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The discourse and study of terrorism in decolonised states: the case of Pakistan

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ABSTRACT
The existing literature in the terrorism field does not address the absence of terrorism scholarship in developing countries. This article focuses on this intellectual gap using the case of Pakistan. It argues that most decolonised states, including Pakistan, are yet to grasp the complexities of traditional approaches to the study of terrorism, let alone its critical dimensions. The article explores some of the prevailing conditions in developing countries, specifically decolonised states such as Pakistan, which prevent the development of a robust academic discourse on terrorism and the development of a strong field of study. It suggests that the main barriers that account for this shortfall include the state's legitimacy deficit, a flawed education system that nurtures fictions as truth and inhibits knowledge production, the institutionalised role of conspiracy theories in national politics and the multiplicity of terrorism discourses among government and sociopolitical entities. The conclusion highlights a number of reasons that might help to explain this persistent condition and offers a few policy recommendations.

Introduction

The last few decades have witnessed phenomenal developments in the field of terrorism studies. Primarily evolving from the West's counter-insurgency during the cold war, and later as a response to 9/11, terrorism studies have entered into what some observers have called a "golden age" (Ranstorp 2009, 17). At the same time, this growth period has witnessed the emergence of a body of "critical" scholarship, a rebel crew imbued with an emancipatory agenda who have challenged the foundations of traditional stream of terrorism knowledge, or what they term "orthodox" terrorisms studies (Jackson 2009, 216–221). Although unintended, this academic debate has over time led to a bifurcation of the terrorism literature into orthodox (mainstream) and critical terrorism studies (CTS). Meanwhile, terrorism research has experienced another transformation by the introduction of a science, technology and medical literature into its domain from the exact and the life sciences (Gordon 2010). Accompanying this explosion of interdisciplinary approaches has been a simultaneous unprecedented growth of specialised journals in the years since 2001. In addition, courses and modules on terrorism have been instituted

and taught at virtually every major university in the world, and terrorism studies degree programmes have been established at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels in an increasing number of universities (Jackson 2012). In particular, academic collaboration in terrorism research has been a significant contributor to the degree of field's interdisciplinarity (Gordon 2010; Silke 2008, 27).

This growth is indeed remarkable. Regardless of some of the enduring challenges facing research on terrorism (for details, see Ranstorp 2009, 13–33), this burgeoning literature has helped to unravel many unexplored, obscure or misunderstood facets of terrorism knowledge.[1] Nonetheless, a serious issue that plagues, and to an extent proscribes, the production and dissemination of terrorism knowledge is a kind of cultural asymmetry in representational terms, an aspect that has been completely ignored in the broader academic discourse. In other words, whether or not terrorism research has become popularised with the advent of CTS (see Fitzgerald and Lemieux 2011), or it is marred by stagnation (see Sageman 2014) or it has made important advances into new disciplines (see Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall, and Jarvis 2015), the entire intellectual discourse on terrorism takes place within a narrow, select sphere: the West. Outside of this realm – more specifically, in the developing world – comprehension of the traditional perspective of terrorism has not gained ground even among the elites, much less civil society and the general public.

Intriguingly, the countries that currently or have previously suffered the most from terrorism stand out distinctly in the absence of significant scholarly research or scientific rendering on contemporary terrorism (Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 216–219; Toros and Gunning 2009, 103–106). India, Indonesia, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria and Yemen provide a few examples. It is not the intention of this article to discredit the efforts of those who have contributed to the knowledge pool of various fields. The fact remains, however, that virtually none of the key publications in the field of orthodox terrorism studies or CTS have been written by well-known scholars from these countries.[2] This observation is further verified by an examination of the editorial compositions of the main journals that deal with terrorism and political violence.[3] The developing world (specifically, decolonised countries) is barely represented in these academic periodicals.[4] The Western domination of terrorism studies, along with the absence of scholarship from the global South, has been noted by some scholars with reference to those countries that are particularly prone to the threat of terrorism (Duyvesten 2006; Ranstorp 2006, 9). Nevertheless, the substantial reasons for the latter group's non-representation in the terrorism literature have not been adequately investigated to date. As a result, not only understanding of the factors inhibiting contribution by these states is continually masked, but a more inclusive and collaborative development of terrorism knowledge is undermined. In particular, this marginalisation of the perspectives of victim societies deprives terrorism research of access to crucially important primary sources, and thus reinforces the Western researchers' customary overreliance on secondary sources of information, and their tendency to employ a limited number of methodologies for gathering data (Schuurman and Eijkman 2013; Symth 2009, 195; Ranstorp 2009, 17; Jackson 2009, 219; Silke 2004, 2007, 2008; Toros 2008).

This article attempts to examine this issue using Pakistan as a representative case study. Its principal focus is to explore, highlight and better understand the

multifaceted causes, dynamics and inadequacies latent in the setting of Pakistan which prevent the emergence of an intelligible discourse on terrorism and the development of this important field of study. One of the reasons why this work is so important is that until the broader Pakistan public are part of a more informed discourse, many will continue to dismiss the country's terrorist violence as a Brahmanic, Talmudic or a Crusader conspiracy, an all too common occurrence (Fair 2014).[5] Such a mindset characterises the broader decolonised community, with frequent challenges to the usefulness of Western knowledge about terrorism. In essence, one aim of this article is to identify and dissect areas of neglect in order to try and bridge understanding and knowledge gaps between both the western and non-western intellectual spheres.

The article begins with an exploration of popular discourses on terrorism in Pakistan, illuminating some of the dynamics, subjectivities and complexities that generate these frames. The role of sociopolitical actors, the media and the security establishment is also analysed in order to better understand the role of conspiracy theories that are popularly employed to construct national security narratives and mindsets. In essence, this section highlights how little is known globally about Pakistan as a country from the perspective of the broader terrorism discourse. Next, the construction of threats and narrative formation by the state is analysed. This section exposes some of the authoritarian tendencies, structural vulnerabilities and the legitimacy deficit emanating from the process of state consolidation following from decolonisation. In doing so, it demonstrates why violence is still a rational option for self-enrichment or for gaining political power (Jung and Klause 1999), as well as underscoring the absence of factors vital to fostering cultural pluralism, political dissent and religious harmony. The final section explores the state of education and terrorism scholarship in order to better understand the reasons for the intellectual and academic deficit preventing the growth of this field of study in Pakistan. The conclusion synthesises the discussion and offers a series of broad proposals to address the impasse.

