneous; it also obscures an irony at once historical and theological. The principle of religious tolerance has historically been one of the hallmarks of Muslim society, right up to its decline in the pre-modern period– a decline accelerated by the assault of Western imperialism, mimetic industrialism, and corrosive consumerism, all of which diminished radically the spiritual 'sap' of the Islamic tradition, and thereby, the ethics of tolerance and compassion. In contrast, the *intolerance* which characterised Christendom for much of its history only began to be 'deconstructed' in this same period, with the advent of Western secularism. In other words, the rise of religious tolerance in the West appears to be correlated to the diminution of the influence of Christian values in public life in the modern period; conversely, in the Muslim world, it is the decline of the influence of Islamic values that has engendered that peculiar inferiority complex of which religious intolerance is a major symptom. Through the emasculation of this spiritual heritage, all sorts of imported ideological counterfeits– from apologetic liberal Islam to militant radical Islamism– have been manufactured in an effort to fill the vacuum, most of them appearing as the desperate but impotent reflexes of a decaying religious form. In such a situation, what is required is a return to the spirit of the tradition, not another form of mimesis; it is therefore highly ironic that Muslims are being called upon to follow the path of secularisation in order to become more tolerant.

Rather, Muslims ought to be invited to become aware of the tolerance which truly characterises the spirit–and the history–of the Islamic tradition; to use this tradition as the yard-stick by which to critically gauge contemporary Muslim conduct and attitudes; to strive to revive and revalorise the principles of tolerance, diversity and pluralism which are enshrined at the very heart of this tradition; and to realise that tolerance is 'neither of the East nor of the West': no religion or culture can claim a monopoly on this universal human ethic. For Muslims, then, being tolerant of the religious Other does not require imitating any philosophical teachings on tolerance the Western thought has to offer, but rather returning to the moral and spiritual roots of their own tradition, while benefiting from and acknowledging the positive aspects of practical tolerance enacted by Western nations in the realms of public law, human rights and political governance.[41]

[41] Islam teaches that tolerance, far from being the preserve of this or that religion, is a universal ethical imperative which must be infused into the moral fibre of each human being. This imperative acquires additional urgency given the fact that human society is characterised by a divinely-willed diversity of religions and cultures. Without tolerance, diversity is jeopardised; without diversity, the God-given nature of humanity is violated. If the diversity of religions and cultures is an expression of the wisdom of divine revelation, then tolerance of the differences which will always accompany that diversity becomes not just an ethical obligation to our fellow-creatures, but also a mode of respecting and reflecting the wisdom of the Creator. That wisdom is inextricably bound up with mercy, for God encompasses all things '*in mercy and*

SHARED LEGACY: DIVERSE DESTINIES!

The last remarks bring us to consider the question that we evoked with reference to the remarks of Pim Fortuyn.[42] Mr. Fortuyn's views have generated many debates in the Islamic communities in the West and even reverberate in the Islamic world where the question has gained space in the prevalent discourse. There are arguments in defence and responses that challenge the argument but

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knowledge' (40:7). From the point of view of the sacred vision of Islam, tolerance is not just a noble human ethic, it is also, and above all, an invitation to participate in the compassionate wisdom of the Creator.

[42] A quick survey of the region would be in order here. In Norway, the 1997 election saw the sudden appearance of the anti-immigrant Progress Party of Carl Hagen, which now holds twenty-five out of a hundred and sixty-five parliamentary seats. Similar to Hagen's group is the Swiss People's Party, which commands 22.5% of the popular vote in Switzerland, and has been widely compared to the Freedom Party of Jorg Haider, which in 1999 joined the Austrian coalition government.

In Denmark, the rapidly-growing ultranationalist DPP has become the third most popular party, benefiting from widespread popular dislike of Muslims. Its folksy housewife-leader Pia Kiaersgaard opposes entry into the Eurozone, rails against 'welfare cheats', and is famous for her outbursts against Islam. 'I think the Muslims are a problem,' she stated in a recent interview. 'It's a problem in a Christian country to have too many Muslims.' [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/europe/2000/far_right/]

In Britain, the same tendency has to some extent been paralleled in the recent growth of the British National Party. A cassette recording issued by the party, entitled 'Islam: A Threat to Us All: A Joint Statement by the British National Party, Sikhs and Hindus', describes itself as 'a common effort to expose and resist the innate aggression of the imperialistic ideology of Islam'. As with its Continental allies, the BNP is gaining popularity by abandoning racist language, and by attempting to forge alliances with non-Muslim Asians and Blacks. The result has been documents such as the October 2001 'Anti-Islam Supplement' of the BNP newsletter Identity, which ended with an appeal to 'Join Our Crusade'. The chairman of the BNP, Nick Griffin, wades in with discussions of 'The Islamic Monster' and the 'New Crusade for the Survival of the West'. [http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles.html]. In July 2001, Griffin and his skinheads polled 16% of the votes in Oldham West: the highest postwar vote for any extremist party in the UK. Nonetheless, British fascism remains less popular than most of its European counterparts. An issue to consider, no doubt, as Muslim communities ponder their response to growing British participation in schemes for European integration, and the long-term possibility of a federal European state.

To offer a final, more drastic example of how such attitudes are no longer marginal, but have penetrated the mainstream and contribute to the shaping of policy, often with disastrous results. On the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the German magazine Der Spiegel told its readers that 'Soon Europe could have a fanatical theocratic state on its doorstep.' [Cited in Andrea Lueg, 'The Perception of Islam in Western Debate', in Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (eds), *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam,* (London: Pluto Press, 1995,).9.] (The logic no doubt appealed to the thirty-eight percent of Germans polled in [Brandenburg]who recently expressed support for a far-right party's policy on 'foreigners'. [The Independent, 5 October 1999.]).

The influential American commentator R.D. Kaplan, much admired by Bill Clinton, thought that '[a] cultural curtain is descending in Bosnia to replace the [Berlin] wall, a curtain separating the Christian and Islamic worlds.' [Cited by Lueg, op. cit., 11] Again, those who travelled through that 'curtain' can do no more than record that the opposite appeared to be the case. Far from reducing to essences, in this case, a pacific, pluralistic Christianity confronting a totalitarian and belligerent Islam, the Bosnian war, despite its complexities, usually presented a pacific, defensive Muslim community struggling for a multiethnic vision of society against a Christian aggressor committed to preserving the supposed ethnic hygiene of local Christendom. In Bosnia the stereotypes were so precisely reversed that it is remarkable that they could have survived at all. Here the Christians were the 'Oriental barbarians', while the Muslims represented the 'European ideal' of parliamentary democracy and conviviality. Neither can we explain away the challenge to stereotypes by asserting that religion was a minor ingredient in the very secularized landscape of post-Titoist Yugoslavia. The Bosnian President was a mosque-going Muslim who had been imprisoned for his beliefs under the Communists. The Muslim religious hierarchy had been consistent in its support for a multiethnic, integrated Bosnian state. Ranged against them were all the forces of the local Christian Right, as the Greek Orthodox synod conferred its highest honour, the Order of St Denis of Xante, on Serb radical leader Radovan Karadzic. Ignoring the unanimous verdict of human rights agencies, the Greek Synod apparently had no qualms about hailing him as 'one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ, working for peace.' [Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 85.]

the insistent question of Mr Fortuyn remains with us. Do we have to pass through his laundromat to be made internally white, as it were, to have an authentic and honoured place of belonging at the table of the modern reality? Islam has a great history of universalism, that is to say, that Islam does not limit itself to the uplift of any given section of humanity, but rather announces a desire to transform the *entire* human family. This is, if you like, its Ishmaelite uniqueness: the religions that spring from Isaac (*a.s.*), are, in our understanding, an extension of Hebrew and Occidental particularity, while Islam is universal. Islam's civilizational eminence stemmed from a spectacular plenitude. Of the other religions of the pre-Enlightenment world, only Buddhism rivaled Islam in massively encompassing a range of cultures; however Islam, uncontroversially, was the foundation for a still wider range and variety of cultural worlds.[43] Has this triumphant demonstration of Islam's universalism come to an end? Perhaps the greatest single issue exercising the world today is the following: is the engagement of Islamic monotheism with the new capitalist global reality a challenge that even Islam, with its proven ability to square circles, cannot manage? The current agreement between zealots on both sides – Islamic and unbelieving– that Islam and Western modernity can have no conversation, and cannot inhabit each other, seems difficult given traditional Islamic assurances about the universal potential of revelation. The increasing numbers of individuals who identify themselves as entirely Western, and entirely Muslim, demonstrate that the arguments against the continued ability of Islam to be inclusively universal are simply false.

Yet the question, the big new Eastern Question, will not go away this easily. Palpably, there are millions of Muslims who are at ease somewhere within the spectrum of the diverse possibilities of Westernness. We need, however, a theory to match this practice. Is the accommodation real? What is the theological or *fiqh* status of this claim to an overlap? Can Islam really square this biggest of all historical circles, or must it now fail, and retreat into impoverished and hostile marginality, as history passes it by?

The same argument underlies the claim that Muslims cannot inhabit the West, or– as successful participants– the Western-dominated global reality, because Islam has not passed through a reformation. This is a tiresome and absent-minded claim and is often advanced by those who simply cannot be troubled to read their *own* history, let alone the history of Islam. A reformation, that is to say, a bypass operation which avoids the clogged arteries of medieval history and seeks to refresh us with the lifeblood of the scriptures themselves, is precisely what is today underway among those movements and in those places which the West finds most intimidating. The Islamic world is now in the throes of its own reformation, and our Calvins and Cromwells are proving no more tolerant and flexible than their European predecessors.[44] A reformation, then, is a bad thing to ask us for, if you would like us to be more pliant. But the apparently more intelligible demand, which is that we must pass through an Enlightenment, articulated in the late Dutch politician Pim

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[43] In particular, we may identify distinctive high civilizations among Muslim Africans, Arabs, Turks (including Central Asians), Persians (including, as an immensely fertile extension, Muslim India), and the population of the Malay archipelago, radiating from the complex court cultures of Java.

[44] The defining demand of the Reformation was the return to the most literal meaning of Scripture. Hence Calvin: 'Let us know, then, that the true meaning of Scripture is the natural and simple one, and let us embrace and hold it resolutely. Let us not merely neglect as doubtful, but boldly set aside as deadly corruptions, those pretended expositions which lead us away from the literal sense.' (John Calvin, *The Epistles of Paul to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians* (Edinburgh, 1965), 84-5.; Is this what the West is demanding of us? That a Muslim state should, in consequence, be a 'city of glass', like Calvin's terrified Geneva?

