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# **Editor's Note**

This issue of the Journal of the Islamic Thought & Civilization consists of exclusive contributions of UMT academicians and scholars. It is dedicated to highlight the research output of UMT scholars for the benefit of the society at large and academicians in particular. Maintaining the tradition of the Journal, the authors have contributed articles on a variety of subjects ranging from management of *madrassa* education to definition of Islamic Tradition, postmodern equipment of research of Arkoun and an analysis of the intertwined roles of faith and reason in contemporary Islam. An effort has also been made in this issue to highlight the importance of *ijtihad* in Islamic civilization and culture.

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# Hofstede's Cultural Model, LMX and Pakistani Historicsocio-political Discourse: An Analytical Critique

# Dr. Naveed Yazdani Dr. Ahmed F Siddiqi

#### Abstract

This paper grounds its analytical historical discourse of Pakistani culture, society and leadership (political, social and economic) in Hofstede's model of national and organizational culture. It borrows from LMX theory of leadership which entails both transactional and transformational elements and applies it in the context of Pakistani leadership style. Since the founding ideology of Pakistan is the religion of Islam, the paper also undertakes a detailed account of Divine Commands based socio-economic Islamic precepts. It also presents some empirical evidence reflecting the present Pakistani cultural and societal values embedding both the culture and leadership style of the country. The paper challenges Hofstede's labeling of Pakistani culture as collectivistic and calls for future research on the 'Dark Side' of LMX practices prevalent in Pakistani discourse.

Keywords: Hofstede's Cultural Model, Discourse, Islamic Socio-Economic System, LMX

"Your worst leaders are those whom you hate and who hate you; whom you curse and who curse you...not as long as they establish Prayer among you..." (Tradition of Prophet Muhammad SAW)

#### Introduction

Pakistan is considered an ideological state because it was formed on the basis of Islam which is the Muslim religion. It is, perhaps, because of lack of actual practice of the ideology that many Pakistanis themselves associate their identity and heritage with diverse and diverging sources. Some think they are the lineage of Indus Valley or Arab or Hindu Civilization whereas others grapple with their identity as being geographically defined in terms of South Asian, Central Asian or a part of the Middle East. Pakistan has about 180 million inhabitants (sixth largest population in the world) and is a nuclear state since 1998. The structure of Pakistani society shows a clear cleavage: its Western part is culturally inclined towards the Iranian and Afghan worlds whereas its Eastern half is sharply divided along the lines of caste, an imprint of being part of largely Hindu India for more than 10 centuries.<sup>1</sup>

International economic, political and social writers dub Pakistan as "an intriguing paradox" exhibiting intensive involvement of donors and with scores of highly educated and achieving elite but underperforming on most social, political, health and education indicators.<sup>2</sup>

The local media has been beating the drum of corruption and injustice in all walks of Pakistani life for years. Some of them note with concern that the history of Pakistan is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> C. Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and its Origin (ed.) (London: Anthem Press Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2004), 1-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> W. Easterly, "The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan", *Paper for the Analytic Narratives of Growth Project* (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1999).

"(being) riddled with examples of corrupt politicians being rehabilitated. Ayub Khan disqualified politicians who were later placed in ministerial offices. Ghulam Ishaq Khan declared Asif Ali Zardari as the most corrupt man in one of his speeches and a few years later swore him in as a minister. Nawaz Sharif was charged with cases of loan defaults and tax evasion but later returned to power. Did we witness any political party challenge the election of Asif Ali Zardari as the president when everyone knew his past record? More recent,...in the political battlefield involving the next generation of politicians – as witnessed in the Ephedrine case against Ali Musa Gilani....(only saw him) won the NA-151 Multan by-elections.....It is time we accept that corruption and nepotism are now accepted as a part of (even the religious and) middle-class morality in Pakistan and are deeply entrenched at all levels of society and class hierarchy".<sup>3</sup>

These observations lead to a natural question: why Pakistan has not been able to achieve political, economic and social justice in the society despite being richly endowed with natural and human resources? Is it a combination of its unique history, founding ideology and geography which explain its overall underperformance? Or is it because of the failure of leadership at all fronts? This paper is an attempt to explore these issues. This study is grounded in the well researched constructs of culture and leadership style which are utilized to assess the underpinning societal values of Pakistani culture and the leadership styles in the political, economic and social domains.

This paper is divided in six sections. The first section briefly surveys the literature available on Hofstede's cultural model and leadership styles. Section two develops the main theory and proposition underpinning this paper. This theoretical development is carried out in the light of the cultural model and leadership style discussion undertaken in the first section. Section three briefly outlines the historic-socio-political discourse of Pakistan over the span of about a thousand years while section four expounds the economic and social model proposed by Islam through Quranic injunctions. This section is of special importance considering that Islam was the founding ideology of Pakistan. Section five summarizes the current state of political, economic and social status of Pakistan through the latest empirical evidence. The sixth and final section discusses the research methodology, analytical findings, limitations and some main future research implications of this research.

# Section 1: Brief Literature Survey of Hofstede's Cultural Model and Major Leadership Styles

It is true that human beings are extremely diverse and unique in all respects. Social scientists have however, attempted to predict an individual's behavior taking into account the individual situation. Hofstede (1980), for example, assumes that we carry a certain stable and somewhat predictable mental programming which causes us to behave similarly in similar situations. These programs are not only both inherited and transferred through genes but also acquired over the lifetime of an individual. It is not possible to peep directly into the mental programs of others but one can infer them through the behaviors exhibited by individuals.<sup>4</sup>

Hofstede distinguishes three levels of human uniqueness in mental maps. According to him, the inherited or biologically operating systems of our mental maps are least unique

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> http://tribune.com.pk

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> T. Levitin, "Values". In J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver (Eds.), Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1973), 492.

or the most universal. The second level is the collective level of uniqueness which is shared among people belonging to a specific group. This level stems from the culture of a community, region or country. It is at this level that most of our mental programs are learned or acquired.<sup>5</sup> The third level of mental programming, probably the product of interaction between the other two levels, is truly unique to each human being and manifests as his/her individual personality.<sup>6</sup>

Anthropologists define culture as a shared mental program that "consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols.....the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values".<sup>7</sup> Culture is therefore, collective mental programming through which we share our collective conditioning with members of our own community, region or nationality. Nation states are political units with their own and distinct history, institutions, governmental forms, legal systems, educational systems and relations between employers and laborers.<sup>8</sup> It can be inferred from these statements that both culture and national identities are underpinned by shared and acquired mental programs or collective value systems.

If cultures represent collective individualities and given that individuals are liable to change and transitions in their life spans, the question arises why cultures remain relatively stable over long periods of time? Berry<sup>9</sup> and Parsons<sup>10</sup> attribute cultural stability to the interplay of ecological factors (geography, economy, demography, genetics, history, technology) and societal norms or value system of the majority leading to shaping, structuring and defining function of institutions like family patterns, education, religion, political structure, legislation and architecture. Since geography, genetics and history are by nature stable and societal value systems are also generally stable unless external influences like change in climate, trade conditions, wars and colonization (Hofstede, 1980: 1983) occur, cultures tend to remain stable over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> E. Durkheim, *Les Regles de la* Methode *Sociologique* (1937 ed.) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1895), 107.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> G. Hofstede, "Culture and Organizations", International Studies of Management and Organization, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?" Organizational Dynamics AMACON.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> C. Kluckhohn, "The Study of Culture", in D. Lerner and H.D. Lasswell (Eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1951), 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> G. Hofstede, "Culture and Organizations", International Studies of Management and Organization, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?" Organizational Dynamics AMACON; G. Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories", Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 14, (1983): 75-89; G. Hofstede, "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences Among Nations", International Studies of Management and Organizations, vol.13, no. 1-2 (1983): 46-74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> J.W. Berry, "An Ecological Approach to Cross-Cultural Psychology." Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, vol. 30, (1975): 51-84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> T. Parsons, *The Evolution of Societies*, ed. J. Toby (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 10.

Figure 1 summarizes this discussion.



Source: Culture and Organization by Geert Hofstede, International Studies of Management & Organization, Vol. 10, no.4, (1981):15-41.

Hofstede pioneered the empirical studies of national cultures. His research spanned over 10 years (1967 – 1978) across 50 countries and involved data collection from 116,000 respondents. Four dimensions of culture emerged from this seminal initial study: individualism/collectivism, large or small power distance, strong or weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity (Hofstede, 1983: 1980). These four dimensions explain more than 50% of variance in the countries' mean scores.<sup>11</sup> His research proposed a framework for assessing national cultures in relation to organizational culture which he termed as the cultural dimensions theory.<sup>12</sup>

Cultures with large *power distance* legitimize high and low inequality and are characterized by a few inaccessible people at the top who are independent while the majority is totally dependent on them. The minority at the top considers the majority below as different kind of people. Power is the basic fabric around which societal norms are woven. People at the top are entitled to all privileges. The powerless majority is disunited but seeks all opportunities of replacing the powerful. An ordinary citizen is however powerless as compared with those in authority. Strong *uncertainty avoidance* means uncertainty of life is perceived as perpetual threat. High anxiety and stress are experienced across the culture where materialist attitude prevails. Tolerance towards the unconventional is generally low and need for consensus and amalgamation towards mainstream dominant thought discourse is strongly felt. As a result, the spirit of nationalism is very strong and search for absolute truths overarches societal norms. Low

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> G. Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories", *Journal of International Business Studies*, vol. 14, (1983): 75-89; G. Hofstede, "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences Among Nations", *International Studies of Management and* 

Organizations, vol. 13, no. 1-2 (1983): 46-74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> www.wikipedia.org.

*individualism* or high *collectivism* entails traditional extended family system with emotional dependence on organizations, institutions and clans which provide order and security in the society. Group decisions are respected and friendships reflect stable social relationships. In cultures scoring high on *masculinity*, men are assertive and in position of authority in all matters while women are nurturing and have little say in decision making of any kind. Gender roles are clearly differentiated and materialism prevails in the society. People are generally ambitious, hard working, achievement and 'macho' oriented. <sup>13</sup> Hofstede's survey places Pakistani culture along four dimensions in the following manner:

Individualism Index	Very Low (Rank 6-7)*
Power Distance Index	High** (Rank 22)
Uncertainty Index	Medium (26-27)
Masculinity Index	Medium (Rank 26-27)

# Figure 2

*Source*: "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices" by Geert Hofstede, *Journal* of International Business Studies, Vol. 14 (1983):75-89, & "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences among Nations" by Geert Hofstede, International Studies of Management & Organization, Vol. 13, (1/2), (1983): 52.

\*Ranks are allocated to all 50 countries involved in the study. 1 would denote the lowest while 50 the highest rank. \*\* Power Distance Index in spite of being ranked at 22 is considered high in case of Pakistan because of the graphical representations shown in the below mentioned Hofstede's articles (author's note).

Based on Hofstede's findings, Pakistani culture would be captured by the following summary:

# Connotations of Individualism – Collectivism Dimensions in Case of Pakistan

- 1. Extended family system
- 2. Presence of "we" consciousness
- 3. Identity based on collective social systems
- 4. Individual emotional dependence is institutional
- 5. Private life is pervaded by institutions, organizations and clans
- 6. Expertise, security, order and duty provided by clans
- 7. Belief in group decisions
- 8. Friendship flows from predetermined social relationships
- 9. Value standards different for social group members and non-members

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> G. Hofstede, "Culture and Organizations", *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, "Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?" *Organizational Dynamics AMACON*.

# **Connotations of the Power Distance Dimension in Case of Pakistan**

- 1. Inequality in society is a norm
- 2. A few are independent and majority are dependent
- 3. Superiors and subordinates live in worlds of their own
- 4. Power legitimacy is irrelevant but is a basic fact of society
- 5. Stress on coercive and referent power
- 6. The underdog is to be blamed
- 7. Absence of trust in society
- 8. Latent conflict between the powerful and the powerless

#### **Connotations of Uncertainty Avoidance Dimension in Case of Pakistan**

- 1. Medium levels of anxiety and stress
- 2. Time is neither free nor money
- 3. Hard work is neither a virtue nor an urge
- 4. Sometimes aggressive behavior is tolerated and sometimes it is not
- 5. Conflict and competition is neither constructive nor to be avoided
- 6. No norms regarding dissent or consensus
- 7. Deviant behavior tolerated selectively
- 8. No age group is preferred
- 9. No generalized attitude towards risk taking, liberalism, conservatism, relativism, empiricism, search for absolute truth, law and order, and governance

#### Connotations of the Masculinity - Femininity Dimension in Case of Pakistan

- 1. Neither people nor money orientation
- 2. No clear preference for quality of life and environment or growth
- 3. No clear preference for service/achievement, intuition/rationality, sympathy for the unfortunate or achievers, leveling and excellence, steadiness and speed, and assertive and nurturing role demarcation between genders

## Leadership Styles

The study of leadership has progressed from a simple description of leaders' traits to examining complexities of interaction between leaders and followers.<sup>14</sup> Trait, behavioral or style, visionary or charismatic, contingency, emotional intelligence and competency schools of thought formulate the six main themes of leadership theories over the past seven decades or so.<sup>15</sup> Leadership style approach has gained popularity since the 1940s. One branch of leadership research which has grown out of the style school is the framework of transactional/transformational leadership.<sup>16</sup> Transactional leaders are primarily *task-focused*, having the ability to motivate people through contingent-reward

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> D. L. Athanasaw, "Leadership Styles as perceived by Career Senior Executives", *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 26. No. 10 &11, (2003): 1207-1236.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> V. Dulewicz & Higgs, "Design of a New Instrument to Assess Leadership Dimensions and Styles", *Henley Working Paper Series*, HWP 0311, (UK: Henley Management College, 2003); C.B. Handy, *Understanding Organizations* (London: Penguin Books, 1982); D.A. Partington, *Managing and Leading in J.R. Turner* (ed.), (people in Project Management. UK: Gower, 2003).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> D. Vera and M. Crossan, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Learning", Academy of Management Review, vol.40, (2004): 222-240.

exchanges.<sup>17</sup> Transformational leaders on the other hand are *people-focused*,<sup>18</sup> and are charismatic, inspirational, intellectually stimulating, and individually considerate.<sup>19</sup> Transformational leaders are also termed empowering leaders because of their abilities such as leading by example, participative decision making, coaching, informing and showing concern for team members.<sup>20</sup>

Leader-Member-Exchange (LMX) theory <sup>21</sup> has been evolving for more than four decades.<sup>22</sup> It has progressed from simple Vertical Dyad Linkage to involve more 'mature leadership relationships'.<sup>23</sup> It is conceptually quite similar to Hersey and Blanchard's situational leadership theory (SLT) which defines four leadership styles on two dimensions of task and people orientation: 'telling', 'selling', 'and participating' and 'delegating'. The leadership style is aligned with the followers' 'maturity level' depending whether they are unable (skills wise)/unwilling (low on motivation), unable/willing, able/unwilling or able/willing. The most suitable leadership style for followers low on maturity (unable/unwilling) is 'Telling' or directing.<sup>24</sup>

LMX theory is embedded in three levels: leader, follower, and relationship. This view is in contrast to the traditional view of examining the three levels/facets differently. A question like 'what is leadership' would not only spell out the behavioral aspects of the leader but also his/her qualities which influence relationship between parties and also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> J. Howell & Hall-Merenda, "The Ties that Bind: The Impact of Leader-member-exchange, Transformational and Transactional Leadership, and Distance on Predicting Follower Performance", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 84 (1999): 680-694; D.I. Jung and B.J. Avolio, "Effects of Leadership Style and Followers: Cultural Orientation on Performance in Groups and Individual Task Conditions", *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1999): 208-218.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> R. Turner & R. Muller, R. "The Project Manager's Leadership Style as a Success a Factor on Projects: literature review", *Project Management Journal*, Vol. 36, no.1, (2005): 49-61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Avolio, B.J., B.M. Bass, & D.I. Jung, "Re-examining the Components of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire", *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 72, (1999): 441-462; S.A. Carless, "Assessing the Discriminant Validity of Transformational Leader Behavior as Measured by the MLQ", *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 71, (1998): 353-358; D.N. Hartog, J.J. Muijen, & P.L. Koopman, "Transactional versus Transformational Leadership: An analysis of the MLQ", *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 70, (1997): 19-34; N. Tichy, & , M. DeVanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York: Wiley, 1990).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> A. Srivastava, K. M. Bartol, & E. A. Locke, "Empowering Leadership in Management Teams: Effects on Knowledge Sharing, Efficacy, and Performance", *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 49, no. 6, (2006): 1239-1251.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> G. B. Graen, & J. Cashman, "A Role-making Model of Leadership in Formal Organizations: A Developmental Approach, In J.G. Hunt & L.L. Larson (Eds.), *Leadership Frontiers*. (Kent, OH: Kent-State University Press, 1975), 143-166.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "The Transformation of Professionals into Self-managing and Partially self-Designing Contributions: Towards a Theory of Leader-making", *Journal of Management Systems*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (1991): 49-54.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources*, 1<sup>st</sup> edition, (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1969); P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *So You Want to Know Your Leadership Style?* (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1974); P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior*, 6<sup>th</sup> edition, (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1993).

his/her ability to influence the followers.<sup>25</sup> In other words, the crux of LMX theory is that effective leaders are able to develop mature leadership relationship with their followers.<sup>26</sup> These mature relationships develop over a period of time and demand practice of both transactional and transformational leadership traits and qualities. LMX 'begins as transactional social exchange and evolves into transformational social exchange'.<sup>27</sup> LMX theory is grounded in social exchange theory<sup>28</sup> and the 'mature relationships' mentioned above develop within a social milieu<sup>29</sup> and 'enhance subordinates' well-being and work performance' <sup>30</sup> by inducing sense of loyalty, thankfulness and inclusiveness in the members. This is where LMX is different from SLT which attempts mechanistically to fit leadership style with followers' maturity level without promising much about their development and enhancement. What posits LMX theory above other leadership theories is the observation that quality of relationships between leaders and members predict outcomes not only at individual but also at group and organizational levels.<sup>31</sup>

Because this paper has grounded the notion of culture in Hofstede's work it would be useful to see how Sadler & Hofstede<sup>32</sup> relate leadership style with nationality and culture. In a study spanning 7 countries and surveying over 6000 employees, they found out the average leadership style among Japanese managers as 'sells', Australia, Germany and UK as 'consults', and Brazil and France as 'joins'. All the countries mentioned so far had very low scores on 'tells' style managers who make their own decisions independently without involving subordinates. The 'sell' style leaders make decisions independently but rather than just telling they persuade their subordinates to accept the decisions. The 'consults' style managers do not make decisions unless the problem is presented first to the group which is consulted while making decisions. Similarly the 'joins' style leaders delegate decision making to the group. The leader considers his or herself part of the group and generally these decisions reflect group consensus based on majority's opinion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "The Transformation of Professionals into Self-managing and Partially Self-Designing Contributions: Towards a Theory of Leader-making", *Journal of Management Systems*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (1991): 49-54

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> R. M. Dienesch, & R. C. Liden, "Leader-member-exchange Model of Leadership: A Critique and Further Development", *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 11, (1986): 618-634; B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> I. Portoghese, N. Galletta, & A. Battistelli, "The Effects of Work-family Conflict and Community Embeddedness on Employee Satisfaction: The Role of Leader-member Exchange", *International Journal of Business and Management*, Vol. 6, no. 4, (2011): 39-48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> S. J. Wayne, L. M. Shore, & R. C. Liden, R.C. "Perceived Organizational Support and Leader-memberexchange: A Social Exchange Perspective", *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 40, (1997): 82-112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> M. A. Hogg, R. Martin, O. Epitropaki, A. Mankad, A. Svensson, & K. Weeden, "Effective Leadership in Salient Groups: Revisiting leader-member-exchange Theory from the Perspective of the Social Identity Theory of Leadership", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, (2005). http://psp.sagepub.com

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> C. R. Gerstner, D. V. Day, "Meta-analytic Review of Leader-member-exchange Theory: Correlates and Construct Issues", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 82, no. 6, (1997): 827-844.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> P. J. Sadler, & G. H. Hofstede, "Leadership styles: Perceptions of Employees of an International Company in Different Countries", *Mens en Onderneming*, Vol. 26, (1976): 43-63.

Power	Uncertainty	Individualism	Masculinity
<b>Distance Rank</b>	<b>Avoidance Rank</b>	Rank	Rank
21	44	29	44
13	17	49	35
11	23	36	42
11	6	48	42
39	30	25	25
38	38	41	18
	Distance Rank           21           13           11           39	Distance RankAvoidance Rank2144131711231163930	Distance Rank         Avoidance Rank         Rank           21         44         29           13         17         49           11         23         36           11         6         48           39         30         25

The above mentioned countries rank on the four cultural dimensions in the following manner:

Figure 3

*Source*: "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences among Nations" by Geert Hofstede, *International Studies of Management & Organization*, Vol. 13, (1/2), (1983): 52.

#### Section 2: Theory and Proposition Development

Based on the above discussion and Figure 1, 2 and 3, we will first of all explore Pakistani culture's ecological (mainly historical) factors, external influences and societal norms manifested as various indices compiled by global agencies. The Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership will emerge from this first step. It is assumed to be underpinned by Hofstede's four cultural dimensions which place Pakistani culture as highly collectivist, power distance oriented and moderate on the two other parameters.

Sadler & Hofstede's model of leadership is theorized to be linked with LMX theory. All the three styles - 'sells', 'consults' and 'joins' - entail mature relationships with subordinates where leaders are concerned with their well being, and social and psychological enhancement by inducing loyalty and inclusiveness in them. The three leadership styles therefore, also entail both transactional and transformational leadership styles. According to LMX theory, the relations between leaders and subordinates start as social transactions and later mature to an inspirational and transformational type of relationship. The 'tell' style of leadership however, does not entail any element of LMX theory and is conceptually quite similar to the 'telling' or 'directing' situational leadership which suits low on maturity or unable/unwilling followers according to Hersey and Blanchard's theory.

Figure 3 also reveals that 'consult' and 'join' styles are high on power distance index and individualism. All three styles are high on masculinity and on uncertainty avoidance (except 'consult' style). Pakistani culture is only unequivocally clear about individualism where it is very low. As for the other three dimensions, it does not show clear inclination to any extreme.

On the basis of the above theoretical relations, this study formulates the following proposition:

#### **Proposition**

Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership styles would be 'tell ('Telling'/'Directing')' in nature with little regard to developing mature transactional and transformational relations with the subordinates. Subordinates are assumed to be low in maturity in terms of being unable (low in skills) and unwilling (low in motivation).

#### Section 3: Pakistani Historic-Socio-Political Discourse

The Arabs and Indians have a long history of mutual contacts which dates back to the pre-Islamic period.<sup>33</sup> After Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sind in 711 AD, the political and business interaction between the two grew further. Qasim's brief rule of Sind was fair and just. Hindus were provided concessions which were reserved only for the People of the Book. They were exempted from military service and payment of *Zakah*. The civil administration was kept under the Hindus and their local system of justice through '*panchyat*' was also preserved. Qasim however, did commit certain excesses which the Muslim historians tolerate by granting benefit of doubt to him because of his young age. Hinduism did not allow sea excursions whereas Muslims, who were expert in voyages, helped build local trade and business. As a consequence, they were able to gain the support of Hindu Rajas of Malabar and Gujarat.<sup>34</sup>

After Qasim, the Rajputs ruled Northern India till 980 when Subaktageen of Ghazni defeated Raja Jai Pal and his son Mahmood Ghazni established his rule in Lahore.<sup>35</sup> Mahmood<sup>36</sup> employed many Hindu officers and soldiers in his army. One of the most respectable Muslim scholars of this period was Alberuni who was quick to identify the cultural gulf between Hindus and Muslims.<sup>37</sup> The first autonomous Muslim ruler of India was Qutb-u-Din who was throned in 1206. Later rulers like Ghias-u-Din Balban and Ala-u-Din Khilji did take up some public projects like building of roads and provision of edibles to the common laity, but overall their rule is accused of being ferocious, merciless, prone to indulgence in luxuries<sup>38</sup>, temple destruction, and robbing India of its wealth.<sup>39</sup> Two products of the early Islamic rulers of India had far reaching consequences

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Tara Chand, (trans. Muhammad Masood Ahmed) Tamuden-i-Hind pur Islami Asraat (The Impact of Islam upon Indian Civilization), (Lahore: Majlis-i-Taruki-i-Adab, 2002), 138.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabi aur Ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent: Mughal Era), (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1992), 20-21, 25-26, 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> M. Q. Farishta, (trans. Abdul Haye Khawja) *Tareekh-e-Farishta, Vol. I*, Sheikh Ghulam Ali & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. Publishers, n.d.,) 90-93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Mahmood used to invade India every winter, filled his treasure chest with spoils, and amused his men with full freedom to kill and returned each spring back to his capital richer than before. When he attacked the Indian city of Somnath, he is said to have killed all 50,000 of its inhabitants. In 1186, Ghauri invaded India and captured the city of Delhi, destroyed its temples, confiscated the wealth and established his Sultanate (Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage* (New York: Simon Suchester, 1935), 460-461).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Sultan Mahmood Khilji was particularly fond of women. He assigned official designations to the women kept in his harem. So dear was the harem to the king that when one day he saw a mouse in the harem, he fixed a hefty amount of eatables (about 80 kg) to be placed daily near the place where the mouse was sighted [Farishta, Vol IV, (1991), 327].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> E. C. Sachau, (ed.) Alberuni's India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws & Astrology of India About A.D. 1030 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2007), 52-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Sultan Mahmood Khilji was particularly fond of women. He assigned official designations to the women kept in his harem. So dear was the harem to the king that when one day he saw a mouse in the harem, he fixed a hefty amount of eatables (about 80 kg) to be placed daily near the place where the mouse was sighted (Farishta, Vol IV, 327).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage*, (New York: Simon and Suchester, 1935), 460-461; M. Q. Farishta, (trans. Abdul Haye Khawja) *Tareekh-e-Farishta, Vol. IV*, (Lahore: Book Talk, 1991), 281-282, 316, 326-328, 332.

in shaping the history of the Sub-Continent. These were a new lingua franca in the form of Urdu, Sufism and mysticism, which spread quickly across the country.<sup>40</sup>

The Mughal rule of India followed the Sultanate in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and lasted till the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Apart from constructing some grand mosques and a few architectural master pieces, large portion of their time (with the rare exception of Aurangzeb) was spent on court intrigues and luxuries.<sup>41</sup> The colonial writers' representation of Mughal rule as an Islamic state where the ruling Muslims suppressed the Hindu majority is however misplaced.<sup>42</sup> Mughal rule was despotic for both Muslims and Hindus alike. Hindu elites like the Rajput chiefs were inducted in large numbers in Mughal courts while the Muslim peasantry of Sind and Multan, and the Meos of Delhi were mercilessly killed by the imperial army.<sup>43</sup> Due to the secular mindset of the Mughals, especially that of Akbar,<sup>44</sup> a number of Hindu cultural and social traditions entered the Islamic discourse of the Sub-Continent. Cultural development at the expense of Islamic values and traditions ultimately weakened the military might and governance capabilities of the Mughals and from the early 18<sup>th</sup> century onwards, their grip on India loosened consistently.<sup>45</sup> By 1857 when the Muslims revolted against the British, the Mughal Empire was literally limited to the city of Delhi and its immediate suburbs and was ready for the British takeover.

After 1857, the British started perceiving Muslims as a real threat to their rule and dealt with them in the most ruthless manner.<sup>46</sup> British apprehensions were not limited to the context of India but were rooted in the long history of tension between the 'Crescent' and the 'Cross' during Christian crusades. After 1857, Syed Ahmed realized that the only way of survival left open for Indian Muslims was through their loyalty in politics to the British and modernism in their own institutions.<sup>47</sup> To meet this need, he set up two

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki muzhabi aur ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent: Mughal Era, 60, 90, 99, 102-107, 149, 467-468; Tara Chand, trans. Muhammad Masood Ahmed) Tamuden-i-Hind pur Islami Asraat (The Islamic Impact upon Indian Civilization), 165-168.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Jahangir the Mughal king of India writes in his biography: "I am an alcoholic since the age of 18. Currently I am 38. In the beginning I used to drink 20 glasses of wine a day. I now drink only to facilitate my digestive system" [Jahangir, (2004), 42]. He used to spend millions in celebrating the day of his crowning and hunted for weeks in the jungles (65, 87). His great-grandfather and the first Mughal ruler of India, Baber, was also a wine lover and writes about his excesses in his autobiography [Zaheeruddin Baber, (trans. Rasheed Akhtar Nadvi) *Tuzk-e-Babri* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2009),166].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> There were many non-Islamic court practices and imperial directives issued by the Mughal rulers. Emperor Humayun introduced the tradition of unveiling his face in public which he termed as *jalwa-i-qudus* or divine splendor. He also proclaimed to be *Padshah-i-Khilafat Panah* (Sovereign Defender of the Caliphate), *Padshah-i-A'ali* (the Exalted Sovereign), *Padshah-i-Alam* (the Sovereign of the World), *Shahinshah-i-Nasal-I Alam* (The Emperor of the entire Human Race). Later on Akbar came up with still more self-promoting claims like *Padshah-i-Islam* (King of Islam), *Imam-I 'Adil* (the Just Imam), *Mujtahid ul-'Asr* (Jurist of the Age) and *Insan-i-Kamil* (the Perfect Man). In their attempt to appease the Hindus, the Mughal rulers prohibited cow slaughter and killing of peacocks along with abolishing the *jizyah* or tax on Hindus. The Muslim violators of these laws were subjected to strict punishments.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> I.A. Khan, "State in Mughal India: Re-Examining the Myths of a Counter-Vision", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 29, no. 1/2, (2001):16-45; S. Moosvi, "The Pre-Colonial State", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 33, no. 3/4, (2005): 40-53; R. D'souza, "Crisis before the Fall: Some Speculations on the Decline of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 30 no. 9/10, (2002): 3-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Will Durant, The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage, 469.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabi aur Ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent, 572-573, 600-601.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> A. H. Hali, (trans. K.H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews). *Hayat-i-Javed* (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat, 1979), 49. <sup>47</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood i Kawar, Jelami Hindu, Pekistan ki Muzhahi aur Ilmi Tareekh Abed e Muchlia (Peligiou

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabi aur Ilmi Tareekh Ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent, 294.

schools in the cities of Muradabad and Ghazipur. In 1864, he founded the Scientific Society which was the first learned body in Northern India. He also started publishing two journals, The Aligarh Institute Gazette and Tahdhib al-Akhlaq with the sub-title Mohammedan Social Reformer. These efforts were directed at bringing moderation in the Muslim attitude towards the West and Western knowledge.<sup>48</sup> He attempted to change the Muslim stance of opposition towards the British to that of acquiescence and participation, and to alter the British government's policy of suppression of Muslims<sup>49</sup> to one of paternalism. After 1885 when the Indian National Congress was formed, Syed started emphasizing Muslim political separatism.<sup>50</sup> He could foresee that in India there was no equality in terms of education between Hindus and Muslims and therefore any conferment of democratic privileges would mean exclusive enjoyment by a few.<sup>51</sup> His fears were not unfounded. With the start of the British Raj, Hindus displaced Muslims in administration of the country. They started embracing British education with fervor and held firmly to the opportunity of becoming minor government officials who played as second fiddle to the ruling elite. The Islamic schools, in a bid to save their religious identity, became strictly jurisprudence oriented. Gradually, Muslim interest in the gentlemanly etiquettes or *adabs* eroded and Islamic schools became synonymous with rigidity and inflexibility.<sup>52</sup>

When All India Muslim League was formed in 1906, it used Syed's arguments about the need for separate representation and educational regeneration for Muslims. The League justified its opposition to the Caliphate Movement of the 1920s and invoked Syed's legacy to attain legitimacy for its pro-British stance. Syed Ahmed was a realist who had seen vast sections of the Muslim aristocracy being either obliterated or utterly impoverished. He saw how passionately the Christian missionaries<sup>53</sup> were spreading hatred against Islam and its Prophet (*SAW*). He could foresee that the British might cannot be challenged through emotions and *fatwas* alone and thus the only option left for Indian Muslims was to reshape and refashion their lives or else be prepared for extinction at the hands of the British Raj and the majority Hindus<sup>54</sup>. It can be said in retrospect that Syed Ahmed was the first Muslim to propound the 'two-nation' idea which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Syed Ahmed prepared the Indian Muslims first through the Scientific Society at Ghazipur and later through Aligarh University. He inculcated in them an Islamic spirit based on Islamic history and rationality derived from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> M.M. Sharif, (eds.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. II (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983), 1581.
<sup>49</sup> Suppression of Muslims through the Western colonial powers, especially the British, was quite common up until the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of the most commonly used tools for this purpose was setting up of the church missionary schools. These schools not only made their appearance in India but in other parts of the Islamic world as well. The Church Missionary Society (CMS), for example, arrived in Sudan in 1899. They could however, gain only one Muslim convert during 60 years of their work (Sharkey, 2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> K. Ahmed, Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask: Facts About Great Men We Don't Want to Know (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt.) Ltd., 2004), 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> M. I. Chaghatai, (ed.), Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan 1817-1898: A Prominent Muslim Politician & Educationist, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005), 25-26, 78, 85, 347-348; A. Ahmed, (trans. Jameel Jalbi) Bar-e-Sagheer mein Islami Jadeediat (Islamic Modernity in Sub-Continent), (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2006), 59-62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> T. Zeldin, An Intimate History of Humanity (London: Vintage Books, 1998), 266-267.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> M.M. Sharif, (eds.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. II, 1590.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The evangelical missionaries in India, the utilitarianism and rationalism of James Mill and Lord Macaulay were however not the only reasons for India's colonization. The support of local *zamindars* (landlords), merchants, farmers and the gentry, all provided capital and support for the East India Company [MansoorMoaddel, *The Origins of Islamic Modernism in India, Egypt and Iran* (2001); Hasan "Indeneous Cooperation and the Birth of a Colonial City Calcutta: c. 1698-1750", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol.26, no.1 (1992) & 1993; Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (1556-1707), 335].

Western philosophy.<sup>55</sup> This synthesis of spirit and reason, which happened first at individual level, soon spread across the Muslims of India at a collective level.<sup>56</sup>

Muhammad Iqbal also saw through the shortfalls of following blindly the Western Modernist philosophy and the politics of Hindu majority. He argued that "A purely psychological method...cannot explain religious passion as a form of knowledge (and that) it is bound to fail in the case of our newer psychologists such as Sigmund Freud) as it did in the case of Locke and Hume".<sup>57</sup> His animosity for both Western materialism and Eastern hollow religiosity shaped his philosophic thoughts.<sup>58</sup> His integrative approach presented a fresh mystic version of philosophy which provided the Indian Muslims with a much needed spirit to squarely face British imperialism and Hindu nationalism. Following the legacy of Syed Ahmed, Iqbal's philosophy and poetry along with the shrewd diplomacy of the All India Muslim League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, succeeded in carving a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. In 1947, India was partitioned and a new state, Pakistan, appeared on the world map.