The popular mindset in Pakistan and the discourse on terrorism

Pakistan has been called an aporia of its kind (Ahmed 2002). It is a highly complex and often poorly understood country, despite an impressive historiography dealing with numerous dimensions of its statehood. An important caveat in understanding it is that the country should not be viewed as a socio-cultural monolith (Lieven 2011, 21–22). Rather, it is important to grasp its complex make-up through ethno-spatial diversity and the operation of a variety of social processes that generate its competing religious traditions, varied social landscapes, deep political tensions and historical patterns of violence (Lieven 2011). It is characterised by "dissenting, alternative, unorthodox, heterodox [and] cultural strands" (Said 1998), in addition to the official culture. The territories that are now designated as Pakistan were once controlled by various dynasties that ruled India (Rizvi 2006). They were cohered together during the imperial colonisation of northern India, in part to thwart Russian ambitions of gaining access to warm waters during the nineteenth century (Syed 2007). The nation's contemporary cultural variety originates from this political geography, and has yet not been moulded into a national identity or a united national cause (Shaikh 2009, 2–3).

Pakistan's political culture has been criticised for lacking a greater capacity for self-analysis according to logic and reason (Rashid 2011). An important factor that accounts for this symptom is a lack of critical thinking within the existing education milieu in Pakistan's public schools and colleges that frequently use textbooks and curriculum rooted in constructed myths which mainstream fringe views on issues such as jihad, extremism, radicalisation and terrorism (see Rana and Sial 2012). In addition, the uncritical acceptance of traditional state-based security narratives derives from the generally poor state of public education where millions are barely literate, many are raised to revere rather than question, and most have access to limited sources of information (Constable 2011, xv). These factors, according to some scholars, manifest in different ways, including a tendency to "await miracles, belief in myths, and [to] pin high hopes on individuals for deliverance" (*The News*, June 6, 2015) – in addition to a proclivity for sentimentalism, provocation and an inability to sustain long and involved rational arguments (Ahmed 2002).

The religious discourse in Pakistan – sectarianism, in particular – contributes to this state of affairs. It is an old division with roots in the destructive engagement in Afghanistan and support for the Taliban (Shaikh 2009, 171–172), but has spread and intensified in recent years due to the forces of political economy and Middle Eastern politics (for more details, see Jaffrelot 2015, 482–497). A complex set of sectarian doctrines espoused and disseminated by the country's clergy (Salafi, Sunni, Ahle Hadit and Shia) constitute a central ingredient in formalising and accentuating the excommunication of the "other", at times violently. Interestingly, each of the sects has tried to define the Pakistani state and society in its own exclusive way. The monolithic construction of Pakistani society as an Islamic state fades away as one becomes increasingly aware of the many "Pakistans" conceptually speaking, who seek to assert themselves at the peripheries (Behuria 2003). The rare case of unanimity among all Sunni and Salafi sects, and to an extent the Shias, is the acute hatred shared against Ahmadis (who deny the finality of Prophet Muhammad among prophets); consequently, violence against them is not construed as terrorism. The sectarian unity, however, falls apart when it comes to the question of considering Shias as Muslims and interpretations of violence against them.

Sunni and Salafi factions differ in their views about Shias. Salafis regard them as kafir (infidel) or apostate and are therefore indifferent to violent acts perpetrated against them. Pakistani Sunnis who follow the Deobandi and Barelvi confessions also have contrasting opinions about Shias. The majority of Pakistani [Deobandi] Sunnis strongly believe that Sunnis are superior to Shia Muslims (Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2010). It is a common knowledge that many in Pakistan sympathise with the underlying views of sectarian extremists, partly evident from the fact that 41% of Pakistanis do not consider Shias as Muslims (PEW 2012, 21). The violence by sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jundullah or the Taliban is therefore rarely, if ever, condemned by Deobandi clerics who have sway over these organisations (Fair 2014, 244). It is also among Deobandis that the major support base of the Pakistani Taliban is located; they are vehemently intolerant of Shias.[6] The Barelvis (the largest Sunni faction) have a more sympathetic image of Shias due to a common Sufi and shrine culture, and shared opposition to Taliban-led violence (*The Express Tribunal*, October 6, 2013). A key characteristic of Barelvis, however, is hypersensitivity to blasphemy to the extent of lionising even murderers of alleged blasphemers (Brulliard 2011). These reactionary views are common among the youth,

both the less educated, illiterate, poor youth, and the affluent cohorts (Siddiqa 2011). The tendency to embrace latent radicalism among the youth does not necessarily occur because they understand the underlying ideology or comprehend the relevant religious principles; rather, such ideas have become popular throughout the society and are not challenged by an alternative discourse (Siddiqa 2011).

This wave of intolerance sweeping the country, particularly since the broader Islamisation project initiated by the military regime of General Zia, is exacerbated by conspiracy theories put forth by the ruling establishment, politico-religious elites, the media and the militant groups. The actors couch the conspiratorial content in an alluring story consistent with the political agenda, which offers a grand, complete, unified explanation that can account for everything as human intention (Bartlett and Miller 2010). For example, the Pakistani state securitises through the use of language and religion to construct the "other" against which Pakistan's identify is reaffirmed – for instance, against the arch-enemy India – in order to coalesce the masses (Shams 2011; Fair 2011; Shaikh 2009, 78). The persistent bashing of Pakistan by India functions to enhance the credibility of this securitisation rhetoric.

Politico-religious elites and the media articulate their conceptual frames employing a mix of the blame game, real-politick and sensational overtones for social and commercial mobilisation. The militants and hardliners articulate their stories in a hate framework aimed at dehumanising the "other" – the state as apostate, for example – for the purpose of radicalisation, contextualising the sham conspiracies in a geo-historical past and offering resolution through ideologised violence (e.g. see Feyyaz 2015). The militant message gains traction in part because it is disguised in religious rhetoric and feeds on popular notions of pan-Islamism and anti-imperialism (*The News*, January 2, 2016). A shared thread that pervades the entire range of conspiratorial material is the notion of Pakistan as a victim, a nation maligned and wronged at the hands of foreign powers, especially the United States and India (Brulliard 2011). In the conventional wisdom, these sinister outsiders want to subvert, destroy and undermine Pakistan, although no logical reason is offered as to why (Ahmed 2013, viii; Rashid 2011). Each new terrorist attack brings a fresh round of reactionary rhetoric blaming "outside forces" and stirring up outrageous conspiracy theories (Khan 2012).