Fortuyn's remarks cited earlier remains with us.[45] In this regard, the case of the Netherlands is especially pertinent because it was, until very recently, a model of liberalism and multiculturalism. Indeed, modern conceptions of religious toleration may be said to have originated among Dutch intellectuals. Without wishing to sound the alarm, it is evident that if Holland can adopt an implicitly inquisitorial attitude to Islam, there is no reason why other states should not do likewise. Fortuyn, a highly-educated and liberal Islamophobe, was convinced that Islam cannot square the circle. He would say that the past genius of Islam in adapting itself to cultures from Senegal to Sumatra cannot be extended into our era, because the rules of that game no longer apply. Success today demands membership of a global reality, which means signing up to the terms of its philosophy.[46] How should Islam answer this charge? The answer is, of course, that 'Islam' can't. The religion's strength stems in large degree from its internal diversity. Different readings of the scriptures attract different species of humanity. There will be no unified Islamic voice answering Fortuyn's interrogation. The more useful question is: *who* should answer the charge? What sort of Muslim is best equipped to speak for us, and to defeat his logic?

Fortuyn's error was to impose a Christian squint on Islam. As a practising Catholic, he imported assumptions about the nature of religious authority that ignore the multi-centred reality of Islam. On doctrine, we try to be united - but he is not interested in our doctrine. On *fiqh*, we are substantially diverse. Even in the medieval period, one of the great moral and methodological triumphs of the Muslim mind was the confidence that a variety of *madhhabs* could conflict formally, but could all be acceptable to God.[47] Fortuyn and others who share his views work with the assumption that Islam is an ideology[48] and given the nature of the Islam-West encounter, the emergence of 'ideological Islam' was, particularly in the mid-twentieth century, entirely predictable. Everything at that time was ideology. Spirituality seemed to have ended, and postmodernism was not yet a twinkle in a Parisian eye. In fact, the British historian John Gray goes so far as to describe the process which Washington describes as the 'war on terror' as an internal Western argument which has nothing to do with traditional Islam. As he puts it: "The ideologues of political Islam are western voices, no less than Marx or Hayek. The struggle with

[45] Fortuyn was not a marginal voice. His funeral at Rotterdam Cathedral, reverently covered by Dutch television, attracted a vast crowd of mourners. As his coffin passed down the city's main street, the Coolsingel, so many flowers were thrown that the vehicle itself almost disappeared from sight, recalling, to many, the scenes attending the funeral of Princess Diana. The election performance of his party a week later was a posthumous triumph, as his associate Hilbrand Nawijn was appointed minister for asylum and immigration. Fortuyn's desire to close all Holland's mosques was not put into effect, but a number of new, highly-restrictive, policies have been implemented. Asylum seekers now have to pay a seven thousand Euro deposit for compulsory Dutch language and citizenship lessons. A 90 percent cut in the budget of asylum seeker centres has been approved. An official government enquiry into the Dutch Muslim community was ordered by the new parliament in July 2002. (These are old statistics but, I presume, the situation has deteriorated since then).

[46] The alternative is poverty, failure, and - just possibly - the B52s.

[47] In fact, we could propose as the key distinction between a great religion and a sect the ability of the former to accommodate and respect substantial diversity. Fortuyn, and other European politicians, seek to build a new Iron Curtain between Islam and Christendom, on the assumption that Islam is an ideology functionally akin to communism, or to the traditional churches of Europe.

[48] The great tragedy is that some of our brethren would agree with him. There are many Muslims who are happy to describe Islam as an ideology. One suspects that they have not troubled to look the term up, and locate its totalitarian and positivistic undercurrents. It is impossible to deny that certain formulations of Islam in the twentieth century resembled European ideologies, with their obsession with the latest certainties of science, their regimented cellular structure, their utopianism, and their implicit but primary self-definition as advocates of communalism rather than of metaphysical responsibility.

radical Islam is yet another western family quarrel."[49] Nonetheless, the irony remains. We are represented by the unrepresentative, and the West sees in us a mirror image of its less attractive potentialities. Western Muslim theologians as well as many Muslim theologians living in the West– René Guénon, S. H. Nasr, Tim Winter, Tage Lindbom, Roger Garaudy to name just a few– frequently point out that the movements which seek to represent Islam globally, or in Western minority situations, are typically movements which arose as reactions against Western political hegemony that themselves internalised substantial aspects of Western political method. In Europe, Muslim community leaders who are called upon to justify Islam in the face of recent terrorist activities are ironically often individuals who subscribe to ideologised forms of Islam which adopt dimensions of Western modernity in order to secure an anti-Western profile. It is no surprise that such leaders arouse the suspicion of the likes of Pim Fortuyn, or, indeed, a remarkably wide spectrum of commentators across the political spectrum.

Islam's universalism, however, is not well-represented by the advocates of *movement* Islam. Islamic universalism is represented by the great bulk of ordinary mosque-going Muslims who around the world live out different degrees of accommodation with the local and global reality. One could argue, against Fortuyn, that Muslim communities are far more open to the West than vice-versa, and know far more about it. There is no equivalent desire in the West to learn from and integrate into other cultures.[50] Islam, we will therefore insist, is more flexible than the West. Where they are intelligently applied, our laws and customs, mediated through the due instruments of *ijtihad*, have been reshaped substantially by encounter with the Western juggernaut, through faculties such as the concern for public interest, or *urf*– customary legislation. Western law and society, by contrast, have not admitted significant emendation at the hands of another culture for many centuries. From our perspective, then, it can seem that it is the West, not the Islamic world, which stands in need of reform in a more pluralistic direction. It claims to be open, while we are closed, but in reality, on the ground, seems closed, while we have been open. There is force to this defense but does it help us answer the insistent question of Mr Fortuyn? Historians would probably argue that since history cannot repeat itself, the demand that Islam experience an Enlightenment is strange, and that if the task be attempted, it cannot remotely guarantee an outcome analogous to that experienced by Europe. If honest and erudite enough, they may also recognize that the Enlightenment possibilities in Europe were themselves the consequence of a Renaissance humanism which was triggered not by an internal European or Christian logic, but by the encounter with Islamic thought, and particularly the Islamized version of Aristotle which, via Ibn Rushd, took fourteenth-century Italy by storm. The stress on the individual, the reluctance to establish clerical hierarchies which hold sway over earthly kingdoms, the generalized dislike of superstition, the slowness to persecute for the sake of credal difference: all these may well be European transformations that were eased, or even enabled, by the transfusion of a certain kind of

[49] *The Independent* July 28, 2002. There are, of course, significant oversimplications in this analysis. There are some individuals in the new movements who do have a substantial grounding in Islamic studies. And the juxtaposition of 'political' and 'Islam' will always be redundant, given that the Islamic, Ishmaelite message is inherently liberative, and hence militantly opposed to oppression.

[50] On the ground, the West is keener to export than to import, to shape, rather than be shaped. As such, its universalism can seem imperial and hierarchical, driven by corporations and strategic imperatives that owe nothing whatsoever to non-Western cultures, and acknowledge their existence only where they might turn out to be obstacles. Likewise, Westerners, when they settle outside their cultural area, almost never assimilate to the culture which newly surrounds them.

Muslim wisdom from Spain.[51] For the humanities, George Makdisi traces European humanism to Islamic antecedents[52] saying that "the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the reception of both movements, scholasticism and humanism, from classical Islam by the Christian Latin West." The implication being that without Islam, the medieval world might have endured forever. However Westerners, unlike the Moors of Cordova, proved less able to tolerate diversity or fecundation by the Other, and their own Renaissance and Enlightenment only added to the European's absolute sense of superiority over other cultures, a prejudice that was augmented further by an escalating positivism that finally dethroned God. Garaudy thus concludes that only by radically challenging its own version of Enlightenment and accepting a Muslim version, rooted in what he calls the Third Heritage (the first two being the Classics and the Bible), will the West save itself from its "deadly hegemonic adventure", and "its suicidal model of growth and civilization."[53]

Nonetheless, it is clear that the Christian and Jewish Enlightenments of the eighteenth century did not move Europe in a religious, still less an Islamic direction. Instead, they moved outside the Moorish paradigm to produce a disenchantment, a desacralising of the world which opened the gates for two enormous transformations in human experience. One of these has been the subjugation of nature to the will (or more usually the lower desires) of man. The consequences for the environment, and even for the sustainable habitability of our planet, are looking increasingly disturbing. There is certainly an oddness about the Western desire to convert the Third World to a high-consumption market economy, when it is certain that if the world were to reach American levels of fossil-fuel consumption, global warming would soon render the planet entirely uninhabitable.

The second dangerous consequence of 'Enlightenment', as Muslims see it, is the replacement of religious autocracy and sacred kingship with either a totalitarian political order, or with a democratic liberal arrangement that has no fail-safe resistance to moving in a totalitarian direction.[54] The West is loath to refer to this possibility in its makeup and believes that Srebrenica,

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[51] It has been made with particular elegance by Roger Garaudy, for whom its highest expression unfolded in medieval Cordova, a city which witnessed a combination of revealed and rational wisdom so sophisticated that it was a 'first Renaissance'. Saint-Simon and others had claimed that the Middle Ages ended once Arab science was transmitted to the West. The case for classical Islam as an enlightenment that succeeded in retaining the sovereignty of God thus seems a credible one. It has been made with particular elegance by Roger Garaudy, for whom its highest expression unfolded in medieval Cordova, a city which witnessed a combination of revealed and rational wisdom so sophisticated that it was a 'first Renaissance'. Saint-Simon and others had claimed that the Middle Ages ended once Arab science was transmitted to the West. Also see Luce Lopez-Baralt, The Sufi Trobar Clus, IAP, Lahore, 2000.

[52] George Makdisi, *The Rise of Humanism: Classical Islam and the Christian West: With special reference to scholasticism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), Xx.

[53] Roger Garaudy, *Promesses de l' Islam* (Paris: Seuil, 1981), 19.

[54] Take, for instance, the American Jewish philosopher Peter Ochs, for whom the Enlightenment did away with Jewish faith in God, while the Holocaust did away with Jewish faith in humanity. As he writes: "*They lost faith in a utopian humanism that promised: 'Give up your superstitions! Abandon the ethnic and religious traditions that separate us one from the other! Subject all aspects of life to rational scrutiny and the disciplines of science! This is how we will be saved.' It didn't work. Not that science and rationality are unworthy; what failed was the effort to abstract these from their setting in the ethics and wisdoms of received tradition."* (Peter Ochs, 'The God of Jews and Christians', in Tikva Frymer-Kensky et al., *Christianity in Jewish Terms* (Boulder and Oxford, 2000), 54.)
Another voice from deep in the American Jewish intellectual tradition that many in the Muslim world assume provides the staunchest advocates of the Enlightenment. This time it is Irving Greenberg: "*The humanistic revolt for the 'liberation' of humankind from centuries of dependence upon God and nature has been shown to sustain a capacity for demonic evil. Twentieth-century European civilization, in part the product of the Enlightenment and liberal culture, was*

or Mr. Fortuyn, are aberrations, not a recurrent possibility. Muslims, however, surely have the right to express deep unease about the demand to submit to an Enlightenment project that seems to have produced so much darkness as well as light. Iqbal, identifying himself with the character Zinda-Rud in his *Javid-nama*, declaims, to consummate the final moment of his own version of the Mi'raj: *Inghelab-i Rus u Alman dide am*: 'I have seen the revolutions of Russia and of Germany!'[55] This in a great, final crying-out to God.