It is ironic that Pakistan, which was created under the banner of the 'two-nation' theory, could never mould its populace into one nation. According to some of its critics, it could never even mould itself into a working state let alone a nation.<sup>59</sup> It is probably because for a country which was created on the basis of the 'two-nation theory', where religion and religion related social and cultural discourse was the only real difference between the two nations, "Islam was quickly marginalized from the main debates in Pakistani politics" <sup>60</sup> The Independence Movement for Pakistan under the All India Muslim League was operated in the most democratic and constitutional manner. But after independence, the failure of politicians to mould the populace into a nation, paved the way for the bureaucracy and army to rule the country for more than half of its total life span to date.<sup>61</sup>

Apart from despotic, corrupt and spiritless rule, inconsistent foreign policy, failure to maintain law and order, and provide justice to the masses, Akbar S Ahmed (1998) provides a 'pendulum swing theory' to explain the inherent tensions of South Asian Islam in general and Pakistani Islam in particular. His theory provides two contrasting models of Muslim leadership in Pakistani society. He bases these models, called model A and B, on the characteristics of Mughal ruler Aurangzeb and his son Dara Shikoh respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki muzhabi aur ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent, 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> M. I. Chaghatai, (ed.), Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan 1817-1898: A Prominent Muslim Politician & Educationist, 23, 193-194, 264-265; A. Ahmed, (trans. Jameel Jalbi) Bar-e-Sagheer mein Islami Jadeediat (Islamic Modernity in Sub-Continent), 85-88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> M.M. Sharif, (eds.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. II, 1630.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> J. Singh, Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009), 484.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> According to Samad, "With hindsight it becomes clear that there were two strands present in the decolonization process. Two imagined communities were forged: one distinct, based on Indian nationalism, and the other more ethereal, formed around Islam.....The Muslim League leadership in Pakistan was convinced for various reasons that the country, and they themselves, could survive politically only if a strong center was established. But they went about this task in an authoritarian way. The result was that the fragile unity which had been created by Muslim nationalism was broken up and strong centrifugal forces re-emerged in reaction to the efforts at centralization.....Thus the tension between centripetal (provincial) and centrifugal (central) forces was a continuous theme in South Asian Muslim politics which contributed to political instability" [Y.Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937-1958* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995)8-11.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> M. Asher, & U. Muhammad, Pakistan ki Siyasi Jamateen (Political Parties of Pakistan), (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 12-13.

- The characteristics of Model A (Aurangzeb) include an orthodox view of legalist Islam, emphasis on *Ummah*, discouragement of all forms of art, support for clergy and *ulema*, rejection of Sufism and, keeping Quran and Sunnah as the basis of the societal fabric.
- Model B (*Dara Shikoh*), on the other hand, seeks eclectic Islam, universalistic humanity, encouragement of art, anti-clergy attitude, Sufism, *Upanishads/Bhagavad-Gita* type mysticism and, free mixing of Muslims with non-Muslims in all societal matters.<sup>62</sup>
- He also identifies a third category of secular Muslims or Model C, which developed as a direct consequence to Western colonialism.
- To him the fourth category of Muslim Model D, which is highly secular and totally committed to modernism in its Western shape and typified by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, is however absent from Pakistani discourse<sup>63</sup>.

He draws genealogical lines from the socio-political Muslim crisis of the 17<sup>th</sup> century to Pakistani discourse of present times. For model A, these lines emanate from Aurangzeb  $(17^{th} \text{ C})$  and through Shah Waliullah  $(18^{th} \text{ C})$ , Syed Ahmed Barelvi  $(19^{th} \text{ C})$  and, Maulana Maudoodi  $(20^{th} \text{ C})$  reach Zia-ul-Haq in the late 1970s. For model B the sequence is from Dara Shikoh  $(17^{th} \text{ C})$  to Wali  $(18^{th} \text{ C})$  to Mirza Ghalib  $(19^{th} \text{ C})$  to Z.A. Bhutto in 1960s. For Model C, the line travels from Syed Ahmad  $(19^{th} \text{ C})$  to M.A. Jinnah  $(20^{th} \text{ C})$  to Ayub Khan in the 1950s.

The above mentioned analysis of South Asian Muslims is fully manifested by three parallel but divergent educational systems operating in Pakistan. They have resulted in fragmenting Pakistani society in three totally divergent social strata which live in their own worlds, have little contact with one another, and have very different career options and life opportunities available to them. These three education systems include religious education imparted at *deeni madaris*, oriental-styled Urdu medium education and purely Western-styled English medium education. This thoughtless education system is probably a major contributor in creating confusion, turbulence and chaos in Pakistani society.<sup>64</sup>

#### Section 4: Islamic Economic and Social Model

It is important to note that contrary to general perception, the Prophet of Islam (*SAW*) did not bring a new religion. His message was the same as that of all the Prophets preceding him. The difference was that he brought a *Din* or a complete code of life which encompassed all religious, moral, social, political, legislative, economic, epistemological, and secular or mundane day-to-day issues of human life and society.<sup>65</sup>

Since Pakistan was created on the ideology of Islam, it is imperative that some discussion of the Islamic societal model be undertaken. The societal discourse of Islam is based on its economic model.

<sup>62</sup> Samad, 9-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> This may not be true after 9 years rule of Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) in Pakistan. His 'enlightened moderation' was probably firmly rooted in the modernism of Mustafa Kemal. He writes in his book about his formative years spent in Turkey: "With the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal had saved Turkey from balkanization and modernized it by dragging it out of dogma and obscurantism". His intense love for Western cultural products started in Turkey (Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 19-24).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> N. Yazdani, "Faith & reason: A Synthesis in Pakistani Society", *Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, (2009): 33-43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Syed Abul Aala Mawdudi, Quran ki Chaar Bunyadi Istalaheen (The Four Foundational Terms of Quran), (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008), 102-108.

The earliest known Islamic economic work is that of al-Shaybani (d. 804) which shows that earning a livelihood is not merely permitted but a compulsion upon the Muslims. Another point which this work brings home is that money earned through commerce or crafts is more pleasing in God's eyes than money received from the government for civil or military services. Abu'l Fadl Ja'far's *Kitab al-Ishara ila mahasin al-tijara (Indications of the Merits of Commerce)* which was written in 11<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> century is a far more practical discussion on economics as compared to Plato's *Politics* or Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean.<sup>66</sup>

Islamic economics is based on Quranic commands. The Islamic economic system subscribes to the idea that the ownership of all natural resources and means of production belongs to Allah. It is He who allows man to use and exploit them for his benefit.<sup>67</sup> The Quran declares it a lie if a man describes a certain thing as lawful or unlawful according to man-made standards.<sup>68</sup> Within the limits imposed by the Quran, the right of holding private property is recognized in Islam.<sup>69</sup> The Quran in its own spirit does not promote communism or Western-style capitalism. Natural inequality is described as the "outcome of His wise apportionment, issuing from His own dispensation".<sup>70</sup> There is no attempt to level up this natural inequality by a 'dead' equality<sup>71</sup> which was attempted through communism. The Quran however, ordains that wealth be acquired through lawful means only. The Quran cites examples of the unlawful means of acquiring wealth which include usurping property<sup>72</sup>, bribery<sup>73</sup>, breaching trust<sup>74</sup>, misappropriation<sup>75</sup>, stealing<sup>76</sup>, spreading of indecent products/services<sup>77</sup>, prostitution<sup>78</sup>, gambling and lottery<sup>79</sup>, and above all, usury or interest.<sup>80</sup>

Islam abolishes the distinction between the material and the spiritual, and fuses these two aspects in its economic system as well. It was enjoined, for example, that those who undertake the *Hajj* journey and engage in trade should not be molested.<sup>81</sup> The Quran also declares the earning of livelihood as God's blessing and thus transforms a purely material activity into a religious virtue. The main aim of Islamic economy is to root out *fasad*, literally meaning 'rottenness', 'spoiled-ness', corruption', 'decay', wickedness', 'immorality', and 'wrongness' from society. As opposed to rationality-based success, it was the understanding of the Quran which led the early Muslims to conquer the resources of earth and build a rich civilization. <sup>82</sup> Islam prohibits all sources of unjustified enrichment and economic exploitation. *Riba* (usury/interest) is a sin under Islamic law for this very reason. It is considered such a major sin in Islam that even those hired to write

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 9:87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Bernard Lewis, Islam, from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople (USA: Chicago University Press, 1974), 98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Al Qur'an, 2:29, 7:10; 13:3; 14:32-33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Ibid., 2:275, 279; 282-283; 4:2,4,7,20,24,29; 5:38; 6:141.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> M.M. Sharif, (eds.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I, 179-180.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Al Qur'an, 4:165; 17:21; 34:39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Ibid., 2:188

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Ibid., 2:188

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Ibid., 2:283

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Ibid., 3:161

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Ibid., 5:41

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Ibid., 24:19 <sup>78</sup> Ibid., 24:33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Ibid., 5:93

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Al Qur'an, 2:275.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Ibid., 5:2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Khan, 1994, 15.

the contract (involving interest or interest-based transactions) or who witness (and thus confirm) the contract are a party to this sin.<sup>83</sup>

The spending of wealth in Allah's way or *Zakah* is not a mere act of piety in Islam. It is elevated as the third among the five basic pillars of Islam. It is mentioned 37 times in the Quran with the twofold purpose of purifying the individual self as well as for the good of society. It is not only a kind of tax but also an act of worship like praying and fasting. Accordingly the Prophet (*SAW*) fixed a maximum allowable limit in respect of different kinds of wealth.<sup>84</sup>

The above discussion can be summarized by focusing on the following Quranic Verses:

"As for those who devour interest, they behave as the one whom Satan has confounded with his touch. Seized in this state they say: 'Buying and selling is but a kind of interest, even though Allah has made buying and selling lawful, and interest unlawful. .....Allah deprives interest of all blessings, whereas He blesses charity with growth"<sup>85</sup>

Why interest has been declared as Satanic is simply because it breeds inequalities, selfishness, miserliness and callousness in society. Charity on the other hand, has the opposite effect and creates the societal values of egalitarianism, large-heartedness, generosity, compassion for others and magnanimity. But the Pakistani banking system like that of any other country is based on interest. The business class which takes loans on interest toil day and night not only to sustain their businesses but also to feed the financers who, apart from loaning the finance, do not shed a drop of sweat but get a fixed and guaranteed income. This is social injustice at its very worst because the financers are becoming richer at the expense of someone who is trying his best to earn an income which is not fixed and not guaranteed. That is why those lending money on interest are "at once guilty of ungratefulness to God (because they did not spend their surplus in charity), and blatantly unjust, cruel and wicked".<sup>86</sup>

Verse 4:59 of the Quran which Commands "Believer! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are invested with authority; and then if you were to dispute among yourselves about anything refer to Allah and the Messenger....." is considered the "cornerstone of the entire religious, social and political structure of Islam, and the very first clause of the constitution of an Islam state". This verse establishes the line of hierarchy to be followed by the believers till the Day of Judgment. The hierarchy entails unconditional loyalty to Allah, the Prophet (*SAW*) along with obedience to intellectual, political, administrative, judicial and regional leaders of the community. The obedience to the third line of hierarchy is however, contingent on two conditions that they should themselves be believers and obedient to Allah and the Prophet (*SAW*). Bowing to any authority other than Allah and the Prophet (*SAW*) is considered as following *taghut* or the satanic authority.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> M. U. Chapra, Islam and Economic Development: A Strategy for Development with Justice and Stability (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Islamic Research Institute, Islamic Research Institute Press, 1993).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> M.M. Sharif, (eds.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. I, 178-188; M. Al-Buraey, Administrative Development an Islamic Perspective (KPI: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 180-189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Al Qur'an, 2: 275-276.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> From interpretation of Surah al-Baqarah of the Quran. [S. A. A. Mawdudi, (translated and edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari). *Towards understanding the Quran: Abridged version of Tafhim al-Quran* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1988), 217-219)]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> From interpretation of Surah Al-Nisa of the Quran. [S. A. A. Mawdudi, (translated and edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari). Towards understanding the Quran: Abridged version of Tafhim al-Quran, 50-53)]

# Section 5: The State of Pakistani Society: Some Empirical Reflections

To fully discuss and explore as to how many of the above Islamic injunctions are followed in true letter and spirit in Pakistan is beyond the scope of this paper. Some statistics capturing the state of social justice and leadership (religious, economic, political and social governance) in Pakistan are however presented in Table 1.

Table 1					
Human Development Index (HDI)	0.504 (among the 'very low' in the world				
2011					
HDI Rank 2011	145 out of 187 countries				
Gender Inequality Index 2011	0.537				
Gender Inequality Rank 2011	115 out of 147 countries				
Population below poverty line 2010	30%				
Income Inequality Gini Index	30.6 (2007-08)				
Budget Deficit	-6.2% of GDP 2010				
Public Debt	50.2% of GDP 2009				
	50.6% of GDP 2010				
Exports	\$ 21.46 billion (2010)				
Imports	\$ 32.88 billion (2010)				
Trade Deficit	\$ 11.42 billion (2010)				
External Debt	\$ 53.6 billion (2009)				
	\$ 56.12 billion (2010)				
Pakistani rupees per US dollar	60.35 (2006)				
	60.62 (2007)				
	70.64 (2008)				
	81.71 (2009)				
	85.27 (2010)				
Global Corruption Barometer over	Increased by 77%				
the past 3 years					
Bribe Payers Index (how do the	Pakistan is no way near the top 30 countries				
country institutions behave abroad)	which include Asian countries like Japan,				
	Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, India,				
	Malaysia, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, UAE,				
Course http://og.do.org.http://b.do	Indonesia and China				

$\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{n}}$	h	h	1

Source: http://undp.org, http://hdr.undp.org, http://www.indexmundi.com and http://www.transparency.org

#### **Section 6: Discussion**

## **Research Methodology**

This paper borrows from the epistemologies of Constructionism and Objectivism. It presents historic discourse of Pakistani culture and constructs the analytical findings based on the discourse. It is empiricist in the sense because it uses Hofstede's cultural research model which is purely empirical in nature. It also relies on empirical evidence reflecting the current economic and social indicators of Pakistan. The paper employs historical research methodologies.

# **Analytical Findings**

The Prophet's (SAW) leadership and political model was firmly rooted in the Divine revelations of the Quran<sup>88</sup> which commanded him to "strive", to be "firm", to "endure" the fierce persecution, to "repel evil with the good", to avoid "arrogance, pride and conceit", to have no fear of dying in the cause of faith, to maintain "equity" and "fairness" in all matters of life and, to be "merciful" and humble to others.<sup>89</sup> The Prophet's (SAW) implementation of the Quranic revelations in establishing the state at Medina left an integrated political model for Muslims to follow. He entered into pledges and agreements, fought wars and led expeditions, formed alliances and governed, changed society and culture, imposed taxes, dispensed justice and created institutions and collective systems by strictly adhering to the Divine-commands of the Quran<sup>90</sup>. The transformational aspect of the Prophet's (SAW) leadership is derived from his preached morality which changed the moral values of his followers. "Fear of Allah and of the Last Judgment, kindness and equity, compassion and mercy, generosity, self-restraint, sincerity, and moral fellowship among the believers became the new bases of conduct".<sup>91</sup>

This form of leadership was based on a strong 'group feel' which Ibn Khaldun, in his ground-breaking work *Muqaddimah* (originally written in 1377) describes as *asabiyah*.<sup>92</sup> It was this Arabic *asabiyah* which ignited the great civilization and high culture in Baghdad and Andalusia.

Muslim rulers in the Sub-Continent broke away with that *asabiyah* very soon after the first Muslin rulership was established. It is no historical secret that the Royal Courts became known for intrigues, luxuries and excesses of Sultans, Khiljis, Ghaznis and especially the Mughals, in place of simple, egalitarian but effective Caliphate. They are dealt with in some detail in the historic discourse section of this paper. How close was Indian Muslim rule to that of Prophet (*SAW*), the Rightly Guided Caliphs and some of the later Caliphs in Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties again openly shows glaring contrasts between how the Islamic rulers of Baghdad and Andalusia differed in their leadership approach from the Muslim rulers of the Sub-Continent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> For details refer to Quranic verses: 25:52, 66:9, 5:8, 10:109, 4:64, 41:34, 8:199, 31:18, 93:10-11, 3:158 (Murad, 2005, 27-32).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *Tafsir-ul-Quran: Translation and Commentary of the Holy Quran, Vol. I, II, III & IV*, Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 1991), Vol. I, 278, 408; Vol. II, 253, 313; Vol. III, 382, 417; Vol. IV, 119, 510.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> The social system of the Prophet ((SAW) based on the concept of Ummah, is traced back to the first meeting at Aqabah in the early days of year 622 while he was still in Mecca. This was followed by the First Pledge of Aqabah called Women's Pledge, because it was agreed not to wage war. There were 12 individuals present who pledged with the Prophet (SAW) not to indulge in idolatry, stealing, adultery, infanticide, fabrications, and not to disobey the orders of the Prophet (SAW). By the time the Second Pledge took place the Prophet (SAW), under Divine-commands, changed the terms and conditions because now the Muslims were given permission to wage war. The treaty of al-Hudaybiyyah was negotiated by the Prophet (SAW) with the Quraysh in year 628 and apparently fostered a military and political triumph for the Quraysh. Later the treaty exposed the weaknesses in the leadership of the Quraysh who had suffered a diplomatic defeat by according a status of equality to Medina through the treaty. From the beginning the Prophet ((SAW) built a dual character in the very core of the Islamic society. On the one hand it was chieftaincy which gradually became a state and an empire while at the same time it was a religious community. [Hishaam, Seerat un Nabi Kamil, (trans. Maulana abdul Jaleel Siddiqui and Maulana Ghulamn Rasool Mehar) Vol. I, 481-482, 489-490, 504, 562; Vol. II, 368; Tibri, Tareekh-e-Tibri, Vol. II, 91, 96, 233, 246, 255; Watson, Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud, 354; Ahmad, Muhammad and His Constitutional Character v, 257; Siddiqi, Organization of Government under the Holy Prophet (SAW), 15-49; Eaton, Islam and the Destiny of Man, 112-125]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> E. V. Donzel, Islamic Desk Reference: Compiled from The Encyclopedia of Islam (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Ibn-e-Khaldun, (trans. Franz Rosenthal) (ed. & abridged: N.J. Dawood), *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History: The Classic Islamic History of the World* (USA: Princeton University Press, 2005), 300-350

It is important to note that Islamic and Muslim leadership styles have always differed. In the Sub-Continent, Islamic leadership never got going. The rulers were legally Muslims but allowed all sorts of excesses. They gave undue concessions to Hindu and later to Sikh Rajas and Maharajas to extend their own rule. While the West was awakening from the Dark Ages and Islamic Civilization was at its zenith, the Muslim rulers of India were busy extending their self-interests and practically failed to deliver any good to the general public. There were hardly any scientific, philosophical and religious developments in about 10 centuries of Muslim rule in India. Most of the much exalted Sufis of that era also allowed free intermixing of non-Islamic rituals, myths and superstitious practices in Islam to win over the hearts of the Hindu majority. A closer look at these practices and tactics and those adopted by the current rulers of Pakistan show many similarities. The most noticeable among them being total disregard of Islamic injunctions-based sociopolitical system, eagerness to appease and adopt secular Indian and Western support, granting concessions to them on unilateral basis, plundering the country's resources and befooling the public under different disguises.

From the above discussion, it seems quite probable that the real motive for the demand of Pakistan was to secure a separate piece of land for Muslims and not for the rule of Islam. If that is untrue, then the Objective Resolution of 1948 and later the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1973 would not have just 'used' the word Islam and Islamic Republic of Pakistan without even trying to implement any facet of Islamic social, political and economic system.

Even the apparently Islamic regime of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) only relied on cosmetic Islamic changes like broadcasting the five *Adhan* live on daily basis, telecasting *Shabeena* Nights live on TV, reciting verses from the Holy Quran in PIA flights, and establishing *Majlis-i-Shura* from among the same political, social and religious elite which had ruled the country since its inception. Was any practical and concrete measure undertaken to enforce Islamic socio-political and economic system in the country? Was interest not rampant in Pakistan even in those days? Did not Zia-ul-Haq's reliance and alliance with America in the Afghan war opened floodgates of millions of Afghan refugees, drug and gun culture and political destruction of Karachi at the hands of ethnic-minded politics? History stands witness to the aftermath of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war and the nation is still dearly paying for its consequences through internal strife and thousands of lives laid in the senseless war on terror.

Moving to Hofstede's three levels of mental programming: genetic, group and cultural, leaves us with an important question to answer: what has Pakistan acquired as its collective cultural model in the context of its history of leadership? The most prominent feature of Pakistani governance at political, social, economic or religious levels is that an elitist minority has always ruled the hapless majority. From President and Prime Minister Houses to National Assemblies, Senates, Provincial Assemblies, local *Panchayat*, judicial system, education and health sector, and local communities down to the individual family levels, this has been the rule of thumb to lead in Pakistan. Our extended family systems and collective identities are the imprints of the caste system which still plagues our democratic process because votes are casted on *biratheri* and *zaat* rather than on ideological basis. What we get in our assemblies are not the brightest brains of Pakistan but the most influential elite who hold the economic jugular veins of the poor belonging to their constituencies. Our 'we' consciousness cannot be compared with that of Japan who rose from the ruins of World War II to become one of the strongest economies of the world. We believe in group decisions not because we practice

participative decision making but because there is no choice for a group but to bow to the decisions of the elite. Be it a ruthless father merrily murdering his daughter because she married on her own and deprived him of some more potential acres of land or a *Nambardar, Vadeera*, SHO, MPA or MNA, our people have no choice but to accept the decisions of the leaders who have no regard for their followers' development in any way. This is not the collectivistic and egalitarian society of Islam but is an amalgamate of conformists who do not dare object to any decision imposed on them or else they are further marginalized, kidnapped, tortured or brutally killed. This is what collectivism means in the context of a Pakistan. Hofstede's analysis fails to make such contextual distinctions and therefore should not be generalized across cultures with the same validity and reliability.

One look at the cultural model of Figure 1 clearly shows how our historic discourse has shaped our societal values and their ill consequences which are briefly captured in Table 1. Pakistan's low ranking in human development, economic underperformance and top rankings in corruption and bribery do not just reflect a governance failure but failure of a nation as a whole. Three of the external influences on the Muslim rulers of the Sub-Continent are especially noteworthy: wars, trade and scientific discoveries. During the Muslim rule, the Sub-Continent faced numerous external threats in the form of wars. Trade became the instrument of introducing colonialism whereas no major scientific breakthroughs occurring in the rest of the world could pave its way to India. Science and technology was a by-product of British colonial rule and which probably helped breed the local mindset (especially of Muslims) that technology and machinery along with technical and scientific education is to be acquired from the West. This is an important observation because in the case of Pakistan the same mindset still prevails and perhaps explains our failure to export value added products to other countries.

The paper has already dealt with the historical discourse underpinning the creation of Pakistan in detail. Suffice is to say that it was a very brief period during which the All India Muslim League brought the Muslims under one banner and this fragile unity soon became fragmented after the creation of Pakistan. The overall leadership style however remained largely unchanged and gave birth to the societal norm of disregarding and marginalizing Islam from mainstream politics and education system which resulted in a disjointed nation with a 'fragmented' collectivism centered on the narrow and myopic notions of provincialism, ethnicity and sectarianism. This form of collectivism was no less materialistic, utilitarian and selfish than the much criticized Western individualism. The resulting political, educational, legislative and other institutions were therefore never strengthened but served as means by the ruling elite to achieve their motives. This pattern has prevailed in the Pakistani society right from the top to the bottom.

In the light of above discussion, our starting propositions that Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership styles are 'Telling'/'Directing' in nature with little regard to developing mature transactional and transformational relations with the subordinates who are assumed to be low in maturity in terms of being unable and unwilling seem to be fully supported. This is because subordinates or voters have failed to choose leaders with long term vision and commitment to the cause of Islam and betterment of Pakistan. They have got those leaders elected who can solve their immediate personal problems like getting their son a job or bailing out a criminal relative from the jail. No mature relationship building between leaders and followers in the sense promoted by LMX seems to have developed across the Pakistani society.

But the dark side of transactional, transformational and LMX in terms of 'mature' relations based on materialistic give-and-take philosophy have definitely developed in Pakistan or else corruption would not have reached every level of society and across all sectors including public and private institutions and organizations. Politically supported criminal mafias and the cult-like religious factions have no doubt established transactional and transformational relations with their followers. It is in this darker sense that LMX is fully operational within the collectivistic and yet fragmented cultural context of Pakistan.

#### Limitations

The most salient limitation of this study is the obvious mismatch between historical account of nearly 10 centuries and the very cross-sectional nature of data depicting some of the societal indicators of Pakistan. It should have been more fitting if the empirical indicators were tracked from 1947 to show how progressively they have deteriorated, especially during the last decade or so. Some statistical techniques like time series and trend analyses of that longitudinal data would have provided much richer insight supporting the main thesis of this study. Similarly application of quantitative techniques employed for comparing the social and economic indicators of Pakistan with other Islamic and South Asian countries could have shed more light on the peculiarities of the Pakistani discourse.

# **Future Research Implications**

The single most important future research implication of this study is to repeat Hofstede's cultural dimension research in contemporary Pakistan. It seems plausible to assume that power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity scores would have undergone a big change for the worse. Another interesting research implication could be multilevel and cross-sectoral ethnographic studies dissecting the dark side of leader-member relations in Pakistani society.

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# Islam and Postmodernity: M. Arkoun on Deconstruction

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#### Abstract

Ideologies are directly albeit not always perceptibly related to methodological and epistemological themes. Social psychology also reveals that knowledge depends upon the policy of rejection or incorporation of various philosophies. In the journey of human thought dawned the age of reason with the Era of Enlightenment. Gradually, universal values and the scientific method gained supremacy. And then all the grand narratives stood redundant and rejected, giving rise to the need to re-search, re-analyze, and re-think every work done thus far with the aim to de-construct the now-discarded. This research studies the greatly admired post structural theory of deconstruction and its proponents in the Muslim civilizations to evaluate its impact on contemporary Muslim thought. The rationale of the study is a critical appraisal of the theoretical concepts in the Muslim world in response or reaction to the current epistemological influences from the West. This exploration led to the conclusion that the scholars of the Islamic world missed the point by going a bit too far as the Holy Quran and collections of authentic Ahadith explicitly state what Muslims should reject or incorporate. The remedy comprises in updating the conventional way of thinking and interpreting things, acquiring the ability to think the unthinkable and the previously unthought, honest hard word, incessant striving for excellence, as well as discarding getting overwhelmed by whatever gains 'currency' in the largely impulsive Western thought.

Keywords: Deconstruction, Epitemology, Rethink, Critique, Qur'an

#### **Islam and Post Modernism**

Ever since the commencement of the 19th century, Revivalism, Reformism and Radicalism along with Nationalism and Islamic Socialism seem to be the most significant movements and inclinations of Islamic thinking in the contemporary Muslim world. Over the years, the restraining hegemony of the Western scientific way of thinking "applied to foreign cultures or concepts' not falling within the sphere of 'Christian Europe and secular Western civilization"<sup>1</sup> has been expanded to the field of Islamic studies as well. Empiricism has always forced "its classifications, categories, definitions, distinctions, concepts, and theories on" <sup>2</sup> other disciplines and philosophical ideas without apprehending any condemnation or negation. In fact, this excessive reliance on reason and senses as the only tools of learning or the logocentricism/logosphere, i.e., focusing solely on reason/*aqal*, ignores or neglects other sources of understanding and thinking, e.g., ethos {morals}, mythos {myths and legends/history} and pathos {emotions} along with a complete disregard of the divine sources of human guidance. On the other hand, the Muslim world is "yet to come up with its own conceptual view of its history, culture,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> http://lrd.yahooapis.comlc=http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0395 accessed: 5/18/09.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> http://rd.yahooapis.com/\_ylc=X3http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0395accessed: 5/18/09.

and religion to challenge the hegemonic perspective"<sup>3</sup> of the West so as to make them see the actual point of view.

The universal and sweeping nuances of scientific investigations make mankind the purpose as well as the cause of investigation. At present, rational interpretation supported by empirical, operational, and creative knowledge and motivated by financial reasons has attained a standing and supremacy equivalent to the 'theological-legal' rationale 'of the Middle Ages or to the Enlightenment reason' due to the pressing stipulations of the industrialized countries. Modern-day political specialists expressing the "threat" to "Western values" caused by Muslim "religious fanatics" rarely talk about the "economic mistakes" of the "scientific experts."<sup>4</sup>

Thus their investigations never inquire about the major hegemonic mode of thinking that goes on to situate main concerns founded on scientific logic and falls short of endorsing research methods or plans, embedded in the social sciences. As ignorance continues to increase in the supposedly politically sovereign nations of the Islamic world, the science of "man and society" in the West follows its mission of capricious partition of the world and disintegration of reality.

Certainly hermeneutics realizes the central role history and language play in any understanding. As language along with its 'content' of thought is not just a way of communication, therefore a series of models of construing the natural world influenced the language of each era/episteme. And in turn religious language manifested the impact of this alteration, ending up in the escalation of a secular mindset. Hence the degree the language of Islamic theology has made an impact as well as "been affected by the expressions of other scholarly exercises, e.g., Greek philosophy, pre-Islamic Persian culture, ever changing Western trends, etc. during the past history as well as present times depends upon the matter of Islamization and de-Islamization of the Muslim mindset."<sup>5</sup>

In the conspicuous absence of a neutral or value-free science of the West, Islamic values with their obligatory sense of responsibility can be very relevant along the boundary between science and moral responsibility. Emphasis must be laid on knowing the main features of Islamic thinking and culture, viewpoints, and ways of living of the most important religions and modern secular civilizations of the world to inculcate authentically Islamic knowledge.

Contrary to this post modern belief that words are worn-out and over and over again inverted from their original meaning, the perceptions as well as conceptual words are in fact containers of 'higher' and more 'original' meanings to which man responds with flexibility to an objective and higher truth. If meaning actually vanishes as manifested by the modern 'diversification' of meanings and various post structural theories, then this world is on the brink of yielding to purposelessness.

"The rudiments of the dîn - tradition or 'religion' are the channels through which man can restore his animal instincts, his ego (nafs) and eventually become the vice-regent of Allah (khalîfah) in this world to truly justify his being a human. In the other world (al-âkhirah)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> http://lrd.yahooapis.com/\_ylc=X3http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0395accessed: 5/18/09.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> http://lrd.yahooapis.com/\_ylc=X3http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0395 accessed: 5/18/094

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.html accessed: 4/20/12.

man will be created in a shape and form corresponding to his intentions and deeds in the life of the world (dunya), and the judgment would be Allah's alone. This philosophy of the Real was compelling and legitimate in the old days of the 'Golden Ages' and this teaching is valid today, be it termed modernism or post-modernism, the times we live in,"<sup>6</sup> and it is going to remain so till the end of time no matter what the ever shifting manmade theories say. The major issue today should be living to the best of one's capacity and ability "as a true believer and as a Muslim in the (post-) modern world, walking the course of uncontaminated religion (Islam), honest and truthful, seeking Allah Almighty's Good Pleasure (*rada*) only."<sup>7</sup>

There is just no turning "back to the Middle Ages or to change back both the Orient and the Occident into some conventionally leaning religious society. But tracing the traditional tenets back to their metaphysical roots, and then trying to apply them"<sup>8</sup> once more with a new vigor examining every aspect of post modernism separately in this light is the most needed thing now. Man has certainly lost much more comparatively than what he has supposedly gained through the process of modernization. Liberty, independence, rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech, and healthcare are the oft quoted gains of humanity although they are accompanied by "negative individualism and consumerism for the 'fortunate few' in this world."<sup>9</sup>

Contemporary science or empiricism often estranged from religion is portrayed "as one of the main instruments of the abandonment of time-honored religions in the current world. From the 17th century onwards, the sanctified and the spiritual surrendered to a"<sup>10</sup> self-sufficient worldview deprived of any kind of divine intervention. In particular, the German and French philosophers, psychologists, and scholars gradually forced religion to give an explanation and to rationalize itself both as a social tradition as well as a compilation of basic items of faith about the world and its various functions. Consequently secularization as a philosophical agenda developed in the Western psyche leading "to the secularization of the community and its detachment from its spiritual issues."<sup>11</sup>

Affiliated queries about integrity, harmony, psychology, politics, etc., also played an essential role in this dilemma. The materialization of modern mentality and the predicament of post modernity, on the whole, is thus neither a local nor an isolated occurrence; it entails a complete theoretical modification. The exaggerated stress and reliance of post modernism on intellect, reason and sense has belittled the significance of morality and mysticism and disturbed the balance among the various aspects of human body (physical, corporal, intellectual, psychological, mental, emotional and spiritual, etc.) essential for the holistic growth and development of a man.

On the other hand, the royal rank of religion is in its pledge to search for the deepest and the highest achievable level of perception. The most intense human stimulus of the innate urge is to be able to appreciate the experience, to achieve a consistent and gratifying knowledge of the world, and connect science and theology both as attempts to discover and investigate distinct characteristics of everything tangible and unsubstantial. Both

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> http://www.livingislam.org/mmt\_e.html accessed: 7/11/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://www.livingislam.org/mmt\_e.html accessed: 7/11/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> http://www.livingislam.org/mmt\_e.html accessed: 7/11/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> http://www.livingislam.org/mmt\_e.html accessed: 7/11/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

religion and science survey the world of experience from their own particular point of view. Consequently, areas of contact are probable between the two. However, once we become conscious that we do not have to agree to the metaphysical view of the world often connected "with science, the communication between human and the Divinely-revealed knowledge"<sup>12</sup> can be observed in a whole new perspective. This reciprocal interaction between the acquired and the revealed knowledge can be considered a prospective opening instead of a conflict. Besides, in any case both theology and science, though at different levels of achievement "in their awareness of the definitive reality and truth, are creatures of the same Creator. Therefore the most important responsibility of religious thought at present is the analysis and critique of the metaphysical basis of modern human sciences."<sup>13</sup>

From the Islamic point of view, the predicament appears to be even more complicated. The present day Muslim world lacks self-confidence because of its weak socio-economic standing. The impact, tests and trials created by the rise of post modernity not only weaken Muslim intellectuals but also put them at a great risk. Thus an appropriate rejoinder and a suitable approach towards such a challenge are imperative. "Isolationism" today is neither feasible nor desirable because the speed and frequency of modern ways of communication has practically left us no place to hide.

Moreover Islam makes it an obligation for each one of us to manage a complete prudence which contains everything at its reasonable and appropriate place. The pursuit for a broader perspective of the world calls for taking into account every type of knowledge and fuse them all into one particular splendid system. To make Islam an essential "part of social and intellectual action and play the role it once did in the world history"<sup>14</sup>, preparations must be made to the best of our abilities to face the ever shifting circumstances of post modern life and thought head-on.

### Deconstruction

The analytical technique post structuralists use to analyze a text is called deconstruction. 'Deconstruction can perhaps best be described as a theory of reading which aims to undermine the logic of opposition within texts.'<sup>15</sup> While deconstruction does not intend to discover the real meaning of a text it does involve two things, which are;

1. A consideration of what is missing from the text, and

2. Foregrounding in the text, the absent or the missing

The term 'deconstruction', means to see the way the essential message of the text is betrayed or destabilized by the 'accidental' attributes of a text. As a philosophy of meanings, deconstruction deals with the ways writers, texts, and/or readers construct meaning. "In linguistics, philosophy, and literary theory, it means exposing and undermining metaphysical assumptions involved in systematic attempts to ground knowledge, especially in academic disciplines." <sup>16</sup> Deconstruction, a major theory associated with structuralism proposes that human logic has given some speculative and abstract opposites, set in an order in a transcript. For example, "the binary pairs of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> David Macey, The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Hugh J. Silverman, Ed. Continental Philosophy II; Derrida and Deconstruction (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 57.

Enlightenment/Romantic, male/female, speech/writing, rational/emotional" <sup>17</sup>, signifier/signified, symbolic/imaginary, etc.

As a well-established but still controversial philosophical theory, deconstruction is aimed at the (re)reading of all theoretical works. In accepted practice, deconstruction depicts analytical taking apart of conventions and conventional approaches of thinking. Deconstruction considers every written work as "a complex, historical and cultural process rooted in texts' relations to one another as well as in the institutions and conventions of writing."<sup>18</sup> Broadly speaking, deconstruction is a sequence of strategies and a deposit of theoretical statements about words, their connotations, and reading texts. The verb "to deconstruct" is frequently employed as a synonym to criticize or show the discrepancy of a point in a text.