To be sure, conspiracy theories are popular in all societies owing to the fantasies underpinning them vis-à-vis the alternative, namely, an absurd, unpredictable world that is far too frightening (Bartlett and Miller 2010). However, conspiracies do not evoke the same level of resonance and acceptance across national divides. Pakistan is a fertile ground from this perspective, illustrated in part by the social ambivalence towards armed responses against the militants (see Fair 2009), the myriad opinions about "extremists" (*The Hindu*, April 28, 2014), wavering levels of support for the war on terror, exaggerated responses to drone attacks, anti-America sentiments and a wider acceptance of the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) despite it being a declared terrorist group (Feyyaz 2015). Interestingly, support for the LeT, the Kashmir-centric militant arm of Salafi Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD), is deeply rooted in Pakistani society and rises above doctrinal or sectarian cleavages (Jaffrelot 2015, 514–517; Haqqani 2013, 273–277; Fair 2011; Jalal 2008, 286–287). This paradox can be better understood through the prism of nationalism and history in relation to India (*Herald.Dawn*, May 19, 2016; Feyyaz 2015; Jaffrelot 2015, 516; Fair 2011).

It is equally ironic that despite the heavy cost suffered by the nation since 2003, the major political parties remain divided over the construction of terrorists, terrorism and how best to counter it, resulting in a confused and frequently self-contradictory narrative (*Herald.Dawn*, May 19, 2016; Feyyaz 2015). The political leadership of Pakistan condemns terrorism rhetorically, while in practice maintaining and often employing armed militias for turf wars (Feyyaz 2011a). For example, Muttahida Qoumi Movement (MQM), which claims to represent the Mohajir community of urban Sindh, essentialises all violence that threatens its political base as terrorism, irrespective of the source – the state, political, intra-party, ethnic, criminal and religious competitors (*The Guardian*, July, 2013; Feyyaz 2011a, 2013a). Meanwhile, the party itself has engaged in premeditated violent acts against political and ethnic opponents, and law enforcement agencies on a large scale (Bennett-Jones 2013).

Other secular parties have similarly applied violence in pursuit of vested interests. On the religious and political right, both JI (Jamaat-e-Islami) and JUI-F (Jameet-ulmai-Islam-Fazalur Rehman) have attempted to shape public discourse and perceptions regarding vigilante activities and insurgent groups, sometimes championing their causes (White 2008). Their interpretation of terrorism is closely aligned and whimsical at times. For instance, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who was killed in the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque, Islamabad) operation by the Pakistan Army in 2007, was hailed as a *shaheed* (martyr) by the late Emir (chief) of JI, Qazi Hussain. Similarly, Fazalur Rahman praised the Lal Masjid fighters as "*mujahideen* who fought for enforcing Islam in its true spirit" (White 2008). Munawar Hussain, another Emir of JI, declared Hakimullah Mehsud (the head of TTP, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) as a martyr, while raising doubts about the eternal destiny of the military personnel who perished in fighting against the Taliban (*Express Tribune*, November 11, 2013). This attitude by JI and JUI-F is not different from their earlier assertions on such issues (e.g. see Hoodbhoy 2010). Similarly the political conservatives – the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf – have maintained an ambiguous stance in relation to the Taliban (*The WorldPost*, December 17, 2014). In particular, the PML-N remained noncommittal towards the war on terror and violent acts by the Taliban throughout the period of General Musharraf's rule.

The media and terrorism

The coverage of terrorism by the Pakistani media has been guided by particular priorities and motivations. In the first place, the glorification of terrorists has been a common theme among "newspaper columnists, newscasters, TV hosts and anchors", which has resulted in genuine problems in relation to the objective identification of real terrorists (*Dispatch News Desk*, May 13, 2015). Moreover, the right-wing commentators and columnists openly function as apologists, subtly justifying domestic terrorism by linking it to international events and Western policies (*Herald.Dawn*, May 19, 2016). Correspondingly, the print media adheres to a mix of typical Pakistani conservatism which is reflected in the widely read Urdu newspapers (89%), and the pragmatism that is embodied in the metropolitan English dailies (11%). The pattern is exemplified by an analysis by Mohammad Vaqas (2013) of 382 stories involving 13 newspapers (six Urdu and seven English nationwide newspapers between 1 November 2007 and 23 September 2010) about JuD which was banned in 2010. Compared to Urdu

newspapers, the English media not only provided significantly more coverage of the group (72% vs. 28%), but more English stories presented the organisation negatively (i.e. as a terrorist organisation). In contrast, the Urdu stories were favourably disposed towards the relief and welfare activities of the organisation.

This sympathetic attitude towards JuD persists, and can be generalised for several other groups who have been banned by the state, such as Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), Lashkr-e-Jhangvi and so on. Further, the Urdu media affords more space to the viewpoint of known violent sectarian organisations such as, but not limited to, TNSM, and invariably invokes the "Indian element" and "conspiracy against Islam" themes (Shams 2011). This is consistent with the broader contours of the state's strategic communication. Similarly, the English news media (e.g. DAWN) readily harmonises its tenor in accordance with state propaganda whenever the latter demonises the militants (Shams 2011). Essentially, major elements of media reporting in Pakistan explicitly deride the Islamist militants as the perceived agents of India, or other "anti-Islam" forces (Shams 2011). Interestingly while the state aspires to be seen as Islamic vis-à-vis the Taliban who are condemned as enemies of Islam, the Urdu media (such as the leading national daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*) provides coverage to the Islamic discourse as a whole, both the state narrative and the Taliban narrative (Shams 2011).