Another aspect of the question needs attention here. Western intellectuals now speak of post-modernism as an end of Enlightenment reason. Hence the new Muslim question becomes: why jump into the laundromat if European thinkers have themselves turned it off? Is the Third World to be brought to heel by importing only Europe's yesterdays?[56] Iqbal represents a very different tradition which insists that Islam is only itself when it recognizes that authenticity arises from recognizing the versatility of classical Islam, rather than taking any single reading of the scriptures as uniquely true. *Ijtihad*, after all, is scarcely a modern invention!

An age of decadence, whether or not framed by an Enlightenment, is an age of extremes, and the twentieth century was precisely that. Islam has been Westernized enough, it sometimes appears, to have joined that logic. We are either neutralized by a supposedly benign Islamic liberalism that in practice allows nothing distinctively Islamic to leave the home or the mosque– an Enlightenment-style privatization of religion that abandons the world to the morality of the market leaders and the demagogues. Or we fall back into the sensual embrace of extremism, justifying our refusal to deal with the real world by dismissing it as absolute evil, as *kufr*, unworthy of serious attention, which will disappear if we curse it enough.[57] Revelation, as always, requires the middle way. Extremism, in any case, never succeeds even on its own terms. It usually repels more people from religion than it holds within it. Attempts to reject all of global modernity simply cannot succeed, and have not succeeded anywhere. To borrow the words of Tim Winter, "A more sane policy, albeit a more courageous, complex and nuanced one, has to be the introduction of Islam as a prophetic, dissenting witness *within* the reality of the modern world."[58] In response Basit Koshul has very pertinently observed:[59]

> [It] means that the dissent from the Enlightenment can only be "within the limits of reason alone". It also means that the prophetic witness will have to play the indispensable role of affirming witness from outside the Enlightenment tradition– affirming some of the deepest

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a Frankenstein that authored the German monster's being. […] Moreover, the Holocaust and the failure to confront it make a repetition more likely - a limit was broken, a control or awe is gone - and the murder procedure is now better laid out and understood. (Irving Greenberg, 'Judaism, Christianity and Partnership after the Twentieth Century', in Frymer-Kensky, *op. cit*., 26.)

55 Iqbal, *Javid-Nama*, translated from the Persian with introduction and notes, by Arthur J. Arberry (London, 1966), 140.

56 The implications of the collapse of Enlightenment reason for theology have been sketched out by George Lindbeck in his *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (London, 1984).

57 Traditional Islam, as is scripturally evident, cannot sanction either policy. Extremism, however, has been probably the more damaging of the two. Al-Bukhari and Muslim both narrate from A'isha, *(r.a.)*, the hadith that runs: 'Allah loves kindness is all matters.' Imam Muslim also narrates from Ibn Mas'ud, *(r.a.)*, that the Prophet (*salla'Llahu 'alayhi wa-sallam*) said: 'Extremists shall perish' (*halaka 'l-mutanatti'ūn*). Commenting on this, Imam al-Nawawi defines extremists as 'fanatical zealots' (*al-muta'ammiqūn al-ghālūn*), who are simply 'too intense' (*al-mushaddidūn*).

58 "Faith in the future: Islam after the Enlightenment", *First Annual Altaf Gauhar Memorial Lecture,* Islamabad, 23 December 2002.

59 Basit Koshul, "Studying the Western Other..", in *The Religious Other– Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age* (Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2007).

> aspirations of Enlightenment ethos from the Qur'anic perspective. .... I'd like to explicitly articulate the logic underpinning both of the approaches offered above with respect to the ultimate goal of Islam in its encounter with the modern West is not to critique-condemn-replace but to redeem-reform-embrace. ... The critique is a means towards redeeming, which itself is a prelude to reforming with the ultimate goal being the embracing of the afflicted paradigm/event.[60]

In the final analysis, if there is one unredeemable part of the Enlightenment tradition it is the fact that it allowed its critique of illumination, wisdom and the Divine turn into an outright rejection because of the reification of the critique. The flip-side of this reified critique is the fact that the Enlightenment affirmation of individualism, universalism and materialism became a set of reified/dogmatic assertions based on completely abstract concepts rather than a living (and life-giving) ethos. It is obviously the case that the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment analysis of illumination, wisdom and the Divine laid bare deeply problematic aspects of traditional culture that were not known before. But instead of endeavouring to redress these problematic aspects of traditional culture as a "philosophic healer" using the resources already present in the afflicted paradigm, Enlightenment thought played the role of a colonizing imperialist on a mission to civilize the savages by means of socio-cultural engineering. In short the only unredeemable aspect of the Enlightenment is that its stance towards non-Enlightenment paradigms is one of critique-condemn-replace.

It should not be hard to see where we naturally fit. The gaping hole in the Enlightenment, pointed out by the postmodern theologians and by more skeptical but still anxious minds, was the Enlightenment's inability to form a stable and persuasive ground for virtue and hence for what it has called 'citizenship'. David Hume expressed the problem as follows:[61]

> If the reason be asked of that obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer: *Because society could not otherwise subsist*; and this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your answer is, *Because we should keep our word*. But besides that, nobody, till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish this answer; besides this, say, you find yourself embarrassed when it is asked, *Why we are bound to keep our word?* Nor can you give any answer but what would immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance.

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[60] I think that Murad is much closer to advocating a "redeem, reform, embrace" approach to the Enlightenment than appears to be the case at first glance. This is suggested by the proposal he makes regarding contemporary Islam's engagement with modern feminism. The following is a quote from the concluding part of Murad's essay titled "Islam, Irigaray and the Retrieval of Gender": http://www.masud.co.uk.islam./ahm/gender.htm
Feminism, in any case, has no orthodoxy, as Fiorenza reminds us; and certain of its forms are repellent to us, and are clearly damaging to women and society, while others may demonstrate striking convergences with the Shari'a and our gendered cosmologies. We advocate a nuanced understanding which tries to bypass the sexism-versus-feminism dialectic by proposing a theology in which the Divine is truly gender neutral, but gifts humanity with a legal code and family norms which are rooted in the understanding that, as Irigaray insists, the sexes 'are not equal but different', and will naturally gravitate towards divergent roles which affirm rather than suppress their respective genius.
Murad is arguing that the most fruitful Islamic response to modern feminism is "redeem, reform, embrace" rather than "critique, condemn, replace". In this particular quote if the term "feminism" is replaced with "Enlightenment" and if the "sexism-versus-feminism dialectic" is replaced with the "modernism-versus-traditionalism dialectic" then it obvious that the "redeem, reform, embrace" approach is as applicable to the Enlightenment in general as it is to feminism in particular.

[61] David Hume, *Essays* (Oxford, 1963), 469.

But why are we bound to keep our word? Why need we respect the moral law? Religion seems to answer this far more convincingly than any secular ethic.[62] Religion offers a solution to this fatal weakness. Applied with wisdom, it provides a fully adequate reason for virtue and an ability to produce cultural and political leaders who embody it themselves. Of course, it is all too often applied improperly, and there is something of the Promethean arrogance and hubris of the *philosophes* in the radical insistence that the human subject be enthroned in authority over scriptural interpretation, without a due prelude of initiation, love, and self-naughting. Yet the failure of the Enlightenment paradigm, as invoked by the secular elites in the Muslim world, to deliver moral and efficient government and cultural guidance, indicates that the solution *must* be religious. Religious aberrations do not discredit the principle they aberrantly affirm.

What manner of Islam may most safely undertake this task? It is no accident that the overwhelming majority of Western Muslim thinkers have been drawn into the religion by the appeal of Sufism. To us, the ideological redefinitions of Islam are hardly more impressive than they are to the many European xenophobes who take them as normative. We need a form of religion that elegantly and persuasively squares the circle, rather than insisting on a conflictual model that is unlikely to damage the West as much as Islam. A purely non-spiritual reading of Islam, lacking the vertical dimension, tends to produce only liberals or zealots; and both have proved irrelevant to our needs.

Are we to conclude that modern Islam, so often sympathetic to the Enlightenment's claims, and in its Islamist version one of their most powerful instantiations, has been deeply mistaken? The totalitarian forms of Enlightenment reason which recurred throughout the twentieth century have discredited it in the eyes of many; and are now less dangerous only because postmodernism seems to have abolished so many of the Enlightenment's key beliefs.[63] If the ideal of freedom is now based less on ideas of inalienable natural rights than on the notion that all truth is relative, then perhaps mainstream Islamist thinking will need to unhitch itself more explicitly from the broadly Western paradigms which it accepted for most of the twentieth century. Yet the relation Islam/Enlightenment seems predicated on simplistic definitions of both. Islamism may be an Enlightenment project, but conservative Sufism (for instance) is probably not. Conversely, even without adopting a postmodern perspective we are not so willing today to assume a necessary

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[62] In spite of all stereotypes, the degree of violence in the Muslim world remains far less than that of Western lands governed by the hope of a persuasive secular social contract. [17] Perhaps this is inevitable: the Enlightenment was, after all, nothing but the end of the Delphic principle that to know the world we must know and refine and uplift ourselves. Before Descartes, Locke and Hume, all the world had taken spirituality to be the precondition of philosophical knowing. Without love, self-discipline, and care for others, that is to say, without a transformation of the human subject, there could be no knowledge at all. The Enlightenment, however, as Descartes foresaw, would propose that the mind is already self-sufficient and that moral and spiritual growth are not preconditions for intellectual eminence, so that they might function to shape the nature of its influence upon society. Not only is the precondition of the transformation of the subject repudiated, but the classical idea, shared by the religions and the Greeks, that access to truth itself brings about a personal transformation, is dethroned just as insistently. [This has been discussed with particular clarity by Michel Foucault, *L'Hermeneutique du sujet: Cours au College de France (1981-2)* (Paris, 2001), 16-17] Relationality is disposable, and the laundromat turns out to be a centrifuge.

[63] Vaclav Havel could write that 'the totalitarian systems warn of something far more serious than Western rationalism is willing to admit. They are […] a grotesquely magnified image of its own deep tendencies, an extremist offshoot of its own development' (William Ophuls, *Requiem for Modern Politics: the tragedy of the Enlightenment and the challenge of the new millennium* [Boulder and Oxford: Westview, 1997], 258); this seems somewhat outdated.

antithesis between tradition and reason.[64] The way forward, probably, is to recognize that Islam genuinely converges with Enlightenment concerns on some issues; while on other matters, notably the Enlightenment's individualism and its increasingly Promethean confidence in humanity's autonomous capacities, it is likely to demur radically.