"As a school of philosophy Deconstruction made an enormous impact on Anglo-American criticism of literature, psychology and philosophy. It overturns the Western metaphysical tradition and represents a complex response to a variety of theoretical and philosophical movements of the 20th century, e.g. Husserlian phenomenology, Saussurean and French structuralism, and Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis."<sup>19</sup>

Jacques Derrida coined the term deconstruction in the 1960s by building up on Ferdinand de Saussure's claim of 'arbitrariness of verbal signs'<sup>20</sup>. In his book *Of Grammatology* (1967), he applied "Martin Heidegger's concept of Destruktion or Abbau, to textual reading"<sup>21</sup> referring to "a process of exploring the categories and concepts that tradition has imposed on a word, and the history behind them."<sup>22</sup>

Deconstructive arguments and techniques are also related with other theories like pragmatism, feminism or critical theory. Being an offshoot of post structuralism, deconstruction is not only a meta-language itself but also an exposer of all languages and discourses. The only way to correctly understand meanings requires deconstructing the hypotheses and systems of information which create the misapprehension of an odd meaning. This deconstructive operation can turn a male into a female, change speech to writing, and convert rational into emotional.

Deconstruction investigates the basics of Western thought but neither to eliminate their inconsistencies and paradoxes nor to break away from the demands of the traditional nor to set up its own system. Derrida described deconstruction as "an unclosed, unenclosable, not wholly formalizable ensemble of rules for reading, interpretation and writing."<sup>23</sup>

Criticism of the Enlightenment, of literature and of metaphysics, especially the original writings of Plato, Rousseau, and Husserl is the central concern of deconstruction without making any of these works pointless. To a certain extent, deconstruction shows these classics to be teeming with manifold and at times incompatible connotations. Furthermore, deconstruction does not assert that conceptions are limitless; it simply states that concepts can be interpreted in diverse ways by putting them into innovative perspectives. Deconstructive analyses confirm that certain peculiarities and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> J. A. Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, 59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (London: Routledge, 1994), 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 329.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/155306/deconstruction accessed: 5/3/2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983), 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Introduction, Part II. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 40. http://lrd.yahooapis.com/\_ =11geg11gv/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Seferin

disagreements do not have any normative consistency opening conceptual oppositions to reinterpretation in which the two terms have at the same time "conceptual dependence or similarity as well as conceptual difference or distinction."24

Deconstructive argument explores the ways 'this similarity or difference' is concealed or disregarded, and lays emphasis on the significance of the situation in pronouncing a decision besides studying the ideological effects of the use of conceptual oppositions. It sees whether their disguised or suppressed instability lends unnecessary plausibility to legal, philosophical, religious and literary arguments and doctrines. "Rarely has a critical theory attracted the sort of dread and hysteria that deconstruction has incited since its inception in 1967."25

As a special type of exercise in reading, a technique of analysis and a form of critical investigation, Barbara Johnson explains the term in her book, The Critical Difference (1981): "Deconstruction is not synonymous with "destruction", however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of the word 'analysis' itself, which etymologically means "to undo" -- a virtual synonym for "to de-construct."

"If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another. It is a reading which analyses the specificity of a text's critical difference from itself."26

Derrida's philosophy criticizes structuralism also. Therefore Derrida states that:

"the motif of deconstruction has been associated with poststructuralism although it was a word unknown in France until its "return" from the United States."27

In fact, Derrida is in favor of the corruption of the unpolluted "origins by the structures of language and temporality. Manfred Frank has even referred to Derrida's work as Neostructuralism"<sup>28</sup> which contained his initial apprehensions about the structure of the texts. Indeed, deconstruction is tied up with both structuralism and antistructuralism, something which Derrida terms "structural problematic." He considers his first use of the word deconstruction during the peak of "structuralism an "antistructuralist gesture" because "Structures were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented." He thinks that both Genesis and Structure are necessary forms of explanation and the difficulty to reconcile the two is the tension of the structural problematic. Therefore:

"some objects need to be described in terms of structure while others in genesis,"29 structural problematic is that "beneath the serene use of these concepts [genesis and structure] is to be found a debate that...makes new reductions and explications indefinitely necessary."<sup>30</sup>

In the Western philosophical tradition, deconstruction identifies and targets a:

"metaphysics of presence", logocentrism or phallogocentrism which holds that speech-thought (the logos) is a privileged, ideal, and self-present entity, through which all discourse and meaning are derived."31

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Jack M. Balkin, "Deconstruction", A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson 2<sup>nd</sup>. Ed. (UK: Wiley- Blackwell, 2010), 117 <sup>25</sup> David Macey, *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory*, 464.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Barbara Johnson, *The Critical Difference* (USA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 121.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation With Jacques Derrida Ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> M. Frank, What is Neostructuralism? trans. S. Wilke& R. Gray. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 211.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, 53.

Martin Heidegger on philosophy as the mission of destroying ontological conceptions including commonplace implications of terms like time, history, being, theory, death, mind, body, matter, logic, etc.:

"When tradition becomes master it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand".<sup>32</sup>

Heidegger believes that custom can become calcified:

"If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since".<sup>33</sup>

In Europe, deconstruction being a reaction to structuralism is considered a poststructuralist philosophy. Deemphasizing the subjects' autonomy in determining cultural meanings, structuralists claimed that linguistic structures shaped personal thinking thus breaking up the subject matter into superior powers of civilization. Deconstruction hits at the so called unwavering, universal, or ahistorical assumptions about structures of meaning. Like other communal philosophies which try to diminish individual contemplation and achievement to enrich constructs, deconstruction is also thought to be an antihumanist theory, especially in the United States where its thoroughly subjectivist assertion makes transcripts signify anything an individual desires them to represent.

#### **Dr. Mohammed Arkoun**

French-Algerian researcher and philosopher of Berber origin, Professor Mohammed Arkoun (1928--2010) is a very significant secular scholar in Islamic studies supplementing modern rational Islamic restructuring. For some 30 years, he remained a reviewer of the concerns about Islam and Islamology, supporting Islamic modernism, as well as promoting secularism, and humanism.

Primarily taken as either an Islamist intellectual or an all-too-liberal detractor of the Muslim way of life, Mohammed Arkoun gradually got a standing among the most important contemporary scholars of the Islamic world. German, Middle Eastern, and the Arab world mostly disregarded or questioned Mohammed Arkoun's stimulating views and theories on contemporary Islamic culture till Hashem Saleh translated his French works.

Arkoun uses the tools and methodologies of history, sociology, psychology and anthropology to critically assess different belief-systems, traditions of exegesis, theology and jurisprudence to liberate reason from dogmatic constructs. Arkoun explores the epistemological options underlying different discourses, development of facts, events, ideas, beliefs, performances, institutions, works of art and individual biographies based

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 44.

on reliable archives. Considering Islam as both a religion and a time-honored tradition of thought, Arkoun attempts to surmount the restrictions of a purely descriptive and chronological handling of history by advocating a critical analysis of the entire Muslim thought, from the Qur'anic worldview to the variety of contemporary discourses.

## **Arkoun and Deconstruction**

The elaborative study Arkoun offers is somewhat different from the other Islamic scholars' work. Influenced by structuralism, post-structuralism, and deconstruction with their emphasis on linguistic analyses, Arkoun tries to 'reemphasize the marginalized meaning', the hidden or the forgotten or the ones contaminated by external factors because of the numerous coverings and freezing processes Islamic thinking has gone through. Nonetheless, Arkoun believes that a "reconstruction" of a discourse should follow deconstruction after that discourse has been made free of the limitations, freezings, and the distortions covering it.

Insisting on a transcendental signifier of the oral language, Arkoun relates the move from verbal to written form of language as a shift from the language of the Prophet SAW into a teaching discourse in the restricted circumstances of human condition open to a variety of contexts. An inflexible perception with an inclination towards a closed interpretation rejecting other interpretations explained and classified the Prohet's SAW teaching discourse. Consequently, "a "text" into "pretext" (arguments), simply repeated frequently without much thinking contributed to the validation of a certain group authority."<sup>34</sup>

Asking to be critical on traditional Islamic reasoning models and opening up the holy texts of Islam for the historical and modern linguistic investigations, Arkoun suggested to the Islamic intellectuals to deconstruct past thinking as well as the classical interpretations of the holy texts. He employed the deconstruction method to reconstruct scientific traditions of classical Islam believing that without stimulus and the discipline of openness of the standards of modern Western research, the standard of Islamic knowledge cannot come upto the mark in the eyes of traditional Islamic experts, the orientalists and the world at large.

By means of his critical approach, Arkoun explained that two trends authorizing the history of Islamic thought were the tendency to make the text and the tradition sacred and the tendency to uncover the sacredness of it. An interaction between universalism and pluralism is required for an updated Islamic thinking. The crises of religious institutions strongly indicate that religion must be authoritative and original, not lost and distorted by the historical processes at work over the centuries to liberate it. The conversion of religion into an "hierarchical" institution where the authorized was an "authority" having the right to speak about the truth on behalf of the "absolute authority", whether God, the authoritative or others resulted in limiting multi-interpretations.<sup>35</sup>

Apart from the official interpretation legalized by the authorized institution, the truth of the other interpretations is made impossible to recognize. The Holy Book formerly opened to multi-interpretations became one single interpretation (monophonic exegesis)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> http://journal.ui.ac.id/upload/artikel/04\_Siti%20Rohmah%20-%20Revisi.pdf accessed: 2/14/11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> http://journal.ui.ac.id/upload/artikel/04\_Siti%20Rohmah%20-%20Revisi.pdf accessed: 2/14/11.

which gave rise to an inquisition institution (*mihnah*) in al-Makmun era in Islam and in Reformation era in Christianity.<sup>36</sup>

When a religion becomes an institution monopolized by a certain authority, it loses its nature as a liberal religion. Getting a new and fresh continuous interpretation to keep it open to the changing time and progress becomes extremely difficult, making the whole society stagnant. The domination of a particular religious discourse produces an hierarchical structure, placing the dominant in the "central" position and the other(s) in the "marginal" (periphery) position excluding certain religious discourses, or conquering, subordinating and repressing them.<sup>37</sup>

The strategy required to reinterpret this hierarchical interpretation structure in the over institutionalized religious processes and to delegitimize the "central", "origin" and "primary" claims of the dominant discourse is the deconstruction method.

Arkoun declared that using Derrida's deconstruction strategy in a complementary manner in religious discourses can form a new perspective to study Islam and its discourses critically through historical inquiry on religious practices indirectly as well as socially to expose a working area of power relation. Besides, the practical aspect of this perspective yields to the "historical ontology" in the field of power relation, mainly to be a part of the struggle of converting repressive types of power relation into positive ones.

To apply deconstruction strategy to a religious text, Arkoun suggests to

- 1. "separate the mono linear relationship between the text and the meaning (the interpretation)
- 2. uncover the belief of the existence of a final relationship between the text and the meaning
- 3. open the possibility for a wide range of interpretations of the text
- 4. discover the layers of knowledge covered by orthodoxies and
- 5. distinguish between the important and the unimportant"<sup>38</sup>

Another sociological consequence of deconstruction of a text is uncovering interpretation monopoly on a certain authority which talks about "one truth" in the name of God, state or the ruler. Believing a certain authority also means assuming "The Transcendence I"<sup>39</sup> which, if put aside can make way for many different possibilities of interpretations making it democratic and no longer a monopoly of any one patronized interpretation.

Arkoun deconstructed "the transcendence I" through the concept of the "logos historicity". When the one authority loses its support, a plurality of interpretation alternatives emerges. Thus deprived of the supremacy of a certain interpretation, the text becomes alive and open to all sorts of interpretations as "the freezing of a text" in both religion and ideology gives birth to all kinds of other frozen thinking in a society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> S. R. S. danUlil-Abshor-AbdallaHerdi, "Demolishing the Hegemony of Islamic Interpretation, Reviving the Texts", dalam Journal Ulumul Qur'an No. 3, Vol. V, 1994, 84-85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> R. H. Alam, "Perspective of Post-Modernism in Religious Studies", dalam Journal Ulumul Qur`an No. 1, Vol. V, 1994, 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Fikr al-Islami: Qiraat al-Ilmiyyah, translation HashimShaleh. (Beirut: Markaz al-Inma' al-Qaumy, 1987), 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "Towards the New Approach of Islam", dalam Journal Ulumul Qur`an No. 7 Vol. II 1990/1411 H October-December 1990, Jakarta: LSAF.

Opening up discourses on the religious texts democratically results in quite an analytical, plural and dynamic religious life for the humanity.<sup>40</sup>

This approach is distinct from analysis by a good number of Islamicists and political scientists. Instead of paying attention to Islam's undeniable precision as a hierarchical power, a type of fiend enduring for centuries and controlling the destiny of all those embracing the religion, it focuses entirely on "Islam". This structure makes it possible for the Islamicists to investigate the powers compelling the leading roles "at all levels of the society e.g. social classes and groups, the privileged versus the less fortunate, as well as intra-group arguments arising in the social as well as political spheres".<sup>41</sup>

Thus the intellectual is concurrently liberated from the constricted ideological ties intrinsic in the selection of studying a civilization internationally through the literature generated and amended "by an elite group or to restrict one's research to an in-depth study of a particular ethnocultural group cut off from the larger socio-historical"<sup>42</sup> procedure. Regrettably, historical and anthropological studies endeavoring to deal with the weak points and threats innate in both these approaches are still rare.

Arkoun tries to harmonize tradition and modernity through a new method. Several commentators from among the orientalists as well as Islamic scholars of the Quran use an historical and linguistic critique, e.g, the internationally renowned Islamic studies scholar and an expert on Quranic exegesis, Jane Dammen McAuliffe's "*Quranic Hermeneutic: The views of Al-Tabari and IbnKatsir*" emphasizes interpretation method and social horizon. Contemporary Muslim intellectual Dr. Fazlur Rahman talked about it with the 'double movement interpretation', whereas Arkoun did it 'with his circle of language-history thinking'. Arkoun declares that the 'integrated interpretation connects language and thinking with their historical aspect'. The first stage of this hermeneutical interpretation is to make a distinction between the real and the counterfeit and confirm the first original text as well as the hermeneutical text. Intending to bring Islamic thought into 'Quranique' discourse, Arkoun wants to keep all of it open to various readings as well as open for different understandings at the same time.<sup>43</sup>

Islamic thinking in various kinds of literatures as a second text or hermeneutical text enveloping the first text or the first event of the Quran is the major obstacle in Arkoun's project besides getting in the way of understanding the Quran as it is.<sup>44</sup> Arkoun overcame this problem by using Derrida's "deconstruction" process or "uncovering" as well as the archaeological analysis utilized to study 'historical artifacts'. During this 'historical clarification on hermeneutical texts from certain thinking tradition', Arkoun attempted to 'clarify and clean the "dust" of space and time covering them so that the relation between texts from particular historical stages, social contexts, generations and the various thinking movements in the same historical time becomes evident.<sup>45</sup>

Arkoun showed the inseparable relation between thinking and history, and between thinking and language. Every Islamic thought not only reflected the vibrant efforts of the socio-historical reality, but was also 'formulated, conceptualized and spoken in a certain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> http://journal.ui.ac.id/upload/artikel/04\_Siti%20Rohmah%20-%20Revisi.pdf accessed: 2/14/11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Robert Young, "Poststructuralism: An Introduction", 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Robert Young, "Poststructuralism: An Introduction", 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Arab Thought, ed. S.Chand, (New Delhi: OUP, 1988), 25-40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Fikr al-Islamy: Naqdwa al-Ijtihad. Translation HasyimShali .(London: Dar as-Saqi, 1990), 232.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Fikr al-Islamy: Naqdwa al-Ijtihad, 233-234.

"language". Arkoun gave an example of "managing" the Quran with the hermeneutic apparatus focusing on three aspects: text, context and contextualization in a continued circle while investigating and at the same time "reproducing" meaning.<sup>46</sup>

He argued that a connection among language, thinking and history must be established and both Islamic and religious societies should be completely alert to this dialectical relation. He maintains that the holy Quran is 'words, language, cultural and religious phenomena' risisng from its own conditions, and circumstances: therefore, it cannot produce meaning out of its context creating a structuralized awareness.<sup>47</sup>

In 2002, in a discussion program on TV with Mary-Jane Deeb, the Arab world area specialist, and Bernard Lewis, a prominent contemporary Orientalist, Arkoun stated that:

"An anthropological triangle" that includes a disintegration of the Muslim tradition of thought, the use of the Koran as a tool for a liberation struggle and the use of religion by governments as a means of legitimizing their power. Those three elements together have led to today's violence in the Muslim world." Islam must be brought back as a tradition of thinking," a tradition that emerged over a thousand years ago in the "Mediterranean space."<sup>48</sup>

Later prompted by his constant commitment with inter-religious discourses as well as his disappointment at the rueful, or exceedingly courteous and deferential approaches governing such conferences, Arkoun broadened his attention to wide-ranging religious phenomena. Lamenting the lack of a critical theology to employ 'religious reason' transparently and rigorously, Arkoun put forward the concept of 'emerging reason'. The positive characteristic of the use of religion lies in the probability of a constant critical appraisal of the three 'postures of human thought', i.e.

- i. the religious stance with its theological, ethical and juridical forms of thinking;
- ii. the scientific-technological styles of thinking directing the current globalization discourse; and
- iii. the rationalist or empiricist philosophical stances still locked in the assumptions of the modernity of the classical age.

This emerging reason can help us find a 'comparative history of the theologies' of the three Abrahamic religions, giving the opportunity to the whole field of human, social, and even accurate sciences to theology.<sup>49</sup>

Arkoun maintained that 'reconstruction' of a discourse must follow every 'deconstruction'. Leaving the constraints and the inflexibility of the past, he suggests two ways for reform, i.e., 'ijtihad' and Islamic critical reason. According to Arkoun, the acceptance of Islamic philosophical tradition and the Arab-Muslim thought without critical analysis resulted in an inert, rigid, and dogmatic Islamic fundamentalism. He employs approaches and techniques used in social sciences as well as postmodernist concepts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> http://journal.ui.ac.id/upload/artikel/04\_Siti%20Rohmah%20-%20Revisi.pdf accessed: 2/14/11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Fikr al-Islamy: Naqdwa al-Ijtihad, 185-186.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Mary Jane Deeb's discussion program *What Went Wrong ... And Why?* with Bernard Lewis, Emeritus Professor at Princeton University and Mohamed Arkoun, Emeritus Professor at the Sorbonne, Paris, in Library of Congress Bulletin, Library's African and Middle Eastern Division and Office of Scholarly Programs, May 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> From Braudel to Derrida: Mohammed Arkoun's Rethinking of Islam and Religion, in Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 4:1 (2011) 23-43.

"Arkoun's epistemological and methodological fundamentals borrowed from Descartes' Rationalism and Kant's Criticism, Saussure's Structuralism, Barthes, Hjemslev, and Greimas' Semiotics and "the Paris school", Paul Ricoeur's myth concept, Michel Foucault's discourse and episteme and Jacques Derrida's deconstruction combined the most divine of Islamic thought (Islamic Reason) and the most important in the modern western thinking (modern thought)."<sup>50</sup>

Arkoun modified Foucault's ideas of episteme, discourse and archeology by splitting up the development of Arab-Islam thought into three historical phases, i.e.,

"classical, scholastic, and modern. Although he did not take over all Foucault's philosophical views, the term got the specific meaning from him and often used in his writings."<sup>51</sup>

In his books Various Readings of the Qurān, 2nd ed., 1991 and A Critique of Islamic Reason, 1998.

"The following issues demonstrate the position:

- 1. The Quranic phenomenon and the historical experience of Medina;
- 2. *jāhilīyah* (ignorance), *ilm* (knowledge), and Islām as anthropological paradigms;
- 3. the generations of the companions of the Prophet SAW and the succeeding generations (the Saābah and tabiūn) as symbolic figures of mythical memory;
- 4. living tradition, ethnographic traditions, and traditionalization as an ideological strategy;
- 5. authority, power, and the search for legitimacy;
- 6. violence, sacredness, and truth in religious discourses and collective practice;
- 7. oblivion, elimination, and repression as dimensions of cultural and intellectual history; and
- 8. orthodoxy as an ideological process"52

In another discussion of Islam with Beverly Gray, chief of the Asian and Middle Eastern Division, Mary-Jane Deeb, Arab world area specialist and Charlynn Spencer Pyne, Arkoun informed that "it is important to review first of all the concepts of Islam and the West". He recommended that "scholars must write a "relative history" of the post-World War II era". He argued that "Sept. 11 incidents are an element of a sequence of disasters ingrained in the post war history of the Arab world. For instance the war of autonomy in Algeria (1954-1962), created the way Muslims used religion not as a structure of belief and thought, but as an ideology of dissent and conflict". He upheld that "Algeria still paid the penalty for the politicization of religion".

Arkoun suggested that "the existing "anthropological triangle" of the three elements that have collectively directed today's violent behavior in the Muslim world includes dissolution of the Muslim ritual of thought, using the Koran as a contrivance for emancipation efforts and using religion by governments as a way of legalizing their authority".

"Islam must be brought back as a tradition of thinking, a tradition that emerged over a thousand years ago in the "Mediterranean space." Islam is a part of the Greco-Roman, Judaeo-Christian traditions that emerged on the shores of the Mediterranean. Muslim scholars revived the works of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Siti Rohmah Soekarba, "The Critique of Arab Thought: Mohammed Arkoun's Deconstruction Method," *Makara, SosialHumaniora*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Desember 2006: 79-87, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia, Depok 16424, Indonesia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> http://journal.ui.ac.id/upload/artikel/04\_Siti%20Rohmah%20-%20Revisi.pdf accessed: 2/4/11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> http://rd.yahooapis.com/\_ylc=X3o http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0395 accessed: 5/18/09.

the Greek philosophers by translating and teaching the works of Aristotle and Plato, and thus contributed to the European Renaissance."<sup>53</sup>

Arkoun also argues that, a lot of books on "Islamic fundamentalists" shed no light whatsoever on Islam but lead people to think that violence is inherent in Islam. People who believe that theirs is the only "true religion" often resort to violence against people who hold different beliefs".

During a meeting with members of US Congress on Oct. 11, Professor Arkoun discussed the use of Islam as a political instrument and some of the causes behind the rise of Islamic militant movements in the Middle East and North Africa. Arkoun also met with members of Scholars' Council of the Library, during its first meeting to advise Dr. Billington on future appointments for five senior chair positions at the John W. Kluge Center of the Library. In reply to a question by the Librarian, "What is the one thing you want Americans to know about Islam?" Arkoun responded that "Islam is a part of the monotheistic tradition of the divine. And the knowledge that all three monotheistic traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) were born in the Near East should prevent us from conceptually separating Islam from the Western tradition of thought".

Bronislaw Geremek a member of the Scholars' Council, an ex- foreign minister of Poland and a scholar of medieval European history at the College de France, asked: "If there is no contempt for human life in the Koran, then why do Muslims seem to value life so little?" Professor Arkoun replied that,

"In all religions and civilizations there is a separation between those who belong to the orthodox tradition and those who are outside it. Although the Spanish Inquisitors valued the lives of Catholics as a whole, they did not value the lives of either those Catholics they deemed heretics or of those who belonged to other religious groups. Even Aristotle, who upheld the principles of democracy in ancient Greece, accepted the concept of slavery for a conquered people".<sup>54</sup>

Professor Arkoun in a shared presentation with Mary-Jane Deeb on "The Use and Misuse of Religious Concepts: War and Jihad in Islam" discussed the way

"the corpus of religious tradition" "we have today was transformed over time. The divine logos (the word of God) was transmitted to the Prophet Muhammad SAW and collected into a volume known as the Koran, only after his death. The Koran was not arranged in any chronological order and lacked the basic vowels and diacritical marks that were added later. The hadith, or the Prophet's SAW sayings, which is part of the body of religious materials that make up the Muslim tradition, also were collected and selected after Muhammad's SAW death. Thus, the basic texts in Islam were affected by the people who worked to put them together. In other words, an interpretation of sacred texts took place from the very start of Islam and continued for several centuries".<sup>55</sup>

Afterwards Arkoun argued,

"the realm of interpretation (or ijtihad) was closed. Official bodies such as states decided that those texts would no longer be interpreted. Yet, those interpretations continued because, Islam is theologically Protestant and politically Catholic, meaning that while Islam can be interpreted by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Critique of The Islamic Reason, 133.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "The Use and Misuse of Religious Concepts: War and Jihad in Islam", a discussion with Bronislaw Geremek. Vol. 60 No. 11, Library of Congress Information Bulletin, November, 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, a shared presentation with Mary-Jane Deeb on "The Use and Misuse of Religious Concepts: War and Jihad in Islam", October 12, 2001. Library of Congress Information Bulletin.

every person who reads the Koran, the state has put a stop to such interpretations and allowed only one version to be taught and disseminated". $^{56}$ 

### A Critique of Mohammed Arkoun

For most part of his life Europe and the West was Arkoun's permanent residence as well as a place of education and work and French was his second language after his Berber mother tongue and Arabic the first one. Thus his thinking, feelings and mind were profoundly influenced by Western thought and culture. In an attempt to win acceptance and authenticity, he seems to side with both the Orient and Orientalism. On the one hand, he becomes a voice of Muslim protestations against the prejudices of Western thought and research. While on the other, he accuses the Orient of similar unfairness. He charges both of having an unjust attachment to the so called universal truths and neglecting history. The so called 'Islamic' dimension of Arkoun's thought appears self-consciously cautious, obscured and subjugated by the supremacy of the Western discourse. Besides, his epistemological expertise seems to humiliate the traditional and the established work of the Islamic scholars without much reason and rhyme.

Despite being a Muslim scholar, Arkoun seeks the help of non-Muslims and nonhistorians to reassess 'the relationship of Islamic thought to text, language, groups, power, time, and place to discover "positivities" that could emphasize an "objective" understanding of the "totality" of the Islamic tradition.' His project of thinking 'the unthinkable and the unthought' aims to abolish all the 'positivities' of traditional thought, necessitating a deconstruction unto nothingness.

Arkoun also uses this allegiance to 'scientific scholarship and empirical investigation' as a platform to censure the Islamic tradition. For him, understanding Islam requires to analyse the way the 'Qur'anic fact' was transcendentalized, or acknowledged as a basis for Divine Law and declared a universal truth. He questions the reason behind the final acceptance of these interpretations of the Revelation and discarding of all the alternative understandings. Arkoun concludes that the state/government has always done its best to reduce the Quranic interpretations to a single set of symbols not only to legitimize its political power but also to enforce the unity and uniformity of Islam.

Arkoun's stance on the history of Islam is to unearth the unthought from the logosphere and investigate the 'border situations' of the ethnically mixed surroundings of the Mediterranean, Arkoun also shares Hanafi's aspiration of applying these discoveries to the inquiry of the 'religious phenomenon' in general and thus add to anthropology of religion.

Guided by history and methodology, instead of faith, Arkoun's radical research wants to get rid of all the Islamic tradition as well as inherited sacred and transcendental structures and to re-cast them in the mould of modern social sciences. More concerned with the questions of methodology and epistemology, Arkoun wants authenticity for new foundations in the 'reconstructed collective memory of the community'. That forces his colleague and translator Robert D. Lee to conclude that;

"There reverberates through Arkoun's work an underlying faith in the truth-producing capacities - if not at this stage, then at the next - of modern social science."<sup>57</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, interview after a presentation with Mary-Jane Deeb on "The Use and Misuse of

*Religious Concepts: War and Jihad in Islam*", October 12, 2001. Library of Congress Information Bulletin. <sup>57</sup>Robert D. Lee, *Overseeing Tradition and Modernity* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 59.

This commitment of Arkoun to a modernist concept of truth weakens his own historicising scholarship that relies greatly on the postmodernist technique of deconstruction. And for this even Arkoun's translator, Hashim Salih also criticizes him in an insightful and harsh way:

"Science has usually meant externality and abstraction, and modern social science has dedicated itself to rendering external - hence, comprehensible at a different time and place - that which is initially internal and time-bound. Arkoun calls upon social science to understand l'imaginaire – that sedimentation of consciousness and conviction that governs so much behavior in any society - and to achieve, if possible ... a direct and totalizing reading of the real."<sup>58</sup>

In fact, science, itself erected on transhistoric procedures and axioms, is equally vulnerable to critical examination of the historicist sort. Despite all his methodological sophistication and familiarity with the traditional and modern thought, Arkoun seems to be either naïve of the problem of relativism linked with historicism, or he simply pretends to take a deceitful facade by the following disclaimer: "There is no such thing as an innocent discourse or innocent method." <sup>59</sup>

Working from a particular perspective in history Arkoun's 'method' is also vulnerable to the decaying solvent of historicism. Thus, both Arkoun's 'epistemology' and historicising consciousness of modernity and postmodernity have a deadlock in common between them. After overthrowing the transcendent, Islamic subject, Arkoun's epistemological search simply fails to find any normative thought in the radical historicism. Thus Arkoun seems to be infatuated with his own opinion.<sup>60</sup>

French philosophy's great impact on Arkoun's writings results in particular in his application of Michel Foucault's thinking to study the Islamic legal and philosophical traditions. He believes that the study of Islam should be freed from the monopoly of conservative interpretation of Islam exercised by the state-sponsored clerical establishment. Calling for an "audacious, free, and productive" thinking Arkoun favors multiple interpretations of the tradition and the text, and strongly proposes multiculturalism and secularism, albeit without using the Arabic word *'ilmaniyya'/* unbelief.

In Fall 2003, Arkoun represented Muslims along with the sociologist, Hanifa Cherifi in the twenty-person presidential Stasi Commission appointed by the French president Jacques Chirac to propose steps to protect the non-religious against the growing presence of religious symbols in public schools and buildings. The commission's recommendation of banning wearing any conspicuous religious symbol in public schools and buildings came under attack in Muslim countries, and Arkoun was accused for failing to defend the Islamic stance on the issue.

Methodology seems to be Arkoun's major concern. He not only questions the authenticity of the Quran but also its claim of the truth. Deducing from the discursive models of post modernism, he is determined to discover an interpretative mechanism that would not only sort out the historicity of the Quran but also augment the history of ideas by producing a better understanding of the Quran. Arkoun's critical discourse on the historicity of the Revelation is the most radical among the contemporary Muslim

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>Hashim Saleh, Annotation and Commentary on Arkoun'sal Fikr al UsuliwaIshtihalat Al Ta Sil:

NahwaTarikhinAkhar Li Al Fikr Al Islami, (Beirut: Markaz al Inma al Qawmi, 1996), 65.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Dr. S. Parvez Manzoor, Responding to Professor Arkoun, http://www.answers.com/topic/mohammedarkoun#ixzz2M4VoGIGc accessed: 2/1/2013.

thinkers. Putting the Quran at par with other religions' Holy Scriptures as the heritage of the whole humanity, he considers the historical method an integral part of the unthought in Islamic scholarship. He declares that such an exercise already being an ingredient of 'ijtihadic' activities to shake the conventional mode of thinking will not harm the Quran in any way.<sup>61</sup>

Arkoun works on the incident of revelation from a general point of view. The theory of interpretation of the Quran he puts forward poses two key hermeneutical questions. The first is the ontoloigal one asking what makes up the Quran or what needs to be interpreted. And the second one is the methodological one seeking how to go about that task.

Similarly, regarding the prophets of God, Arkoun compares their advent into the world to the "production of great men in history".<sup>62</sup> He considers the psycho-social impulses the prophets used to organize and motivate their nations more important than the spirit and substance of their message. Dissociating the heroism, charisma and holiness from the prophetic eras, he attempts to make God inactive in history so that he could not only evade the obligation of submission to its demand but also retain the autonomy of human reason. That is why he propagates that prophets carried no criterion from heaven to make people practice and repeat infinitely but came only to "propose meanings for existence", which certainly are open to modification and revision within the structure of the promise of reason granted to man. In this context, Arkoun makes the mistake of quoting the example of naskh/abrogation to support his notion of subjectivity of meaning in history.<sup>63</sup>

In his attempt to reduce the effect of the Divine Revelation as well as the role of God's prophets in shaping the destiny of mankind, Arkoun puts their great and awe-inspiring impact down to his concept of 'the debt of meaning' towards God's message, His messengers and the noble, pious people who followed them in all ages and times. Thus all three are converted into major and respected sources of inspiration in addition to the moral recognition of being in debt to their great work of reforming the decaying community. <sup>64</sup> However, contrary to Arkoun's belief that the prophetic model was valid only within an episteme that prefers myth to history, spirituality to positivism and imagination to rationality, Muslims all over the world have persistently considered the occurrence and accomplishments of the Prophet Muhammad SAW in the highest esteem with the conviction that following in his footsteps will result in progress and prosperity while turning away from his traditions will worsen their condition.

Contradicting himself, Arkoun acknowledges at a place while giving a description of the phenomenon of revelation that:

"Revelation is a speech directed towards action and application. It actively and continuously influences human history because it proffers practical solutions to the ultimate concerns of human condition. By 'the ultimate concerns' we mean life, death, justice, love, legitimate authority (or veneration), unjust authority, social relations, transcendence, etc. The Quran fulfils all the needs and fills these functions in the best manner. It has spread amidst different strata and various

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "The Heritage: Its Content and Identity- Its Positive And Negative Charaecteristics", In *Al TurathWaTahaddiyat Al Asr Fi Al Wastan Al Arabi*, 2nd Ed. (Beruit: MarkazDirasst Al Wahdah Al Arabiyyah, 1987), 176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "Present Day Islam between Its Tradition and Globalization", In *Intellectual Tradition in Islam*, Ed. Farhand Daftary (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 192.

communities where it demonstrated the soundness of its solutions and ideal model, its strong argumentation against spurious values, tyrannical authorities and wrong conducts."<sup>65</sup>

Arkoun opines that the Quran re-establishes opposing ancient symbols with an alternative system, whereas positivist rationalism criticizes all kinds of symbols and myths substituting them with scientific concepts. That is another reason he gives for the impossibility of returning to the prophetic time and model. Consequently, he believes that secularization of the prophetic message is unavoidable.

Arkoun divides Divine Revelation into two levels. According to him, the first level is the Archetype of the Books referred to as *Ummul Kitab* in the Quran<sup>66</sup> while the second level is its 'worldly editions' including the Bible, the Quran, etc. On its first level, the eternal and timeless revelation/*UmmulKitab*/The Heavenly Book holds the ultimate truth albeit beyond human reach, safe in the 'preserved tablet' with God alone. Human beings know of it only through its second level which often went through several modifications, revisions and substitutions.

"Then the heavenly Book is accessible to the believers *only* through the *written* version of the books or scriptures.... This second aspect of the Book is then submitted to all the constraints of arbitrary historicity,"<sup>67</sup>

which in turn relativised and molded the truth in the Quran. According to Arkoun, modern historicists hold the responsibility of uncovering the historicity of the sacredness of the Quranic events so as to "historicise what has been systematically dehistoricised."<sup>68</sup>

The three sets of rules of reading/interpreting the Quran Arkoun suggests are:

- 1. The Historical Anthropological Interpretation
- 2. The Linguistic-Semiotic and Literary Interpretation
- 3. The Theological-Exegetic or Religious Interpretation

By the Historical Anthropological Interpretation, Arkoun means to relate the Quran to its background in the 7<sup>th</sup> century Arabian Peninsula. The well established fact about revelation is that the Quran was first sent down orally and throughout the life time of the Prophet *SAW* it was not compiled in a book form although it was written down in scratches and the whole of it was recited and memorized by a large majority of Muslims. Arkoun however, has a very different history to tell. He divides the history of the Quran again into two periods; the formative period of revelation when the Quran was disseminated orally in Makkah and Medina and the later period of collection, and fixation expanding from the time of the Prophet's SAW death to the  $4/10^{th}$  century till the complete compilation of the Quran. Arkoun refers to the Quran in its first period as "the Quranic Discourse" and "the Prophetic Discourse" while its second transition is named by him as "the Official Closed Corpus".<sup>69</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, From Faysal To Fasl Al Maqal: Where Is The Contemporary Islamic Thought? (Beruit: Dar Al Saqi, 1993), 92-93.