The state's construction of threats, terrorism and narrative formation

Pakistan and its governmental apparatus have been the subject of sustained attention regarding its authoritarian character, including its relationship with and support for, international jihad or/and "terrorism" (see Fair 2014, 3; Gall 2014; Haqqani 2013, 272–274). Multiple dynamics ensuing from decolonisation suggest that "Pakistan was born with an insecurity syndrome … [which has meant that it faces] the most complex security environment of any state in world" (Staniland 2008). These challenges were supplemented by another set of systemic dynamics. Lawrence Ziring argues that the foremost of these challenges was "the inability of the Muslim League [the founding party of Pakistan] to transform itself from a movement to a vibrant, unified, and coherent political party. … [thereby unleashing] the divisive forces that, more than India, threatened the survival of the young nation" (cited in Staniland 2008). Pakistan also inherited a substantial landowning class in the Punjab that was quite hostile to democratic norms and institutions (Ganguly 2009). The Founding Father's untimely death compounded the problems brought about by mounting factionalism within the Punjab, and the revival of traditional opponents in the Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – KP) and Sindh (Talbot 1988). Simultaneously, the country required the articulation of a vision for survival in the context of its highly charged tensions with neighbouring India (Sadaaki 2003) and the challenge posed by nation-building of an ethno-culturally diverse population.

The security predicament provoked by this set of challenges was enhanced by two other compelling factors. First, the roots of the nation's instability, Gulab Mishra (1987, 15) observes, lay in the lack of a natural frontier or a separate history, tradition, culture, and linguistic or ethnic identity of its own vis-à-vis India (cited in Shaikh 2009, 1). Inevitably, this vulnerability saw regional identities as direct threats to the state (Levesque 2013), which thus "tended to augment ethnic tensions and potential for

violence" (Siddiqi 2003, 449). Second, the conflict in Kashmir, a region which was declared as the jugular vein of Pakistan by Jinnah, at this point was described as "the greatest and gravest single issue in international affairs" (Hasan 1966, 3).

Together, these and other real as well as imagined imperatives laid down the national security parameters of the nascent state which not only translated into conventional security policies, but also acquired added cultural, social and economic features thereby underwriting the idea of specialists on violence, the men in khaki, as being the best qualified to provide leadership in all important sectors of societal existence (Rumi and Raja 2013). Given that India is more populous and more powerful in military terms, the Pakistan Army easily assumed a key role in defining and defending the nation and the state (see Wilke 2001). Anatol Lieven (2011, 8) suggests that the threat perceived from India may have been exaggerated but it was not irrational, and neither have most of the policies which resulted from it. Christine Fair (2014, 6–7) also partially concedes to the army's concern vis-à-vis India, particularly in terms of the territorial defence of the country. The obsession with India, she argues, has not been purely or even mostly driven by security, but also stems from civilisational reasons, since the Pakistan Army from its inception also considers itself the guardian of the nation's ideological frontiers and aims to maintain Pakistan's "Islamic" identity.

Consequently, the state edifice that emerged was much stronger over government and civil society (Siddiqi 2003, 448), underpinned by Urdu and Islam as the overarching official scribes of Pakistani nationalism. On the international front, Pakistan's relationship with the United States has contributed to perpetuating military rule and the strengthening of state structures at the expense of democratic institutions and a strong civil society (Siddiqi 2003, 450; Mishra 1987). Further, the centralising tendencies have entailed tremendous defence expenditure at the cost of an "illiterate, malnourished, and underdeveloped society, and a social environment that causes conflicts of various types" (Siddiqi 2003, 450). More fundamentally, the security lens set by the state evolved indigenous thresholds to judge patriotism and safeguard national interests by designing a kind of risk resistant (or risk acceptant) form of statecraft (see Fair 2014, 12, 282).

This historical specificity transpiring from the experience of colonialism is not unique to Pakistan, but applies to many postcolonial societies where the special role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has become all too common a phenomenon (Alivi 1972). The processes underpinning this change were facilitated by the weakness and underdevelopment of the indigenous bourgeoisie, who at the moment of independence were unable to command the relatively developed colonial state apparatus which was instrumental in the exercise of the metropolitan power over it (Alivi 1972). A fitting expression of this structural condition is found in the conceptual formulation of the "over-developed state" by Hamza Alivi (1972), and in direct relation to Pakistan, the notion of "the Garrison State" by Ishtiaq Ahmed (2013). In addition, the belligerent role of India since the waning months of British rule weighs heavily in bolstering this security paradigm (Hajari 2015).

A key consequence of this bureaucratic approach to nation-building has been the regulation of political parties through legislation to ensure that they support the concept of Pakistan – a vestige of an early effort to repress the activities of the National Democratic Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami, which opposed Partition in 1947 ("Pakistan – Political Parties" 2016). Subsequent military regimes have been far more aggressive in purging nonconformist voices from Pakistani society. From the outset, the very

definition, for instance, of "disorder" by General Ayub, the "Suppression of terrorist activities" under the civilian government of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto, and the "Anti-terrorism Act" introduced by Nawaz Sharif, has been politically charged and domestically oriented in nature (Fayyaz 2008). In each instance, those in opposition to the federal or central government were deemed "traitors" and were equated with "anti-state" principles that threatened the integrity of Pakistan as a nation. This resulted in a blurred distinction between genuine political opposition and political violence, a trend that continues to the present day (*The Economic Times*, May 6, 2016; Fayyaz 2008).

It was in this context that the Awami League-led separatist demands during 1970 in former East Pakistan were regarded by then West Pakistan as an act of treason designed to destroy the state of Pakistan. The Bengali nationalists were hence labelled as traitors (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 54), and the Al-Badhr Mujahidin group comprising the youth from Jamaat-e-Islami was created by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) to neutralise the dissidents (Schmid 2011, 600). The 1971 war with India resulting in dismemberment of the country faced Pakistan again with a sense of existential threat. The sacking of the provincial governments of Balochistan and North West Frontier (now KP) under National Awami Party (NAP) – now Awami National Party – during 1972 by the Bhutto govern-ment, the trial of its leaders on charges of sedition and the banning the NAP in 1975 were reminiscent of the unremitting resolve to sustain statehood through unitary political order regardless of the implications (Ahmed 1996).

In the late 1970s and 1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) not only silenced liberal opinion (Azad 2012), but went a step further by reconstructing Pakistan, as a political entity, from a Muslim to an Islamic state (Wilke 2001). The metamorphosis was paradigmatic. The education system was the most influenced sphere of his attention. His reformation drive radically altered the curriculum, particularly the social sciences and the subject of history. The importance of textbooks as an instrument to pass on officially recognised narratives of the nation to succeeding generations (Anjum 2013) is not novel to Pakistan. What has been distinctive in Pakistan, however, was the exploitation of the history syllabus and the rewriting of textbooks in order to define the nation's past in the construction of collective memory and the develop-ment of Pakistani nationalism.