What matters about Islam is that it did not produce the modern world. If modernity ends in a technologically-induced holocaust, then survivors will probably hail the religion's wisdom in not authoring something similar.[65] If, however, it survives, and continues to produce a global monoculture where the past is forgotten, and where international laws and customs are increasingly restrictive of cultural difference, then Islam is likely to remain the world's great heresy. The Ishmaelite alternative is rejected. But what if Ishmael actually wishes to be rejected, since the one who is doing the rejecting has ended up creating a world without God? Grounded in our stubbornly immobile liturgy and doctrine, we Ishmaelites should serve the invaluable, though deeply resented, function of a culture which would like to be an Other, even if that is no longer quite possible!

[64] Hans-Georg Gadamer, tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, *Truth and Method* (second edition, London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), 281.

[65] Is this what Melville, whose days in Turkey had made him an admirer of Islam, meant when he made Ishmael the only survivor of the Pequod?

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CRISIS OF MUSLIM CIVILIZATION IN MODERN TIMES: SOME INSIGHTS FROM IBN-E-KHALDUN'S THOUGHTS AND IDEAS

Dr. Faraz Anjum

ABSTRACT

No one would, probably, doubt that Muslim civilization is facing a serious crisis since the 18th century. It first resulted in political chaos and ultimately colonization of Muslim lands by Western powers. Later, Muslim civilization faced serious cultural and intellectual onslaught from the West which intensified and deepened the crisis. Though the period of Western colonization ostensibly came to an end in the middle of the 20th century, Muslim lands did not come out of the crisis. Despite some sincere efforts for Islamic revivalism, Muslim civilization has failed to respond to the modern crisis, particularly 9/11 incident has exposed the vulnerability of the Muslim world to Western political agenda, and its failure to respond effectively to Western civilizational challenges. The scholars are divided as to the cause of this crisis of the Muslim world and consequently, as to the measures to remedy the problem.

Abdur Rehman Ibn Khaldun, a 13th century Muslim historian and intellectual, emerged at a time when the Muslim states in the Maghreb (North Africa) and Muslim Spain were passing through a phase of decline. His critical thoughts on the society (*Al-Imran*) and particularly his concept of social solidarity (*Al-asabiyah*), as propounded in his magnum opus, *Maqaddimah* (Prolegomena to History), can provide important insights into the present crisis of the Muslim Civilization. The present paper seeks to understand and explain this crisis with the help of the social analysis and critical ideas of Ibn Khaldun.

Key words: Ibn-e-Kahldun, Historian, Social Solidarity, *Muqaddimah*, Muslim world, Civilizational Challenges

INTRODUCTION

Muslim civilization faced a number of challenges soon after the period of *Khilafat-i-Rashidah* (Pious Caliphate). The first challenge came as a result of its rapid growth, coupled with internal tribal dissensions resulting in the dominance of hostile political factions. Though this challenge resulted in the establishment of autocratic governments, it did not lead to either loss of political dominance of Muslim community or a serious crisis in religious or intellectual thought. The second crisis came with the translations of Greek philosophical texts in the 9th and 10th centuries. It was basically an intellectual crisis in which new philosophical thoughts seriously challenged some of the fundamentals of Islamic principles. However, the *ulama* (Muslim scholars of religious sciences) were able to counter this challenge and assert the superiority of Islamic principles by introducing a new *Ilm-ul-Kalam* (scholasticism). The next challenge to Muslim civilization came with the Mongol raids from the East. It destroyed the flourishing Muslim towns in the whole of Middle East and Central Asia and for the time being seriously hampered the cultural and intellectual growth of Muslim civilization and led to the destruction of political authority in major parts of the Muslim world. However, the crisis proved to be short-lived as the barbaric tribes were

converted to Islam and inaugurated a new verve in the body politic of Islam. The Turks and Mongols, after being converted to Islam, became the harbingers of a new renaissance of Muslim civilization.

It was in the middle of the eighteenth century that the present crisis of Muslim civilization began to manifest itself. Initially, it started with the political decline of centralized empires and their balkanization into petty states and kingdoms. There were diverse and complex administrative, political and socio-cultural reasons behind this decline. This weakening of centralized empires led eventually to the political dominance of European powers as the latter were able to annihilate the small Muslim states, mainly with better tactics of manipulation. Despite having attained independence from the political hold of colonial powers, the Muslim states have largely failed to build their societies and reintegrate the social fabric.

The post-9/11 world has exposed the Muslim civilization to new challenges. It has reinforced the idea of Islam as an enemy of the West and Muslim civilization is being widely viewed as "terrorist," "fundamentalist," and "fanatic."[1] Though this idea is not new, rather a continuation of the previous ideas about Islam; however the major difference is that previously a tiny minority implicitly claimed and now a large segment of Western media and public opinion has openly started to believe that Islam is a predatory civilization threatening, not just the West, rather the whole civilizational progress of mankind. This trend has manifested itself in the symbolic acts of banning of Muslim women's scarfs and disallowing the minarets of mosques. This growing Islamophobia is a new challenge to the already weakened Muslim civilization. It is worthwhile to see whether a 14th century Tunisian scholar can provide a way out of this challenge. However, before delving into his ideas and thoughts, it would be appropriate to briefly examine the life of Ibn Khaldun which in more than one way reminds us of the life history of many modern Muslim intellectuals.

LIFE AND TIMES OF IBN-E-KHALDUN

Abu Zaid Abdur Rehman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunis in 1332. The tradition describes that his ancestor Khalid had come with an army to Spain in the 3rd century A.H. His family had lived in Seville in Muslim Spain before moving to Tunis. His early career as public official involved him in politics and power struggles between the Hafsids of Tunis, the Marinids of Fez, and the Nasrids of Granada. Many times he was imprisoned and many times appointed to the highest offices. However, in 1378 he left public life for a four-year sojourn in Tunis (1378–1382), which he devoted to scholarship. It was in this period that he completed his first versions of both the *Muqaddimah* and his historical work, *Kitab-ul-Ibar*, although he continued to revise these texts for the remainder of his life. In 1382, he received permission to undertake the pilgrimage. But he did not reach Mecca. For in Cairo, the Mamluk Sultan gave him a professorship at the University of al Azhar, and in 1384 appointed him as Chief *Maliki Qazi*. In this position, he energetically corrected certain abuses and instituted certain reforms which aroused much opposition. He therefore, had to resign from *Qaziship* and retired to an estate in 1385. In 1387, he made his pilgrimage to Mecca. After his return to Cairo, he employed his leisure to revise the History and to prepare his autobiography, *Al-Tarif*, which was completed in 1394,

[1] Akbar Ahmed, "Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations and the Dilemmas of Islam and the West Today," *Middle East Journal*, 56, No. 1(Winter, 2002): 23.

when he was sixty-two. In 1399, he was again appointed as *Qazi*, but could retain this office for only a year and a half. While in the service of Mamluk Sultan, Ibn Khaldun traveled to Damascus as part of an expedition to counter the invasion of Amir Timur (Tamerlane). Ibn Khaldun met Timur after the latter had taken Damascus, and subsequently wrote a detailed account of his interview.[2] He returned to Cairo where he died in 1406, shortly after his sixth appointment as Chief *Maliki Qazi*.[3]

Ibn Khaldun's life may be divided into three parts. The first 20 years were occupied by his childhood and education, the next 23 years by the continuation of his studies and his political adventures, and the last 31 years as a scholar, teacher and *Qazi*. The first two periods were spent in the Muslim West and the third was divided between the Maghrib and Egypt.[4]A close look at his life has persuaded one scholar to comment that Ibn Khaldun had his faults and serious blemishes of character as he "easily changed his allegiance, leaving one master to serve another, shrewdly watching their chances of success. He was as versed in intrigue as any diplomat in any other age."[5] However, in all fairness, his career can only be studied in the context of his times. He was certainly living in an age where living had become a dangerous business. Charles Issawi has rightly pointed out that:

> There have been few periods in history as agitated, not to say chaotic, as the thirteenth century in North Africa after the collapse of the Al Muwahhidun dynasty. Innumerable kinglets, princelets, and feudal lords struggled for supremacy; towns changed masters with astonishing rapidity; intrigue, murder, and revolts were rife. Survival was as much a question of luck as ability.[6]

Notwithstanding his political pursuits, Ibn Khaldun is best known as the author of *Muqaddimah* (Introduction), the first part of his universal history titled *Kitab al-Ibar*.[7] He has divided his historical work into three large parts: First part deals with society and its inherent phenomena, such as sovereignty, authority, earning one's livelihood, trades, and sciences. It serves as prolegomena to the study of history, in which Ibn Khaldun developed the concepts for comprehending human civilization. Second part is related to history of the Arabs, their generations and dynasties from the human creation to the author's time. It contains accounts of some of the contemporary nations and great men and their dynasties. Third part deals with the history of the Berbers and tribes appertaining to them and their kingdoms and dynasties in North Africa.

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[2] For details of the episode, see, Walter J. Fischel, *Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1952)

[3] Details of his career are known primarily through his autobiography, *Al-Tarif* which is the concluding part of his history. Different works have extracted his biographical details from this autobiography and a few scattered sources. See, Nathaniel Schmidt, *Ibn Khaldun: Historian, Sociologist and Philosopher* (Lahore: Universal Books, n.d.), 34-38; M.A. Enan, *Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Works* (New Delhi, Kitabbhavan, 2000 [1932]); Charles Issawi, *An Arab Philosophy of History: Selections from the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406)* (London: John Murray, 1958), 1-6.

[4] *Encyclopedia of Islam*, III: 825, s.v. "Ibn Khaldun"

[5] Schmidt, *Ibn Khaldun*, 42.

[6] Issawi, *Arab Philosophy of History*, 3.

[7] The full title is: *Kitab al-Ibar, wa Diwan al-Mubtada wal Khabar, fi Ayyam al-Arabi wal Ajami wal Barbar, wa man Asrahum min zawi al-Sultan al-Akbar* (A book of instructive examples, and a collection relating to the subject and the attribute, in the days of the Arabs, the Persians, and the Berbers and the great rulers who were their contemporaries).

His *Muqaddimah* is commonly regarded as one of the most significant works of medieval Muslim civilization. The noted historian, Arnold Toynbee, appreciating the scope and scale of Ibn Khaldun's work, has called it "undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place."[8] Ibn Khaldun was concerned with the history of civilization (*al-umran*) in all its complexity, and *Muqaddimah* encompasses its social, economic, and natural, as well as political and religious aspects. He is, therefore, labeled by some modern scholars as a founder of ''scientific history,'' as well as of sociology. A major theme of *Muqaddimah* is the rise and fall of states, or dynasties. States, as explained by Ibn Khaldun, rose and fell in a cycle similar to human life: birth, maturity, decline, and death. Central to Ibn Khaldun's discussion of the life cycles of states is the concept of *asabiyah*, variously translated as solidarity, group feeling, or group consciousness. A group with strong *asabiyah* (established through means such as blood relation or religious solidarity, etc.) would be able to achieve supremacy over other groups and establish a state. However, once predominance was achieved, *asabiyah* would eventually fade, leading to the overthrow of political power and the establishment of a new state.