<sup>66</sup> Al Quran 13: 39 and 43: 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup>Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam Today, 241.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 57, 64-65.

Arkoun defines the Quran as "a finished and an open corpus expressed in Arabic, to which we cannot have an access except through the text fixed after the  $4^{th}/10$ th century."<sup>70</sup>

Arkoun declares the Quran as holier, more authentic, and more reliable in its discourse form than when it took a written form of a mere worldly book. He considered it open to all meanings in its oral form. He does not think that the *Mushaf*/the written official Quran deserves the holy status it is given as a divine speech of God.

Nonetheless, in an abrupt shift in the same book he states that his distinction between the oral and written forms of the Quran does not make one form more authentic than the other. It only means that the eyewitnesses of the revelation had the privilege of a comprehensive and easy access to its meaning than the later receivers of its written form. In fact, Arkoun is so befuddled about the whole thing that his finest translator Hashim Salih admits of not being sure what he meant. Hashim Salih, his best interpreter, has to add extensive comments to make Arkoun's ideas clear. In fact Hashim's annotation on Arkoun's *Al Fikr Al Usuli wa Istihalat Al Ta Sil: NahwaTarikhinAkhar Li Al* Fikr Al Islami consumes about one third of the whole book.

Arkoun promotes the Linguistic-Semiotic and Literary Interpretation of the Quran to reveal the historicity of both the language of the Quran and its content. He questions the sacred, the spiritual, the transcendent attributed to the Quran because its words are subject to the impact of historicity.<sup>71</sup>

He does not approve of the general practice of Muslims referring to the Quarn in their routine lives calling it as "a semiotic manipulation" and "fundamentalism" making Muslims intentionally detach the Quarn from its socio-historical and linguistic contexts and force their own relevant contexts to make the Quarn pertinent to their particular situation/ incident.

As the Quranic language is also made up of signs and symbols, it too refers to the objects by capricious and conventional judgments within a society with no natural link with the signified. <sup>72</sup> Questioning the authenticity and usefulness of the conventional *qiraats*/variant readings also, Arkoun takes them to be merely the norms of the early Muslim community rather than the true meaning of the Quran. That is why currently in the changed needs and norms of contemporary society, he feels that a new reading and a new interpretation is required.

Time honored scholarly works verify that the authentic *qiraats* are divine as told by the Prophet *SAW*. The multiple choice just makes it easier to execute or recite instead of being a sign of unlimited options of alternative readings. While many commentaries of the Quran as well as several scholars admit the inevitability of reinterpreting the Quran in the light of the historical changes<sup>73</sup>, Arkoun wants a new decoding of the signs and symbols of the Quran because according to him the earlier Muslims had decoded them through their *qiraat* and commentaries. In this regard, he argues that the Quran is a work

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>Mohammed Arkoun, *Rethinking Islam Today*, 237.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought", In *Islam: State and Society*, Eds. Klaus Ferdinand And Mehdi Mozaffari (London: Curzon Press, 1988), 70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, "Religion and Society", In *Islam in a World of Diverse Faiths*, Ed. Dan Cohn Sherbok (London: Macmillan, 1991), 176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Abdul KabirHussainSolihu, "Understanding the Quran In The Light Of Historical Change," *Islamic Studies*, 42, No. 3 (2003): 393-413.

of signs and symbols portraying infinite meanings, open to everyone and its text can be interpreted in countless ways.<sup>74</sup>

Thus Arkoun's hermeneutic semiological analysis refers to

"the understanding of a set of signs ordered into a coherent textual complex. Such an understanding will disclose the aspects of a particular text or textualization but always in relation to (or in the context of) alternative texts and textualization."<sup>75</sup>

According to Arkoun, the last kind of reading, the Theological-Exegetic or Religious Interpretation of the Quran must be based exclusively on the findings of the first two types of readings. Because theological problems are bound to come up if one carries on regarding the Quran as a divine text.

A 'rational belief' based on the conflict between the general episteme at a certain point and the problems put forward by a religious text, i.e., between heritage and history is required to undertake this third interpretation of the Quran. As all kinds of belief oriented readings make up a 'dogmatic enclosure', therefore the early epic masterpiece exegesis add to the historical development of 'the living tradition'. Arkoun calls it as a 'ritual reading' and considers the first two suggested readings as more 'academic and more complex'.<sup>76</sup>

Arkoun recommends only his personal favorite 'secular theology' for this religious interpretation. He also does not accept the majority belief that 'islam does not separate the spiritual from the profane'. Instead, he declares that secularism is inbuilt in Islam. Just as Harvey Cox derived justifications for secularization from the Bible,<sup>77</sup>Arkoun too states that "secularism is included in the Quran and Medinan Experience"<sup>78</sup>, not a logical conclusion based on historical facts but a preconceived, biased notion of the author. In his essay 'Islam and Secularism', Arkoun declares his intentions and objectives in this regard very clearly.

"It is necessary for us to deconstruct the closed orthodoxy from within. This cannot be possible until we search for a free history which alone could lead us to the entrance of secularization in Islam."<sup>79</sup>

Dr. Abdul Kabir Solihu of International University Malaysia accuses Arkoun of twisting historical facts to suit his objectives. He observes:

"If Arkoun succeeded in avoiding a belief oriented reading in order to evade the 'dogmas' of Sunnites and Shiites definitely he has fallen prey to a secular theology with its own dogmas."<sup>80</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, *The Historicism Of Arab Islamic Thought*, Trans. HashimSalih, 2nd Ed. (Beruit: Markaz Al Inma'alQawmi, 1996), 145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Hugh J. Silverman, *Textualities between Hermeneuitcs and Deconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Harvey Cox, "The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization", In *Theological Perspective* (New York: Collier Books, 1990), 5-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, *The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought*, 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, Tarikhiyyat Al Fikr Al Arabi Al Islami, 286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Abdul Kabir Hussain Salihu, Mohammad Arkoun's Theory Of Quranic Hermeneutics: A Critique, Intellectual Discourse, Department of General Studies, Kulliyah of Islamic Nd Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islami University Malaysia. 2006. Vol. 14, No. 1, 19-32.

Commenting on Arkoun's deconstruction of Islamic Reason and the unthought, Jon Wansbrough writes; "one unfortunately not yet realized to any practical extent"<sup>81</sup> Ali Harb, remarking about Arkoun's main concern, i.e., his method, states:

"Arkoun's method lacks creativity and coherence, and his readings did not enrich the history of thought of either the Muslims or the Orientalists."<sup>82</sup>

Giving opinion about Arkoun's semiotic readings of the Quran, Ahmad Al Alawi ridicules:

"If all the jinns and human beings made a concerted effort to implement Arkoun's semiotics reading, it would not lead to the Muslims' development."<sup>83</sup>

Even Arkoun himself felt quite disillusioned when he admitted that

"No Orientalist or Islamic studies' scholar shared with him the conception he had long ago invented for the Quran, as the 'Official Closed Corpus' and that his methodological discussion has been largely neglected."<sup>84</sup>

Above all, Muslim scholars and commentators of the Quran unanimously hold the view that no one has the right to interpret the *ayaats* of the Quran according to one's personal view and opinion divergent to the accepted principles and norms of doing so. Several authentic *ahadith*/traditions are narrated on the topic. For example:

According to authentic sources, the Holy Prophet (SAW) is believed to have narrated:

- 1. One who interprets/explains the Quran according to his/her personal opinion (*tafsirbira'yihi*) shall take his abode/place in the fire (Hell),<sup>85</sup> and
- 2. One who interprets the Quran according to his view, even though it may be right, commits a sin.

Abu Bakar *RA* is reported to have said; "What earth will bear me and what sky will over shadow me if I say anything by my personal opinion when explaining the Quran."<sup>86</sup>

The great Islamic scholar Imam Al Ghazali explains the prohibition of the explanation of the Qur'an (*tafsir*) by personal opinion (*bir-ra'i*) as forbidden by the Prophet *SAW* himself. He states that

"Two reasons for the prohibition of interpretation of the Quran according to one's opinion are

- 1. Every man has his own individual opinion with regard to every matter and actually he is inclined to that opinion.
- 2. Every interpreter explains the Quran according to his wish and desire to serve his own ends."<sup>87</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Jon Wansbrough, The Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 47, no. 2 (1984), 413.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Ali Harb, Naqd Al Nass, (Beirut: Al Markaz Al Thaqafi Al Arabi, 1993), 84-85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup>AhamdAlalawi, Al Tabbi Ah Wa Al Tumthal: Masail An Al Islam WaAlmarifah (Rabat: Al SharikahalMaghribiyyah Lil Nashirm Al Muttahidin, 1988), 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Mohammed Arkoun, TheUnthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 2002, 32, 86; Present Day Islam Between its Tradition and Globalization, 214.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> At Tirmidhi, Sunan, KitabutTafsir, 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Imam al-Ghazali Chapter Four: the Etiquettes of Qur'an Recitation (KitabAdabTilawat al Qur'an) Book VIII) in the Ihya' Ulum al-Din (The Revival of Religious Sciences). Transl. Muhammad. AbulQuasem, Revised & Ed. Abu Ibrahim al-Hanafi, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia Press, Imam al-Ghazali Institute 900th Anniversary & Dar Al—Figh, 1979), 44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup>Imam al-Ghazali, Chapter Four: the Etiquettes of Qur'an Recitation, (KitabAdabTilawat al Qur'an) Book VIII) in *the Ihya' Ulum al-Din (The Revival of Religious Sciences)*. Transl. Muhammad. AbulQuasem, Revised &

# Conclusion

The intellectual legacy of the Islamic world unmistakably points out that this is not at all an unmatched venture. Confronting the new and challenging thoughts originating from the early Greek and other cultures, Muslim researchers have already demonstrated an amazing competence to counter as well as assimilate "those ideas, and to expound a new metaphysical groundwork for a comprehensive perception of man and the world."<sup>88</sup>

That is why present-day deliberations of post modernity have to be carried out aligned with the historical context of Islamic scholarly practice. First of all, modern knowledge must be situated in its historical context because the meaning of knowledge itself "has been mystified from one historical time to another and its origin has been shaped by each age's special vision of man and his connection to the world. In addition, post modern Western interpretations and applications of thoughts about knowledge, progress, and development have resulted in"<sup>89</sup> blending the astonishing accomplishments as well as unpardonable and unrelenting catastrophes. Post Modern Western civilization must recommence the dialogue with Islam to revitalize itself and humanity in general. In this backdrop, we should think and reflect on the ways both the Western and the Islamic points of view of the world can intrude upon each other to look for an appropriate stance to make their interaction productive and dynamic.

"Familiarity with traditional diversity of Islamic philosophy as well as with the contemporary philosophical thoughts of the West; modern Muslim philosophers neither entirely reject Western view, nor are they absolutely inundated by the West."<sup>90</sup>

Muslims are all set to study Western vision with a critical consideration adopting a farreaching approach to develop a non-western culture and creativity besides getting rid of the West's superiority complex. Instead of considering Western thought and civilization a source of knowledge, it must be observed, historicized, and studied as an object of knowledge to put it at its proper geographic boundaries. Nevertheless, caution must be heeded that in an attempt to be free from this old yoke of getting beleaguered by Western thought and culture, we may not fall prey to some new trap or yet another yoke.

A new and direct relationship with reality must be established without any intermediary, challenging the Western monopoly over theorization, forcing others to simply interpret their work and to see reality through Western philosophical thought and structure. We need to put forward our own version of the reality; current and practical, and convert it into a new text/discourse to be able to get rid of colonization, captivity, disunity, undeveloped state of human and social capital, alienation, corruption, pollution and mass-destruction of material resources and morals, of values and beliefs.

Muslims resist the postmodernist notion that everything is a social construct because if it were the case then the Quran is not Divine anymore and that all our fundamental concepts constituting our worldview would be rendered meaningless because all of them are but social constructs established by those who were in power at that time in history. Similarly the notion that there is no objective truth out there, and that all religions including Islam are simply social constructs, partially man-made truths supplemented by

Ed. Abu Ibrahim al-Hanafi, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaysia Press, Imam al-Ghazali Institute 900th Anniversary & Dar Al—Fiqh, 1979), 44.

<sup>88</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/apr95/7.htm accessed: 4/20/12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> http://drsoroush.com/English/On\_DrSoroush/E-CMO-19980000-Islamic\_Philosophy-Modern.html accessed: 9/15/10.

other human-created thoughts and ideologies, and that Islam is not the Absolute Truth for all times to come till Dooms Day, also hold no ground.

As far as the post modernists' denial of all Grand Narratives is concerned, we do declare the Oneness of Allah and the Truth of His Religion, His Prophets, and His Revelation. Therefore, apart from the Holy Quran and the authentic compilations of *ahadith* of the Prophet *SAW*, the two sources whose truth and finality is established and recognized beyond any doubt, much of the rest of the large body of Islamic literature based on human thinking/interpretations can be put to the rigors of deconstruction and/or other textual analysis in a larger philosophical and autobiographical framework using anthropology, psychology, sociology and historicity, etc. Moreover enthusiastic, willing and creative researchers of Islamic studies must continue to critically assess one another's work with a multidisciplinary approach.

The Holy Prophet SAW did ask all those present, including his greatest companions, during his address on the occasion of the last pilgrimage to pass his message on to all those who were not there that day, adding that they might prove better in listening, understanding and implementing his commands. This implies at the possibility of multiple and better interpretations of the Prophet's SAW utterances. The intellectual challenges posed by post modernism in the form of colonialism, evolutionism, rationalism, empiricism, existentialism, agnosticism, individualism, secularism, capitalism, humanism, nihilism, deconstruction'ism', and the like can only be answered intellectually and philosophically.

All the Muslim intellectuals who raise hue and cry about deconstructing Islamic thought and sources of Islamic law are graduates and/or professors of the Sorbonne University, Paris France, which had also been the alma mater of Heidegger and Derrida. Thus, it is basically a case of the mentors and the guides directly and deeply influencing the thinking and working of their protégés.

In conclusion, the major findings about contemporary Muslims' getting influenced by Western thought with special reference to Arkoun's work and thought as a well known representative icon can be summarized as following:

- Being a student of and teacher at Sorbonne University, Paris with a permanent residence in France, Arkoun's thought and work is neither open nor neutral.
- Arkoun adopted the Western point of view estranging himself from his origins.
- His prolific French work is mostly unknown or untranslated.
- His thought is uninhibited and secular.
- His objective remains unclear whether he wants to focus on the Quranic studies or methodological studies.
- He studies the Quran only for the sake of methodology.
- He is willing to apply to Islamic heritage the deficient and immature methods/theories developed in the West.
- He wants and expects the Quran to give concrete shape to his preconceived notions.
- He gives an entirely new account of the history of the Quran.
- He has no qualms about twisting history wherever it suits his ends.

- He dares question the authenticity of the Quran, Quran's own account of itself and its truthfulness.
- He acknowledges the truth of the *Umm ul Kitab*/Revelation but only at a level beyond human reach.
- He recognizes the veracity and credibility of the oral Quran only which is lost forever beyond recovery.
- In his hermeneutics, there is a sense of profound 'ontological uncertainty' which confuses the reader too.
- Most of his work is reader-unfriendly due to the excessive use of difficult language, vague expression, many foreign words/terms and other unfamiliar/technical terminologies, repetitions, contradictions and ambiguities.
- Readers unfamiliar with semiotics/deconstruction consider his writings a mathematical work instead of a textual analysis.
- Generally a negative impression of his work prevails as novices and experts in the field all are disenchanted with his work.
- He himself eventually began to feel that intellectuals and scholars either ignored or dismissed his thought and work as worthless.

# A Danish philosopher, Soren Aabye Kierkegaard said

"People demand freedom of speech to make up for the freedom of thought which they avoid."91

So basically it's more about the freedom of thought than anything else that is needed to break free from the conventional way of thinking and interpreting things in addition to acquiring the ability to think the unthinkable and the previously unthought as well as to get rid of being too overwhelmed by whatever gets 'current' in the largely impulsive Western thought.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Evan Esar, 20000 Quips & Quotes (USA: Barnes & Noble Publishing, 1995), 327.

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# **Islamic Tradition and its Defining Characteristics**

Dr. Humaira Ahmad

#### Abstract

Tradition conveys the meanings of connectedness to past and transmission of knowledge, practice, laws, and many other elements of both an oral and written nature. "Islamic Tradition" is no different from the general definition of 'tradition'. Understood in three different meanings, though interlinked, Islamic Traditionis a big circle which engulfs many traditions grown over some fourteen centuries inhabited nearly in every corner of the globe. Originating from the roots of divine transcendent, it spreads like a tree having many branches ranging from intellectual to mystical and from law to art and culture. Exhibiting the characteristics of assimilation, flexibility and adaptability, Islamic tradition has maintained its uniqueness and distinction among the world's religious traditions. Despite political fragmentation, theological differences, and ethnic distinctions, Islamic tradition has maintained its unity of the Islamic community. This article aims to introduce the various aspects of Islamic tradition and their development over the time. It is also an effort to highlight the distinctive features of Islamic Tradition and different "Traditionalist Schools".

Keywords: Hadith, Qur'an, Transcendent, Islamic Tradition, Traditional Schools

# Introduction

Tradition means many things. In its plain sense, it means simply a *tradium*<sup>92</sup>; it is anything which is transmitted, passed or handed down from past to the present, from one generation to another generation, is considered authoritative, or deferred without argument.<sup>93</sup> Tradition includes all that, a society of a given time possesses and which already existed.<sup>94</sup>

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, an eminent representative of "Traditionalist School" <sup>95</sup> in modern and postmodern world has put tradition on much higher place than confining it to customs and norms only. He has defined tradition as having its "origin in divine"<sup>96</sup>

<sup>92</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Tradition."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Edward Shils, *Tradition* (London: Faber & Faber limited, 1981), 12;Harry B. Acton has defined tradition a belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and or accepted as authoritative, or deferred without argument. (Harry B. Porter, "Tradition and some other forms of Order," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LIII [1952-54], 2); "It is handing down, delivery, especially oral delivery, fact handed down from one to another, or from generation to generation; transmission of statements, beliefs, rules, customs, or the like." (*The Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "Tradition.")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Around the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe there rose a reaction against modernism and it took various forms. One form of this reaction was due to the inspiration of the orient and this motivated many thinkers to peruse the concept of esoteric dimension of tradition which was more prevalent in the Orient. Thinkers in this School of thought advocated that "tradition is the continuity of revelation: an uninterrupted transmission, through innumerable generations, of the spiritual and cosmological principles, sciences and laws resulting from revealed religion: nothing is neglected, from the establishment of social orders and codes of conduct to the canons regulating the arts and architecture, ornamentation and dress. Personalities in this School of thought include Rene Guenon, Ananda Commaraswamy, Martin Lings, Frithjof Schuon, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> "Tradition means truth or principles of a divine origin revealed or unveiled to mankind and, in fact, a whole cosmic sector through various figures envisaged as messengers, prophets, avatars, the Logos or other

The one who adheres to tradition is called 'traditional'<sup>97</sup> and the system where adherence to traditional doctrine or theory or submission to the authority of tradition is known as "traditionalism."<sup>98</sup> One who belongs to traditionalism is nominated as 'traditionalist.<sup>99</sup> The word traditional, traditionist and traditionalist are used in same meanings.<sup>100</sup>

Tradition is closely linked to religion. A religion is founded first by revelation and it is passed on through tradition. All religions are traditions in this sense. Tradition in its meaning contain the element of transmission and religion implies in its root meaning "binding." <sup>101</sup> In this sense religion can be considered as the origin of tradition which through revelation manifests certain principles and truths through revelation and whose application then comprise tradition. <sup>102</sup>

A society is nominated the traditional one which is occupied with traditions. Almost every society is equipped with certain traditions whether modern or traditional. However, the distinction between "modern" and "traditional" lies in the functional authority of tradition in the traditional society.

The differentiation between modern and traditional society does not necessarily mean that modern or modernizing societies are tradition-less or within them there is no attachment to customs and norms of the past or to various symbols of collective identity with strong orientations to the past. "It means, rather, that modernization has greatly weakened one specific aspect of traditionality---namely, the legitimation of social, political, and cultural orders in terms of some combination of "pastness," "sacredness," and their symbolic and structural derivatives.

Before the advent of modernity and modernism almost all societies were called as traditional with little difference of more or less role of tradition (either the role of religious tradition or role of local norms, customs and folks). The epoch of modernity changed the ways of thinking and approach to different domains of life and religion. This transition from traditional to modernity entailed a break from the past; in some conditions it was not a radical one though as it added new paradigms to the tradition and defining the values and norms in new contexts which did not imply disappearance of the past. But in some conditions it completely overthrew the past. It is important to note that in all of these conditions traditionalists in societies undergoing rapid change understood themselves to be conservators of values and what is valued from the past. However they always tended to oppose the break that would decisively overthrow the authority of the past. Hence in the opinion of Graham, "traditionalism does not necessarily involve the attitude of conservatism or opposition to change in political, social, or religious life;

transmitting agencies, along with all ramifications and applications of these principles in different realms including law and social structure, art, symbolism, the sciences, and embracing of course Supreme knowledge along with the means for its attainment" [*Knowledge and Sacred*, 67-68; Victor Danner, "Religion and Tradition," in *Quest of the Sacred: the Modern World in the Light of the Tradition*, ed. S.H. Nasr & K. O Brien, (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2001), 22-23]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., s.v."Traditionalism."

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Ibid., 354-355.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Ibid., 354-355.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., s.v. "Religion."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Schuon says, "Religion is that which binds man to Heaven and engages his whole being; as for the word 'traditio,' it is related to a more outward and sometimes fragmentary reality, besides suggesting a retrospective outlook. At its birth a religion 'binds' men to Heaven from the moment of its first revelation, but it does not become a 'tradition', or admit more than one 'tradition', till two or three generations later." (FrithjofSchuon, *Light on the Ancient Worlds*, "144); *Knowledge and the Sacred*, 78-79.

traditions may serve equally well as the bases of reform and innovation or as the grounds for defense of the status quo."  $^{103}$ 

Even though no society in the modern age is without an element of tradition and traditionalism, still, Muslim society is the one in which tradition plays a remarkable role from the advanced industrial societies that have cultivated "modernity" and perceive themselves as nontraditional, modern or postindustrial.

In what meanings Islamic Tradition is being understood? What features do constitute Islamic Tradition and how it is distinctive from the other religious traditions of the world? The following discourse is an effort to answer these questions.

# **Islamic Tradition**

The term 'Islamic Tradition' is usually understood in three meanings; firstly, main streamline of orthodox beliefs in all aspects of Islam whether exoteric or esoteric; secondly, narrations of the Holy Prophet's (*SAW*) sayings, deeds are also known as traditions of the Holy Prophet (*SAW*);<sup>104</sup> thirdly, Islamic tradition has acquired special meanings in the writings of the traditionalist school. Here, Islamic Tradition would be dealt with in all of these meanings. Islamic Tradition must be distinguished from words like fundamentalism, conservatism and fanaticism used in popular media to portray Islamic Tradition these days.

"Islamic tradition is al-din at once, which embraces all aspects of religion, based upon sacred, divine models. In its every aspect and streamline, there is a chain which relates each period, episode stages of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin. Islamic tradition, therefore, is a like a tree, a single tree of Divine Origin, the roots of which are sunk through revelation in the Divine nature and form which the trunk and branches have grown over ages. At the heart of the tree of tradition resides revelation, and its sap consists of that grace or barakah which, originating with the revelation, makes possible the continuity of the life of the tree. Islamic tradition implies the sacred, the eternal, the immutable Truth; the perennial wisdom, as well as the continuous application of its immutable principles to various conditions of space and time."<sup>105</sup>

The "sense of connectedness," or *ittisaliyah* --- the need or desire for personal connection (*ittisal*) across the generations with the time and the personages of Islamic origins makes Islamic Tradition very distinctive and pervasive among other traditions. This is something that has been a persistent value in Muslim thought and institutions over the centuries.<sup>106</sup>

Islam is the last revealed religion which established a religion on earth for all<sup>107</sup> and would be manifested before the closing of the ages. It is the greatest representative and personification of monotheistic traditions in the world. At the heart of the Islamic tradition stands the reality of God, "the One,<sup>108</sup> the Absolute<sup>109</sup> and the Infinite,<sup>110</sup> the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> William A. Graham, "Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation," 499.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup>TheOxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Tradition."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*, (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1997), 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> William A. Graham, "Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23, no. 3, *Religion and History* (1993):507; Islamic Tradition in all its forms requires the

connectedness whether in *Hadith*, Jurisprudence or history. It is all about continuity and this chain of continuity is linked to transcendent.

<sup>107</sup> al Baqarah, 2:133; al-An'ām, 6: 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> al Baqarah, 2:163 ;al An'ām, 6:102; Tā hā, 20: 98; Hajj, 22:62; Al-Qasas, 28 :70; Al-Ghafir, 40:62. <sup>109</sup> al-Ikhlas, 112:1-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup>Ibrāhīm, 14:34; An-Nahl, 16:18.

Infinitely Good and All Merciful,<sup>111</sup> the One who is at once transcendent and greater than all we can conceive or imagine<sup>112</sup> as mentioned at different places in the Qur'ān.<sup>113</sup> The idea of tawhid (monotheism, oneness) makes Islam distinctive from other monotheistic traditions of Judaism and Christian tradition as in Jewish faith, salvation is reliant upon a certain ethnocentrism revolving around the Chosen people<sup>114</sup>, and this is in turn confines monotheistic concept to them; in Christianity salvation is bound up with a certain Christocentrism that leads to the worship of the God-Man, who in his turn detracts, from the absoluteness of the One.<sup>115</sup> The concept of oneness of Allah or *tawhid* is a radius around which the whole Islamic tradition is centered and this concept is the only reason of uniqueness, idealism, authenticity and dignity of the Islamic tradition.

Qur'ān is that last divine revelation,<sup>116</sup> which is the spoken word of God, revealed on Prophet Muhammad (SAW)<sup>117</sup> and is the fountainhead of Islamic tradition. Both the meanings and the text are considered to be the eternal word of God, <sup>118</sup> uncreated, as everything else is connected with it.<sup>119</sup> In every way, the soul of the traditional Muslim is like a mosaic made up of phrases of the Qur'an, which are repeated throughout life. It is transmitted from the Prophet (SAW) to us in its original form and everything of Islamic Tradition ushers from the Our'an.

While Islam considers itself the last religion to be revealed to mankind on earth, it also sees in the Messenger and Prophet Muhammad (SAW), the Seal of the Prophets.<sup>120</sup> Prophet Muhammad (SAW) as the seal of Prophets brings to an end, in his own person, the entire line and chain of prophets stretching back to Adam. Muhammad (SAW) was not just a reformer of society as present day modernists consider, but as the Qur'an asserts that Prophet (*SAW*) was a man <sup>121</sup>, not divine, that he was given the most exalted and noble character, <sup>122</sup> and that he was chosen as a model for Muslims to imitate. <sup>123</sup> For Muslims, the Prophet (*SAW*) is a mortal man, <sup>124</sup> but also Allah's most perfect creature on earth or in the terminology of the universal man (al-insan al Kamil).<sup>125</sup> It is the basic aspect of Islamic religious life to have an unconditional love for the Prophet (SAW). It might be said that this love is the key love for the love of God, for in order to love God, God must first love us, and God does not love a person who does not love His messenger.<sup>126</sup> A Muslim is also required to love other prophets and messengers. A devout

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> al Baqarah, 2:208; al An'ām, 6 :12 ; al An'ām, 6 :54; al-Hijr, 15:49; Ash-Shu'arā', 26:9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Tā hā, 20:110; Luqmān, 31: 26-31

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004), 3, 5.

<sup>114</sup> al-Mā'idah, 5:18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> al-'Imrān: 79-80; Abd al Jabbar Danner, The Islamic Tradition: An Introduction (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1991), 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Tā hā, 20: 4; an- Naml, 27 :6; Az Zumar, 39:1;41:2; al-Jāthiya, 45:2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> al-Kahf, 18:110 ; Az Zumar, 39: 2 ; Ibrāhīm, 14:1.

<sup>118</sup> Al-Wāqi 'ah, 56:80 ; Al-Hāqqah, 69: 43

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup>An- Nisā', 4:174; al-'Imrān, 3:138; Qāf, 50: 37; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values *for Humanity*, 22. <sup>120</sup>al-Mā'idah, 5:3; al-ahzāb, 33:40.

<sup>121</sup>al-ahzāb, 33:40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> at-Tawbah, 9:128; al Qalam, 68 :4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup>al-ahzāb, 33:21.

<sup>124</sup> al-'Imrān, 3:144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 18, 28.

<sup>126</sup> al-'Imran, 3: 132; at-Tawbah, 9: 24; al-ahzāb, 33: 6; al-Fath, 48:10

Muslim will not disgrace the prophets who came before Prophet Muhammad (*SAW*) particularly mentioned in the Qur'ān.<sup>127</sup>

The *Sunnah* and the Traditions of the Holy Prophet (*SAW*) are fundamental to the Islamic Tradition. *Sunnah* and *Hadith* have maintained their position in Muslim society as something which is passed on to us from transmission of chain of narrators.<sup>128</sup> The system of transmission of the *Hadith* has been based upon the use of the *isnad* (chain of transmitters), or "support," that accompanies the text of every individual *Hadith*.<sup>129</sup> The *isnad* takes the form of a list or "chain" (*silsilah*) of individual transmitters who cover the generations from the most recent reporter back to the Prophet (*SAW*) or the Companions.<sup>130</sup> The *isnads* exist in order to confirm the authenticity of a given report by confirming that it has come down via a *silsilah* composed of trustworthy persons - preferably a "high" chain made up of a minimum number of links.<sup>131</sup>

William Graham describes the defining elements of the *isnad* paradigm as: "(1) derivation of authority primarily or even, in extreme cases, solely from (2) linkage to a sacred, but historical, time of origins of the tradition through (3) a chain of personal transmission, the individual human links of which represent all intervening generations between that of the original source (ideally the Prophet (*SAW*) or one of his Companions) and that of the latest reporter. This paradigm is, in turn, the mechanism or explicit vehicle for the realization of *ittisaliyah* (connectivity), the personal connectedness which substantiates a report as valid tradition."<sup>132</sup>

This *isnad* paradigm is the most important model of Muslim traditionalism, which has most clearly and consistently expressed its need for connectedness.<sup>133</sup> "Correspondingly, "Qur'ān and *Sunnah*" early on became the dual catchphrase of Islamic traditionalism as passed on and elaborated by the *'ulama*', or religious scholars.<sup>134</sup> Whether identified as "orthodox," "orthoprax," or "scripturalist," the tradition of the *'ulama*' has always been characterized by reliance on "these two sources" of scripture and *Sunnah*. "Islamic traditionalism is also to speak about the widespread Muslim emphasis upon the primary, dual authority of the revelations of the Qur'ān and the tradition or practice (*Sunnah*) ascribed to the Prophet (*SAW*) and the first few generations of Muslims (the "pious forebears," *as-salaf*)."<sup>135</sup>

Consequently, Islamic Tradition is a big circle which engulfs many traditions grown over some fourteen centuries inhabited in nearly every corner of the globe. All prevalent traditions based on these two fundamentals of the Qur'ān and *Hadith* among Muslims either living in the Muslim world or in any other country as minority is considered Islamic, whether intellectual or mystic or artistic (Islamic architecture manifested in mosques buildings, calligraphy, etc). Qur'ān and *Hadith*, watchwords of Islamic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> al-baqarah, 2:133; An- Nisā', 4:150, 152.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> M. Mustafa Azmi, *Studies in Hadith Methodology and Literature* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2002), 35-65.
 <sup>129</sup> Muhammad Mustafa A'zami, *"Isnad* and its Significance," in *Hadith and Sunna: Ideals and Realities*, ed.,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> A. Rahman I. Doi, Introduction to Hadith (Nigeria: Arewa Books, 1981), 14; Muhammad Zubair Sidiqui, Hadith Literature: Its Origin, Development & Special Features (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993), 76.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Muhammad Zubair Siddiqui, "The Science and the Critique of Islam," in *Hadith and Sunna: Ideals and Realities*, 72-73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> "Traditionalism in Islam,"502.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Ibid., 521-522.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Ibid., 504.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Ibid., 500.

Tradition provide basis for orthodoxy in Islam as earlier it was studied that the concept of orthodoxy is of capital importance in every religious tradition. The very word orthodoxy means "correctness of belief or doctrine" <sup>136</sup> and Islam is also called the "religion of the straight path"<sup>137</sup>. Thus, in Islamic Tradition, orthodoxy can be understood as the state of being on the "straight path." Orthodoxy provides the basis of Islamic traditionalism which in turn is grounded in Qur'ān and *Sunnah*, *Sharia* law as well as its esoteric elements as Sufism.

As stated earlier, *Sunnah* was the key element in interpreting the Qur'ān for the development of Islamic Law. Jurists also relied on *Ijmaa* or consensus of the Muslim community; the third source of Islamic Law and the principle of authority.<sup>138</sup> Jurists of the second and third centuries after the *Hijra* illustrated the revealed law from these three sources and "roots of Islamic jurisprudence." <sup>139</sup> They also mobilized the *Ijmaa* or consensus by equating it with unanimity among those pious ancestors who constituted the first generation of Muslims.<sup>140</sup> "On the basis of these sources, Muslim jurists built a system of law which, from the point of view of logical perfection, has been described as one of the most brilliant systems of human reasoning."<sup>141</sup>

The different ways of interpreting the Qur'ān and applying different ways of *qiyas and ra'y* on *Sunnah* of various jurists laid down the foundation of *madhabs*.<sup>142</sup> Some of these *madhabs* or schools died out during the course of time,<sup>143</sup> but four have been accepted by *Ijma* as orthodox and practiced during the past millennium. They constitute the main body of traditional *Sunnism*<sup>144</sup> and traditional Muslims all around the world adhere to either of these. The teachings of these four schools were recognized as orthodox and traditional by the Muslim community. These schools were named after their founders, the Imams Malik (*Maliki*),<sup>145</sup> Abu Hanifa (*Hanafi*),<sup>146</sup> Ahmed Ibn Hanbal (*Hanbali*)<sup>147</sup> and Shaf'i (*Shaf'i*).<sup>148</sup> Though they differed in various issues but fundamentals and the basics remained the same throughout the Islamic World. In Islamic Tradition, *Sharia* is defended as the divine law which has been crystallized in these classical and orthodox Schools of Law. Moreover it also accepts the possibility of giving fresh views on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., s.v. "Orthodoxy."