The country's leading historians were therefore mobilised in constructing a past for their new nation that would set it apart from the Indus Valley Civilisation[7] involving, among other things, the relegation of a diverse but vibrant composite cultural and intellectual legacy to a footnote (Zaidi 2010). Through the movement away from the primal preserve of the Indian subcontinent, this reductionist discourse denied the existence of different cultural varia-tions, and focused instead on producing a polemical essentialism (Zaidi 2010). An unpala-table feature of this national project was the use of varied narrative practices by writers to "forget" the uncharitable past and "silence" uncomfortable events, including vital questions about the role of army in the 1970–1971 conflict (Anjum 2013). The Afghan "freedom struggle" that was sold within Pakistan as a war of survival against expansionist communism (Abbas 2010) also created a mindset among curriculum committees and textbook writers to shift the emphasis towards a more martial ideology (Zaidi 2010). The existing curriculum in the public education system is consequently one "of hatred", and one "which wholly or partially is biased, selective and inculcates in the child a parochial and subjective outlook",

including against non-Muslims (*Express Tribune*, May 23, 2012; Hussain, Salim, and Naveed 2011).

The zeal of Zia to introduce Islamic Sharia – especially, a Sunni Hanafi-Deobandi system of jurisprudence – as well as a few other key legal mutations, has had far-reaching implications in terms of the production of a variety of "Islams", providing the context for sectarian forces to emerge with greater force in Pakistan (Behuria 2004). The increased sectarian bias now permeates the civil bureaucracy (Rana 2012), which, it can be argued, will produce more differences in relation to definitions of terrorism, as well as affecting state responses to the violence. The religious cohesion of Pakistani society has been damaged further by injecting legal contradictions between the fundamental rights granted by the Constitution of Pakistan, and the Pakistan Penal Code that usurps it. This has further galvanised religious activism.[8] The exclusive definition of "Muslim" and the prevention of non-Muslims to higher political office (i.e. president and prime minister) by the Constitution supplemented existing differentiation on the basis of religion. Similarly, blasphemy law promulgated by Zia has over time evolved into a social norm that transcends even the sworn neutrality of justice dispensation in Pakistan by encouraging religious assertiveness among the judiciary (Kamran 2012; Behuria 2011).[9] In sum, the legal changes introduced by Zia founded and increasingly deepened radical tendencies among various sections of society (Hussain 2008, 53; Nasr 2002, 87–88; Sawhny and Narain 2003, 467–470). It is putatively on this basis that some scholars have argued that the state's Islamic ideology and its so-called strategic discourse does not [or cannot] complement anti-extremism narratives; on the contrary, it favours extremism (Feyyaz 2015; Shams 2011).

Another major development under Zia's rule involved the ISI assuming the role of an all-powerful agency with the capability to act virtually unchallenged inside Pakistan. The political wing of the ISI infiltrated political parties and manipulated the political process, even under democratic rule (Haqqani 2013, 266; Wilke 2001). Ethnic differences were accentuated, for example, among Mohajirs and Sindhis, by partially founding, and fully facilitating, the lateral entry of MQM into provincial and national politics as a bulwark against the regime's political opponents, namely, the Sindhi-led Pakistan People's Party, ousted by Zia through a coup in July 1977 (*The Tribune*, May 28, 2007; Sen 2004). The Afghan Taliban were also propped up by the ISI; this has been described as more of a marriage of convenience between Pakistan and the Taliban than the result of any ideological affinity between the two (Rais 2008). This nexus, described as Pakistan's adventurist Afghan policy by Larry Goodson (2001, 175), was to later create severe disorder in Pakistani politics and civil society, by narrowing the parameters of public discourse and focus on social policy. Importantly, this contributed to the normalising of a discourse that has propagated a natural association between Islam, jihad and violence (Fiaz 2012). Thus, the Pakistani population, especially in the tribal regions, was left amid confusing and mixed messages (Fiaz 2012) about the connection between holy war (which is *harb* and not entirely jihad) and terrorism. That condition continues to persist without any appreciable improvement.

General Musharraf's rule can be compared with previous dictatorial regimes in terms of authoritarianism, subversion of the democratic process and a reliance on right-wing religious allies opposed to secular politicians (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 58). He proved to be exceptionally detrimental in bringing Pakistan to the brink of chaos by engaging in

confrontational and ethnic politics. Notably, the killing of Akbar Bugti – an important tribal leader or *sardar* and a known politician on 26 August 2006 which was hailed a successful elimination of a terrorist by the military (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 61) – was a trigger to resurrect Baloch memories of humiliation inflicted on them by the state during past uprisings. Eventually, it sparked full-blown Baloch anti-state war from 2006 onwards. The systematic ethnic cleansing of settlers by Baloch armed groups and extra-judicial reprisals by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies have bloodied Balochistan province ever since (Feyyaz 2013b). In addition, the MQM was emboldened militarily to openly challenge the writ of the state by placing urban Sindh under their militant control and to target Musharraf's political rivals with impunity (*The Tribune*, May 28, 2007). The seeds of the Sindhudesh movement had been sown by Zia who formed MQM. The rise of the violent Sindhudesh liberation movement from 2002 onwards can in part be explained as a reaction to the militarisation of MQM by Musharraf. Similarly, Gilgit-Baltistan suffered over the introduction of a controversial school curriculum, and many lost their lives in protests against it (Ali 2014).

Oppression was also unleashed against political opponents who were "intimidated, kidnapped, tortured, and even killed by agencies of the states, such as the police force, to attempt to quell the growing unrest against the incompetence of Musharraf's rule and of the arrogant claim of the military to play the central role in the government" (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 58). Editors and journalists were arrested and harassed for criticising the government (Worldaudit 2016), coupled with attempts to silence voices challenging the monopoly of industrial elites, including the armed forces. President Musharraf himself branded Ayesha Siddique, the author of the widely acclaimed but controversial book, *Military Inc*, as a traitor (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 51). The launch of the book, which exposed the extent of the military's economic resources and lack of financial accountability, was cancelled, and the author's life was threatened (Murphy and Tamana 2010, 51).