Ibn Khaldun's views were shaped in part by the events he witnessed in his own life. However, his life, not just his socio-historical analysis, has an importance which goes beyond his own age. As mentioned by a prominent Muslim anthropologist, Ibn Khaldun's life forms a bridge, a transition, between the distinct phases of Muslim history…the Arab dynasties in the tail-end of which - as in *Umayyad* Spain - he lived, and the great Muslim empires which would develop by the end of the century in which he died. His life also teaches us many things, confirming them for us in our own period: the uncertainty of politics; the fickleness of rulers; the abrupt changes of fortune, in jail one day, honored the next; and finally, the supremacy of the ideal in the constant, unceasing, search for *ilm*, knowledge, and therefore the ultimate triumph of the human will and intellect against all odds.[9]

Ibn Khaldun's active political life remained confined to North Africa and Spain. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these areas showed serious symptoms of general decline and disintegration. This is corroborated by the accounts of Ibn Khaldun himself and by other contemporary sources. Western North Africa, where Ibn Khaldun grew up and spent fifty years of his life before going to Egypt, was "a spectacle of chaos and desolation."[10] Constant struggle with Berber tribes in the south and rising Christian powers in the north resulted in frequent political upheavals and changes in the fortunes of ruling dynasties. It became a constant feature of political culture of the region and prevented the establishment of stable political institutions and traditions. Though Muslim civilization in other parts was in the process of decline, in the words of Muhsin Mahdi, "in North Africa it had virtually ceased to exist."[11]

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[8] Cited in Bruce B. Lawrence, "Introduction," in *The Muqaddimah*: *An Introduction to History*, tr. by Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N.J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), viii. All other references of the *Muqaddimah* have been given from the same abridged edition.

[9] Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society* (London: Routledge, 1988), 106.

[10] Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun 's Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 26; See also for a detailed study of various aspects of medieval North African society, Michael Brett, *Ibn Khaldun and the Medieval Maghrib* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999)

[11] Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun 's Philosophy of History*, 26.

Ibn Khaldun grew up in that same decadent society and became a part of that political culture. His social analysis rested mainly on his own experiences of that society. One of the major motives for compiling his socio-historical work was to make an attempt to understand the nature and causes of the decline and chaotic conditions prevailing in the Islamic world, particularly in North Africa, and to draw some lessons about the nature of human history and society. That is perhaps the reason that he has called his universal history as *Kitab-ul-Ibar*. Muhsin Mahdi has perceptively remarked that:

> The key word in the title of Ibn Khaldun's work which seems to contain some hints and allusions is not 'history' (*tarikh* or *khabar*), but the word *ibar*; for the work is first and foremost called 'The Book of the *Ibar*. . . . we might simply choose a less significant aspect of its meaning and translate it as 'instructive examples.' . . . It was in relation to history, however, that *ibra* was most commonly used in the Koran and in the Traditions of the Prophet. Man was urged to 'consider' the past as the evidence, allusions, and examples, through which he could pass from the appearance of things to the knowledge of the unseen. . . . The use of *ibra* [by Ibn Khaldun] in connection with history indicated essentially the activity of looking for the unity of the plan underlying the multiplicity of events, of grasping the permanence pervading their ever-changing and destructible character, and of using the results of such reflections in the management of practical affairs.[12]

As Ibn Khaldun himself wrote that "the past and the future are more similar to each other than water is to water."[13]We can get some useful insights from the observations of Ibn Khaldun contained in his *Muqaddimah* and apply them to the present crisis of Muslim civilization. Though it should be conceded that all his observations are certainly not applicable to the modern world, yet the scholars generally agree that notwithstanding the lapse of centuries, he still maintains "its value, vigour and modernity, and occupies a high place among the monuments of world thought."[14] The list of his observations can be extended to many other quarters, but for the present purpose, four main areas have been selected for further exposition. These include Ibn Khaldun's analysis of power and the state, his idea of leadership, his concept of *asabiya*, and his emphasis on *ilm* [knowledge].

ANALYSIS OF POWER AND THE STATE

State and its political institutions occupy the central stage in Ibn Khaldun's analysis of civilization and society. Building of cities and extent of urbanization are dependent on the support and protection of a powerful state. The state is the cause of the development and organization of economic institutions: it is the greatest of buyers, the greatest spender of money, and the largest monopoly; and economic luxury is dependent on the protection and policies of the state. Finally, the state is the cause of the flourishing of the sciences, directly through its support of scientific institutions and indirectly as the cause of the other aspects of civilization in the absence of which the sciences could not exist. The life of the state and the life of the civilization it brings into existence are coextensive. A civilization follows the rise of a powerful state, it is limited in space by the extent of the state, it flourishes when the state is at the height of its power, and it disintegrates with the state's disintegration. Consequently, Ibn Khaldun's study of the

[12] Ibid., 26, 38, 64-68.
[13] Ibid., 149.
[14] M.A. Enan, *Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Works* (New Delhi, Kitabbhavan, 2000 [1932]), v.

development of civilization is primarily a study of the development of the civilized state and an examination of the interaction of the other aspects of civilization within the state. The problems of the creation of the state, the stages through which it passes, its various forms, and the causes of its decline, are the central problems of Ibn Khaldun's socio-historical analysis.[15] He has tried to demonstrate in the *History* the workings of *siyasa* [political power], its functions and limits.[16] One of the most striking features in Ibn Khaldun's theory of power and its consequences which distinguish him from earlier political thinkers was his awareness of larger and more impersonal forces shaping the political process.[17]

In the post-colonial period, Islam has broadly been interpreted in three ways. These have generally been recognized as Modernist, Revivalist[18] and Traditional approaches. Modernist approach for its exponents has such figures as Ziya Gokalp and Mustafa Kamal in Turkey, Muhammad Abduh in Egypt and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in South Asia. Revivalist approach has been expounded by Syed Qutub and *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun* in the Middle East and Abul Ala Maududi and *Jamat-i-Islami* in South Asia.[19] Traditional approach is related to traditional *Sufi* orders throughout the Muslim world and particularly *Deoband* School of thought in South Asia. In the modern period, it has been forcefully expounded by Sayyed Hossein Nasr.[20] All the three schools of thought, with varied emphasis, have grappled with the problem of defining Islamic modes of power and using diverse ways and means of establishing an Islamic state in the modern world. A particularly crucial issue in the post-colonial Muslim societies was to devise and work within or without the political systems imposed by the colonial powers, roughly modelled on Western lines. As Western political systems evolved through a period of centuries within the intellectual framework of the West which was steeped in opposition to Christianity, particularly to the authority of the Church, this Western political discourse rested on the negation of any metaphysical reality, over-emphasis on role of the human being, human will and rationality and, consequently, nearly unrestrained notion of individual freedom and liberty. The modernist approach to Islam which emerged in the last half of the nineteenth century in reaction to Western colonialism and emphasised reconciliation between Islam and the West, naturally accepts Western political systems with only minor variations. It does not intellectually challenge the Western democratic institutions, but rather accepts, sometimes with minor variations, as a developed political system. On the other hand, the traditional approach, being influenced by the medieval notions of statecraft and political conditions of the prevalence of hereditary kingship, only marginally recognized the importance of political power and laid more emphasis on individual piety and reformation of the self. Its dominant exponents still consider politics as playing only a minor part in Muslim civilization and if some enter the political arena, they do so with considerable reluctance. In contrast to these two approaches, the Revivalists have attempted to evolve an alternate political system and have directly confronted the Western political discourse; thus, asserting the necessity of Islamising the political culture of Muslim

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[15] Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun 's Philosophy of History*, 204.

[16] Tarif Khalidi, *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 224.

[17] Ibid., 225. For a comparative study of Ibn Khaldun's political ideas with other Muslim philosophers, see Enan, *Ibn Khaldun*, 121-133.

[18] It has also been variously referred to as Islamist and Fundamentalist.

[19] S.V.R. Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); idem, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

[20] See Nasr's *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1987), especially "Prologue: What is Traditional Islam," 11-25.

societies and consequently the state.[21] As Abul Ala Mawdudi, one of the most important ideologues of Islamic revival, explained:

> the struggle for obtaining control over the organs of the state, when motivated by the urge to establish the *din* [religion as complete code of life] and the Islamic Shariah and to enforce the Islamic injunctions, is not only permissible but is positively desirable and as such obligatory.[22]

However, this centrality of politics and the state in the Islamic discourse, championed by the Revivalists, has evoked biting criticism and strong opposition from the other two Muslim groups, Modernists as well as Traditionalists. Maulana Taqi Usman, one of the exponents of traditional Islam, voices his concerns in the following words:

In their zeal to refute secularism, some writers and thinkers of the present age have gone so far as to characterize politics and government as the true objective of Islam, the reason why the prophets were sent [by God to the people], indeed the very reason for the creation of the human being. And they have not only given other Islamic commandments – for instance on matters of worship – a secondary position, but have even deemed them to be mere means for political ends, just a way of training people [towards political mobilization].[23]

This kind of criticism has led to diluting the influence of the Revivalists and has created rifts between the three groups.

Ibn Khaldun makes it unequivocally apparent that an Islamic state should be the desired goal. He makes a distinction between *siyasa diniya*—based on God's revealed law, the *Sharia*—and *siyasa aqliya*—based on political laws made by rational man. Ibn Khaldun leaves no doubt that the law of the prophetic lawgiver is best and is superior to that of the human lawgiver, who is guided only by his own reason.[24] According to Ibn Khaldun, "the state whose law is based upon rational government and its principles, without the authority of the Shariah, is likewise blameworthy, since it is the product of speculation without the light of God ... and the principles of rational government aim solely at worldly interests." Caliphate is the only perfect state, which is based on the true practice of the Shariah, and which furthers both the temporal and spiritual interests of its subjects.[25]

Ibn Khaldun's observation is very much clear. There is no doing away with politics, particularly in the modern world, where the role of the state has been extended beyond any bounds. Without Islamising the State, Muslim civilization cannot prosper. The Modernists have to recognise the irreconcilability of Islam with Western political discourse while the Traditionalists should give politics the central place in their view of Islam and one of the important means to reform Muslim societies. On the other hand, the Revivalists must strive to preserve the ethical dimension of politics, by not succumbing to the temptations of power, and do their utmost not to dilute the religious colour.