<sup>137</sup> Al-Ana'm 6:161.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966), 72-75; Saba Habachy, "Islam: Factors of Stability and Change," Columbia Law Review. 54, no. 5, Community Security vs. Man's Right to Knowledge (1954):712.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> Islam, 68-70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> Ahmad Hassan, The Doctrine of Ijma' in Islam: A Study of the Juridical Principle of Consensus (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1978), 3-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Saba Habachy, "Islam: Factors of Stability and Change," 713.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Islam, 81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> *Islam*, 83; Muhammad Hameedullah Khan, *The Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study* (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2001), 131-134; *Zahiris*, the Literalist, School of Tabari, Auzai, etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Islam, 8; Ahmad Hassan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, 1994), 21-28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Malikism, founded by Imam Malik ibn Anas (d.179/795), is based mostly on the practice of Medina and is very conservative in its approach to Law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Hanafism was founded by a Persian, Imam Abu Hanifah (d.150/767), who was a student of Imam Jafar Sadiq, the sixth Imam of Shi'ite Law, which is called Ja'fari law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> The Hanbali School, founded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) from Baghdad, based itself solely on the Qur'ān and *Hadith* and gave a very strict interpretation of the Shariah.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> The Shafi'i School was founded by a student of Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Muhammad Idris al Shafi'i (d. 204/819). He was the one who completed and perfected the methods of jurisprudence in Islamic Law.

basis of legal principles *ijtihad*,<sup>149</sup> as well as making use of others according to such traditional legal principles as *qiyas*<sup>150</sup> and *istihsan*<sup>151</sup> and *istislah*<sup>152</sup>, etc. In Islamic Tradition, all morality is derived from Qur'ān and *Sunnah* and in a more concrete manner from *Shariah*.<sup>153</sup>

*Shariah* or Orthodox Islamic Law Schools constitute the exoteric aspect of Islamic Tradition. Also, there are orthodox esoteric elements of Islamic Tradition. Although in most Western studies, orthodoxy is limited to exoteric elements but there is also an exoteric orthodoxy and orthopraxy and there is esoteric orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Traditional and orthodox Sufism is not only a part of Islamic orthodoxy <sup>154</sup> but it also constitutes the inner dimension of the Islamic Tradition. The sense of connectedness or *ittisaliya* which is the distinctive characteristic of Islamic Traditionalism also plays a key role in mysticism as in *Hadith*, in law and history.

"Sufism is the name of Islamic mysticism which is an attempt to reach an individual salvation through attaining true *tawhid*."<sup>155</sup> The Sufi tradition or *tariqah* has played such a major role in shaping Muslim values, worship, theology, conversion, and social order that it has functioned almost as an equal partner with the "ulama tradition" of "normative" religious and legal learning in defining actual Muslim piety and practice.<sup>156</sup> Sufism traces its origins to the Holy Prophet (*SAW*) and his companions. Some of the Prophetic traditions are taken as mystical traditions as the one known as "*Hadith-e-Jibraeil*."<sup>157</sup> The concept of 'Ihsān' mentioned in this *Hadith* has become the foundation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> Ijtihad is defined as, "expending of maximum effort in the performance of an act. Technically, it is the effort made by the *mujtahid* in seeking knowledge of the *ahkam* (rules) of the *sharia* through interpretation." (Imran Hassan Khan Nyazee, *Islamic Jurisprudence* [Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007], 263)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> *Islam*, 71; The term *qiyas*, according to the Muslim jurists, means analogical reasoning, i.e., concluding from a given principle embodied in a precedent that a new case falls under this principle or is similar to this precedent on the strength of a common essential feature called the 'reason'(*illa*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> Istihsan was the form of ray in the School of Abu Hanifa. It was a unique method of exercising personal opinion by setting aside the apparent and strict analogy in the interest of public benefit, equity or justice. (The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, 145-151)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup>*Istislah* means a deduction of law based on consideration of public good or public welfare. Imam Malik sanctioned this doctrine. (*The Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study*, 56)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 85-86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Umar ibn Khattab (RA) said: "As we were sitting one day before the Messenger of Allah (SAW), a man suddenly appeared. He wore pure white clothes and his hair was dark black-yet there were no signs of travel on him, and none of us knew him. He came and sat down in front of the Prophet (SAW), placing his knees against his, and his hands on his thighs. He said, "O Muhammad! Tell me about Islam." The Messenger of Allah (SAW), replied, "Islam is to bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God; and to perform the prayer; pay zakat; fast Ramadan; and to perform Hajj to the House if you are able."The man said, "You have spoken the truth," and we were surprised that he asked and then confirmed the answer. Then, he asked, "Tell me about belief (iman)."The Prophet (SAW) replied, "It is to believe in Allah; His Angels; His Books; His Messengers; the Last Day; and in destiny-its good and bad."The man said, "You have spoken the truth. Now, tell me about spiritual excellence (ihsan)."The Prophet (SAW), replied, "It is to serve Allah as though you behold Him; and if you don't behold him, (know that) He surely sees you." "Now, tell me of the Last Hour," asked the man. The Prophet (SAW) replied, "The one asked knows no more of it than the one asking." "Then tell me about its signs," said the man. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) replied, "That slave women give birth to their mistresses; and that you see barefoot, unclothed, beginning shepherds competing in the construction of tall buildings." Then the visitor left, and I waited a long time. Then the Prophet (SAW) asked me, "Do you know, Umar, who the questioner was?" I replied, "Allah and His Messenger know best."He (SAW) said, "It was Jibril. He came to you to teach

for Sufism. Companions of the Holy Prophet (*SAW*) Salman al Farsi (*RA*) and Owais-e-Qarani (*RA*) are also symbolized as mystics.<sup>158</sup> Mystic tendencies did develop after the martyrdom of Ali b abi Talib (*RA*) in the period of the Ummayads as the government was more involved in worldly desires and luxuries. The resistance of the pious circles to the government during this period significantly shaped Sufism.<sup>159</sup>

Sufism in the beginning remained limited to individual circles but with the development of formal disciplines of Islamic law and theology, it has grown into institution or paths (*tariqas*) with a mass appeal.<sup>160</sup> From about the sixth and seventh centuries (AH), there developed orders from these paths.<sup>161</sup> In each of the orders continued particular inner or esoteric teachings traced back to a master teacher, from whom the tarigah often took its name and this *isnad* was traced back to Companions of the Holy Prophet, most often Ali *ibn Abi Talib (RA).*<sup>162</sup> Sufis are of the view that prophecy (*nubuwwah*) was replaced after the death of the last Prophet (SAW) with sainthood or the state of nearness to God (wilayah), which has its own succession. Thus it can be noted that "at the center of systematized Sufi thought the key concept of an initiatory isnad of spiritual guides or masters (murshids, shaykhs, pīrs) that is most commonly referred to as a "chain," or silsilah.<sup>163</sup> The spiritual power (barakah) of charismatic religious figures is thus achieved in a line of spiritual descent that links each new generation and lay followers of an order to the spiritual authority of the Prophet (SAW) and ultimately to God-through the Companions and the best of their successors."<sup>164</sup> The notion of the *silsilah* is so much pivotal in Sufism that it is used generally in many Sufi traditions throughout the Islamic world to designate an entire order and/or its tradition of teaching and initiation.<sup>165</sup> The induction of the Sufi into a particular "path" receives its and authority through the silsilah into which he or she gains acceptance and it is also noteworthy that almost all tariqas have traced their silsilas back to Prophet Muhammad (SAW) through his son-in-law and cousin, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (RA), most often through the famous, al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728) and from Sufi, al- Junayd al-Baghdadi (d. 298/9I0).<sup>166</sup>

It can also be observed that there has been a conflict between *ulama* the guardians of *Sharia* and Sufis due to inclusion of heterodox elements in Sufism<sup>167</sup> which were being corrected and removed by emergence of orthodox Sufism. This orthodox Sufism culminated in the works of Imam Ghazali "who not only reconstituted orthodox Islam, making Sufism an integral part of it, but also a great reformer of Sufism, purifying it of un-Islamic elements and putting it to the service of orthodox Islam."<sup>168</sup> His influence throughout the Islamic World is incalculable as Sufis of Africa, Central Asia and India derive their doctrines from his teachings.<sup>169</sup>

you your religion." [Imam Mulism ibn Hajjaj bin Muslim alQushairi Nesaburi, *Jami' as Sahih*, Kitab ul Imān, babul Bayan al Imān wal Islām wal Ihsān wa Wajub al Imān bi Ithbāt Qadar allah hi Ta'ala- wa Bayan ad-Dalīl al al Tabarri mimman la Yu'minu Bilqadar wa ighlath al qawl fi Haqqihey, *Hadith*, 1.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup>*Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> Ibid.,29-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup>Islam, 132.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 132.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> "Traditionalism in Islam," 515.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 231, 239-240; Islam, 156.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> "Traditionalism in Islam," 515.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 26-28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Junaid Baghdadi and Hassan Basri

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Islam, 129-130, 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> Islam, 140.

Another side of Islamic Tradition that developed during the period of Ummahyds is philosophical. The emergence of Shi'a, Khawārij and other similar movements promoted philosophical debates like divine will, nature of divine attributes and reason, etc. The development of Muslim philosophy and parallel to this the development of theology constituted the intellectual side of Islamic Tradition. Islam created the richest philosophical tradition, one which possesses great significance for Islam itself and has survived as a continuous tradition to this day.<sup>170</sup> In the Abbasid period, translation of the Greek philosophical texts into Arabic contributed to the development of Muslim philosophy.<sup>171</sup> Islam created a powerful and original philosophy within the intellectual universe of monotheism and the *Qur'anic* revelation, while incorporating those elements of Greek philosophy which conformed to the Islamic perspective. "Being traditional philosophy based upon supra individualistic opinion, Islamic philosophy developed schools and perspectives which were followed over centuries, rather than being changed and overthrown and opposed by one philosopher after another. Some of the philosophers as Averroes and Avicenna were criticized by theologians who developed another paradigm of Islamic Tradition."<sup>172</sup> Still, Islamic Philosophical Tradition despite its diversity, variety and richness, shares some common features. It is dominated by the word of Allah, Qur'an and Prophetic (SAW) traditions (Hadiths), assures harmony between reason and revelation, and provides within the context of a religious tradition dominated by monotheism, metaphysics centered on the Supreme doctrine of One.<sup>173</sup> Muslim philosophy is not only rich in religious and ethical philosophy, but also in the philosophies of nature and mathematics as well as of art. In fact, Islamic sciences were cultivated in the Islamic philosophy and almost always by men who were not only scientists but also philosophers.<sup>174</sup>

In the development of different intellectual and mystical streamlines of the Islamic Tradition, the role of madrasa education cannot be ruled out which also constitutes a significant portion of the Islamic tradition. The quest for knowledge and its true celebration were dominated from beginning to end by its sacred quality and nature. In Islam, knowledge was never divorced from the sacred presence. Islamic education is related to holiness and wholeness and is concerned with the whole being of the men and women whom it sought to educate.

In the early period of Islam, *khuttab* were setup as the institutes for imparting elementary education to the young for learning Qur'an and its message.<sup>175</sup> The rise of Islamic jurisprudence gave way to higher learning. Madrasa Nizamia under patronage of Veizer Nizam ul Mulk around 1064 AD was the next step in the evolution of higher learning and education in Muslim World.<sup>176</sup> This madrasa can be nominated as college. The opening of this school was also a transition from mosque to schools.<sup>177</sup> Established in the time of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Role and the Meaning of Philosophy in Islam," Studia Islamica, vol. XXXVII, 1973, 57-80.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> C. A. Qadir, *Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World* (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 32-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 133.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid. <sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> Charles Michael Stanton, Higher Learning in Islam: The Classical Period A.D. 700-1300 (Mary Land: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1990), 14-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup>George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 24, no. 1 (1961): 1-56, http://www.jstor.org/.: Higher Learning in Islam: The Classical Period A.D. 700-1300. 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> Mehdi Nakosteen, History of Islamic Origins of Western Education (Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1964), 39.

the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW), eht madrasa has maintained its integrity as the source of religious learning as well as other disciplines of knowledge. Madrasa has provided a special atmosphere; it combined the academic and social lives of students and teachers residing in it and formed a community of scholars.<sup>178</sup> These *madrassas* were established on the principle of transmission of knowledge from teacher to disciple and then a formal *ijaza* (a letter certifying the proficiency of student in that particular subject) was granted to transmit this knowledge to others.<sup>179</sup> The radiance of such institutions and their significance was so great that soon they were being noticed throughout the whole of the Islamic world and in fact played a fundamental role in the foundation of the European centers of higher education, a role that is only now fully recognized.<sup>180</sup> Madrassas founded by Nizam ul Mulk were very famous all over the world and in the words of Shalabi, "no single village lacks one of these schools."<sup>181</sup> The main activity of the madrassas was instruction in the religious sciences, especially Divine Law (al Shariah), its principles (al-usul), jurisprudence (al-Fiqh), and theology, etc.<sup>182</sup> These disciplines together were referred to as the transmitted (nagli) sciences and they dominated the educational activity of most *madrassas*.<sup>183</sup> Another important feature of the *madrassa* was its beautiful architecture which served the needs of boarding for students and faculty.<sup>184</sup> To this day, in most Islamic cities, after the mosques, the *madrasas*, which in fact were always related geographically to mosques, are the most notable architectural masterpieces to be found.

Tradition of Islamic architecture manifested through mosques and domes, tradition of Islamic calligraphy and painting also constitute the big circle of Islamic Tradition.<sup>185</sup> These various forms of art insist upon its relation to the inner dimension of the Islamic revelation and its crystallization of the spiritual treasures of the religion in visible or audible forms.<sup>186</sup> Islamic architecture has made full use of light and shade and heat and coolness, of wind and its aerodynamics.<sup>187</sup> The ecological harmony in Islamic architecture is the result of Islamic spirituality guided by Qur'ān and *Sunnah*.<sup>188</sup> In the Qur'ān, the terminologies related to modern architecture is mentioned at many places.<sup>189</sup> Islamic architecture though is unique and distinct from other forms of architecture as it has assimilated elements of local culture and made them own the characteristic of Islamic tradition. This characteristic is true for all forms of Islamic Tradition. Historical analysis shows that Islam is the religion of adaptability, wherever it was embraced in any part of the world, it assimilated in it the local norms and traditions while remaining within the limits of orthodoxy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup>Higher Learning in Islam: The Classical Period A.D. 700-1300, 47.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Nakosteen sums up the outcomes of Muslim education as, "The Muslims passed on the experimental method of science, however imperfect, to the West... They stimulated European thought, reacquired it with the Greek and other classical Greek cultures and thus helped to bring about Renaissance. They contributed knowledge of hospitals, sanitation, and food to Europe" (*History of Islamic Origins of Western Education*, 62).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Ahmad Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education* (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1952), 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup>Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 126.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup>Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup>The Islamic Tradition: An Introduction, 178-179.

<sup>186</sup>Ibid., 179.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Art and Spirituality (Cambridge: Golgonooza Press, 1987), 56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup>Islamic Art and Spirituality,57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> Prof. Gelani Ikram Ali Shah, Architecture and Town Planning in the Holy Qur'ān (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd, 1991)

This particular feature of adaptability and flexibility of Islamic tradition makes it distinct from the world traditions. The fundamental reason behind this uniqueness is the prohibition of the spirit of exaggeration in all aspects of life mentioned in the Qur' $\bar{a}n^{190}$  and *Sunnah* of the Prophet *(SAW)*.<sup>191</sup> Islamic tradition declares the right path for the

orthodox community where its adherents keep the forces of conservatism and the forces of progressiveness in equilibrium.<sup>192</sup> Both these factors are necessary for the preservation and continuity of Islamic tradition. Without the former, Islam would lose its character and yield to dangerous heresies; without the latter, it would lose touch with the changing conditions of life.<sup>193</sup> A necessary balance has always been maintained between traditionalism and innovation in Islamic tradition. Over the centuries, with the advent of new inventions, new changes were welcomed and legitimized after close scrutiny and critical analysis of *ulama*, religious scholars and jurists. The process of exercising legal opinion in case of not finding any legal evidence from the past also continued throughout the history of Muslims supported with the strong source of consensus of the Muslim community which laid down the basis of collective *Ijtihad*.<sup>194</sup> There were of course, continuous renewals from within that must not, however be confused with reform in its modern sense. Many great scholars of law continued to appear and Sufism was also rejuvenated in several areas.<sup>195</sup> In the words of Nasr,

"New ways of conceptualizing the Sharia, efforts to reach new audiences, new conceptions of religion and of the 'ulama's position in society and polity, and new roles of religious and political activism are, some of the many facets of change that continue to sweep through the world of ulama. Such changes are not the product of some grand blueprint for bringing them about; nor are they necessarily recognized as "changes. Many, indeed are the paradoxical product of the 'ulama's very effort to conserve their tradition in a changing world. Whether or not, they acknowledge this, such an effort necessarily entails continuous redefinition of themselves, their stances and their intellectual sources."<sup>196</sup>

The entire Islamic history is full of these examples since the time of the Holy Prophet (SAW) when changes were made in Islamic law according to the contemporary conditions without entailing a break with tradition.<sup>197</sup> The process of exercising *ijtihad* for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> al-Mā'idah 5:77 ;An-Nisā'4:171.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> The Apostle of Allah (SAW) said: "Do not impose austerities on yourselves so that austerities will be imposed on you, for people have imposed austerities on themselves and Allah imposed austerities on them. Their survivors are to be found in cells and monasteries…" [Sulaiman Dawood bin Asha'as, Sunan Abi Dawood, Kitab ul Adab, Bab, fil Hasad, 4886.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup>al-Baqarah, 2 : 143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 84-87.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Examples of collective ijtihads can be observed during the reigns of Abu Bakrτ and Umar RA. They used to call upon the companions and used to take their opinions in any new matter, faced by Muslim Ummah. They issued judgments after the consensus of these companions. There are many examples of this kind of judgments which laid down the basis for collective Ijtihad. ; Examples of these judgments can be found in Abu Yusuf, Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari, Kitab al-Kharaj (Cairo: al-Matba'at al-Salafiyah, 1325), 26-27; al-Qasim ibn 'Abd al-Salam Abu 'Ubayd, Kitab al-Amwal, ed. Khalil Harras (Cairo: Maktabah Kulliyah al-Azhariyah, 1975/1395), 61-62; Abu Muhammad 'Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Bahram al-Darimi, Sunan al-Darimi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.), 1:58, Abu Muhammad 'Abdullah ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.), 2:720-21; al-'Ayni, 'Umdat (n.p.: n.d.), 23:266; Yunus ibn 'Abdulah Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, ed. Abu al-Ashbal al-Zuhayri, Jami' Bayan al-'Ilm wa Fadlihi, 1st ed. (Dar Ibn al-Jawzi: 1994/1414), 2:56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 101-106.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., 124.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Aznan Hasan, "An Introduction to Collective Ijtihad (Ijtihad Jama 'i): Concept and Applications," in *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* (20:2): 29; Taha Jabir al- 'Alwani, *Ijtihad* (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), 6-9.

legitimization of new changes emerging in the world of Islam gained momentum during the nineteenth century. Throughout the Muslim world, reforms were made within the divine limits to meet the local norms and traditions. For instance, the Ottoman reforms of Tanzimat including the commercial code of 1850 were similar to European commercial and criminal code. The Majalla of 1870 based on the rulings of Hanafi School of law provided greater degree of regularity required in complex economic transactions, including trade with non-Muslim powers. This was the first and most successful attempt to codify Islamic Law.<sup>198</sup> This *Majalla* was also the beginning of the era of collective *litihad*.<sup>199</sup> There are many other examples of the local variety of *ijtihad* conducted in different parts of the Muslim world. Now it has become a matter of routine practice that reforms are made in Islamic legal practices on the basis of *ijtihad*. In Saudi Arabia, reforms occur on routine basis on the invocation of masala mursala (Public Welfare).<sup>200</sup> For further legislation based on the *ijtihad* of *ulama*, a Jurisprudence Academy of the Organization of Islamic Conference is working to cater for the needs of modern period.<sup>201</sup> There are many other many academies, organizations and councils working at local level to conduct the process of *ijtihad*.<sup>202</sup> Other than varieties of individual *ijtihad*, numerous international institutions are performing this noble task of exercising *ijtihad* at collective level. The collective *ijtihad* ensures harmony and unity among Muslims belonging to different ethnic groups, different tribes living in different parts of the world.<sup>203</sup> These

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Amin Ahsan Islahi, *Islamic Law, Concept and Codification* (Lahore: Islamic Publishers, n.d), 89-105.
 <sup>199</sup> First Encyclopedia of Islam, 1913–1936, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., s.v. "Medjelle."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Muslim Politics, 26; The author of the Muslim Politics has given the example of Social Insurance Law of 1970 which was a departure "from the classical laws of inheritance as in the case of deceased worker: Inheritors of his governmentally guaranteed insurance would now be principally his wife and children and not simply ---- as might be expected – male agnatic relatives."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> King Fahd Abdul Aziz's inaugural address on the eve of the establishment of the Academy of Ijtihad is quoted here when he said, "Such Ijtihad must be validated by the ulema after due research in and consideration of old and new jurisprudence. In this regard, the call for the establishment of this academy reflects an imperative need at this stage of development of the Muslim Ummah. Indeed it provides the truly Islamic response to questions raised by the challenges of modern life. This requires the pooling of the efforts by jurists, scholars, sages, thinkers throughout the Muslim world with a view to seeking answers to the questions posed by the challenges of our time, based on the reality of our tolerant Shariah." [Dale F. Eickelman, James P. Piscotri, *Muslim Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 26-27]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Aznan Hasan has listed some prominent Muslim countries and the institutions for performing Ijtihad on collective level.; Egypt: The Academy for Islamic Researches (Majma' al-Buhuth al-Fighiyah), and The High Council for Islamic Affairs (al-Majlis al-A'la li al-Shu'un al-Islamiyah), Saudi Arabia: The Organization of Great Jurists of Saudi Arabia(Hay'at Kibar al-'Ulama' fi al-Mamlakat al-Arabiyat al- Sa'udiyah); The Permanent Committee for Scientific Researches and Ifta' (al-Lajnat al-Da'imah li al-Buhuth al-'Ilmiyah wa al-Ifta'); The General Commission for the Administration of Scientific Researches, Ifta' and Missionary Works and Preaching (al-Ri'asat al-'Ammah li Idarat al-Buhuth wa al-Ifta' wa al- Da'wah wa al-Irshad); The International Fiqh Academy (Majma'al-Fiqh al-Islami al-Dawli); and The Fiqh Academy (Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami). Kuwait: The General Administration for Ifta' (Kuwait); The Islamic Organization for Medical Researches (al-Munazzamat al- Islamiyat li al-'Ulum al-Tibbiyah); The Islamic Council for Fatwa and Shari'ah Supervisory in the Kuwaiti House of Finance (Hay'at al-Fatwa wa al-Rigabat al-Shar'iyah fi Bayt al-Tamwil al-Kuwayti); and The International Shari'ah Council for Affairs Related to Zakat under the House of Zakat in Kuwait (al-Hay'at al- Shar'iyat al-'Alamiyat li al-Zakat al-Tabi'at li Bayt al-Zakat fi Dawlat al-Kuwayt). Sudan: The Board for Shari'at's Ifta' in Sudan (Majlis al-Ifta' al- Shar'i fi al-Sudan) and The Supreme Council of the Shari'ah Supervisory Board for Banking and Financial Institutions in Sudan (al-Hay'at al-'Ulya al-Shar'iyah li al-Jihaz al-Masrafi wa al- Mu'assasat al-Maliyah fi Sudan). Pakistan: The Council for Islamic Teaching in Pakistan (Majlis al-Fikr al-Islami bi Bakistan). These Institutions hire scholars only from their respective country. However there are other institutions which hire scholars from all over the world as International Figh Academy, The Islamic Organization for Medical Researches and the International Shari'ah Council for Affairs Related to Zakat under the House of Zakat in Kuwait. (Aznan Hassan, "An Introduction to Collective Ijtihad (Ijtihad Jama 'i): Concept and Applications," 39-41)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> These institutions do not only stick to the opinion of any specific school of thought.

international organizations work on the principle of minimizing the juristic and theological differences among the Muslim *Ummah*. Their main aim is to cater for the needs of the traditional Muslims living in the modern and postmodern world.<sup>204</sup>

There is of course, a visible unity in Islamic civilization. Despite political fragmentation, theological differences, and ethnic distinctions, Islamic tradition has maintained its unity of the Islamic community and a constant desire for political unity within the *dar al-Islam* in the hearts of all Muslims.<sup>205</sup> The central factor in the creation of unity among Muslims is the Qur'ān. Then there are the *Sunnah* and *Hadith* of the Prophet (*SAW*), which are very powerful unifying factors. Although there are local varieties in the understanding of the twin sources of the Islamic religion, that is, the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, there are three central doctrines upon which all schools of Islam agree, namely *tawhid*, or Divine oneness, *nubuwwah*, or prophecy, and *ma'ad*, or eschatology.<sup>206</sup> Hossein Nasr, while discussing the unity and diversity of Islamic Tradition states,

"The vast majority of Muslims still breathe in a universe in which the Name of God is associated above all with Compassion and Mercy, and they turn to him in patience even in the midst of the worst tribulations. If one looks at the extensive panorama of the Islamic spectrum, it becomes evident for the vast majority of Muslims, the traditional norms based on peace and openness to others, norms that have governed their lives over the centuries and are opposed both secularist modernism and "fundamentalism" and central concern. And after the dust settles in this tumultuous period of both Islamic and global history, it will be the voice of traditional Islam that will have the final say in the Islamic world."<sup>207</sup>

The significant role of tradition in Islamic societies is strengthened by the presence of different Schools of Tradition. These Schools adhere to different forms of Islamic Tradition in one way or the other.

### **Islamic Traditionalist Schools**

The broader term used for the cluster of traditional Muslims is Sunni Muslims <sup>208</sup> all around the world. The Sunni Muslims follow and adhere to either of the orthodox legal schools<sup>209</sup> and constitute different schools of traditional Islam. They follow the doctrines of orthodox legal schools and are divided on the basis of doctrines.<sup>210</sup> There is a group of traditionalists who share the doctrine, emphasizing the study of law and the traditions attributed to Prophet Muhammad (*SAW*) as well as a self consciously Muslim belief and practice.<sup>211</sup> The other traditionalists affirm not just the authority of the Prophet (*SAW*) but also of religious saints and holy people, whom they revere as source of religious guidance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Aznan Hasan writes on the importance of collective Ijtihad, "Its role is essential to Islam's continuity and survival in the modern world. It is a viable way to accommodate all Muslims, organizations, or even authorities who are concerned with a more utilitarian solution that suits the exigencies of modern life and business." ("An Introduction to Collective Ijtihad (Ijtihad Jama 'i): Concept and Applications," 37)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 108.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity, 108-112.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> The Islamic term that was generally applied to this cluster of traditional Muslim groups within Islamicate society during the first few centuries was *ahl al- Sunna wal-jama'a* "the people of the Sunna and the Community," from which the term "Sunni" is derived. This term is also used to distinguish from the Shi'i Muslims all over the world.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Hanafi, Shafii, Hanbali, Maliki.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Here the names of these schools would not be mentioned because it would be very difficult to cover the whole Muslim world. However these traditional Muslims follow orthodoxy in different ways.
 <sup>211</sup> In the sub continent it is called the Deoband School.

<sup>70</sup> 

and vehicles of mediation between God and human beings.<sup>212</sup> Another traditional school, for its part, denies the legitimacy not just of all practices lacking a basis in scriptural texts, but even of the classical schools of law, stringently insisting on the Qur'an and Hadith as the exclusive and directly accessible sources of guidance.<sup>2</sup>

The term traditionalist is also referred to reformist religious movement primarily associated to hanbaliya, the followers of Ahmad bin Hanbal.<sup>214</sup> They were nominated traditionalists in opposition to Mu'tazila who were called rationalists.<sup>215</sup>

There are a considerable number of traditional *ulama* who are also working as modernists and advocate the traditional themes and doctrines in a modernist way. Hence, they also constitute the larger circle of Islamic tradition. Presently Shi'a follows their legal school of Imam Jafar Sadiq and orthodoxy are also nominated as traditionalists. After the Iran revolution in 1974, the Iranian Government follows Shi'a orthodox doctrines. They are nominated as traditional.

There is another significant school which is recognized with the name of 'traditionalist.' It arose mainly in the West in reaction to the destruction caused by Western modernism and modernity. From the 1960s onward, it began to manifest itself in the public intellectual arena and challenged both the modernists and the secularists. Rene Guenon was the pioneer in this School.<sup>216</sup> He studied deeply the traditions and histories of the West and East and was impressed by the occult of the orient. He challenged the premises of Western modernity and synthesized the crisis of modern man.<sup>217</sup> Along with him many other followers' advocated certain common doctrines called tradition. "They considered tradition as the continuity of revelation: an uninterrupted transmission, through innumerable generation, of the spiritual and cosmological principles, sciences and law resulting from a revealed religion: nothing is neglected, from the establishment of social orders and codes of conduct to the canons regulating the arts and architecture, ornamentation and dress; it includes mathematical, physical, medical and psychological sciences, encompassing moreover those deriving from celestial movements."<sup>218</sup> They also emphasized that all religions have some common transcendent unity and originally all religions are good and divine.<sup>219</sup> The followers of this School referred all things back to superior planes of being, and eventually to ultimate principles.<sup>220</sup>

The use of tradition in the writings of these traditionalists is equated with Philosophia Perennis or primordial tradition.<sup>221</sup>All of the followers of this School criticized the West and its technological advancement which destroyed traditional culture in a profound

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> In sub continent, this school of thought is known as *Brelwi* (both Brelwi and Deobandi are followers of the Hanafi School of Law).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in the Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (UK, Oxford University Press, 2004), 1; They are called salafi the followers of Adul Wahhab and Ibn-e-Taymiyya.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>214</sup> Richard C Martin, Defenders of Reason in Islam, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Rene Guenon, East and West (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2002); William W. Quinn Jr., The Only Tradition (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Rene Guenon, Crisis of the Modern World (London: Luzac & Co., 1962), 34-56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen, "Why I am not a Traditionalist", 2002; http://www.religioscope.com/pdf/esotrad/legenhausen.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, trans. (London: Faber and Faber Limited, n.d), 23-65.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen, "Why I am not a Traditionalist", 2002;

http://www.religioscope.com/pdf/esotrad/legenhausen.pdf. 221 The Only Tradition, 3.

way.<sup>222</sup> Frithjof Schuon (1907-1998), Titus Burckhardt (1908-1984), Marco Pallis (1895-1989), Martin Lings (1909-2005), Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b.1933) and Huston Smith (b. 1919)<sup>223</sup> are the most prominent names of this school. These scholars were not only deeply rooted in the local religious tradition whether Islamic, Hindu or Buddhist, but were also well acquainted with the West. They insisted on participation and regular initiation in a living tradition in order to understand and assimilate the first principles and the esoteric teachings.<sup>224</sup> They began to defend the integral Islamic Tradition, the *tariqah* as well as the *sharia*, the intellectual disciplines as well as the traditional arts.<sup>225</sup> Such scholars base themselves on the universality of revelation stated in the Our'an. These scholars and leaders sought to preserve the rhythm of traditional Islamic life as well as its intellectual and spiritual traditions and find allies in Judaism and Christianity in confronting the challenges of secularism as well as globalization.<sup>226</sup> But one thing is important; they all emphasized the exoteric dimension of religion.

One thing should also be kept in mind while observing all traditionalist schools; once the people who were nominated as modernists or liberal by their contemporaries became traditional for the later ages as happened in the case of the Hanafi's as they were called as 'Ahl ar raave' by their contemporaries, and now they are nominated as traditional school, part of Islamic traditionalism. So it is not necessary that modernists of one period would be called traditionalist for the coming time ahead.

The development and refinement of Islamic Tradition is evident from these different schools built up over a period of time. The opposite elements deviating from tradition play an important role in the crystallization and maturity of Islamic Tradition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Guenon states, "As the danger of the inventions, even those that are not designed to play a final role for humanity but that nevertheless cause many catastrophes---not to mention the unsuspected troubles they create in the terrestrial environment---as this danger, we say, will doubtless continue to grow to proportions difficult to determine, it is permissible to think without too much improbability that it is perhaps by this method that the modern world will achieve its own destruction if it is incapable of stopping this process while there is still enough time; (Rene Guenon, Crisis of the Modern World [London: Luzac & Co., 1962], 144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Huston Smith, *Forgotten Truth: The Primordial Tradition* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1981), 12-45. <sup>224</sup>The Only Tradition, 303.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> The name of Martin Lings, Seyyed Hoseein Nasr and Frithjof Schuon is particularly mentioned in this regard and are described in *tariqa*. <sup>226</sup> The Islamic Tradition: An Introduction, 222-224.

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# Faith, Reason and Statecraft in Contemporary Islam: Interpretations, Interface and Distortions

# **Muhammad Feyyaz**

### Abstract

Role of reason in faith and statecraft in Islam is the central feature that this article attempts to investigate. The underlying argument that constitutes the premise of the paper is the suggestion that faith and reason are mutually amenable, and their sustained bondage is essential for forward movement of the state, its citizenry and the statecraft. A key question being looked at is whether or not intellectual movement in Islam is experiencing stagnation or otherwise. Following a systematic enquiry pathway, the discourse therefore examines how, to what extent, and for how long reason has guided development of Islamic jurisprudence and political thought with contingent bearing upon direction of the state and statecraft until contemporary Muslim environment. Among others, the discussion engages with controversies surrounding ijtihad as well as the question of Islam versus modernity with necessary reference to secularism. The paper concludes by resolving the issues raised.

Keywords: Ijtihad, Statecraft, Modernity, Muslim Society, Intuition

#### Why this Discourse?

Religious and anti-religious people alike habitually ask about reason – faith linkage from time to time, partly because it has a deceptively simple meaning and partly because, although as it stands, it is a vague question, it nevertheless refers to something of vital, burning importance with which every believer, in every religious tradition, has to come to terms with over the course of his religious life.<sup>1</sup> At this historical juncture, when much of the Muslim world is in a state of disarray, and when there appears to be no clear vision as to where it stands, what determining role its faith should play, and what, as a community of God (*Umma*), is the horizon of its action and position among nations, contemplation on faith-reason correlation within the framework of state becomes exceedingly important.<sup>2</sup> Substantive understanding of this project however implores clarity on relative position of faith by turning toward sources of all knowledge begetting it - reason, intuition and authority.

Each of these variables has its distinct etymology, and operates in own epistemological domain. Intuition relates to conviction of certainty (*yaqeen*) of an impending occurrence. The word referred to as a higher kind of intellect is derived from a verb that means 'looking at', and its extended use seems to have originated as a metaphor from sight.<sup>3</sup> Arguably, it principally resides in abstract firmness of faith which positions it beyond the realm of rationalism. In Iqbal's philosophy, great emphasis has been laid on intuition as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Aziz Esmail, "Reason and Religion: The Old Argument Revisited," Institute of Ismaili Studies 2003, accessed 26 September 2013, http://www.iis.ac.uk/SiteAssets/pdf/esmail\_reason\_religion.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Amr G. E. Sabet, *Islam and the Political Theory, Governance and International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Stocks, J. L.,"Reason and Intuition", in *Reason and Intuition and Other Essays* (London, 1939), 3.

mode of knowledge. He therefore rejects reason which does not recognize intuitions.<sup>4</sup> This thinking accords with those who "say we believe in God because our intuitions about how and why things happen lead us to see a divine purpose behind ordinary events that don't have obvious human causes." <sup>5</sup>

Within temporal spheres, it has been posited that "Intuition may have an important role in finding answers to all sorts of problems in everyday life."<sup>6</sup> In this sense, its primary anchor is rooted more in experiential backdrop. Among others, General MacArthur's decision to undertake Inchon landing during the Korean war of the 1950s amidst height of tidal forecasting exemplifies the role of intuition in decision making of strategic consequences. Despite its psychological appeal, value of intuition as an instrument to seek guidance is confined to those who are aware of its spinoff or those who receive it as a strong forewarning impulse.

On the other hand, authority as a source of knowledge is a function of social setting drawing upon historical narratives. This syndrome prevalent mostly in social institutions is inspired by belief in ancestral authority which generates a faith framework with less reliance on reason.<sup>7</sup> It hardens overtime along kinship lineage and becomes less receptive to logic due to resistance by the authoritative guardians to change. In many ways, authority can also be understood as a form of institutional memory, feeding on past mechanisms, processes and exclusive interactions. Conceptually, this phenomenon can be conflated with *taqleedi* (adherence, 'blind imitation', literalism, also `uncritical faith') traditions.