Throughout this period, the traditional national unity narrative remained central to Musharraf's attempt to homogenise public discourse through terms like "Pakistan First" and "enlightened moderation". In effect, the state machinery spearheaded by the intelligence agencies was employed to deny truth and to misinform Pakistanis about the internal security situation, its causes and the role that the state had in promoting external insecurity in the region. Ahmed Rashid's review essay (2011) "Cry, the beloved country", methodically critiquing four leading books on Pakistan, expresses it all comprehensively.

In the war against terrorism, the military-centric approach not only failed to tackle violent extremism, but also undermined public confidence in the government's ability to deal with the growth of terrorism (Masood 2012). Significantly, in Musharraf's time, the Army's premier spy agency, Military Intelligence, emerged equally if not more powerful and fearsome than the ISI to perform an independent role in both the strategic and political fields (Wilke 2001). In governmental discourse, the counterterrorism agenda was conceived and propagated through binaries of the "good" and "bad" Taliban (*The WorldPost*, December 17, 2014; *Friday Times*, November 9–15, 2012). Peace deals with Taliban commanders, such as Nek Muhammad, Gul Bahadur and Moulvi Nazir, during the 2000s in North and South Waziristan, were based primarily on this conceptual backdrop (see Khattak 2012; Tajik 2011; Hussain 2008, 71–72, 78–79).[10]

There have been mixed developments since the restoration of democracy in 2008. Indeed, there is a marked reduction in incidences of violence because of the ongoing military Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. It is redolent nevertheless of the establishment's almost exclusive reliance on military instruments to counter violent extremist forces. It is argued here that in the long run, this type of policy renders the jihadist ideology embodied in groups like the TTP, all the more persuasive and increasingly pervasive (*Time*, December 18, 2014). Arbitrary "dilution", expediency, and the slow execution of the National Action Plan 2015 against terrorism by the Nawaz government more aptly reflect the crisis of counterterrorism in Pakistan (*The News*, July 4, 2015; *The Express Tribune*, March 8, 2015). More importantly, the country's most strategic think tanks remain operational under the control of defence and other key ministries. Those which are somewhat independent illustrate that their "advocacy on nationalism sharply contrasts with that of the 'establishment' which is rooted in the anti-India narrative. Therefore, they occupy a marginal place at best in terms of influence in policy making" (Feyyaz 2011b). At least five strategic and policy research organisations can be located in Pakistan which are funded by the government. Little is known, however, about the level of consultation between the government and these organisations in relation to their role in the formulation of counterterrorism policy (Feyyaz 2011b).

Even though the political parties and other stakeholders and participants in the political process have a common stake in the continuance of democracy (Lodhi 2011), they are not keen to advance their understanding and find solutions to tackle the problem. The status quo is preferred over change, for example, by "trying to defeat efforts at creating difference of opinion and tolerance of opinion opposed to the indoctrination of the state" (Khaled 2012). It is not difficult to appreciate the plight of the Pakistani public who are confronted with differing versions of Pakistani policy put out by the army, the political parties, Islamic fundamentalists, the press and other components of civil society. There is confusion about what actually constitutes a threat to the state and what is needed for nation-building (Rashid 2009). Despite some positive changes in the political landscape, Pakistan has shown little success in confronting and resolving issues pertaining to the consolidation of the state (Gilani 2012,16).

Indeed, the military is now trying to readjust itself according to emerging realities. The future of this process, however, is not looking completely positive, as parliamentary deliberations and public discussions become contentious over the alleged involvement of intelligence agencies at home, and extra-constitutional meddling of federal forces into provincial affairs (*DAWN*, June 17, 2015; *Daily Times*, April 30, 2015; *DAWN*, April 22, 2014). Interestingly, political leaders themselves do not shy away from transgressing the domains of public institutions through policy injunctions driven by autocratic tendencies (*The News*, June 6, 2015).

Finally, one thread that has been the cornerstone of all Pakistani regimes, civilian or military, is the sustained support for the Kashmir freedom struggle. More widely, the post-9/11 era has considerably eroded the politics of self-determination by integrating those politics pre-emptively within the broad post-9/11 anti-terrorist agenda (Chadwick 2011, xi). However, Pakistan has somehow stood its ground in relation to Kashmir.

The state of terrorism scholarship in Pakistan

It is never easy to review the literature of a phenomenon so widely studied and ardently contested as terrorism. In the case of Pakistan, the first challenge is the non-availability of any previous academic reviews detailing works on this issue. The task is facilitated nonetheless due to the manageable size of the writings produced by native scholars. This scholarship mainly comprises books that do not exceed more than a few dozen, even fewer conference compilations, and some research articles published locally, as well as in foreign journals – not to mention publications in the Urdu language which are numerous and not dealt with here. By and large, the reviewed material can be described as geopolitical, journalistic, and security-centric, with terrorism tagged as one of several variables. It is marked by limited historical analysis, analytic linearity, lack of methodological rigor and statistical analysis, and the failure to engage in field research.

It is understandable therefore that no Pakistani book on terrorism or counterterrorism has ever found a place among the reviews published regularly by the journal *Perspectives on Terrorism* since 2012. This list is noteworthy from the perspective that it chooses works that deal with pure terrorism research and topics (see Sinai 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b). Exceptionally, three books and a single article appear in the bibliography compiled by Gillian Duncan and Alex Schmid in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (2011, 491–492), even though none of these publications related to hard-core terrorism subjects.[11] Interestingly, in the questionnaire-based *Handbook of Terrorism*, Schmid harnessed views on multiple aspects of terrorism from nearly 100 experts from more than 20 countries. He could not, however, find a single Pakistani academic for inclusion in this compendium (see Schmid 2011, 21).

In fact, there are very few terrorism scholars in Pakistan who have a firm grounding in the discipline of terrorism studies comparable to scholars in the West.[12] Many of those who write about terrorism have emerged following different occupational pathways (Ahmed Rashid, personal communication, January 2014). For example, the journalist class who can be classified as specialists – such as Ahmed Rashid, Zahid Hussain, Imtiaz Gul, late Saleem Shahzad, Amir Mir and Amir Rana – were originally associated with reporting or writing about security issues in the foreign press. The 9/11 events were the catalyst for bringing these journalists into this field of studies (Rashid, personal communication, January 2014).[13] A recurring theme of their work has been the focus on narratives that dwell around the Pakistan army, Islam, the ISI, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Kashmir, Afghanistan and various policy prescriptions for America (see Rashid 2008, 2013; Hussain 2010; Shahzad 2011). These specialists are prolifically adept at investigative journalism, but do not venture into theoretical and critical analyses of terrorism. Another strand of journalists comprises those who mostly write descriptive analysis and columns covering issues involving militancy, the Taliban and terrorism.