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[21] For a discussion of the relationship of Islam and modern state, see, Abdelilah Belkeziz, *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought: A Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), and John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *Middle East Journal*, 45, No. 3 (Summer, 1991): 427-440.

[22] Cited in M. Qasim Zaman, *Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi: Makers of the Muslim World* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 117.

[23] Cited in Ibid., 116-17.

[24] E.I.J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline* (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), 95.

[25] H. A. R. Gibb, "The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun's Political Theory" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, University of London, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1933): 30

IDEAS ON LEADERSHIP

Another dominant idea in Ibn Khaldun's socio-historical analysis of society is the importance of the ruler and his duties to the ruled. The leader, according to him, embodies both political and moral authority.[26] Ibn Khaldun believes that such a Muslim leader (Caliph) must have four qualifications. First, he must have knowledge (*ilm*) of the Law and be proficient in that knowledge to the extent of being able to interpret personally and elaborate on the Law (*ijtihad*). Second, he must be just. Justice (*adala*) in this context includes both general and particular justice: the Caliph must be good or righteous as well as just in distributing offices and insuring that they dispense justice among the members of the community. Thirdly, the Caliph must have competence (*kifaya*): he must be courageous in applying the Law. He must have courage in waging wars, know how to conduct them, and be able to arouse people to fight them. He must know the nature of solidarity; and must be shrewd, resourceful, and forceful in conducting the affairs of the state. It is primarily this quality of competence which Ibn Khaldun emphasizes as leading to the protection of religion, the establishment of state, and the management of public interests. Finally, he must be free from bodily and mental defects, and of circumstances that may prevent him from the exercise of his powers.[27]

Ibn Khaldun devotes a chapter to the relationship between the ruler and the ruled which has the revealing title: "Exaggerated severity harms and mostly ruins the state *(mulk)."* The welfare of the subjects and of the state rests on good relations between the ruler and his subjects. The essence of the ruler is that he cares for their affairs. Kindness towards the subjects is an essential quality of the ruler. Kindliness and good treatment also consist in caring for their livelihood. According to Ibn Khaldun, overriding consideration for the ruler should be public welfare and the interests of the state.[28]

In the present circumstances, one of the major crises that faces Muslim society is that of leadership. Apparently, there are different categories of leaders in the Muslim world: kings, military dictators, so-called democrats and, tribal men or religious scholars. However, it is difficult to point out a leader who also enjoys a widespread moral authority and fulfils the four conditions laid down by Ibn Khaldun. This crisis of leadership is both a symptom as well as a cause of the breakdown of Muslim civilization.

CONCEPT OF *ASABIYAH*

Asabiyah is one of the most known terms of Ibn Khaldun. It has been variously rendered into English as social solidarity, social cohesion, group feeling, etc. The concept of *asabiyah* is at the core of his whole socio-historical analysis. He has formulated the concept of *asabiyah* as a type of group solidarity based on blood or strong bond of mutual affections among the members of the group, which make them willing to fight and die for one another.[29] The basis of solidarity may be a common language, culture, and code of behaviour at different levels of organisation such as

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[26] Akbar S. Ahmed relates Ibn Khaldun's science of culture with the science of good governance. See his article, "Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations," 29.

[27] *Muqaddimah*, 158-59. Ibn Khaldun has also discussed the condition of Quraishiyat for being a Caliph but has not accepted it.

[28] Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, 93.

[29] Mansoor Moaddel, "The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28 (2002): 368.

family, clan, tribe, and kingdom or nation. With *asabiyah*, society fulfills its primary purpose to function with integrity and transmits its values and ideas to the next generation.[30] Ibn Khaldun points out that it is *asabiyah* which is the force working behind every civilization. If *asabiyah* is strong, the tribe will be able to develop a civilization and retain its dominant position. As *asabiyah* fades away, civilization begins to collapse and ultimately is replaced with a civilization with stronger *asabiyah*.[31]

In the present day Muslim world, every one is witnessing that Muslim societies are breaking down. There are serious political fissures and socio-cultural dissentions which are sapping the vitality of the Muslim societies. The process started with the advent of European colonialism. In the beginning, this phase of European colonialism which spread throughout the Muslim lands in the eighteenth century was nothing more than a political dominance which exposed the frigidity of political institutions of Muslim empires and states. However, as colonialism spread its tentacles, it led to cultural and intellectual dominance, resulting in the virtual collapse and extirpation of traditional institutions and structures. Colonial masters changed the language of the Muslim lands, replacing them with European languages as the administrative language, thus severing the connection of the new generation of Muslims in these colonized lands with their literary and cultural traditions of more than thousand years. The old educational system was crushed and the institutions were forced to close down. In their place, the European powers introduced a new system of education, the basic purpose of which was to impress upon the intellectual hegemony of the West and to produce an educated class which was imbued with Western values and traditions.[32] The colonial powers imposed an administrative and political structure which was alien to the people of the land and naturally the latter had no emotional attachment with it. Thus Franz Fanon argues that:

> Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today. [33]

This destruction of their past has made the Muslim masses lose much that was extremely valuable. Muslim scholars have pointed out a number of reasons for this loss such as massive urbanization, dramatic demographic changes, population explosion, large-scale migrations to the West, the gap between rich and poor, the wide spread corruption and mismanagement of rulers, rampant materialism, the crisis of identity and, new and often alien ideas communicated from the West which challenge our classical values and customs.[34] The reality is that all these are the symptoms of the breakdown of *asabiyah*. The real cause lies in the fundamental break from the past which the colonial powers effected in all the Muslim societies. Ibn Khaldun himself hinted towards it when he wrote that those who are conquered and enslaved, wither away, since to be enslaved is

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[30] Ahmed "Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations," 30.

[31] *Muqaddimah*, Ch. 3.

[32] Thomas Macaulay advocated the production of a specific kind of educated subjects in India: 'We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions we govern: a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, in intellect.' "Minute on Indian Education" in *Postcolonial Studies Reader,* eds. Bill Ashcrof, Gareth Grifiths and Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge, 1995), 430.

[33] Franz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, tr. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

[34] Ahmed "Ibn Khaldun's Understanding of Civilizations," 3.

contrary to human nature and leads to the loss of hope.[35] If the Muslim societies want to gain *asabiyah* and establish social cohesion and solidarity, they should do away with colonial legacy and reconnect themselves with their forgotten past.

EMPHASIS ON *ILM* (KNOWLEDGE)

Ibn Khaldun gives an important place to *Ilm* and devotes chapter six of the *Muqaddimah* to different forms of sciences.[36] He establishes a direct relationship with development of sciences and growth of civilization. He writes that "the institution of scientific instruction has disappeared among the inhabitants of Spain. Their former concern with the sciences is gone, because Muslim civilization in Spain has been decreasing for hundreds of years. . . . Of the intellectual disciplines, not even a shadow remains. The only reason for that is that the tradition of scientific instruction has deteriorated and the enemy has gained control over most of it."[37] However, he also believes that sciences flourish only after the necessities of life have been provided. He thinks that "the degree of their advance is dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions: the possibility of leisure, the continuity of a civilized tradition, the social demand for the services of the learned, and the appreciation and encouragement of the rulers of their profession as expressed in their generosity in establishing schools and founding endowments to maintain them."[38]

Muslims in their heydays developed a strong tradition of knowledge. Muslim culture was basically a book culture and it has been estimated that during the period from the beginning of Islam to the fourteenth century AD, 900,000 books of only Arabic language were compiled.[39] The knowledge generated by the Muslims, though diverse and pluralistic, was invariably consistent with their own Islamic worldview. Ibn Khaldun though studied and wrote on history, philosophy and other social sciences. He, like most other medieval Muslim scholars, has reconciled the rational sciences with religious knowledge. He believes that the highest and most important source of knowledge is the knowledge that comes from the prophets.[40] When some of the Western scholars portrayed Ibn Khaldun as a liberal scholar who challenged the norms of Islamic law on the basis of rational thought, H.A.R. Gibb wrote:

> Ibn Khaldun was not only a Muslim, but as almost every page of the Muqaddima bears witness, a Muslim jurist and theologian, of the strict *Maliki* school. For him religion was far and away the most important thing in life-we have seen that he expressly calls his study a thing of subsidiary value-and the Shariah the only true guide.[41]

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[35] Cited in Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun 's Philosophy of History*, 178.

[36] For a detailed exposition of this chapter, see Zaid Ahmad, *Epistemology of Ibn Khaldun* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

[37] *The Muqaddimah*, 341.

[38] Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldun 's Philosophy of History*, 222.

[39] Aziz al-Azmeh, *Arabic Thought and Islamic Societies* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), i; For a brief view of the encyclopaedic nature of Muslim scholarship, see, Gerhard Endress, *Organizing Knowledge: Encylopaedic Activities in the Pre-Eighteenth Century Islamic World* (Brill: Leiden, 2006).

[40] Ahmad, *Epistemology of Ibn Khaldun*, 24-25.

[41] Gibb,"Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun's Political Theory," 28. Allama Muhammad Iqbal has also written: "The truth is that the whole spirit of the 'Prolegomena' of Ibn Khaldun appears to have been mainly due to the inspiration which the author must have received from the Quran." *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed and ann. Saeed Sheikh, 3rd ed. (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1996), 111.

In stark contrast to their medieval traditions, in the modern world, the Muslims have lagged behind in the field of knowledge. Their universities and research centres occupy the least importance in the academic world and they have failed to make their mark in the scientific field. One of the reasons is the colonisation of Muslim lands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The present day modern educational institutions were established during the colonial period and were implanted by the colonial powers. This fact has practically alienated the Muslim masses who do not feel emotionally attached to Western style educational institutions. The kind of knowledge which is taught in these institutions is steeped in Western epistemological tradition. There is a growing realization in the Muslim world that modern knowledge has grown out of western intellectual tradition and represents a particular worldview. The Westernised knowledge is in many ways alien to Muslim mindset and irreconcilable to Islamic traditions. Three issues can particularly be highlighted in this regard. The first and foremost is the worldview which developed in the post-Renaissance Europe. It drastically transformed man's conceptions about God, nature and the universe. Based on the denial of any metaphysical reality, a new paradigm of knowledge was created on which the edifice of modern knowledge, particularly of social and behavioural sciences, was constructed. Secondly, modern knowledge developed in the West is materialistic and utilitarian, devoid of any ethical value. Thirdly, modern knowledge is essentially Eurocentric, which devalues, if not altogether denies, the contribution of other cultures and civilizations. These three aspects succinctly highlight the difference between Western and Islamic view of knowledge.

Thus, it is very much obvious that Muslim societies cannot progress in education and learning unless modern knowledge is not only 'de-westernised' but is also Islamised. Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas has written that the greatest challenge for Muslim civilization today is the challenge of knowledge, because it is the knowledge as "conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western civilization."[42] Various institutions are working to face this challenge and many attempts have been made to Islamize knowledge. However, a large part of Muslim intelligentsia and academic fraternity has remained indifferent, if not altogether hostile, to such endeavours. The need is to create more awareness about the issue and to develop coordination among different institutions.