Broadly, and as it emerges from the above discussion, both intuition and authority contain germs of aversion to reason, and warrant stringent scrutiny before being trusted. Besides, their role increasingly centers in nonformal and individualistic spheres than in systemic complexities surrounding statecraft. Exceptions symbolized in initiative by MacArthur are episodic and occasional. Yet, conceding their significance and interplay with sociopolitical vagaries, reason qualitatively predominates them vis-à-vis faith due to its impressional allure that seeks rationale justification for all human experience.

On the comparison scale, the given perspective proposes; first, faith and reason have relatively more mutual amenability, and secondly, their sustained bondage is essential for forward movement of the state and its citizenry. Consequently, they turn into essentializing features for a structured, morally just and adaptable statecraft. This tentative suggestion constitutes the underlying premise of this paper. In its breadth, the discussion will inevitably engage with controversies surrounding *ijtihad* (exertion, striving)<sup>8</sup> as well as Islam versus modernity question to deduce their comprehensive place vis-à-vis the argument raised. Secularism will figure out prominently in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed. M.Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1996), 1-22; Muhammad Iqbal, *Zarbe-e-Kaleem* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, n.d.), phalsipha – 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Stephanie Pappas, "Belief in God Boils Down to a Gut Feeling", *Live Science* 21 September 2011, accessed 26 September 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "Study Suggests Why Gut Instincts Work, "Live Science 8 February 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Muhammad Feyyaz, "Radicalisation in Pakistan," unpublished paper 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ijtihad is the exertion of mental energy in the search for a legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist become incapable of further effort. In other words, ijtihad is the maximum effort expended by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of usual alfiqh (legal theory) for the purpose of discovering God's law. For details see Wael B. Hallaq, WAS THE GATE OF IJTIHAD CLOSED? Int. J. Middle East Stud. 16 (1984), 3-41 printed in the United States of America.

discourse. Besides, discussion will also entail among others, attention to conception of state and statecraft in Islam and their transformation in time and space variations reflected in the political thought of the age. The thesis is however, not a philosophical debate on reason or faith. Drawing upon multiple sources, the aim is to investigate and cohere faith-reason interface, their nexus and distortions in order to deepen understanding of the malice plaguing prevailing stagnation of intellectual movement in statecraft (if it is so), and to explore objective pathways reflective of our shared, argumentative and rational faculties to respond to the situation facing the contemporary Muslim world.

Methodologically, the study has employed a blend of qualitative tools albeit without making conspicuous reliance on a single method; historical, case study, discourse, and critique to mention a few. Faith, reason and statecraft are the principal notional frameworks that compose the entire research effort.

# **Defining Faith, Reason and Statecraft**

Faith has umpteen definitions. A common understanding of faith employed loosely implies perseverance to pursue an ideal. Faith embodied in troika of *Unity*, *Faith* and *Discipline*, as a source of inspiration and a guidance parameter by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah for building the perfect state, highlights this connotation of faith.<sup>9</sup>

Faith is also used interchangeably with religion. According to experts belonging to major religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam, faith and religion are not the same, but they are inseparably linked together.<sup>10</sup> In theology, faith has been defined as belief and loyalty to the fundamental sources that provides a value framework of a faith.<sup>11</sup> The Islamic term for faith is "iman", which has the root meaning of peace. In here, faith emerges as the fountainhead of all actions; it resides in hearts and manifests into actions.<sup>12</sup> These actions consist, on the one hand, of formal worship that represents relationship with God [which is faith], and on the other, they include all worldly actions that stem from Divine guidance [which is *sharia'h*].<sup>13</sup> A meaningful explanation of the difference between faith and religion is found in Islam: A Concise Introduction by Javed Ahmad Ghamidi. When "worship", in order to fulfill the rights of the relationship between a servant and his Lord, prescribes metaphysical and ethical bases, determines rituals and stipulates limits, then in the terminology of the Qur'an, this is called "religion" (din). Technically, the metaphysical and moral basis of this worship is called *al-Hikmah*, and the rituals and limits prescribed for it by religion are called *al-Kitāb* by the Our'ān. The latter is also called *sharī* '*ah*, which means law.<sup>14</sup>

This is the doctrinal side of religion that has been defined by Professor Alfred Whitehead, an English philosopher, as 'a system of general truths which have the effect of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See, Syed Shahjahan Bakhtiyar, "COMMENT: 'Unity, Faith, Discipline', a slogan or a way forward? *Daily Times*, 22 April 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For detailed discussion read, "Ask the Religion Experts: Is there a difference between faith and religion?" *The Ottawa Citizen*, Canada 17 January 2013, accessed 26 September 2013,

http://www.ottawacitizen.com/life/Religion+Experts+there+difference+between+faith+religion/7833531/stor y.html#ixzz2WP5a2PVI

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> As'ad Abukhalil and Farid Esack, "The US, the Muslim World and an Islamic Response," *Policy Perspectives* 5/1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> "Ask the Religion Experts."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Islam: A Concise Introduction 1st Edition trans. Shehzad Saleem (Lahore: Mawrid, 2008).

transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended'.<sup>15</sup> In the spiritual domain, Iqbal likens faith with the essence of religion which is more than a feeling but has something like a cognitive content, i.e., the idea which is a vital element in religion. He contends against rival parties - scholastics and mystics, who emphasize on the role of heart (alone) described as the *qalb*.<sup>16</sup> For example, Reynold Alleyne Nicholson in The Mystics of Islam, tells that in mystic thought, "the qalb, though connected in some mysterious way with the physical heart, is not a thing of flesh and blood. Unlike the English 'heart', its nature is rather intellectual than emotional, but whereas the intellect cannot gain real knowledge of God, the *galb* is capable of knowing the essences of all things, and when illuminated by faith and knowledge reflects the whole content of the divine mind. Hence the Prophet (SAW) said, 'My Earth and My Heaven contain Me not, but the heart of My faithful servant contains Me!"<sup>17</sup> Faith was defined by the Prophet (SAW) as a belief that is deeply entrenched in one's heart and to which evidence is given by action.<sup>18</sup> It can be safely surmised from the discussion that religion has a cosmic dimension which is conceptualized as faith, and the doctrinal facet dealing with temporal affairs of individual, state and society in their entirety which is formalized as *fiqh* or Islamic jurisprudence.

Proceeding further, the reason simply defined is questioning the basis or justification of established foundations governing sociopolitical and religious aspects of human life. In philosophy, reason is constructed as the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences while in theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human intelligence exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation.<sup>19</sup> A classic debate on reason and faith interface is found in *critique of pure* reason by Kant that determinates transcendental a priori conditions as a substantially limiting factor on role of reason, thereby providing a legitimate justification to faith, and that of Foucault's postmodern conception of reason by refuting faith. The latter claims that structures, institutions and rationalities of contemporary Western society are informed by human discourse, and reason is the result of historical contingencies and arbitrariness, and hence is not irrational.<sup>20</sup> His argument is therefore construed as a threat to faith. With reference to significance of contextual dynamics, his observation appears partially plausible when reason is grasped as an agency of change, largely informed by geohistorical contexts of societies. Egypt provides an incisive case study to prove this point where entrenched imperialism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to phenomenal growth of reason based reform and revival literature.<sup>21</sup> However, the key argument underlying the problem of faith and reason has been to work out how the authority of faith and the authority of reason interrelate. According to James Swindal, an American Professor of Philosophy, the religious conservatives, traditionalists and biblical philosophers view and defend the world and human life as subject to natural law and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Riffat Hussain, "The Meaning and Role of Intuition in Iqbal's Philosophy," accessed 27 September 2013, www.allamaiqbal.com.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Arab News Jeddah, *Our Dialogue: the Religious Editor*, MAS Media Karachi (n.d.), 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> "Encyclopedia Britannica: reason and Rationalism," accessed 26 September 2013 at

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/493197/reason and http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/492034/rationalism

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Dr. Zulifiqar Ali, "Post-Modern refutation of faith and religion: exploring Foucault's argument," *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 2/1 (Spring 2012):

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Tareq Y.Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, *Government and Politics in Islam* (London: Frances Printer (Publishers), 1985), 25-30.

causal inquiry, wherein humans can intervene in limited ways while the scientific naturalists resolve it on the side of reason (conflict model).<sup>22</sup> However, a strong compatible model by natural theologians suggests that faith and reason have an organic connection and perhaps even parity.<sup>23</sup> He notes that the articles of faith can be demonstrated by reason, either deductively (from widely shared theological premises) or inductively (from common experiences).<sup>24</sup>

A popular perception associated with the religion reason rivalry, especially among Muslim societies is often the use of the expression 'secularism' for non-religiousness (la *dinee'at*), thereby morphing the construction as secularism vs. religion. In so doing, secularism has been formed into an antireligious narrative albeit controversial. It embraces human reason as the crucial ingredient to inspire its whole spirit expressed in concept, text and practice. For example, the Western worldview that affirms evolution and denies creation, takes a secular view that makes human beings the measure of all things and master of their own destiny, pinning reliance on reason alone, contrary to the argument by Muslim scholars that Islam relies on revelation and reason both to ascertain truths.<sup>25</sup> It is another thing that in recent years a few religious scientists in the West have claimed a refutation of the main tenets of Darwinian evolution to show that an "intelligent design" rather than the unguided processes of random variation and natural selection that Darwin postulated must be responsible for creating life and human beings.<sup>26</sup>

In response to whether or not to teach Christian doctrine in public schools, the former US President Bush opined that "both sides ought to be properly taught.<sup>27</sup> That apart, understanding of the essence of secularism in context is essential. It has structural twain, academic (or perceptual) and statist. In the former case, secularism is not understood to imply limitation on religious beliefs; its implication spans across a wide spectrum of applications. In order to accommodate religious diversity in a society, it focuses on pluralism by allowing freedom of adherence to traditions, rituals and practices to all and sundry without being prejudiced to majority considerations of a particular faith or religion. A vivid example of this conception is found in the way Emperor Akbar laid the foundations of secularism and religious neutrality of the state in India. He interpreted secularism as the requirement for the state to be equidistant from different religions with proviso not to treat any religion with special favor.<sup>28</sup> Sayed Khatab, an Australian Muslim scholar, draws an all together different meaning of secularism opining that secularism does not mean the absence of religion; that is, one who believes in Islamic heritage (i.e., the Qur'an and its commands; shari 'ah and its rules) cannot be seen as a secular person.29

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> James Swindal, "Faith and Reason," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 27 September 2013, http://www.iep.utm.edu/faith-re/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Dr. Abdulmomini A.Oba, "Human rights and beyond: some conceptual differences between Islamic and western perspectives of human rights," Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, 2/1 (Fall 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Ronald Dworkin, "Three Questions for America," *The New York Review Books*, 21 September 2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/sep/21/three-questions-for-america/?pagination=false <sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 2010), 37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The theory of Jahiliyyah (London and New York: Routledge 2006), 111.

Within the statist model, religion and state (RAS) dataset is employed to measure whether countries meet several standards of separation of religion and state (SRAS) and secularism—laicism. The SRAS requires that the state neither supports nor hinders any religion while secularist—laicist model specifically declares that not only does the state not support any religion, it also restricts the presence of religion in the public sphere.<sup>30</sup> Intriguing enough, the analysis finds that the majority of states which declare separationist or secularist–laicist policies in their constitutions do not adhere to these provisions perhaps implying tacit role of religion in politics. Above referred endorsement by Bush advocating study of both evolutionary and intelligent theory perspectives indicates this assertion to an extent. That brings into equation the role of statecraft in public policy arena which came into being soon the existence of state germinated in human history.

Till recent times, more than one hundred and forty-five definitions of state have been put forward by different writers<sup>31</sup> underscoring complexity in configuring a single definition of statecraft. The challenging issue hence is to assimilate concept of state thoroughly for comprehending meaning and attributes of statecraft subsequently.

The State in occidental idiom is both an idea and a political institution where sovereignty resides in popular will, and every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors.<sup>32</sup> The term 'state' began to take its present-day significance in the seventeenth century in Europe, historians dating it from the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its most essential feature in the modern world is that of a governing entity that legislates, i.e., creates laws, and most usually in our contemporary situation through some form of process of representative democracy.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, a critical review of Islamic history and Muslim literature reveals an ambiguous idea of state among major streams of belief. Besides, state and government are often used interchangeably. In Shia theology, e.g., need for a government is driven by the fundamental reason to guarantee the implementation of laws at all levels of society.<sup>34</sup> This view is inspired by the argument that Islam regards it absurd and unrealistic to say that society is needless of government and brute force even when it possesses sound training, knowledge of law and what is beneficial and harmful. Two verses of the Our'an are cited to justify the requirement for a government. First, in the verses about the creation of Hadhrat Adam ('a) (Surah al-Bagarah 2:30, cited below), the creation of man has been explained in such a manner that his weakness and possibility of going astray is clearly indicated:

(وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلائِكَةِ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً قَالُواْ أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَن يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاء وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسَ لَكَ قَالَ إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لاَ تَعْلَمُونَ)

"When your Lord said to the angels, 'Indeed I am going to set a viceroy on the earth,' they said, 'Will you set in it someone who will cause corruption in it, and shed blood,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Jonathan Fox, "Separation of Religion and State and Secularism in Theory and in Practice," *Religion, State and Society* 39:4 (2011):384-401.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, State and Legislation in Islam (Islamabad: Publisher Sharia Academy International Islamic University, 2006), 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ari Afilalo and Dennis Patterson, "Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 6/2 (Winter 2006): 725-759.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Abdassamad Clarke, "The Falsity of the Concept of the Islamic State," BW, http://www.bogvaerker.dk/Bookwright/state.html#note-17fd0550.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ayatullah Professor Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, *Islamic Political Theory (Statecraft) Volume 2* (Iran: The Ahl al-Bayt ('a) World Assembly (ABWA), 2006).

while we celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your sanctity?' He said, 'Indeed I know what you do not know'."

The second verse (*Surah Ibrahim* 14:34, cited below) wherein God describes man as "*zalum*" which is the superlative degree [*Sighah al-Mubalighah*] and means "most unfair", indicates that inequity, insolence and ungratefulness in human beings is such that it cannot be neglected, and human societies will always be replete with injustice and ingratitude, signifying the exigency of state and government.

# (إِنَّ الإنسَانَ لَظَلُومٌ كَفَّارٌ)

# "Indeed man is most unfair and ungrateful!"

In it organic entirety, the approach proposes a theory of state and governance, which later assimilated concepts of *asabiyya* (natural social solidarity), and *Wilayat al-Faqih*.<sup>35</sup> The latter forms the central axis of contemporary Shi'a political thought, and advocates a guardianship-based political system which relies upon a just and capable jurist (*faqih*) to assume the leadership of the government in the absence of an infallible *Imam*.<sup>36</sup> The Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei) in Iran who is constitutionally responsible for the delineation and supervision of "the general policies of the Islamic Republic," and sets the tone and direction of Iran's domestic and foreign policies (statecraft), symbolizes this conceptual underpinning.<sup>37</sup> Ibn Khaldun, a historian and architect of sociology, ventures into discussion of governmentality ("governing the self" as well as "governing others") dimension of state with disposition toward *assabiyya* as the unmitigated power. Khomeini's political theory of *al-Wilayat* integrates Ibn Khaldun's *asabiyya* to signify ethnic as well as communal attributes of Iranians in particular and twelver shia's globally in general.<sup>38</sup>

According to Sunni political thought, there is no direct reference in the Qur'an to the institution of a state. Even the term 'state,' or its Arabic equivalent '*dawlah*,' [or *dawla*] has never been used in the Qur'an. The word *dawlah* was used in the early Islamic sources but not in the sense of a 'state.' The term came to mean 'state' much later, in the fourth or fifth centuries of the Muslim era.<sup>39</sup> The terminology used by the early Muslim jurists for the Islamic state was '*imamah*'. There is no word in the *hadith* literature for 'state' either.<sup>40</sup> Yet, Hallaq argues the state remains the favored template of the Islamists and the *ulama* (Muslim clergy).<sup>41</sup> Besides, narratives related to state have varied interpretations with generations of Muslim scholars. One stream is content with regional or zonal Islamic governance arrangements – nation state, other views it as consequential and yet another school refers to it in the universal sense. These traditions owe their roots to historical, evolutionary and revisionist nature of development of Muslim thought between eighth and fourteenth centuries. Those advocating the first kind exemplify the state of Madina, involving a single community, and later the era of the Caliphate of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Sabet, Islam, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Ahmed Vaezi, Shi'a Political Thought - Chapter 2- What is Wilayat al-Faqih? (UK: Islamic Centre of England, 2004), http://www.al-islam.org/shiapoliticalthought.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> "The Structure of Power in Iran," Iran Chamber Society,

http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure\_of\_power.php#sthash.VkzJ4RWJ.dpuf, accessed 3 October 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Sabet, *Islam*, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Mahomood Ahmad Ghazi, "The Islamic State in the Contemporary International Scenario," *Policy Perspectives* 4/2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Clarke, "The Falsity".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Wael B Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

Usman in their defence. They contend that there has never been a single Islamic political entity (united *khilafah*) but a plurality of caliphates, sultanates and emirates.<sup>42</sup> Rise of rival caliphates in Cordova (Spain) and Cairo, autonomous Persian and Turkish dynasties consequent to the fall of Baghdad, and Mughals in South Asia, epitomize it.<sup>43</sup>

Paul Kennedy presents a lucid picture of the state of the Muslim world during the sixteenth century, which then comprised of Turks, Safavids, dwindling Mamluk in Egypt, West African Islamic state, and Babur's rise in India, to mention a few.<sup>44</sup> South eastern archipelago (Indonesia, Malaysia) from middle of the thirteenth century is yet another example of stratification Muslim rule into sultanates.<sup>45</sup> Going a step further, Noah Feldman claims that to characterise post-khulafe' al-rashiden (guided vicegerents) system of governments as Islamic state, is to do violence to history. There were no Islamic states but states run by Muslims in the name of Islam.<sup>46</sup> Persian literature known as andarz-namin ('Book of Advice') and Arabic nusha-tul-muluk ('Counsel of Kings') written by Ghazali, Khajah Nasir Tusi and Nizam ul Mulk developed a theory of kingship clearly influenced by pre-Islamic Iranian notions of governments, though dressed in an appropriately Islamic garb, explicates aboriginal character of Islamic states.<sup>47</sup> Further, the expediency to sustain autonomous structures can be found in the works of jurists who defended tyranny as the lesser of the two evils when the alternative was anarchy.<sup>48</sup> Identically, in early twentieth century, the idea of Islamic nation state was not only being declared by Turkish secularists but also by Muslims of such diverging outlooks as Abd ar-Raziq, Rashid Rida, al-Hamid bin Badis of Algeria, Abd al-Raziq al-Sunhouri, Hasan al-Banna and Abd al-Qadir of Egypt, Abd al-Rehman al-Bazzaz in Iraq, Alal al-Fasi in Morocco and the 'Ulama' of al-Azhar, many of whom were disposed toward democratic Islamic government.<sup>49</sup> Interestingly Hasan al-Banna, a religious scholar and founder of present day Muslim Brotherhood, who is sometimes cited as one of the pioneers of global violent Salafia movement,<sup>50</sup> also saw *Khilafah* as relatively unimportant side issue on the road to Islamic government.51

The second stream holds the state a religious obligation to realize ethical and social potential and attendant responsibilities thereof, of the collective *Ummah* (wider Muslim community), for which political power is essential, and hence need for a state.<sup>52</sup> Despite being a proponent of the modern state, Abd ar-Raziq admitted that contrary to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Read e.g., Naef R. F. Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft and Meta-geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests and Justice in the 21st Century (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy LIT Verlag Münster, 2009), 168-171; Abdassamad Clarke, "The Falsity of the Concept of the Islamic State," BW; Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic book trust, 2001), 119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2001), 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1996), 10-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Read, Jonathan H. Pinmg, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia Pacific (UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005), 141-155.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Abdul Rashid Moten, review of *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*, by Noah Feldman, *Intellectual Discourse* 17/1 (2009): 107-122.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Enayat, *Modern*, 18.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Ibid, 104. Ismael and S. Ismael, Government, 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Anthony Bubalo Greg Fealy, "Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia," Lowy Institute Paper 05, 2005, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia, 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Ismael and S. Ismael, *Government*, 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> For detailed discussion read, Ghazi, State, 6-8 and ibid, "Scenario."

caliphate, the creation of government has in fact been envisaged in Quran as an essential instrument to administer the affairs of the Muslims, and protect their interests. <sup>53</sup>

Finally, the revivalist school driving the global Islamic movement is associated with several religious luminaries and ideologues viz. Imam Taymiyya, Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab, Maulana Abul A'la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Salam Faraj, Abdullah Youssuf Azzam, Aymen Alzawahiri and Sayyed Iman Al-Sharf (albeit to a lesser degree). For them, and in particular Maududi, an Islamic state has universal meaning since notion of *Ummah* transcends all races, social distinctions and regions wherein 'humans are defined in terms of vicegerency'- *Khilafat*. It is for this reason that they reject notions of both ethno centricism and nationalism in an Islamic state due to the narrow interests emerging from race, language, geography and history. <sup>54</sup> Maududi therefore, abhorred the concept of 'Muslim Nationalism' latent in the Two Nation Theory underpinning creation of Pakistan by All India Muslim League, the party that was called 'chaste prostitute' by him.<sup>55</sup> His reflection on Islamic state of global dimension can be noticed in a public lecture on 'Jihad in Islam' delivered at Lahore Town Hall in April 1939:

"The purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the basis of its own ideology and programme, regardless of which nation assumes the role of the standard-bearer of Islam or the rule of which nation is undermined in the process of establishment of an ideological Islamic State. Islam requires the earth – not just a portion, but the whole planet – not because the sovereignty over the earth should be wrested from one nation or several nations and vest in one particular nation, but because the entire mankind should benefit from the ideology and welfare programme or what would be truer to say from 'Islam' which is the programme of well-being for all humanity'. Towards this end, Islam wishes to press into service all forces which can bring about such a revolution."<sup>56</sup>

In June 1966, Maududi published his critical treatise 'Khilafat-o-Malukiat' (Caliphate and Kingship) encompassing features of an Islamic state inspired by early period of Khilafat and how it transformed later to become perverted monarchies. A distinguishing mark of this book was introspective review of his earlier argument for an Islamic state. Among other characteristics, he envisioned it to be such "an entity predicated on altruism...whoever of the mankind anywhere on earth wish could embrace its ideals... it will be Islamic in character regardless of its continental proximity...it would face no obstacle if it aspired in becoming a supranational state...but if there are several of these kinds in different parts of the world, all will have Islamic character...if mutually agreed, they could also form a global federation."57 In addition to conceding to geopolitical realities, the tone and tenor for spread of religious tenets gleaned from this book appear far more disposed in favor of reason and accommodation.

The above discourse supplies some information and peeps into suggestions for statecraft. The concept as such encapsulates and is dependent upon the state as an organizational entity irrespective of its ideological nature, and has been called the 'science of government'.<sup>58</sup> Semantically, statecraft assumes its operating character according to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Enayat, *Modern*, 94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Tarik Jan, Is Islamic Governance Theocracy? - Pakistan between Secularism and Islam (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998), 119. Also see Khatab, Political, 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> K.K Aziz, *The Murder of History (Lahore:* Vanguard Books Pvt Ltd, 1993), 168-170.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> For an online Translation read, Abdul Waheed Khan, trans. *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publication, (Pvt) Ltd, n.d.), http://www.scribd.com/doc/18996214/11-Jihad-in-Islam-by-Maududi

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Maududi, *Khilafat-o-Malukiat* Edition 31 (Lahore: Idara Tarjamnaul Quran, 2008 [1966]), 56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Ping, *Middle*, 14-15.

purpose and perspective of those employing it, i.e., foreign affairs, economy, trade, security, etc. For example, the common contemporary interpretation of political economists holds it to mean the actions of a state to include both domestic and international actions, and development and implementation of policy.<sup>59</sup> In the functional sense, it is the application of form of a craft or art that requires skills, technique, and judgment, the use of appropriate policy tools to achieve policy objectives effectively, and always involves deploying power.<sup>60</sup> Statecraft therefore, embraces all the activities by which statesmen [policy makers, decision making hierarchies, state functionaries, government leaders] strive to protect cherished values and to attain desired objectives vis-à-vis other nationals and /or international organisations.<sup>61</sup>

A strategic feature of statecraft is its perennial amenability to changes in the nature of the state dictated by shifts in internal as well as external environment. The present scenario where the very nature of the modern state is claimed to have evolved in response to developments unique to the twentieth century, reflects this position.<sup>62</sup> Significantly, Muslim modernists draw a conceptual parallel to indicate structural resilience of the state by arguing that the whole quest of creating an Islamic form of government [though] must always be in the style of the model of the first Islamic state established at Medina, but not in form rather in higher spiritual purpose of life.<sup>63</sup> However, systemically statecraft in Islam can be reckoned close to politics that in Arabic is translated as 'siyasa' [or siyasah] which denotes the manner in which a ruler tends and manages his subjects, based on the way that a shepherd tends his flock, which is the primal metaphor of revealed *siyasa*.<sup>64</sup> An important aspect that has to be kept in view is that *fiqh* which is the domain of jurists and *ulama*, has not and cannot work in isolation from 'siyasah' (the operation of legal system i.e., statecraft). The structure of an Islamic legal system arises most essentially from the complex interaction of these two institutions -siyasah and ruler on the one hand, and *fiqh* and the *ulama* on the other, the indispensability of *siyasah* cannot therefore be neglected. 65

### **Fundamental Muslim Schools and their Traditions**

It will be appropriate here to take a pause in order to trace and explain various Muslim schools in Islamic jurisprudence to establish a frame of reference for subsequent discussion.

The interpretations, interaction and nexus between faith and reason in Islam draw on diverse dialectics involving theological, philosophical and intellectual contests among and between exponents of different strands, i.e., *salafi, taqleedi* and *ijtahadi* schools. Each side views construct of Islam and place of reason in it through its held position. Instruments and thresholds of statecraft have been advocated by them accordingly, adopting forms in keeping with local conditions.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft, 356.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Ping, *Middle*, 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Afilalo and Patterson, "States,"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Sohail Mahmood, *The Concept of an Islamic State* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), 24.

<sup>64</sup> Clarke, "The Falsity".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Frank E. Vogel, "The closing of the door of Ijtihad and application of Law" (paper delivered at the American oriental society conference, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 13 March 199), available at 2http://i-epistemology.net/attachments/402\_V10N3%20FALL%2093%20-%20Vogel%20-%20Vogel%20-%20The%20Closing%20Door%20of%20Ijtihad.pdf

The proponents of *salafism* (puritans) besides Quran and Sunnah derive inspiration from *aslaf*, the 'pious predecessors', the first three generations of Prophet Muhammed's (*SAW*) followers including his select companions (*sahaba*) who are seen as paragons for the correct faith and practice of Islam. *Salafists* are called *Ghair Moqalideen* (nonadherent of any school) due to accentuation of *Tauheediat* (oneness of Allah) by discarding all other sources of knowledge.<sup>66</sup> *Salafism*, also a method or an approach to Islam, has historically been an effort to revive what are viewed as Islam's fundamentals, and were practiced by *as-salaf as-salih* (though there is not always agreement between self-described *salafists* as to what these fundamentals are).<sup>67</sup> While most revivalists and Islamist movements are *salafist* to some degree, contemporary *salafism* is identified with distinct groups that preach a literalist approach to Islam and are largely concerned with reforming the religious practices of individual Muslims. Egypt's *salafis* and central command of Al-Qaeda are one of the types constituting part of the current salafist; most of today's *salafists* would condemn the older *Salafiya* as religious innovators.<sup>69</sup>

Even though Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Sheikh ul-Islam Ibn al-Qayyim, Abo al-Hasan Ali ibn Umar al-Daraqutuni and Idn al-Salah are ranked among the leading *salafis* of their time, *salafism* assumes its fullest meaning and manifestation in the person of Imam Ibn Taymiyya, who aspired to revive Islam of the Prophet (*SAW*) and *Sahaba* that was regarded free of temporal impurities and weird thoughts susceptible to innovations and myths.<sup>70</sup> There are contrasting views on the use of methods whether by analogy (*qiyas*) or induction by *salafis*. Iqbal, Ruth Mas or even Wael Hallaq (tacitly) have opined Taymiyya's tilt towards induction as the only form of reliable argument; others perhaps owing to lack of subtle dimensions of 'Refutation of Logic' by Taymiyya, have assumed him to be an advocate of analogy.<sup>71</sup>

The *Salafiya* movement, a religious movement dedicated to the puritanical reform of Muslim society in seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Libya and Sudan was philosophically founded on the work of Ibn Taymiyya.<sup>72</sup> In South Asia, *salafism* is identified with *Ahle Hadith*, who are generally confused with *Wahabis*, whereas they assert themselves a sub-continental movement vaguely beginning in the eighth century that grounds its tradition into belief of advent of *Hadith* (sayings of Prophet Muhammad) into this region directly through various *sahabas* during the life time of the Prophet (*SAW*). Hence, they are called "*Ahle-Hadith*" (bearers of the sayings of the Prophet).<sup>73</sup>

Within *taqleedi* experience, notion of *taqleed* as such commonly denoted to practices of imitation in pejorative meaning is misleading. Its literal definition and social

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Muhammad Feyyaz, "Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 5/2 (2013).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Fealy, "Islamism and Indonesia," xxi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> A brief review on Salafis can be obtained from "What the Salafis Want: An Interview with the Blind Sheik's Son," *Time* September 2012 by Ashraf Khalil/Cairo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Fealy, "Islamism and Indonesia," xxi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> See Maulana Fazal ur Rehman bin Muhammad Alazhari, *Ibn Taymiyya: a Great Reformer* (Lahore: Zahid Bashir Press, 2009), 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 102; Ruth Mas, "Qiyas: A Study In Islamic Logic," *Folia Orientalia* 34 (1998), accessed 3 October 2013, http://spot.colorado.edu/~rmas/MasQiyas1998.pdf; John F. Sowa and Arun K. Majumdar, "Analogical Reasoning," http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/analog.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Ismael and S. Ismael, Government, 25-26.

<sup>73</sup> Feyyaz, "Pakistan."

constructions surpass more than a single formulation. Formatively, it has served as a conceptual tool to examine issues of reality by recourse to injunctions founding other religions and ancient philosophical epistemologies. For example, the Mutazilites applied *taqleed* equally to both the Islamic and Aristotelian-Neoplatonic traditions, whereas the Ashrites only applied it to the Islamic tradition and not to any other. Besides, *taqleed* has been deployed as an umbrella idiom to stereotype traditionalists as well as to endorse abiding discursive moral truths, i.e., the rulings or to acclaim teachings of a school of thought or jurist(s) associated with it. It is worth noting that *taqleed* does not necessarily imply `blind adherence.' It signifies `adopting' the rulings of a jurist with trust in their correctness.<sup>74</sup> In shi'at, *taqleed* is ranked from simple adherence to *Al- marja*` or *marja*`iyya (authoritative reference) which is the supreme spiritual source (or *Marja*` *al-Taqlid*: The Highest Juridical Authority) followed for total commitment in all religious and secular matters.<sup>75</sup>

The first to be identified in Muslim history with taqleedi (traditionalist) characterization were the *Ahle hadith* ('people of *hadith*) of eighth century who were primarily concerned with the study of transmitted sources and their literal interpretation, while denying human reason any right to be exercised in ijtihad or in the process of legal reasoning. <sup>76</sup> Perhaps out of all the empirically recorded traditionalists, they comprised extremists who rejected the strict procedure of *qiyas* even when based solely on scripture – Hashwis school of Dawud al-Zahiri (d. 270/883).<sup>77</sup> They disappeared however, in the short term. It is instructive to note that legal theory which entailed the acceptance of *qiyas* as a source of law, is viewed by Sunnis almost equal in power to the Quran, the Sunna, and the *ijma*.<sup>78</sup> Later generations of *taqleedi* (or *mukallideen*) mainly in Sunni but also among Shias, were adherents after practices of Hanifi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbli and Jaffaria (Twelver Shi`ite) schools.

*Ijtihadi* school deriving its inspiration from ijtihad, is a wide embracing identification that includes a whole array of Muslim *mujtahids*,<sup>79</sup> jurists and scholars who believe in the progressive, dynamic and perennial applicability of Islamic jurisprudence to all ages. It needs clarification that *ijtihadi* perspective should not be confused with the advocates of Islamic modernism, principally the apologetics, who are attempting to reconcile Islamic theological structure with precepts of the West. Technically, those who considered *ijtihad* an indispensable ingredient of legal system have been identified as 'people of ra'y' (who employed *qiyas*).