Among the second category are regular scholars and analysts who pursue a specific area of analysis (in a strategic or security sense) like terrorism, violent organisations, antiterrorism, militancy, sectarianism, radicalisation and extremism.[14] With certain exceptions, theoretical critique is generally absent from their research. Finally, there are a large number of one-off entrants who are governed more by a particular interest such as war crimes, the impact of terrorism on the economy and the media. Terrorism, in such formulations, appears only in a mundane way.

Although there is clearly an identifiable group of writers working on counterterrorism issues in Pakistan, to suggest that they are consciously linked by a shared worldview or similar analytical outlook would be far from the truth. In fact, it could be argued that scholarly reflexivity on what terrorism studies is about, or contemporary debates in the field, have not fully germinated in most decolonised states. This aspect needs to be viewed from the larger perspective of Pakistan's education system which has historically received the least priority, has been overly politicised and has constitutionally been devolved to the provinces, with unresolved implications. The state of education from primary to university level is miserable in Pakistan, and access to higher education only accounts for 8% of the population (DAWN, August 20, 2013). Within Pakistan's public universities – at least in their present condition – a culture of corruption has made the value of research uncertain at best (Hoodbhoy 2009). Academic crime such as plagiarism, fabrication, falsification and the like flourishes because it is almost never punished. Even when media publicity makes action unavoidable, the punishment amounts to little more than a slap on the wrist (Hoodbhoy 2009). Among several other examples, the masterpiece of plagiarism in Pakistan has been the case of Dr Durrani who escaped legal action despite having been alleged to have copied and reprinted entire physics papers written by others, near verbatim, under his own name in his two books and in the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC)-approved journals (Ebrahim 2014).

In fact, there is a limited pool of skilled researchers in the country; competent and qualified mentors are few and the number of erudite social scientists is even fewer (Mustafa 2013). Consequently, there are very few sound empirical studies produced by social scientists that are of relevance, pragmatic and actionable for the resolution of the problems at hand, including terrorism. Either they are too narrow in scope and cannot be used for drawing broad generalisations, or they lack a rigorous approach (Hussain 2008). However, instant experts with no or little reservoir of new knowledge are found abundantly to recycle their views in talk shows and newspaper columns. Off-the-cuff comments unsubstantiated by logic or evidence have become the common staple in this game (Hussain 2008). In addition, few Pakistanis publish in internationally known peer review journals. Instead, they prefer to publish in local venues due to less expected rigor in the review process. All the Pakistani academics and writers who have made a name for themselves, with the odd exception, have done so while living and working abroad (Zaidi 2002). More specifically, Pakistani diasporic academics at western universities have access to colleagues, literature and theoretical frameworks that many in Pakistan, given the state of the social sciences, do not enjoy (Zaidi 2002). This is as true today as it was in the past, indicating a lack of incentives, opportunities and priorities in public and private spheres to promote knowledge (Mustafa 2013 etc.).

In contrast, the reason why terrorism studies have flourished in the West is owed in part to the application and testing of theories of terrorism. Even though these endeavours are not without problems, especially the overreliance on and habit of recycling secondary sources (Schuurman and Eijkman 2013), the desire to generate new knowledge is beyond question. That propensity is measurably missing in Pakistan (with notable exceptions e.g. Biberman and Zahid 2016; Zaidi 2010, 2013; Iqbal and Silva 2013 etc.).

It may be noted that in several countries hit by terrorist violence, governments came forward to initiate the process of debate and research on the topic. The United States,

the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, Singapore and even Saudi Arabia are some examples. In majority of the decolonised states, however, there is an explicit lack of official patronage of terrorism research. The counterterrorism policies in these states, as well as in Pakistan, are therefore devoid of meaningful expert input. As yet, Pakistan does not have a single think tank, study centre or research organisation dedicated to terrorism studies. Similar conditions prevail in academic institutions that also lack dedicated study programmes, as well as the faculty to teach them.[15]

Space for freelance research and polemical expression has existed in the country. However, its sustained nurturing has remained elusive, since social and cultural values encourage the acquisition of power, privilege and wealth, while sustaining an intolerant culture that discourages dissent and debate (Mustafa 2013; Zaidi 2002). In this respect, Pakistan is a victim of the "relevance" debate, with disciplines such as political science and history viewed as having little practical application (Zaidi 2002). Dr Ishrat Hussain (2008), the country's leading public policy practitioner, summarises the state of knowledge in Pakistan by noting that there was [or has been] no public policy towards the social sciences. He further opines that the daunting agenda spawned by the challenges faced by the country would provoke and excite any set of academics and researchers into investigating and producing a plethora of interesting and useful work that can form the basis of discourse and discussion and influence policy outcomes directly and indirectly. In any other country, there would be hundreds of books, thousands of journal articles and popular commentaries flowing out of this work. But this is not happening in Pakistan (Hussain 2008).

The field of terrorism studies is no exception. It was no surprise therefore to find only a handful of books (around two dozen) with the key word terrorism, written by Pakistanis in the libraries of four leading national academic and training institutions (namely, the National Defence University, Islamabad; Karachi University; the University of Management and Technology Lahore and the National School of Public Policy, Lahore), which was revealed in a random survey by this writer on 31 December 2013. This knowledge scarcity may well answer why in spite of the fact that Pakistan possesses a robust military and legal system to deal with terrorism, the incidence of terrorism has not been eliminated (Fayyaz 2008).

Conclusion

This article has examined terrorism discourse in Pakistan from multiple perspectives. The enquiry primarily focused on locating the dynamics and causes that prevent a coherent understanding of the phenomenon in Pakistan, as well as more broadly in decolonised states. The discussion investigated reasons that shape thinking modes, as well as nuances of terrorism at the popular level, and why a habit of informed understanding does not permeate the society. Furthermore, the role of the state and its structures, particularly the intelligence organisations and the education policies, were discussed. The discussion was further expanded by critically reviewing the prevailing educational conditions in the country, and the factors that account for an insignificant role by the academic community in generating knowledge on the subject. It can generally be surmised that the processes ensuing from decolonisation are still not stabilised.