CONCLUSION

Seven centuries have passed between the times of Ibn Khaldun and the contemporary world but some of his ideas seem to be as fresh as ever. Muslim civilization is facing some of the severest challenges of its lifetime and Ibn Khaldun's solution lay in multi-pronged strategy: invigorating an alternate political discourse based on the Islamic injunctions and making state and politics the basis of transforming the Muslim society; creating a leadership which also enjoys a moral authority and possesses the qualities of *ilm* (knowledge), *adl* (justice), *kifaya* (competence) and is seriously concerned to mitigate the sufferings of the people; developing an *asabiyah* (social cohesion) which has been weakened by colonial powers' deliberate attempts to distort past Muslim history and to create linguistic, cultural and ethnic divisions in the Muslim world; and finally, reconstructing the medieval Muslim legacy of knowledge and learning which challenges the westernisation of knowledge and attempts to de-westernise as well as Islamise it.

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[42] Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1998 [1978]), 133. For the whole discussion on de-westernization of knowledge, see 133-68.

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Encyclopedia of Islam, III: 825, s.v. "IbnKhaldun"

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION: POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES

The Department of Islamic Thought and Civilization organized an International Conference on March 28-29, 2011 under the banner of UMT Ideas Exchange 2011. This two-day Conference comprised of eight sessions including one session devoted to Arabic papers. The first session of the conference started after the inaugural session of UMT Idea Exchange and comprised of keynote speeches. Dr. Abdul Hameed (Dean, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Management and Technology, Lahore), chaired the session.

Dr. S. M. Ghazanfar (Professor Emeritus, University of Idaho, USA), delivered his keynote address on "***Civilization Links: Early Islam and Western Renaissance.***" He said that many discourses clearly indicate that Muslim civilization played an important role in the rise and culmination of the movement of Renaissance in the West. He proved his point by citing Western authors and intellectuals admitting the role of texts of Arabs and Muslims during the Renaissance.

The second keynote speaker was Dr. Adnan Aslan (Professor of Philosophy at Istanbul 29 May University, Turkey). He spoke on "***Religious Pluralism in Islam.***" He was of the view that Islam allows pluralistic societies. He said that Islam has always encouraged pluralism and the history of the Muslim world is replete with examples where Muslims, Christians, and Jews have coexisted peacefully in a harmonious manner.

Dr. Hasan Sohaib Murad (Rector, University of Management and Technology, Lahore), presented souvenirs to the keynote speakers. The session was moderated by Ms. Shagufta Jabeen (Assistant Professor, Department of English Language and Literature, UMT).

The second session of the day was chaired by Dr. Absar Ahmad (Former Head, Department of Philosophy, University of Punjab, Lahore). The session theme was 'Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence'. Dr. Laszlo Csicsmann (Vice Dean, International Affairs, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary), presented his paper on **"*Islamist Movements at the Crossroads: The Choice between Ideology and Context Driven Approach to Politics: Case Study on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordon.*"** His paper was based on his recent research and stay in Jordon. The second paper titled **"*The Transformation of Egyptian Islamists: Genuine Value Pluralism or Democratic Window Dressing*"** was presented by Ms. Gillian Kennedy (a doctoral candidate in Middle Eastern Studies, Kings College London, UK). She discussed the dynamics of the recent revolution in Egypt. The third presentation was that of Dr. Branislav Radeljic (Associate Lecturer at University of London). Dr. Radeljic talked on **"*Islam in European Union: Key Issues & Debates.*"**

In his concluding remarks, Dr. Absar, appreciated the efforts of the non-Muslim presenters to understand and write on Islam. He said that this attempt to understand how others view us is commendable and will play an important role in creating an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence. Commenting on the paper by Ms. Gillian Kennedy, he said that she has supported her argument drawing from the Italian philosopher Gramsci and political thinker Machiavelli, and has rightly observed in her illuminating paper that if a modern prince fails to continue playing a cultural and

hegemonic role, the state will soon be reduced to a mechanism of pure coercion and corrupt bureaucracy. No doubt, the modern Prince was Hosni Mubarak who was elected for the 6th time in September 2005 with no regard to the fact that Egypt has been continuously in a state of emergency. Since 1981, the electoral system lacked any balance of power in the upper reaches of the state and adopting the notion coined by the famous political scientist Muhammad Tusi, became idle and ineffective. In last year's elections, many candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood were declared ineligible and were barred from participating in the electoral process on one pretext or the other. This made the entire exercise a farce. So, Gramsci's logic of coercion and meager consent or consensual support was demonstrated by the repressive methods of Nasser and Mubarak regimes. In the opinion of Dr. Absar, Ms. Gillian is very right in her observation that repression and catering to the Focurani's reformist concessions falls short of fulfilling the democratic vacuum created by decades of decadent and authoritative rule.

In his comments on the paper of Mr. Branislav Radeljic from Sarajevo, Dr. Absar said that the paper gives us an overview of Islam and Muslims in Europe, their trivial and gradual yet painful entrenchment in the industrially developed, and largely secular and liberal countries of Europe. Dr. Absar Ahmad said that all three papers deal with very essential and sensitive concepts. Most of the political parties in Muslim lands in Jordan and Egypt are trying to coexist with secular parties but they are not dealing with theological or ideological concepts, thus ignoring the basic conceptual framework. In this reference, Dr. Absar quoted Dr. Fazlur Rahman, an eminent scholar of Islamic thought who was a professor at Chicago University. In a paper published in an academic journal of Chicago University, Dr. Fazlur Rahman explored the core concept of *Iman, Islam* and *Taqwa*, culminating in the highest and ultimate civilizational, social political goals of Islam. Dr. Absar highlighted the following points from Dr. Fazlur Rahman's paper:

1. Personal inner faith is not by any means sufficient for God's purposes. Organized normative community is a dire necessity. He thus fully affirms reification which is Cantwell Smith's term; reification of *Iman* in the temporal context while all modernists attempt to empty Islam of its political context.
2. In Kennedy's paper you heard about a French scholar Olivier Roy using the term 'Post Islamism' and similarly Jenny B White's paper is titled 'The End of Islamism'. Even Turkish intellectual Akif Burkey has written an article titled 'the Death of Islamism'; he believes in the personalization of Islam, making it a private ritualistic religion whereas it is in fact a 'Deen' as we know from the Quran.
3. Discussing deeply the nature of *Taqwa*, which is one of the core concepts of *Islam, Iman* and *Taqwa*, Fazlur Rahman very rightly observes that the self is an emanation as it is applied in the notion of *Taqwa* and it can never by itself mean self righteousness. Thus he writes, "if self examination had built in success, humanism would work perfectly well and there would be no need for transcendence." Dr. Fazlur Rahman thus in one stroke disposes of both rational and humanist philosophers and those present day modernists and Muslim intellectuals who try to "*deshariatize*" Islam through various innovative modes. At another place we read that only when it (Islam) has become a social order, it becomes a political order i.e., Islam has to play a world role. One cannot earn the political order unless the basis of the social order is laid firmly. Thus Dr. Fazlur Rahman stands for real action and dynamism and repudiates the stresses of soul and empty political slogans.

4. All of us are familiar with the Muslim Brotherhood or *al-Ikhwan ul Muslimun* that was founded by Hasan al Banna in 1928 and much later in the 1940s Maulana Maududi started *Jamat-e-Islami* in India before partition. Syed Qutb's tract 'Milestones' *Maalim fi al Tareeq* and similarly Hassan al Hudaibi's "We are Preachers not judges" are also known. This title is very significant. Maulana Maududi's writings provided lot of theoretical help to *al-Ikhwan*. They were more dynamic and active but theoretically, the understanding of the Quran and socio-political thought was contributed by *Jamat-e-Islami*, and many of Maulana Maududi's works were translated into Arabic. Similarly Dr. Israr Ahmad started '*Tanzeem-e-Islami'* for Islamic renaissance and revival. Maulana Maududi and Dr. Israr Ahmad don't believe in attenuation of Islam. They believe in authentic Islam and the Quran and the *Hadith* or the *Sunna* whereas all these movements in most of the Arab countries are now presenting a much attenuated form of Islam which is pluralistic and quite liberal.

Dr. Absar concluded by thanking all paper presenters. The session ended with the distribution of souvenirs to paper presenters and the session chair.

There were two paper presentations in the third and final session of the day based on the theme of 'Muslim Intellectual Contribution.' Ms. Zora Hesova (a Czech Republic National, Doctoral Candidate at free Berlin University), presented her paper on **"*Scheler and Ghazali: Explorations of the Finality of Knowledge between East and West.*"** Her presentation was based on the exploration of the ways in which Islamic tradition in general and Islamic philosophy in particular, contributes a constructive rethinking of modernity in a dialogue between Western and Islamic thought. Dr. Faraz Anjum (Assistant Professor, University of Punjab, Lahore), presented his paper on the topic of **"*Crisis of Muslim Civilization in Modern Times: some Insights from Ibn-e-Khaldun's Thought & Ideas.*"** His research was an attempt to understand and explain the crisis of Islamic Civilization with the help of the social analysis and critical ideas of Ibn-e-Khuldun.

Dr. Syed Nomanul Haq (Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, Lahore University of Management Sciences, LUMS, Lahore), chaired the session. He opined that after coming across such discourses, he feels the need to revisit and reconsider some commonly used terms. This whole dichotomy of rise and decline, modern and ancient/primitive, orient and occident; all these are highly problematic terms. Many among us know that all these are social constructs, many are more ideological than others but these are nonetheless constructs and we have to break them in order to make sense of our own station. He added that he always had problems with the dichotomy between East and West, Orient and Occident. Dr. Nomanul Haq quoted Marshal Hodgson who has pointed out the Rise of the West, the Rise of Europe, as a convergence, and not a single thread that starts from the Greeks and goes on to the Renaissance and then rises somewhere in Paris, London and Amsterdam. But it is really a convergence of many forces and in that convergence, the thread of Islam is extremely important. So in a way when the West rises there is some contribution of Islam in it. Now given this point where many things get together and a new phenomenon rises, it is hardly surprising that we find a parallel between the ideas and examples of Ghazali and a 20th century German philosopher Max Scheler. He emphasized that he cannot imagine, he cannot even begin to write the history of the legendary West without having recourse to Arabic resources nor can he write a history of Arabic culture without having recourse to the Greeks. They are all connected; once felt in 11th century Spain of Ibn-e-Khaldun, once felt somewhere else. And of course the whole process of translation in the 11th century and transmission of administrative structures, attitudes, institutions, all the things that make up the

Modern European Civilization, is rooted in Muslim Civilization. He appreciated the idea of reconnecting these threads, for if nothing else, it is an antidote to the rhetoric of clash of civilization. Seen as a continuous human effort, this whole issue of clash goes by the board once this historical continuity is realized.