### Faith, Reason and Statecraft in Islam

The debate over place and use of reason in Islam is not new, epitomized by Mutazilites and traditionalists spanning either extreme of religious discourse. Schools have differed on role and extent of reason in faith. In addition to that, a sensitive issue that has remained at the center of intellectual probe and warrants prior attention is whether or not the doors of *ijtihad* are still open, and if yes, how much of it is to be employed in the conduct of state affairs, and if not, what other choices are to be looked upon. That has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina, "Taqlid: Blind Adherence or Rational Acceptance?" University of Virginia, http://people.virginia.edu/~aas/article/article5.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Hallaq, *The Impossible*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> For understanding of these terms see, "Studies in Usul ul Fiqh- Introduction", at http://wwwpersonal.umd.umich.edu/~etarmoom/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> A person entitled to ijtihad is called mujtahid, and a person bound to practice taklid, is called mukallid.

generated assumptions that Islamic law, since it became stagnant at an early period, was usually ignored in practice, and as a result *fiqh* (Islamic law) retreated into the ideal world of scholarship while the application of law fell under the sway of arbitrary and despotic rulers. Among others, eloquent replies to these questions and idleness of *fiqh* are found in a study, 'Was The Gate of Ijtihad Closed?' by Wael B. Hallaq published during 1984 and a presentation by Frank Vogal, a law professor at Harvard Law School in 1992.<sup>80</sup>

Before attending to details of these rejoinders, it will be appropriate here to briefly review reason as an attribute of Islam and its learning. The tradition of the use of reason goes back to the Prophet's times. Iqbal observes that the search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet himself. His constant prayer was: 'God! grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things!<sup>81</sup> He goes on, 'inductive reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement; and when once born it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge. Indeed the Quran regards both Anfus (self) and Afaq (world) as sources of Knowledge' [and this] knowledge must begin with the concrete. It is the intellectual capture of and power over the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass beyond concrete'.<sup>82</sup> Amin Ahsan Islahi, a renowned Pakistani scholar of the Quran, while discussing issues of prophetic traditions, comments that one needs to appreciate that the 'Prophet is not expected to defy reason and the *fitrah* (human nature) for the Faith does not contain any element that violates the *fitrah* or the human reason'. Therefore, the traditions should be pondered over in the light of the dictates of reason and *fitrah*. Islahi consequently, insists that the Book of God itself adduces reason and *fitrah* to prove many of its fundamental premises.<sup>83</sup>

In the same vein but based on a systematic and chronological study of the original legal sources, Hallaq is of the opinion that the views on the history of *ijtihad* that it was closed after the second/eighth century are entirely baseless and inaccurate.<sup>84</sup> There was no school or a wing of a school inside the Sunni Muslim community that could have opposed *ijtihad* as a principle. It is true, he argues, that in the third, fourth, and fifth Islamic centuries, *ijtihad*, the only channel of legal development, was rejected by various elements because of their inimical attitude towards it, such as by Zahiris (and to an extent but later reformed Hanblis). But these groups found no place inside the pale of Sunnism.<sup>85</sup> It is further revealed that numerous scholars openly disagreed with the established doctrines of the schools during the tenth century, a comprehensive but implicit agreement on the illegality of establishing new schools and of any 'separatist' tendencies was reached approving *ijma*' (consensus) on the validity of the existing Sunni schools.<sup>86</sup> To which, Hallaq persuasively demonstrates that nowhere is an explanation found in later centuries until the modern period about the claim of the existence of *ijma* 

<sup>80</sup> Vogel, "The closing."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Iqbal, Reconstruction, 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Ibid, 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Tariq Hashmi, trans., Fundamentals of Hadith Interpretation by Islahi (Mabadi Tadabbur-e Hadith), 11 November 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Hallaq, "Was The Gate of Ijtihad Closed? International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984): 3-41.
<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

on prohibiting the founding of new schools or closing of the gate of *ijtihad*. He concludes that the gate of *ijtihad* was never closed in theory nor in practice.<sup>87</sup>

Furthermore, there is no reliable source about the origins, development and the ramifications of closing the gate of *ijtihad*.<sup>88</sup> There is one feint narration describing a person Abu Bakr *al-Qaffal* (one who closes something) who issued a *fatwa* closing the door of *ijtihad* in the fourth century of *Hijrah*/tenth century cited in Islamic Voice in its 138 issue of June 1998 which is not sustained by any evidence; instead it has been refuted as a myth alleging that this strawman is paraded mostly by *Wahabis* and *Hizb al-Tahrir*.<sup>89</sup> The closure has often been taken for granted and history was repeatedly reconstructed upon it.<sup>90</sup>

In theory at least, there is certainly nothing to indicate that *ijtihad* was put out of practice or abrogated. This is reckoned by uninterrupted practice of the institution of qadi (judge) throughout Muslim history, in almost all regions of their reigns, which buttresses the fact of *ijtihad* being the root of *qada* (judgeship) ensuring continuity of the day to day legal system. Vogal notes that the 'closing of the door' (insidad bab al-ijtihad) was intended to constrain rank and file *qadis* and *muftis*, not the elite. Elite scholars, who possessed the capabilities and the courage to exercise *ijtihad* as well as the prestige to make it stick, could breach the barrier exemplified among the late Hanafis.<sup>91</sup> In addition to commotion over *ijtihad*, towards the end of the sixth/twelfth century and the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth, another controversy was under juristic spotlight regarding whether or not it is possible for an age to be devoid of *mujtahids*. One position asserted that the 'gate of judgeship' (bab al-gada) was closed because there no longer were any mujtahids.<sup>92</sup> To which the Hanbalis and a number of prominent Shaf'is maintained, while adducing rational and scriptural evidence, that *mujtahids*, must exist at all times. An apprehension was expressed however, by the Hanafi's and Shafi's about possible extinction of *mujtahids* in the short run.<sup>93</sup>

In Shia Islam, descendants from Hadrat Ali and Fatima (RA) are acknowledged as Imams (spiritual leaders) who are beheld as embodying the Prophet's (SAW) authority. Their statements (qawl), acts (fi'l) and approvals (taqr'ir) were considered authoritative like those of the Holy Prophet (SAW), and hence as part of the Sunnah. Accordingly, the Shia did not feel the need for *ijtihad* contemporaneously with the Sunnis; it was only after the Greater Occultation (*al gheybat al-kubra*) of the Twelfth Imam (A) that the Shia came to feel the need to practise *ijtihad* on an extensive scale which has continued ever since.

Structurally, however, *ijtihad* appreciably differs between Shias and Sunnis.<sup>94</sup> Shia scholars suggest that as long as the *taqlid* of the four Sunni Imams is considered binding, and new research, study and expression of views is regarded as impermissible, there

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Ghulam Nabi Falahi, "Ijtihad - Question of the Controversy Regarding the Closing of the Gate of ijtihad," UK Islamic Mission, http://www.chsbs.cmich.edu/fattah/courses/pols426/ijtihad.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> See in a discussion by Sad ibn Abu Waqas regarding Abu al-Hasan al-Karaji "How door of Ijtihad was closed? *Islamic Voice* 12-06:138 (June 1998/ SAFAR 1419H), Sunniforum,

http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?28737-Regarding-Abu-al-Hasan-al-Karaji

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Falahi, "ijtihad."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Vogel, "The closing."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Falahi, "ijtihad."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> For more details, see Section 4 - *The Beginnings of Shi'i ljtihad*, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/ijtihad/4.htm

appears to be little hope of any effective change. Shias are of the opinion that the gates of *ijtihad* were reopened during the eleventh century. The first Shi`i [sic] *faqih* to open the gates of *ijtihad* as a comprehensive scientific discipline was Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn 'Ali al-'Umiini (d.513/1119), known as Ibn Abi `Aqil, and the first legist to open the gate of practical *ijtihad* was Shaykh al-Ta'ifah Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi (385-460/995-1068), who applied the general principles of jurisprudence to new and emergent *furu*' (matters).<sup>95</sup>

A contentious issue in administration of juridical judgments among Sunnis has been whether a *qadi* or jurist belonging to one school can adjudicate a case based on legal formulations from the other, in case he does, shall that render his appointment void or does the ruler have the power to impose jurisdiction of a school upon *qadis*. Al Mawardi as quoted by Vogel affirms extra school jurisdiction of *qadis* joined by Hanfis as well who viewed such appointment as legal. The Ottoman rulers however, decreed in later centuries to adhere to dominant Hanfi schools. How temporality and *ijtihad* are related, finds best explanation in Basri's assertion who regards familiarity with customary law (*'urf*) as a qualification required for *ijtihad*, for it is essential, he argues, to determine God's law in the light of the exigencies of human life. <sup>96</sup> This brings into focus *siyasah* or statecraft which has remained central to theo-political narratives of Muslim jurists and historians since ages.

Critically reviewed character of statecraft broadly corresponds with two variables, the type of governing dispensation, and its temporal proximity or remoteness from epoch of the Prophet (*SAW*). The model for statecraft that originated from the state at Medina symbolized justice, equitability, nondiscrimination and communal solidarity (rooted in the mores of pre-Islamic Arabia) for domestic governance, and commitment, honesty, international justice, reconciliation, just treatment of non-hostile forces, and proportionate reprisal for foreign relations.<sup>97</sup>

During the reign of Prophet (*SAW*), and *Khulafa-e-Rashideen*, glimpses of these attributes manifest in abundance. Their reign was a period of expansion - to the East, the Persian Empire and Central Asia; to the West, the Byzantine dominions. This period of grace ended with the assassination of Hadrat Ali by a dissident group.<sup>98</sup> An in-depth study of this phase in Muslin history proves falsification of many misconceptions, writes Barnaby Rogerson in his seminal book - *Heirs of the Prophet Muhammad*. He disputes the idea of the "Muslim warrior with a sword in one hand and the Quran in another" and forceful conversion to Islam of new subjects, highlighted inter alia, in recognition of Persian Zoroastrianism a "religion of the book" to avoid popular discontent.<sup>99</sup>

While the role of reason vis-à-vis prevailing realities distinguish all of these epic governorships, geopolitics mixed with Arab nationalism and tribal favouritism arising out of divisive trends among Muslims over the question of selection of the caliph, discrimination against the home of the Prophet (*SAW*) and increasing Iranian intrusion in body politics of Arab from the time of *Hadrat* Umar, somehow gradually set erosion of

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Hallaq, "Closed?"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> For foreign relations see, Maududi, *Khilafat-o-Malukiat*, 50-55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Shusha Guppy, "Caliphs of a golden age," review of *Heirs of the Prophet Muhammad*, by Barnaby Rogerson, *the Independent*, 19 February 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-

entertainment/books/reviews/heirs-of-the-prophet-muhammad-by-barnaby-rogerson-525668.html. <sup>99</sup> Ibid.

initial objectives of statecraft idealized by the Prophet (*SAW*) in motion.<sup>100</sup> First was the discontent mounted over the favor Hadrat Uthman showed to his own Ummayad family, who seemed to enjoy a monopoly of influential and lucrative appointments.<sup>101</sup>

Despite the challenges confronted by the latter two *khulafa* (*Hadrat Uthman, Hadrat Ali*), their states were run by dictates of *shariah*, and adhered to stipulated limits in exercise of power to maintain rule of law and justice. Later, with the murder of *Hadrat* Ali, Rogerson broaches, " the era of holiness within the Islamic community is over, the scheming politicians, the police chiefs and the old clan chiefs are once again back in power." Other than semblance of organized administration of state functions during comparatively five larger caliphates, *Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid,* Mamluk and Ottaman, hundreds of dynasties (*malukiat*) emerged in Asia, Africa, China and parts of Europe, many as offshoots from original caliphates built around Arab-Ajam nationalism and ambition of rulers for self preservation and self perpetuation. Consequently, the statecraft during this period of diverse caliphates, monarchies, emperorships, sultanates and emirates witnessed array of legal and policy instruments. The differentiation chiefly lay in degree of adherence to theological or intellectual school as well as contemporary sociopolitical conditions.

During the times of *Malukiat*, statecraft has been related to political thought of the age, and therefore drew its direction from it which grew phenomenally during Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman caliphates. Polemical writings spurred by ecclesiastical controversies were one reason to generate and sustain the growth of knowledge including that in non-religious domains. Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali nevertheless, characterized this intellectual difference among the Muslim scholars, thinkers and reformers as crisis in the Ummah's religious culture and thought, and Ummah's philosophical and civilizational culture and thought in his two great works: '*Ihya Ulum ad-Din*' and '*Tahafut al-Falasifah*' respectively.<sup>102</sup> Abdul-Hamid Ahmad Abu Sulaiman links genesis of the distortion of the 'Presentational Approach' and its negative impacts when, according to him, men of Al-Madinah School were defeated; firstly, by members of the political elite of the racial and tribalistic Arabs; and later, by the racist non-Arabs resulting in divisive crack and estrangement which led to imposing academic inertia on the intellectual elite. The ideology of practical application, independent judgment, reform and creativity was changed into that of a closed textual ideology which became an ideology that was based on imitation whereby, according to some of them, a weak text that is probably not really authentic was given priority over an opinion based on judgment, and weak text was regarded a proof.<sup>103</sup> No wonder therefore, that whenever the state [during malukiat] flagged in ideological zeal, the venality of the Ulama filled the vacuum, and the result was always the same; the retreat of critical thought before the encircling rigidity of official dogma.<sup>104</sup>

Nevertheless, a key feature of this period until the sixteenth century, evident from several illuminating theses (e.g., by Hallaq, Ruth, Falahi, etc.) was the sustained attention to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Maududi, *Khilafat-o-Malukiat*, 99-100, 105-116; Enayat, *Modern*, 46 and W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (UK: Edenburg Univesity Press, 2007), 509.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Richard Cavendish, "Caliph Uthman Murdered," *History Today*, 56/6 (June 2006), http://wwjw.historytoday.com/archive/history-today/2006/volume-56-issue-6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Abdul-Hamid Ahmad Abu Sulaiman, "Contemporary Islamic Presentational Approach: Distortions, Confusions and Superficialization," http://i-epistemology.net/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Enayat, Modern, 18.

development of Islamic jurisprudence within classical politico-religious framework accentuated by internal upheavals undergoing in the Muslim world. Europe was yet out of the scene but was the beneficiary of advancement in multidisciplinary spheres of knowledge by Muslim thinkers. Imperialism was to alter this paradigm in later centuries, when the Western discourse at the height of Europe's imperial power came to characterize Islam as inherently "antihumanist", "nonrational", and inimical to modernity.<sup>105</sup> Particularly, the colonial period gave rise to more geographically and politically-oriented forms of Orientalism; anti-Muslim discourse now embraced a new function...the justification of the imperial project, with a corresponding need to show the irrationality, barbarity, obscurantism and backwardness of Muslims and Islam (and therefore their need to be "civilized" and "enlightened").<sup>106</sup> It may be noted that it were Christian missionaries who laid the foundation for Orientalism, which reached its peak during the first half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with involvement of missionaries from Belgium, France, Britain, Holland, Spain and the US. They had one objective and that was "to deny and disprove the Prophet's status as such and the Quran as revelation."<sup>107</sup> With the spread of Ottoman Empire into Europe, it was assumed that such an empire stood for the perpetuation of Islamic misrule and tyranny, and such assumptions remained unquestioned for a considerable period during the nineteenth century.<sup>108</sup> Meanwhile and coincidently, as the emerging West began to check and challenge the power of the Ottoman Empire, effective government administration within the empire was being dissipated by the excesses of luxury and abuses of power.

A corollary of this development was that Muslim consciousness was jolted out of slumber manifested by intensified growth of reform and revival ideologies from the eighteenth century onward, as the foreign powers pushed for strongholds into Muslim territories. Islamic political thought was thus revitalized in Egypt, Iran, Arabia, North Africa and South Asia.<sup>109</sup> Objectively, among the most authoritative exponents of Islam and the most widely acclaimed interpreters of the Shari'ah from the days of the founders of the major legal schools up to the end of the nineteenth century, none assigned such a central place to the subject of statecraft and politics as is found in the writings of twentieth century revivalist scholars.<sup>110</sup>

The present presentational domain is not only plagued by intra-Muslim polarization, but by non-Muslim world as well where Islam is depicted as a religion of the sword with the blade forever at the throat of the unbeliever.<sup>111</sup> In the post 9/11 stereotypical representations of Muslims as a community and Islam as a faith, a steep rise was witnessed in psychosocial and political phenomenon as xenophobia in general and Islamophobia in particular.<sup>112</sup> The analysis of 78 selected articles on how Islam and Muslims are portrayed and represented in the discourses reported in the New York Times newspaper in the wake of the September 11 events and in the ensuing two years, showed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Samira Haj, *Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality and Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Kate Zebiri, "The Redeployment of Orientalist Themes in Contemporary Islamophobia," *Studies in Contemporary Islam* 10/ 1–2 (2008): 1–41.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> Asaf Hussain, "The ideology of Orientalism," in *Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists* ed. Asaf Hussain, Robert Olson and Jamil Qureshi (Battleboro Vermont: Amana Books, 1984), 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Ismael and S. Ismael, Government, 25-30.

<sup>110</sup> Ghazi, "Scenario."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Timothy R. Furnish, "Beheading in the Name of Islam," *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2005), 51-57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Muhammad Safeer Awan, "Global terror and rise of xenophobia/Islamophobia: an analysis of American cultural production since September 11," *Islamic Studies* 49/4 (winter 2010).

that most of the themes that dominate the representational discourse of Islam and Muslims hover around the concepts of violence, turmoil, threat, *jihad*, and evilness of Islam and Muslims.<sup>113</sup> But Islam itself, that is supposed to be the cement of the nation, its raison d'être, is more and more divided.<sup>114</sup>

It has also been asked whether Islam as a system of regulatory beliefs is compatible with the modern world. This question arose in part because Islam has tended to be portrayed as a politicized faith, due to there being no separation between church and state of the type that took place within Christianity. <sup>115</sup> Consequently, key ideas from modernity are coded to situate Islam in a position where it negates these ideas so that Islam and Muslims are seen as illogical, autocratic, and living in stasis. <sup>116</sup> Clearly, in such perspectives modernity and tradition are seen as mutually exclusive polar opposites. <sup>117</sup> This perception primarily stems from democratic norm of precedence or otherwise of contestation between divine and popular will which has been responded varyingly by Muslim intellectuals.

The Islamic concept calls upon the Muslims to subordinate their will and decisions to the guidance of the Divine Law. According to conservatives and traditionalists with this obligation also comes a willing acceptance to adhere to 'all things lawful and permissible by God, unless He himself determines otherwise'. In temporal dimensions, such provision implies that when a government adopts and enforces a law other than that of Islam, then its action amounts to a declaration that it finds that law preferable to, or better than God's law.<sup>118</sup> Arguing against this doctrinal formulation, Kazem Alamdari, a Muslim scholar on the Middle East, not only declares such a society theocratic but further notes that social regulations that ought to be based on rational, relative, changeable, and collective agreements when based on religious principles, are absolute, unchangeable, and autocratic.<sup>119</sup> In such a society, he further argues, the government gains its legitimacy not from people's consent but from God's will, freedom of expression is limited and human creativity is repressed. Consequently, the integration of religion and state leads to a centralized and a more absolutist power, and this, in turn, leads to the creation of obstacles to rationalism, secularization, and pluralism for instance, the three fundamental elements of modern civilization in the West.<sup>120</sup> While endorsing sovereignty of God, Maududi illustrates seven pillars and characteristics of governance by Khulafe-e-Rashideen – election of khalifa, consultative mechanisms, austerity in use of exchequer, concept of governance, rule of law, uniform equitability and spirit of democracy.<sup>121</sup> In this lengthy monologue, faith, reason and statecraft have been deconstructed by him as integrated with and into each other to account for monumental changes that were occurring and being experienced in face of the expanding domain of Islam.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Murad ali obaid abdullah alazzany, "A critical discourse analysis of the representation of Islam and Muslims following the 9/11 events as reported in the New York Times," University putra Malaysia, November 2008, http://psasir.upm.edu.my/10335/1/FBMK\_2008\_23\_A.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> Jean-Luc Racine, "Pakistan's predicament: The diagnostic and the debates within," *Journal of Pakistan Vision*, 13/1 (2012): 1-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Nasya Bahfen, "Borderless Islam and the modern nation state," *Intellectual Discourse* 19 (2011): 147-160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Arab News Jeddah, *Our Dialogue*, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Kazem Alamdari, "Religion and Development Revisited: Comparing Islam and Christianity with Reference to the Case of Iran," *Journal of Developing Societies* 20/1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Maududi, *Khilafat-o-Malukiat*, 85-102.

This observation notwithstanding, the religious reductionism and misgovernance challenges confronting Muslim states all over lend credence to critics of real-politik within body politic of Islam supported by numerous indicators. **The combined GDP of a billion plus Muslims living in some 56 sovereign Muslim states is less than that of Japan.** Barring a few countries like Malaysia and Turkey, most Muslim states are underdeveloped.<sup>122</sup> One reason for lagging behind in wealth generation is the failure to produce commercial institutions (e.g., joint-stock companies) that distanced themselves from individuals or partnerships and could endure for long periods of time and mobilize large quantities of resources.<sup>123</sup> Principles such as *jihad* and martyrdom have introduced new dimensions in politics and conflict in much the same fashion.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, some experts contend that sectarian populism, the tendency for political leaders to align themselves along sectarian lines as show of solidarity with their constituency, is quickly becoming the dominant factor in Middle Eastern politics and a critical driver of regional instability.<sup>125</sup>

Furthermore, the leadership and legitimacy crises in most Islamic countries are largely a result of the absence of religio-political dialectics as well as by elite capture, internecine power struggles, opportunism and corruption.<sup>126</sup> In the Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 released by Transparency International, only two out of the 48 Muslim majority countries made it above 50 on the overall ranking with the bottom range overwhelmingly occupied by the remaining. Top six most populated and important Muslim countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Iran and Egypt) scored in the miserable range beyond 100.<sup>127</sup>

Above all, offensive/defensive apologia of Muslims is engaged to compensate for repeated attacks on the "authenticity" and the "identity" of the Islamic personality with dogmatic affirmatives and self confirming discourse, reflecting deficiency in indigenous prowess. <sup>128</sup> Even an erudite scholar like Abu-Sulayman notes that the modern world cannot be explained in terms of the classical concepts and frame of mind. <sup>129</sup> While a convincing rebuttal by Amr Sabet neutralizes the former by arguing enduring relevance of Islamic theoretical and practical tradition, it does not account for the bigotry among theologians over faith-reason debate on one hand, and insidiousness of secular statecraft practiced by contemporary Muslim leadership for self actualization on the other.

Hallaq makes a compelling case for incoherent statecraft from yet another angle by arguing that the modern [Islamic] state not only suffers from serious legal, political, and constitutional issues, but also, by its very nature, fashions a subject inconsistent with what it means to be, or to live as, a Muslim.<sup>130</sup> By Islamic standards, the state's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> "Muslim world's condition," *Dawn.com*, 5 Dec 2012.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> John Draper, "Why are Muslim countries poor? 22 February 2013,

http://www.cobourgatheist.com/index.php/islam/muslim-culture/1016-why-are-muslim-countries-poor <sup>124</sup> Sabet, *Islam*, 57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Scott Helfstein, "The Rise of Sectarian Populism," The National Interests 18 July 2013,

 $http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-rise-sectarian-populism-8740 \#.UgEzTqQRM4s.email {}^{126} Sabet, {\it Islam, 98.}$ 

<sup>127</sup> Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2012,"

http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results#myAnchor1. Also see Dr. Faheem Younus, "Confronting Corruption in the Muslim World," Huff Post – Religion, 16 June 2-11,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/faheem-younus/enforce-shariah-law-or-le\_b\_877211.html <sup>128</sup> Sabet, Islam, 63.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> Hallaq, *The Impossible*.

technologies of the self are severely lacking in moral substance, and today's Islamic state, he continues, has done little to advance an acceptable form of genuine Shari'ah governance. The Islamists' constitutional battles in Egypt and Pakistan, the Islamic legal and political failures of the Iranian Revolution, and similar disappointments underscore this fact.<sup>131</sup>

Yet it is also a fact that reason-faith at its optimal level continues to be institutionalized and decreed by leading academia, seminaries, think tanks and educational organizations worldwide in keeping with evolving challenges; Jamia al Azhar in Egypt, Centre for Islamic Research and Studies in Saudi Arabia, The Amman Message Jordan, Islamic universities in Malaysia and Pakistan, judgments by Federal Shariah Court and Council of Islamic Ideology Pakistan and Minhaj ul Quran, Pakistan are a few prominent examples, <sup>132</sup> in addition to dozens of Islamic studies, academic journals and legal resources operating globally. The establishment of the jurist's governance (*wilayat al-faqih*) in a modern nation- state of Iran <sup>133</sup> has also been a novelty of its kind. Post-Islamism is the emerging buzzword resonating in intellectual reformation confines, which has been characterized by thinking in some major Islamic religio-political and politico-religious movements on how to combine Islam with the values of modernity by embracing the idea that modern values are inherent in Islam.<sup>134</sup>

### Conclusions

The discussion has examined faith-reason-statecraft nexus in their definitional, epistemological, and structural dimensions and interactions drawing upon multiple qualitative frames, praxis and indicators. Role of reason was looked at throughout with particular attention. Reference to political thought generated during different times and settings was also probed. Triggers and dynamics impacting change in structural and functional outlook of statecraft in the form of revival and reformation projects was analytically situated accordingly.

At the general plane, the study finds that seventeenth century and early part of eighteenth stand out as devoid of much intellectual activity due to severe tensions and ramification of breakdown of spiritual source of Muslim – Ottoman Khilafat. Prior to and consequent to this monumental shock, development of Islamic jurisprudence and its application has continued. Identically, political thought has moved on though relatively at slow pace between fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, but has not stopped altogether. Demise of Ottoman and colonization were major events that helped revive retarded interest in intellectual and revisionist undertakings. Conquests by Ottoman Turks into hinterland of Europe marked the advent of mutual suspicion of the two largest religious entities of the world. September 11 catastrophe was the pinnacle of historical discord which created constituency of apologetics in the Muslim world. Earlier, modernization reformers were only concerned with integrating Western innovations to improve upon domestic situations. Apologia was non-existent in the literal sense. Misrule, leadership crisis and

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> For details on the Amman Message, visit http://www.ammanmessage.com/; also see Amman Message, "Islam's Position on Extremism, Radicalism, and Terrorism," Declaration 154, (Jordan: Amman, 2006), 143-

<sup>144;</sup> Tahir ul Qadri, *Fatwa- Terrorism Fitna- Khawarij*, 1<sup>st</sup> Edition (Lahore: Minhaj Books, Jan 2010). <sup>133</sup> Sachedina, "Rational Acceptance?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Dr. Laszlo Csicsmann, "Islamist movements at the crossroads: the choice between ideology and contextdriven approach to politic. Case study on the Hashmite kingdom of Jordan," *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization* 1/2 (fall 2011): 55-70.

religious infighting indigenous to Islam have harmed Muslim interests more than external incursions. That defines direction of response interventions.

Specifically, it emerges that barring some faint traces of opinions, there is no authentic evidence about non-use of reasoned exertion to extract applications germane to changed environment. The sustained traditions of such endeavors by mechanisms operated by globally known Islamic organizational institutions validate these processes. The fact can be corroborated by size of literature being produced and addicts (*fatwas*) issued by sharia courts, jurists and seminal academic outfits. A separate study will be required to establish sprawl of this scholarship.

It can be further inferred from the foregoing that closure of *ijtihad* is merely a metaphor to indicate intellectual crisis in growth of knowledge but otherwise an unsubstantiated myth. Jurists who were capable of *ijtihad* have existed at nearly all times; *ijtihad* was used in developing positive law after the formation of the schools; hence, the controversy about the closure of the gate and the extinction of *mujtahids* prevented jurists from reaching a consensus to that effect.

Some of the *mujtahids* from the recent past and those alive include Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, Ibn Kathir, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Shaikh Muhammad Naasir-ud-deen al-albaani, Maududi, Muhammad Shafi Usmani, and Muhammad Taqi Usmani. Similarly apart from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, several *mujtahids* are located in Qum and Najf schools.

It is however, emphasized that faith has to be doctrinally understood as the spiritual ingredient of religion that feeds on and is consolidated by conviction in '*aqeeda*' which is reinforced by systematic employment of reason. Critics have therefore described Egyptian reformer Abduh's faith on authority [as source of knowledge] but devoid of contemplative understanding (*aql*) and [inner] discernment (*hidaya*) as the virtual state of godless rather than one of faith.<sup>135</sup> The caveat is that Mu'tazilahs's neoplatonical rational that reason is the "final arbiter" in distinguishing right from wrong, and "sacred precedent" is not an effective means of determining what is just, as what is obligatory in religion is only obligatory "by virtue of reason, should not dazzle wisdom.<sup>136</sup> What needs to be remembered is that inner experience (faith) is only one source of human knowledge. There are two other sources of knowledge that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best.<sup>137</sup> This deliberation sufficiently insinuates tradition and space for free enquiry in Islam which has to rely on reason for its actualization to inform public policy processes, institutionalization and implementation in prevailing settings.

It will be in fitness also to objectively conceptualize essence of *taqleed*. The discourse brings to the fore that while blind imitation is nonsensical, hence may be connoted pejoratively; an informed adherence of a school of thought is healthy. Secondly, while it is common to bifurcate believers into different categories, *taqleedi*, *salfis* and *ijtihadi*, etc. as has been done in this paper as well. Incisively probed, all of them are *taqleedi* in one form or the other. The differentiation lay in the degree of reliance to pathways or methodologies to find answers to practical problems. Exceptions are there in the person of Ibn Taymiyya who even though a *salfi* was amenable to all sources of knowledge to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Haj, Reconfiguring, 115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Qussama Arabi, *Studies in modern Islamic Law and Jurisprudence* (Springer; 1 edition (October 1, 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 102.

resolve emergent *fiqhi* issues. <sup>138</sup> Finally, those who do not believe in *ijtihad* at all can be classified as orthodox traditionalists.

As to the question of nature of state and statecraft; reality of existing geopolitical configurations constituting nation state system ought to be accepted. This has become now fairly well entrenched in most cases owing to aspired, and fought for ethno nationalistic identities among diverse Muslim societies, not to mention those occurring in intra-Muslim paradigms. This has in turn eroded appeal for a global *khilafat* which is still subjectively cherished without concrete propositions and models. In intrastate context, Shariah based dispensation is possible. Scholars have opined that [increasingly] misgoverned Muslims yearn for a return to a rule of law, the *shariah*, "a just legal system, one that administers the law fairly."<sup>139</sup> Without a genuine desire and consensus among and between politico-religious leadership of concerned states, this will not happen. The misgivings about shariah as a harsh and punitive regime have to be dispelled through articulate national efforts by highlighting its soft facet.

A consultation to these drivers accordingly will shape, organize and animate statecraft to respond to dynamic needs of the state, polity and citizenry. In this respect it is asserted that while element of secularization in itself is not demeaning as long as it is driven by an intent of good, its complete internment to temporality for fulfillment of the 'self' or even the subjects is uncalled for. From this perspective, historical antecedent of Akbar rooted in favour of egalitarian pluralism and centuries later, Aurangzeb Alamgir's reign symbolized by abandoning religious toleration of his predecessors, seem excess of moderation and extreme each at the cost of other.<sup>140</sup>

Whether or not Islam is compatible with modernity is a futile argument. Even though Western writers themselves argue that the idea of modernity and tradition being in contradiction to each other rests on misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them.<sup>141</sup> This writer would contend that modernization should be viewed from the lens of demand based evolutionary imperatives which is neither opposed by nor opposed to essence of Islam since its inception. The care is essential in adapting practices of modernity which imply marginalization of religion from civil society, state, and politics.<sup>142</sup> In passing, it may be remembered that modernity has been witnessed by the Muslim world, and in effect was triggered and exported by them to the West. The Muslim quest for knowledge often drove even the most devout rulers and religious scholars to support freethinking and empirical scientific inquiry, this tradition of learning and Islamic education system is believed to have influenced the West. <sup>143</sup> The notion underlying Akbar's approach, a devout Muslim himself [sic], to social custom and public policy by 'the pursuit of reason' rather than 'the marshy land of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> See Alazhari, *Ibn Taymiyya*, 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> Moten, 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> See for example, Richard M. Eaton, "Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States," under *Religions – Sikhism: Guru Tegh Bahadur*, BBC. 1 October 2009,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/sikhism/people/teghbahadur.shtml;

Harbans Mukhia, The Mughals of India. 25-2; Katherine Butler Brown, "Did Aurangzeb Ban Music? Questions for the Historiography of his reign," Modern Asian Studies 41/1:78; John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, The New Cambridge History of India 5 reprinted edition (UK: Cambridge University Press).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Bahfen, "nation state,"147-160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Haj, *Reconfiguring*, 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft, 162-163, 167-171.

tradition' to address difficult problems of good behavior and the challenges of constructing a just society, therefore does not hold ground.<sup>144</sup> It has been pointed out earlier that both tradition and change can coexist by delineating their respective spheres.

At present, there is no discernable theory of governance and statecraft in contemporary Islamic thought barring contested postulate of *wilayat al-faqih* which is still in stage of maturation. It is therefore, difficult to identify with precision exact contours of ongoing political thinking in Muslim world other than those emanating from apologetics, and those who have internalized perceptual binaries of clash of civilization. Divisive trends have further weakened voices clamoring for unity. Discussion on post-Islamism is yet in nascent stage.

The budding research needs to engage with questions whether we really require a grand and unified theory and governance in times of fragmentation heightened by impact of globalization, ethnonational assertion, and sectarian nuances, rather than focusing on making living conditions of the general lot worth a respectable life and leave this question for posterity? Or how should a Muslim state define its political identity which predicates itself on cultural pluralism, while its nationals are Muslims and adhere to fundamental tenets of Islam and whether we need to find a novel typology for this purpose to create synergy in faith-reason-statecraft equation to meet challenges of the real world. The subject is wide open for debate and dialogue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Sen, *The Idea*, 38.

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# Reforming Madrasa Education in Pakistan; Post 9/11 Perspectives

#### Ms Fatima Sajjad

#### Abstract

Pakistani madrasa has remained a subject of intense academic debate since the tragic events of 9/11 as they were immediately identified as one of the prime suspects. The aim of this paper is to examine the post 9/11 academic discourse on the subject of madrasa reform in Pakistan and identify the various themes presented in them. This paper also seeks to explore the missing perspective in this discourse; the perspective of ulama; the madrasa managers, about the Western demand to reform madrasa. This study is based on qualitative research methods. To evaluate the views of academia, this study relies on a systematic analysis of the post 9/11 discourse on this subject. To find out the views of ulama, in-depth interviews of leading Pakistani ulama belonging to all major schools of thought have been conducted. The study finds that many fears generated by early post 9/11 studies were rejected by the later ones. This study also finds that contrary to the common perception the leading ulama in Pakistan are open to the idea of madrasa reform but they prefer to do it internally as an ongoing process and not due to outside pressure. This study recommends that in order to resolve the madrasa problem in Pakistan, it is imperative to take into account the ideas and concerns of ulama running them. It is also important to take them on board in the fight against the religious militancy and terrorism in Pakistan.

Keywords: Madrasa, Perspectives, Militancy, Extremism, Violence, Ideology, Reforms, *Ulama*, Education, Religion

#### Introduction

*Madaris* in Pakistan became the focus of the world's attention after the catastrophic 9/11 incident. Despite the fact that none of the alleged attackers of the twin towers belonged to Pakistan or studied in *madaris*, these traditional institutions of learning became the focus of the world's attention as ' centers of religious militancy and radicalism'. Many studies were carried out by the Western as well as the local academics, journalists and government officials to establish links between the growing religious militancy and madrasa education in Pakistan. Many reports, articles and opinions were published in academic journals and print media. Initially, all pointed out the role of madrasa education in propagating religious violence and anti West sentiment among the Muslim youth. These studies issued warnings, alarmed the public about the 'menace of madrasas' in their society and demanded reform of *madrasa* education.

The perceptions about Pakistani *madrasas* as expressed by Western media and academia immediately after 9/11 incident, have been aptly summarized by Nasr in the following words; "The violent attack of 9/11 convinced the Western world especially Americans that the problem with the Muslim world is that it is 'unenlightened' which means that it is pre Renaissance in its mindset. Due to their own historical experience many perceived that the Islamic world is in need of a Religious Reformation. Islamic Madrasas were

perceived as the places where traditional, obsolete teachings indoctrinate dangerous values to the young minds."<sup>1</sup>

Western media as well as government officials propagated this image of the *madrasa*. In a memo leaked to the media in Oct 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence wrote; "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"<sup>2</sup>

In an interview to Fox News in November 2003, he declared; "there's little places around the world where radical, extremist clerics are teaching young men and women to become suicide bombers and to go out and kill innocent men, women and children…".<sup>3</sup> In the same interview, he presented his ideas to reform *madrasa* education, pointing out the need to engage in a 'battle of ideas', encouraging young Muslims to learn science, math, language so that they can earn a respectable living.

Various think tanks and government agencies published reports and recommendations to resolve the 'madrasa problem'. The World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), US Institute of Peace, the International Crisis Group (ICG), RAND Corporation, Congress, Pentagon and numerous European agencies joined this campaign. Later, many Pakistani writers, journalists and academics also jumped in and confirmed Western fears.

The Brookings Institution, a leading American think tank published an analysis paper on Pakistani Madaris in 2001 written by P.W. Singer. The paper stated that although religious education is an internal affair of the Pakistani government, the United States does have concerns about it as it has been 'highjacked by the extremists'.<sup>4</sup> The report described a 'complete change' in traditional madrasa education during the 1980s as the Zia regime sought the support of religious groups for political gains and the war in Afghanistan led to mushroom growth of these institutions which accommodated millions of Afghan refugees and became involved in a radical *jihad* movement with the support of the US government. According to Singer, this development had dangerous repercussions as many madaris became affiliated with extremist religious/political groups and started teaching violence and hatred. About such madaris, Singer states: "These schools teach a distorted view of Islam. Hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of innocents, and the new heroes are terrorists. Martyrdom through suicide attacks are also extolled, and anti-western speeches are committed to memory. The students are uneducated, young, dependent on the schools, and cut off from contact with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to being programmed toward violence."

The report advocated registration and regulation of Pakistani *madaris* by the government, and strengthening public education system in the country. The US government was urged to support Pakistan government in this regard. It was termed as 'a new cultural war' which had to be won.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Syed Vali Nasr, *The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: the Changing role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics*, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> USA Today.com; October 16, 2003; from Donald Rumsfeld, retrieved July 12, 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/11/02/transcript-donald-rumsfeld-on-fox-newssunday/#ixzz2YoUPZTvd

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> P.W. Singer, Pakistani Madrasas; Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad, Analysis Paper # 14.(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001).

The International Crisis Group published a detailed report about the Pakistani *madaris* in July 2002 titled *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and Military*. The report traces the history of *madrasas* in Pakistan and notices the exponential growth in *madrasa* numbers during the 1980s, a phenomenon described as 'the Madrasa Boom' in the report. *Madaris* were termed as the 'supply line of jihad' against the Soviets. It notices that violence in the name of religion neither originated in *madrasas* nor is this their defining characteristic. Majority of the *madrasas* do not advocate violence. Those who are associated with *jihad* and sectarianism are few and instantly recognizable. It is noted that pro *jihadi madrasas* only play a supporting role mainly as 'recruiting ground for militant movements'. It is more of an ideological affiliation than direct involvement.<sup>5</sup>

The Crisis Group Report takes into account the role America played in promoting the jihadi culture in madaris during the 1980s Afghan War. It states that US and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence sponsored not only Afghan jihad but also internal sectarianism. The message of *jihad* was targeted at the Soviets. The Muslims were told through madaris that participation in the Holy War was their sacred duty. There were special text books published by Center for Afghan Studies in the University of Nebraska-Omaha which was funded by USAID. These books were written in Pashto and Dari by American and Afghan experts. The aim was to promote militant *jihad* among the Afghan youth. Basic math was taught by counting dead Russians and Kalashinkov rifles.<sup>6</sup> University of Nebraska was paid US\$ 51 million from 1984 to 1994 for this project. The textbooks designed for promoting militancy in young minds were distributed among the displaced Afghans. Over 13 million copies were distributed in Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madaris where many of their children studied. These books continued to be read by students even after the war ended. The Taliban found them useful as well. The report admits that traditional text of *madaris* does not include militant *jihadi* content. Afghan jihad and later Kashmir struggle brought the militant elements in madaris.

Hussain Haqqani, a prominent Pakistani journalist and later ambassador to the United States termed Pakistani *madaris* as 'Islam's Medieval Outposts' in an article published in Foreign Policy magazine in November 2002. The article confirmed Western fears by narrating the stories of *madrasa* students and teachers emphasizing their conservative mindset. It describes visits to different Pakistani *madrasas* by the author including Darul Ulum Haqqania, Akora Khatak, which has been described as a 'University of Jihad', a place which gives birth to the likes of Mullah Umar.<sup>7</sup>

Madrassas in Pakistan, an article by Suba Chandran was published in 2003 by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in India. The author explains that after the end of Afghan war, *madrasas* and militancy continued to flourish in Pakistan because of the states changed policy on Kashmir. The *jihad* in Kashmir, the rise of the Taliban and the failing education system in the country led to an exponential growth of *madaris*. The author recommends that *madaris* have to be regulated, their funding should be controlled and their education must be reformed to control the menace of militancy.<sup>8</sup>

The US official 9/11Commission Report published in 2004 specifically mentioned the role of Pakistani *madrasas* in spreading violent ideologies. The report stated that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> International Crisis Group *Pakistan; Madrasa, Extremism and the Military. Asia Report No.36,* (29 July, 2002).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Hussain Haqqani, "Islam's Medieval Outposts," *Foreign Policy, Nov 1, 2002.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Suba Chandran, "Madrasas in Pakistan", Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (Sep 2003).

although 9/11 was a shock for the United States, it was not a surprise. Islamist extremism had not concealed its intention of hurting the interests of the West. While identifying the enemy, the report traces the roots of extremism in Afgan *jihad*.

"We now know that these attacks were carried out by various groups of Islamist extremists. The 9/11 attack was driven by Usama Bin Ladin.....Bin Ladin also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the Muslim world".<sup>9</sup>

The report recommends a global strategy against Al Qaeda in which their ideological support base has to be eliminated in order to reduce its impact.

"The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism...

..Root out sanctuaries. The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries and have realistic country or regional strategies for each,.."

The Pakistani *madaris* have been termed as the 'incubators of violent extremism', which breed terrorism and supply motivated warriors. Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, is quoted in the report, asking; "*Is enough being done to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of the terrorists*?"<sup>10</sup>

The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report on Education Reforms in Pakistan in December 2004. It expressed concerns about the poor state of Pakistan's public education and described US interest and investment in Pakistani education. The report stated that USAID signed a \$100 million five year bilateral agreement with the Pakistani government in 2002 to improve the quality of education in the country. It also stated that the government of Pakistan assured them that they will modernize the curriculum in religious *madaris* and will crack down on the ones involved in militant activities.<sup>11</sup>

A 2004 Report by A.H. Nayyar on the state of Pakistani education expressed concerns about the radical ideologies spread by *madaris*. The writer also expressed concerns about mainstream education in Pakistani schools and the widespread national myths created by the official textbooks, contributing to growing religious radicalism in society.<sup>12</sup>

In 2005, Indian author Sushant Sareen wrote a book on the subject with the title 'The Jihad Factory; Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making'. She emphasized the link between *jihadis* and Kashmir issue, gave detailed profiles of Pakistani *jihadi* organizations and the role of *madaris* in making them.<sup>13</sup>

In 2007, Paul M.P. Bell from US Naval Post Graduate School, titled his thesis paper 'Pakistan's Madrassas; Weapons of Mass Instruction?' He traced links of Pakistani *madaris* with 9/11 incident and July 7, London bombing, recommending education reform in Pakistan. He also pointed out that traditional *madaris* closed the door of 'independent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Official Government Edition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> K.A.Kronstadt, "Education Reform in Pakistan", CRS Report for Congress Dec 23, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> A.H. Nayyar, "The Subtle Subversion" in *The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakista*, ed. A. Salim et al (SDPI, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Sushant Sareen, The Jihad Factory; Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2005)

reasoning' (*ijtihad*) long ago, a fact which according to him, became a major reason for *madaris*' conservative attitude towards science and modernity.<sup>14</sup>

Pakistani mainstream media also began to express such concerns, especially during the Jamia Hafsa episode in 2007. Daily Jang, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Pakistan published many articles on the subject of *madrasa* reform during this time. Irshad Ahmed Haqqani, the late columnist, in an article published in July 2007, wrote about the need to bring the *madaris* out of the medieval times and make them enter the 21<sup>st</sup> century. He expressed hopelessness stating that *madaris* are resistant to change and they will not accept reform.<sup>15</sup>

# **Later Perspectives**

The initial perceptions about Pakistani *madrasa*, especially in the Western media and academia altered with time. The desperate search for the unidentified attacker and incomprehensible causes of the 9/11 attack led to hasty conclusions, simplified answers, distortion of facts and ground realities. The 'myth' created around the Islamic *madrasas* and their medieval education gradually began to break. New searches revealed new facts. Many sweeping statements and easy generalizations about *madrasa* education in Pakistan did not seem to fit in the newly found facts. Questions were raised about the earlier assumptions. It was realized that the truth is far more complicated.

This twist in the Western perceptions about Pakistani *madaris* began roughly around 2005 when numerous studies showing alternative facts began to appear. With time, many research projects and papers challenged the earlier studies presenting a different story about Pakistani *madaris*. This shift in Western and local understanding of *madrasa* education raised new questions about *madrasas* and the correct way to deal with them. A brief review of these new studies has been presented below.

The *Madrasa* Scapegoat by Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey published in Washington Quarterly in 2006 openly challenged the earlier perceptions about *madrasas*. The report stated that *madrasas* have become a symbol inviting condemnation and fears among the Western policy makers. Citing Donald Rumsfeld and 9/11 Commission Report, Pandey and Bergen pointed out that out of 79 terrorists involved in recent attacks in New York, Africa, London and Bali, only a few had ever visited a *madrasa*. Many of them had university degrees. This raises questions about what kind of education contributes to terrorism.

"....madrassas are less closely correlated with producing terrorists than are Western colleges, where students from abroad may feel alienated or oppressed and may turn toward militant Islam.

Given that 27 percent of the group attended Western schools, nearly three times as many as attended madrassas, our sample seems to confirm this trend. The data also show a strong correlation between technical education and terrorism, suggesting that perpetrating large-scale attacks requires not only a college education but also a facility with technology. This type of education is simply not available at the vast majority of madrasas."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> M.P. Bell, *Pakistan's Madrassas; Weapons of Mass Instruction?* (MS diss., Naval Post Graduate School, California, 2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Irshad Ahmed Haqqani, "Dini Madaris aur unka Fehm-e-Islam, Koi Tabdili Mumkin Nahin," *Daily Jang*, July 18, 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrasa Scapegoat," Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006.

The 'truth about terrorist education', according to this report is, that terrorism is not linked to *madrasas* and therefore they need not be a national security concern for the United States. Detailed accounts of recent terrorist attacks have been presented in this report. The origins of terrorists involved in these attacks have been traced. No links were found between *madrasas* and terrorism.

One obvious reason for this fact is stated as the absence of capacity in *madrasa* students to carry out an effective terrorist attack;

"Because madrasas generally cannot produce the skilled terrorists capable of committing or organizing attacks in Western countries, they should not be a national security concern. Conceiving of them as such will lead to ineffective policies, and cracking down on madrasas may even harm the allies that Washington attempts to help. In countries such as Pakistan, where madrasas play a significant role in education, particularly in rural areas, the wholesale closure of madrasas may only damage the educational system and further increase regional tensions."

This study suggested that instead of cracking down on Pakistani *madrasas*, the Western countries should monitor the activities of Islamic centers in their urban areas.

Another aspect of *madrasa* reform rhetoric was challenged by Hartung in his study 'Reform of the Indian Madrasa?' published in 2006. Hartung writes that the Western policy makers demand greater government control over *madaris* assuming that it was due to the independent status of *madrasa* that they were able to get away with violent activities. Strict government control would prevent them from doing so. Registration and regulation of *madrasa* by state was the foremost demand of the reform campaign. It must be recognized that most *madaris* that participated in Afghan *jihad* and later developed extremist tendencies were the ones funded by Saudi Arabia. The fact which is overlooked here is that the same *madaris* are state sponsored. So lack of state control is not an issue to be concerned about.<sup>17</sup>

In Pakistan as well it was under state patronage that many *madaris* became involved in Afghan and Kashmir *jihad*.

Another study done during the same year, 'The Indian Madaris and the Agenda of Reform' by Yoginder Sikand (2006) differentiates between objectives of *madrasa* and mainstream education. It reminds the audience that the purpose of madrasa education is "providing Muslims with specifically religious education and transmitting the Islamic scholarly tradition. Madrasa education should not be judged by external goals but the ones set by the ulama themselves. It must be remembered that the aim of madrasa education is different from that of the modern school."

"The critics tend to see the madaris in stereo typical terms, often branding all madaris as backward and reactionary....They are seen as a major burden on Muslim society...Much of what they teach is considered 'useless' in contemporary context."<sup>18</sup>

Such criticism of *madaris* has been termed as exaggerated. Claims that all *madaris* are static are grossly misleading. *Madaris* see themselves as guardian of the old tradition. This is the role that they are playing effectively and this is the main focus of their teachings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>J.P. Hartung and H. Reifeld, *Islamic Education, Diversity, and National Identity* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Yoginder Sikand, "The Indian Madaris and the Agenda of Reform," in *Islamic Education, Diversity, and National Identity* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006).

In 2008, a major study conducted by Christian Fair was published as a book titled 'The Madrasa Challenge; Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan'. The study presents a detailed account of the *madrasa* education system in Pakistan. The structure of *madrasa* education and curriculum is discussed at some length. The enrollment figures in *madaris* are also presented. The study finds that contrary to the earlier assertions the *madrasa* enrollment figures in Pakistan are not alarming.

"The most generous estimates put full time madrasa enrollment well below 10%.and most conservative estimates suggest that it is below 1%.<sup>19</sup>"

The book states that various studies reject the idea that *madaris* are directly related to militancy.

It also suggests that contrary to the common perception, *madaris* might not simply *produce* terrorists rather the intolerant families might *choose madaris*. *Madrasa* enrollment trends indicate that most Pakistani parents prefer to send their children to private schools if that option is available in their locality. Many families who choose *madaris* do it not because of poverty but for ideological considerations. The mainstream schools of thought and the *madaris* being run by them are discussed in detail. It concludes that Pakistan hosts a diverse range of religious education. Unlike the popular perceptions, *madaris* do engage in rigorous scholarly activity. Many of them have close ties with religious political parties. *Madaris* in the tribal belt of Pakistan do supply suicide attackers in Afghanistan. Terrorists are recruited from such *madaris*. But since a small number of the population attends such *madaris*, they have little connection to international terrorism.<sup>20</sup>

This study recommends that international community must not make *madrasa* reform the focus of its policy. Pakistan's public institutions must receive the attention of the world. Investment should be made in public schools instead of *madrasa* reforms. If better options are available to the parents, they might not choose a *madrasa* for their children's education.

Christopher Candland's study "Pakistan's Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education" published in 2008 presents a thorough review of the reform effort in Pakistan. The study begins with relating the fact that just a decade ago, the whole world used to praise Islamic seminaries in Pakistan for their contribution in Afghan *jihad*. After 9/11, there was considerable pressure on the Pakistani government to monitor the activities of these schools and reform their education system. The government issued two ordinances to establish model *madaris* and regulate the affairs of regular *madaris*.

The study goes on to describe the controversy regarding the *madrasa* enrolment as the earlier figures were strongly contested by the later. The World Bank study presented figures which were far lower than the earlier estimates. Some sources that conducted the statistical studies might be considered more reliable by one scholar and might not be considered accurate by the other.

According to Candland, unlike the common perception, many *madaris* do have a desire to reform and update their curriculum. Many *madaris* agreed to get registered and affiliated with the Government *Madaris* board. Many prominent *madaris* became affiliated with the board but government efforts to control their affairs were not tolerated

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Christian Fair. *The Madrassah Challenge* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2008).
 <sup>20</sup> Ibid.

by the *ulama*. An association of *madaris* with the name *Ittehad Tanzimat-i-Madaris Diniya*, Religious Madaris Organizations Alliance, was formed to protect the interests of the *madaris* and curtail government interference. This alliance represents at least 15000 *madaris*.<sup>21</sup>

The writer concluded that the reform effort based on the assumption that religious education be removed from the national curriculum is impractical. Such efforts imposed by force shall not enhance tolerance in society but would be counterproductive. Instead more importance should be given to religious education and *dini madaris*. With better funding, religious values of tolerance should be promoted. Better qualified, moderate *ulama* should be supported. Sectarianism should be discouraged. The Islamic message of peace should be highlighted.

Busting Pakistan's "Madrasa Myth," an article published in 2010 by Graff and Winthrop, as the name suggest, reinforces the scholars' view that the earlier 'myth' about *madrasas* in Pakistan was largely exaggerated. The continued attention of the world's media on Pakistan's religious schools was therefore misguided. The article says that education whether public, private or religious is not the main cause of militancy in Pakistan. The overwhelming focus on *madaris* has been aptly described by Pandey and Bergen as a scapegoat. The real causes of militancy are ignored.<sup>22</sup>

A major study by Brookings Institution's Center for Universal Education thoroughly investigated the problem of militancy and its links with education in Pakistan. Winthrop and Graff presented a new argument in this study which many earlier studies had been pointing out. Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan, published in 2010 makes a case for enhancing good education opportunities, improving quality of general education to reduce militancy. It is not religious education but the absence of any education which causes conflict and militancy. This argument has been supported by empirical evidence and statistics. The paper suggests that although the concerns about militancy in *madaris* had been partly justified, ignoring the big picture of Pakistan's public education condition has been a grave mistake which has led to misguided policy making and funds allocation.

According to this report, public education in Pakistan is a real cause for concern. The government of Pakistan completely failed to meet its targets and fulfill its lofty goals. The number of illiterate people in Pakistan is close to 47 million, this can go up to 50 million by 2015. These figures should be the real cause of concern for the policy makers. There are big gaps and huge disparity among different sections of the society causing unrest. The government is mainly responsible for this state of affairs.

The conclusion this study draws is that contrary to the common perception the *madaris* education is 'at par' with education in other schools of Pakistan. The low standards of education, the disparity between different classes, poor teaching methods, obsolete curriculum is a common feature in public schooling as well. Madaris are not the sole problem. The policy of focusing on madaris alone must be changed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Christopher Candland, "Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan," (2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Corinne Graff & Rebecca Winthrop, "Busting Pakistan's Madrasa Myth," *Foreign Policy. July 1, 2010.* 

"In light of these findings, the almost exclusive focus on madrasas as a security challenge—which is especially prevalent in the West—needs to be corrected?<sup>23</sup>,"

Two important studies published in 2011 by Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das and Asim Khwaja of Harvard University, completely alter the earlier perspective on Pakistani *madaris*. They challenge the statistics on madaris presented in earlier studies.

*Madrasa* Metrics; the Statistics and Rhetoric of Religious Enrollment in Pakistan and The Madrasa Controversy; The Story Does Not Fit the Facts present groundbreaking work on *madrasa* controversy.

The former study challenges the assertions in different reports warning growing number of madrasa schools and enrollment in Pakistan. The writer wonders why such an important issue was reported without the backing of authentic research and survey. This paper is based on authentic data sources and reveals that earlier figures of *madrasa* enrolment were 'inflated by an order of magnitude'. Many other findings of this survey also contradict earlier reports. Instead of *madrasas*, it is the private schools which have grown in number and enrollment in Pakistan.<sup>24</sup>

This study also critically evaluates the reports on *madrasa* saying that many ideas presented in such investigations were based on weak evidences. The 9/11 Commission Report has also been criticized for relying on laymans interviews and not on authentic sources.

# **Responses of Ulama**

The response of the *ulama* belonging to the five main *wafaqs* (boards) representing five main schools of thought in Pakistan, on government's *madrasa* reform campaign have been recorded for this study. In- depth interviews of *ulama* have been carried out and their views on various aspects of the post 9/11 *madrasa* reform campaign have been recorded. Selected parts of these interviews have been listed below.

# The Role of Pakistani Madaris during the 1980s Afghan Jihad Allama Khalil-ur Rehman Qadri, Nazim-i-Aala Jamia Islamia, Johar Town Lahore

#### Representative Tanzeem al Madaris Ahl-i-Sunnat (Hanafi Barelwi School)

The attempt to link *dini madaris* with *jihad* in Afghanistan is also a result of the influence of Western propaganda. *Madrasas* are working on the same pattern since 1947. They are only concerned with education and training (*taleem-o-tarbiat*) of their students which results in the making of people who manage mosques, perform religious duties, conduct research in religious studies.

When Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 1980s, they were welcomed by the people of Pakistan. *Dini madaris* also welcomed them and accommodated them in the spirit of brotherhood. These refugees included teachers and students who were adjusted in Pakistani *madaris*. Later, after the defeat of the Soviets when the fight continued, the same people went to fight in Afghanistan. In our opinion, it is the fight for their independence and survival.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, *Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*. Working Paper 2 (Brookings Centre for Universal Education, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Tahir Andrabi et al. *The Madrasa Controversy; The Story Does Not Fit the Facts* (Pomona College, 2011).

# Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf, Punjab University, Lahore

# Representative of Wafaq Madaris al Arabia (Deobandi School)

At that time (1980s), the Americans needed the *madaris* for their interest. Pakistani and American governments used *madaris* to win the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The *mujahideen* did not have any link with these *madaris* other than religious link. *Madaris* accommodated and supported *mujahideen* because they considered it their religious obligation. Initially, the *mujahideen* began their struggle against the mighty Soviets with meager resources and weapons. It was only later, after they had achieved initial successes that the Americans noted that they are capable of defeating the Soviets. It was then that they decided to support them. Mujahideen accepted this assistance from the US because they considered it legitimate to use whatever means are available to them for their defence.

# Maulana Abdul Malik, Muhtamim Jamia Markaz-e-Ulum Islmia Mansura, Multan Road, Lahore.

# Rabta al Madaris al Islamia (Jamat-I-Islami) Representative of Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan

There was no major change in the character of *madaris* during the 1980s. They were playing the same traditional role of upholding the Islamic values and education in the society. Only this traditional role was strengthened during this decade, when Afghan refugees came here and joined Pakistani *madaris*. The number of *madaris* grew due to this reason. Moreover, when UGC recognized *madaris* degrees as equivalent to M.A. Arabic or Islamiyat, the common people also became interested in *madrasa* education. Conequently, their scope and number grew.

Some *madaris* students took part in Afghan *jihad* on their own initiative. *Madaris* did not make themselves the centers of *jihad*. Religious organizations also did not get directly involved in *jihad*. But they did support the *mujahideen*'s effort morally and financially. *Jihad* in Afghanistan was purely an Afghan struggle but the Muslims all over the world, especially the Arab Muslims, supported this struggle of their Afghan brothers. Many came to Afghanistan including Osama bin Laden. Wherever in the world the Muslims are in trouble, Muslims in different parts of the world feel for them and try their best to help them.

The American occupation of Afghanistan was also illegal. The world does not raise questions about this illegal occupation and American terrorism. But they do raise questions about *madaris* involvement in *jihad*. The Soviet occupation was unjustified, so is the occupation of the Americans. The former ended and the latter is also going to end soon. Currently, America is negotiating with the Taliban so that they may get a safe and respectful exit from Afghanistan.

# Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar Chief Patron Idara Minhaj-ul-Hussain, Johar Town, Lahore

The 1979 Iranian revolution inspired the whole Muslim world. People in Pakistan were also affected by this strong movement in their neighborhood. It strengthened Muslim freedom struggles throughout the world. It was during this time that the Soviets attacked Afghanistan. The Soviet system was based on atheist beliefs. In order to contain its influence, Islamist organizations all over the world became active. The US was also supporting the cause of *mujahideen* during this time because it suited their interests. *Ulama* and *madrasa* students also actively participated in this war. Mostly, the *madrasas* from Deoband School participated in this war. The Government of Pakistan was also involved in this war. As a result of this war, the Soviet Union disintegrated. Imam Khomeni predicted this event in his last letter to Gorbachev. He also invited him to accept Islam in this letter.

The negative repercussions of Afghan *jihad* continue to this day. We are all facing its dangerous fallout.

# Dr. Hasan Madni, Nazim–i-Aala Jamia Rahmania, Garden Town, Lahore Representative of Wafaq al Madaris al Salfia (Ahl-I-Hadith School)

One thing has to be made clear here. US did not initiate the Afghan *jihad*. It was initiated by the Afghan *Mujahideen*. They were already engaged in war when Americans decided to intervene.

The role of *madaris* in the Afghan war was the propagation of this ideology. When *madrasas* enjoyed state support, they were empowered. Their position became better. During the Afghan *jihad*, *madaris* trained leaders who fought in the *jihad*. At that time, it was the Americans who were supporting the *jihad*. They were the ones who brought Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan. Later, they were the ones who took a U turn, not *madaris* or *ulama*.

# About the post 9/11 Western demand for madrasa reform in Pakistan

#### Dr. Hasan Madni

The 20<sup>th</sup> century was the century of the wars between the Western powers. After the cold war, a new world order was established in the world. The notions of the 'clash of civilizations' were promoted in this unipolar world. The United States never took part in World War I and II. After the cold war, they deliberately created an enemy for two basic reasons; first, the US war and weapons industry needed conflict in the world. Secondly, the US needed a common enemy to stay united, as it consists of many different states and many different cultures.

# Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar

The US and its Western allies had seen the ideological and intellectual strength of *dini* madaris. The felt threatened by this force. Although most students who participated in *jihad* came back to madaris after the war was over but some of them became agents of external international powers. They became involved in armed struggle in the name of religion.

#### Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf

*Madaris* never had links with militancy. They were concerned with education. The US government felt threatened with the implementation of Islamic laws and government in Afghanistan back in 1990s. It was a system challenging their imperialist system based on greed. The Taliban government would run government affairs with meager resources. It was unlike the system of government anywhere in the world. Our cricket team would have more budget than the total budget of the Taliban government. This was a clear challenge to the capitalist greed based system. That is why they created the drama of 9/11 to make an excuse to curb this system. Now after 10 years it is hard for them to find a safe exit from here.

# Why Pakistani Madaris are being Blamed for Spreading International Terrorism

# Allama Khalil-ur Rehman Qadri

In the 1990s, a kind of unity was being developed among *ulama*. United they were a force as they catered to approximately ten million students. This large number could bring change democratically without violence. They (state and the West) perceived this as a threat and wanted to control *madrasas* so that they do not activate. But this was just their perception. *Madaris* had no such intention. They were working on their own traditional agenda. It was just a threat perception.

#### Dr. Hasan Madni

Terrorism has never been defined clearly by the West. This term has no clear meaning. According to the Western people, anyone who is in minority and dares to take a different position than the majority is a terrorist. Anyone who refuses to accept the existing norms is a terrorist. This is how this term has been used by the West. Pakistan went for nuclear explosions in 1998. The US entered this region within two and a half years of that.

# Maulana Abdul Malik

Americans use the term 'reforms' to take control of the *madaris*. Government also received huge amounts for this purpose. But *Madaris* had understood their scheme and together they rejected the government's interference in the name of reforms. Today *Madaris* are as free and independent as ever. *Madaris* did not accept the American dictation.

# Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar

US and its Western allies had seen the ideological and intellectual strength of *dini madaris*. They felt threatened by this force. Most students who participated in *jihad* came back to *madaris* after the war was over but some of them became agents of external international powers. They became involved in armed struggle in the name of religion.

Any real investigative report of the 9/11 incident has not been made public. Many evidences point to very different facts than the official story. Besides, none of the alleged attackers of the twin towers were students of any religious *madrasa*. Despite this, *madaris* have been targeted as a prime suspect. The same *madaris* which helped US and Western powers against the Soviets were now declared terrorists. American interests changed. America feared the Islamists now.

#### Measures Taken by Pakistani Government to Reform Madrasas after 9/11

They asked us to establish *madrasa* boards despite the fact that we already had a comprehensive organization. There was an attempt to make an official government (*sarkari*) board but the *Ulama* wanted to continue following their own mechanism.

There was a demand to expel the foreign students. First they were asked to get NOC from their respective embassies. Later even those who got an NOC were kicked out.

I would like to share a very important piece of information here. In 2002, India had 1200 students studying in 911 *madaris*. During the next 5 years, 2500 new *madaris* were established. Many incentives were given to foreign students; they were encouraged to join *madaris* in India. It was on this basis that in 2007, India applied for the membership of OIC claiming that they have students from all over the Islamic world studying in India.

When we were having a 'crack down' against the foreign students, India was welcoming them. Later they accused Pakistan that no foreign student stays there.

There was also demand for *madrasa* registration. *Ulama* had no objection to this demand. Many *madaris* got registered.

Another demand was the inclusion of modern subjects along with the religious subjects in the curriculum. This is also considered a correct demand by ulama. In fact, many of them already taught both types of subjects in their *madaris* before this reform campaign.We think it is important for students to understand social issues. *Ulama* agree with this demand of the government but we have strong reservations to their raiding *madaris* and expelling foreign students from the country.

## Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar

With the help of different agencies, investigations were carried out against the *madaris*. The purpose was to impose such a syllabus by force which damages the spirit of *jihad* in the Muslim youth. The aim was to suppress the religious mind. Different excuses were made to interfere in the affairs of *madaris*. Huge financial incentives were given. Provision of modern facilities was promised. Trained teachers were offered to teach modern subjects with modern methods. Initially, some naïve *madaris* were fooled into accepting such offers. But later the true intentions of these people were exposed when they started interfering in the *madrasa* affairs and threatened to withdraw their financial support in case *madrasas* do not comply. Even the *madaris* who initially fell prey to the Western designs, returned to their original traditional method.

It was alleged that dini madaris do not provide modern education. This is against the reality. Madaris do provide modern education but they do it according to their limited resources.Shia madaris admit only those students who have passed matriculation exams. Other Ahl-i-Sunnat madaris have also improved their education system with time. Computer education has been introduced in many madaris.But this used under strict supervision of the teachers. Islam is not against the modern education. But the aims of modernity at times are incompatible with Islam.

#### Maulana Abdul Malik

American reforms demand that *jihad* be excluded from the Quran and *Hadis*. The *ayat* of *jihad* should be taken out of the Quran. The *ayat* condemning Jews and Christians should also be excluded. All this is an old wish of the Jews which could neither be fulfilled in the past nor will it be fulfilled now.

# Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf

The Musharraf government, pressed by the demands of the Western governments, ordered an immediate action against the *madaris* and bring all of them under the Ministry of Education. The Minister of Religious Affairs Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi was given the task to make a comprehensive report about the activities of these *madaris* within four months. Dr. Mahmood Ghazi told me himself that after four months, the report he had for Musharraf was that the work done by the *madaris* cannot be handled by the government. Without taking any help from the government, *madaris* are providing education, food and clothing to the poorest section of the society. The people giving them money for this job would stop paying them if they were brought under government control. Government would not be able to regulate such a big task. It would be a huge burden on the national

resources. After this briefing Musharraf came to the television screen and admitted the contribution of *madrasas* as 'the largest NGO' working in Pakistan. From that moment onwards, the government practically stopped interfering in the affairs of *madaris*.

## **Response of** *Ulama* **to Madrasa Reform Campaign**

#### Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf

The *ulama* have joined together, they insisted that allegations against madaris are baseless. We invite Western researchers to come, enter our *madaris* and then report about us. Many reports and surveys published in their journals are mere fabrication of facts and not based on ground realities.

#### Allama Khalil ur Rahman Qadri

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#### Dr. Hasan Madni

The government did not do much on the ground. They only made statements in the media. We did not face any pressure. Madaris continue to give their traditional education, their system has not been affected at all. However great damage has been done on the media, where the traditional role of madaris has been undermined, ridiculed and their image has been destroyed in the eyes of the public.

# Your personal opinion about the need to reform madrasa education in Pakistan

#### Allama Khalil-ur Rehman Qadri

In my opinion, modern subjects should be a part of *madrasa* curriculum but ground realities must be kept in mind in this respect. We cannot teach medicine or engineering in *madrasas*. We have our own system which is quite demanding. But I do think we should teach the basics of science and other subjects. We should pay special attention to the speaking skills of the students. Current affairs should also be taught in *madaris*.

I also think that inter-sect harmony should be promoted in Pakistani *madaris*. If we (*madrasas*) are blamed for sectarianism, it is justified. We must put a stop to the existing practice in *madaris* which promotes sectarian hatred.

# Dr. Hasan Madni

*Dini madaris* are fulfilling about 30%- 40% of their objectives. There is room for improvement.

*Madaris* were mainstream educational institutions in the past. They used to fulfill all the educational needs of society. There was no distinction between religious and secular

education. With the advent of imperialism, a duality emerged in education. Religious education was separated from secular, modern education. *Madaris* were reduced to religious education alone. This is also a form of secularism. Today, both mainstream institutions and *madaris* are secular in this sense. They separate religion (*din*) from the world (*dunya*). The educational ideology of Islam does not differentiate between the two.

#### Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar

*Dini Madaris* have a history. There was a time when a comprehensive system of education existed in *madrasas* under one roof. The graduates of these early *madrasas* would become scholars, *Faqih*, scientists, politicians, economists and experts in various different fields. This system of education was changed with the advent of the British imperialism. British occupied different parts of the world and gradually they divided the education system into two parts; religious and secular education. All resources were now spent on the propagation of the British education and interests. But despite all this, the *ulama* refused to surrender to the British might. They accepted hunger, thirst and poverty but did not compromise on their principles. They revived the *Sunnah* of *Ashab-i-Suffah* and continued their teaching and learning with meager resources.

With time, most worldly needs and resources were diverted towards the government. Many issues which *madrasas* dealt with became obsolete. *Ulama* continued research and teaching.

Later, many independence movements changed the environment of the imperial rule. A strong independence movement in the sub-continent resulted in the making of Pakistan. The basis of Pakistan was the ideology of Islam. The purpose of making this country was to acquire a land where the laws of God are implemented. Therefore, all constitutions of Pakistan have an Islamic spirit. The 1973 constitution also recognizes the sovereignty and power of Allah. Declaration of Qadianis as non Muslims is also a result of religious concerns of *ulama* and the people.

# Maulana Abdul Malik

There is need for improvement in *madaris*. *Madaris* need to teach modern subjects at all levels like they teach the religious subjects. *Madaris* students must be kept aware of the current developments and languages. They should be given information about the Muslim world, their geography, natural resources, location, etc. Modern technology must be used for this purpose. We need to develop good representatives of the Muslim *Ummah* who can effectively raise their voice on important issues.

#### Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf

One must understand that there are about 18000 registered *madaris* in Pakistan where millions of students study. These students come after completing their primary level studies. They are taught *Dars Nizami* which consists of 25 subjects which have to be covered in 10 years. The teachers teach these subjects from dawn till dusk on a very low salary. The students come from the poorest section of the society. Now *madaris* teachers are expected to teach 25 subjects as well as the modern syllabus taught in universities to these lower class students with limited ability on an extremely low salary (the maximum they get is 10,000). What exactly are we asking from these poor souls? We should think about it. A university teacher gets an excellent salary and gets tired if he takes four classes in a day. These *madrasa* teachers are only human.

# Your Recommendations for Reforming Madrasa Education Maulana Mufti Qari Muhammad Yousaf

Let me share with you that on their own, the *madaris* have started teaching modern subjects in their limited capacity. We have *madaris* now where we are producing MBAs as well as *Dars Nizami* Graduates. In my own small *madrasa*, some students are studying medicine and engineering. But we tell them that this is just a source, the real knowledge is the one that builds characters and helps in the hereafter. Instead of people urging *maulvis* to learn modern subjects, it should be the other way around. People should learn some religion as well because it is important. The *Faraiz* and *Wajbats* should be taught in schools. Aren't they important for life? We have seen many examples of big bureaucrats, officers not able to recite *Dua-i-Qanoot* or *Ayat-ul-Kursi* properly. Why insist that a maulvi learn English or Math?

#### Dr. Allama Muhammad Hussain Akbar

*Dini madaris* are not provided any budget share from the government. They are working on self reliance basis. Examine the government educational institutions' performance on the other hand who receive government funds on regular basis. There are ghost schools but you will never find a ghost *madrasa*. *Madaris* are the largest NGO in the countrym catering to the needs of millions of Pakistani students.

I would especially like to mention here that the concerns expressed by the West about the lack of employment opportunities for *madrasa* students are not genuine. Don't be fooled when they call them sympathetically '*beycharey*', '*maskeen*', not able to earn a decent living.

I remember during one of my meetings with an American delegation, they were expressing deep sympathy for *madrasa* students. I assured them jokingly not to worry as 'no *maulvi* has ever died of hunger, however many might have died of overeating...' (Laughing) It is a fact.

Having said this, I do feel there is a need to reform education in all sectors after every five years on regular basis.

I do feel there is a need to improve relations with the West through dialogue. The door for dialogue is open in Islam till the very last moment. In Karbala, Imam Hussain kept on inviting the Yazidi Commandos for dialogue. We still have the place in Karbla where he held talks with Umar bin Saad at the last moment. Islam is a religion of peace. It is a religion of logic. That is why despite Western propaganda, it is the fastest growing religion in the world today.

#### Conclusion

The post 9/11 *madrasa* reform campaign by the government, international and local media, and academia failed to impact the Pakistani *madaris* mainly because the views of the *ulama* were largely ignored in this debate. The voice of *ulama* running the *madaris* was mostly absent from the extensive discourse on the subject of *madrasa* reform after 9/11. It was mainly due to this reason that despite spending huge amounts of money, loud rhetoric and media campaigns, nothing substantial could be achieved on the ground. It is hard to reform *madrasa* education and system in Pakistan without taking into consideration the concerns of *ulama*. For successful reform of *madrasa* education, *ulama* have to be taken on board, their problems have to be addressed, and they should be made partners in the efforts to root out militancy and religious extremism from the country.

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