Commenting on knowledge, he pointed out two issues. First is the idea of knowledge as it grows in a utilitarian mode where knowledge is information management. Knowledge is an instrument of utility on the one hand and on the other, knowledge having a higher goal has actually two fundamental dimensions; one is what our speaker told us, the question of hierarchy and teleology. Nowadays teleology is rejected in biological evolution.

Dr. Nomanul Haq reminded the audience that there are scholars and thinkers in Europe who have quested all and he recalled Iqbal who addressed the whole issue of education:

"Drown the self of seeker into the acid. This burning acid of Education is so effective that if it is Himalaya of Gold it becomes a heap of dust."

Dr. Allama Iqbal was well aware of the ethical dimension of education. It attenuates the Islamic way of thinking because it separates ethical implications from acquiring knowledge. Dr. Nomanul Haq's own basic premise is strengthened by Dr. Iqbal who saw the dichotomy. He said that this whole duality, at least, between East and West really breaks down because he sees in Post-modernist thought, even in Foucault who has been quoted by Ms. Zora and in Heidegger, things that are really parallel. This mode of thinking where much of what we do is social construct, even religion can be a social construct as there is no such thing as "*Deen*" and "*Dunya*" and so on. What is religion, he asked. Is it *madhab*? *Madhab* is a doctrine, and "*deen*" is only one. There are issues with these concepts and one has to revisit the categories and terms for real scholarship. One does not go into rhetorical propaganda and if one really means business then one has to think. So for example, Foucault in hermeneutics raises these issues and so does Max Scheler and we have these concerns that knowledge must have an ethical dimension. It cannot be just information management as it is today.

Dr Nomanul Haq said that Pakistan faces an intellectual problem. Concluding his discussion, he said that he feels happy when he comes across Abu Hamid al Ghazali being mentioned with Foucault and Scheler. Now the typology of knowledge is really an exercise in Social Sciences but the typology given by Zora Hesova is useful in the attitude of Perennial Philosophy and that of Mahdi Yazdi and traditional modality arising out of tradition is very important thing to note.

Sharing his insight on reformation of the *Madrasa*, Dr Nomanul Haq said that there are problems of discipline, peace and security, but as an institution the *madrasa* has been historically significant. Dr. Fazlur Rahman was a product of the *Madrasa*. Jamal-ud Din Afgahni never went to a university, Sir Syed never went to a university; they were all Madrasa people and Madrasa people have made remarkable contributions in the development of science. It should be noted that scientific revolution was initiated by Copernicus who drew upon the work of Ibn al-Shatir who was a "*Muwaqqit"* (time keeper) in a mosque of Damascus. Copernicus is a verbatim citer. He quotes verbatim; where there is *Alif* he writes A, where there is 'baa' he writes b. He takes theorems of Naseer-ud-Din al-Tusi for example, and Mu'ayyad al-Din *al-'Urdi who* have quoted

verbatim manuscripts on the Vatican and in Arabic and there are annotations written in Latin, so that means that there were people who knew both Arabic and Latin.

The second day of the Conference started with the recitation of some verses from the Quran. The theme of the first session was 'Muslim Cultural Heritage.' There were two presentations; one in Arabic language and the other in English on Islamic Architecture. Dr Spahic Omar (Bosnian National, Assistant Professor at International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), spoke on **"*Islamic Architecture and the Prospect of its Revival*."** The paper concluded that Islamic architecture embodies the message of Islam through its multidimensionality. It both facilitates the Muslim's realization of Islamic purpose and its divine principles on earth, and promotes a lifestyle generated by such a philosophy and principles.

Mr. Kamil Khan Mumtaz (famous architect of Pakistan and former Head, Department of Architecture, National College of Arts, Lahore), chaired the session and presented the characteristics of traditional Islamic architecture. He was of the view that the function of Islamic architecture is to remind us constantly who we are and where we are and where we want to go. Islamic architecture reminds us that, yes we are on the horizontal plane of the world, but there is a higher reality and that is the real origin and destination of man. This horizontal plane is temporarily a passing phase. And this brings us to the function of history, because the function of history is also precisely the same. History is also meaningless if it does not enlighten us as to who we are and where we are and where we want to go. But there is something very curious about the way we look at history. Usually we look at history on a horizontal plane (these people came from here, they conquered this land and went to another land, etc.) in time and space.

In other words, this is a linear paradigm of history and surprisingly all of us accept it without questioning it. As someone said, change is the only thing constant in the universe. But nothing follows a linear progress - development or change forever in one direction. Every natural phenomenon in the whole universe follows a cyclic paradigm: origin, development, evolution, degeneration and return. How is it that we have conveniently adopted a paradigm of human history that goes forever from primitive man to civilized man, to industrial man, to modern man, to postmodern man and better, towards progress and development forever.

Is this possible? Isn't it absurd? Then why do we adopt such a model of history? It must suit somebody. And yes, it does. This is a paradigm of history that suits every fascist, imperialist, Marxist, Modernist, all kinds of supremacists. Because it shows that where they are in time and space, they are coming from a lesser and moving towards a better future forever. But if this is an absurd notion and everything goes in cycles then we need to look at the lessons of history.

Again, man in all traditions has had a cyclic paradigm of history, and human history, we should know as Muslims, is designed on a cyclic model. But within the cycle, while at the end of the cycle of course we must return to our origin, there are larger cycles and there are smaller cycles. It is almost like a rubber ball that has been tossed up, it follows a big arch, hits the ground and bounces back, hits the ground in smaller arcs, and then smaller and smaller, and ultimately it stops. Energy dissipates. So consider human history as this kind of cycles within cycles. There is natural man as he was created *ashraful-makhluqaat*: the greatest creation, and then he falls to lower than the lowest. Natural man: the biggest circle, sixty thousand years in which man lives in direct relationship to nature; civilized man: much less time about six thousand years, a tiny portion

of human history, and it is in this period that man attained so much of what we recognize as civilization, be it Greek, Roman, Persian and Assyrian, Christian civilization, Muslim, all civilizations belong to this cycle of time including the revealed books. And then comes the smaller cycle: six hundred years of modern man, industrial man, in which begins a process of dissipation, not only of man's own energies but the energy sources available to him, precisely because of modernization and industrialization. And now we have gone beyond.

We are now in the postindustrial and postmodernist stage. If the civilizational stage was about 6,000 years, modernism beginning with the Renaissance is just about 600 years. And postmodernism, beginning with the atomic explosion of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, barely 60 years. 60,000, 6000, 600, and 60! That is where we are at now and this is also the way that the resources of this planet are dissipated. Conserved, maintained for 60,000 years or more, ever since man was on this planet, but with modernization we began to dissipate and deplete the resources. In the cyclic view of history of all traditions, whether it is Greek or Hindu or Islamic, all of them point out to the end of the cycle of time. These are the last days, *Aakhira*, this is the *kalyug*, and this is the dark epoch. So when we talk about the future, when we talk about reviving Islamic civilization when we talk about keeping abreast with the developments of science, technology and modernism, when we talk about … what are we really saying? Is there any time left? Allah Almighty tells us that He can create another generation different from us. What that will be, Allah SWT alone knows. Kamil Khan Mumtaz said that we need to place our deliberations' on architecture, culture, history, and civilization within this traditional, and Islamic paradigm of what and who we are, what is the world, where are we coming from and where are we going.

The second paper of this session was in Arabic Language covered the distinctive features of Islamic civilization and was presented by Dr. Abdul Hai Madni (NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, Pakistan), Civilization. Dr. Mazhar Moeen (Principal Oriental College, University of Punjab, Lahore), and Dr. Khaliq Dad (Head, Department of Arabic, University of Punjab), jointly concluded the session.

The theme of the second session of the day was 'Inter Civilizational Dialogue.' There were two presentations in the session. Dr. Naveed Yazdani (Director, School of Professional Advancement, University of Management and Technology, Lahore), presented the paper titled "***From Modernity to Postmodernity: A Historical Discourse on Western Civilization*.**" He covered the historical paradigm of Modernity and Postmodernity. He also analyzed the behavior of Western civilization in this context. Ms. Memoona Sajjad (pen name Maryam Sakeena), the second presenter of the session, addressed on **"*Fraternity of Civilization: Prospects for Dialogue and Search for Common Thread*."** She refuted the idea of Clash of Civilization and said that Islamic history is rich in narratives of pluralism, tolerance and peaceful co-existence with diverse communities. Mr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar, (Director, Iqbal Academy, Lahore), concluded the session and said that the role of Islamic Tradition is most important in this postmodern age.

Three papers were presented in the third session of the day under the theme of 'Islamic Civilization: Emerging Issues and New Horizons.' The first presentation was ***Pluralism in Islam: A Comparative Study with Western Pluralism*** by Dr. Farooq Hassan (Assistant Professor at NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi, Pakistan). The second paper was a joint presentation of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Majooka and Mr. Habib Elahi Sahibzada (University of Hazara, at Mansehra, Pakistan). Their research was on the **"*Resources of Muslim World: A***

***Reflection on the Muslim World's Resources, Their Development and Utilization*.**" The third presentation was delivered by Ms. Nighat Noureen (Lecturer, School of Social Sciences and Humanities at the Department of Social Sciences, UMT, Lahore), on the topic of **"*Islamic Globalization: An Urgent Need of the World.*"** Session Chair, Dr Syed Sultan Shah (Head, Department of Islamic Studies, Government College University, Lahore), concluded the session.

The theme of the final and last session of the Conference was 'Islam and Postmodernity.' Two papers were presented on postmodernity. Ms. Sabina Shah (Lecturer, Department of English Language and Literature at University of Hazara), presented her paper on **"*Cultural Invasion through Media War: Islamic Civilization and the Challenge of Postmodernity.*"** Her paper encompassed the notion of Post-modern life in the Islamic world. She emphasized that importance of mass media in the Post-Modern world is beyond any doubt. She was of the view that through mass media, the Occident is continuously trying to impose its sensibilities on the Oriental mind. Dr. Muhammad Zaid Malik, (Assistant Professor, International Islamic University; Islamabad), expressed his views on the topic of **"*Post-Modernity and Crisis of Muslim Identity*."** Dr. Zafar Iqbal (Former Head, Department of English Language and Literature, University of Management and Technology, Lahore), concluded the session. At the end, Dr. Muhammad Amin (Head, Department of Islamic Thought and Civilization, School of Social Sciences and Humanities, UMT), gave the vote of thanks and announced the closing of the Conference.

All the working sessions were followed by question and answer sessions and souvenir presentations. A large number of students from UMT and other educational institutions attended the Conference. Educationists, intellectuals, media representatives and members of the general public interested in the various dimensions of Islamic civilization graced the Conference with their presence.