The preservation of territorial integrity has been a priority all along, rather than the social content that also goes along with it. The state-led practice of securitisation and the autonomous functioning of the military bureaucracy in the past demonstrate this assertion. One far-reaching implication of the coercive behaviour of the Pakistani state has been the unsuccessful management of diversity since independence in 1947, which helps to explain why Pakistan has not yet reached a consensual conception of the nation (Levesque 2013). Additionally, the state has clearly been negligent in empowering the masses with the requisite skills to think critically. All regimes, especially those after 1971, engaged in efforts to cultivate nationalism based upon militarised federalism rooted in a narrow interpretation of religion. Given the country's unique conditions following its dismemberment, this is understandable.

However, what differentiates Pakistan from other states suffering from similar sociopolitical chaos is not the regimented use of power alone to buy legitimacy, but a well-considered national project during the latter half of the 1970s to fundamentally restructure and realign the ideological order of the state to further the interests of specific individual actors. Doctoring the educational system and tinkering with the factual history of the country have become the ultimate corrupting influence of the state. The military regime of General Zia stands out for this abusive "murder of history". A generation of misinformed youth has emerged, and the appalling state of learning, knowledge production and bigotry are obvious outcomes of this process. Pakistani society has been rendered bereft of intellectualism, heterogeneity of opinion and political space to stimulate thought and debate.

The terrorism discourse in Pakistan reflects similar symptoms. Overall, successive governments have been generating national political outlooks through a security framework. Rather than projecting independent perspectives, academia have been following the lead of state institutions. Political and religious elites have similarly remained divided on the construction of terrorism. Consequently, the scholarly work in situating and assimilating "terrorism" with due regard for ontological, epistemological, methodological and analytical concerns is almost non-existent in the local literature. This has led to a complete absence of understanding about terrorism in its multiple methodical and theoretical forms. The lack of tradition, or the potential for reflexivity and intellectual debate coupled with societal polarisation, also prevents the growth of analytical approaches to the study of terrorism. This quandary also explains why no coherent outlook exists on this issue in Pakistan, despite the enormity of losses suffered to date from terrorist attacks. It is important to remember that not only terrorism in its geo-historical, political and social formation in Pakistan has not been comprehensively analysed, but that the government and its executives' engagement in a reactive and fragmented response to acts of political violence has intensified civil dissention, bitterness and frustration. This has created additional contexts and justifications for violence among non-state and societal peripheries, which the state with its present dilemma of legitimacy and infrastructural capacity, is unable to handle.

In short, it can be argued that the society at large is intellectually struggling. This is perhaps why Pakistani society has a proclivity for conspiracy theories, and also why constructed narratives by those with authority easily feed into social processes. The lack of academic depth further facilitates these transmissions, since social scientists are unable to develop and offer alternative narratives. Nevertheless, assessing the changes in parts of society – especially the rise of the middle class who are increasingly

questioning the accountability of decision-makers – presents a less than revolutionary but nonetheless hopeful promise of the readjustment of social order in the short term, and the transformation of existing power structures and relationships in the long term.

What is required of the state, public figures and civil society is to come out of the syndrome of state-based security and broaden the reformation search through a calibrated articulation of comprehensive notion of national security. This calls for disengagement from a uni-focal and exclusionary perspective of terrorism, which will allow the polity to recast its exclusive and discriminatory culture towards more inclusive existence, terrorists included. In this respect, academia, scholars and researchers have a responsibility to take the lead in order to fulfil their social obligations, while the public at large under the stewardship of political leadership will be well advised to seek enlightenment to make coexistence and pluralism possible. Dissenting voices must also be allowed to be part of the political and intellectual culture. Diversity rather than uniformity should underpin national unity.

The ability to systematically conceptualise violence overridden by contextual specificity lies at the heart of terrorism studies. For terrorism studies to be of meaningful assistance, it is essential that there is a voluntary acceptance by Pakistanis that prolonged exposure to conflict situations has embedded violence into the value systems of the society. As a result, attention will be required to unravel the transmission processes underpinning the cultures of violence, in part by focusing on youth as carriers, and simultaneously recipients of, such transmission (Dari 2012). This is of vital significance first, to rid Pakistanis from the trappings of competing narratives of violence, namely, political Islam championed by militant groups and progressive Islam often pushed by the government and parts of the media (Rana 2012); and secondly to engender coherence in the discourse on terrorism.

A multipronged effort by the government, civil society, social institutions, academics and academic organisations is required to address these conditions, discourses, narratives and structures spawning "terrorism". This will not be possible without the generation and acquisition of knowledge as an imperative. Grounding in *integrated* terrorism studies (conventional as well as critical) among budding scholars and students through university-based programmes is vitally important if Pakistan is to create a new generation of knowledgeable academics. Tradition of rigorous research should likewise become the norm rather than the exception among scholars writing on terrorism. Provincial higher education departments and the HEC should come forward to sponsor research projects to this end. Textbook revisions also warrant attention by the government in order to restore the historical heritage of Pakistan.

Finally, international scholars, universities and journals within the terrorism studies field need to encourage academics from violence-stricken countries such as Pakistan to engage in academic debates on terrorism. The starting point can be collaborative studies with primary data being provided by the scholars living in the violence prone countries. The editorial staff of terrorism journals can also play a decisive role in this regard through sustained peer review guidance, which will entail extra labour on their part. However, given the potential dividend, this calling is worth the effort. All said, it is the developing world itself which ought to prioritise growth of knowledge as an obligation to empower the citizenry intellectually; all other efforts can complement this goal.

Notes

1. For example, see contributions in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2014: issue 26:4) for a snapshot of some of the questions under investigation and contributions to the study of terrorism.
2. Rohan Gunuratna from Sri Lanka is an exception who has made a name at the global level in this field, though his credentials are seriously questioned (for more details, see Ranstorp 2009, 25–30).
3. Some of these journals include *Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Behavioral Sciences in Terrorism and Political Aggression* and *Perspectives on Terrorism*.
4. The author's observation based on a review of the editorial boards of several journals, including the aforementioned.
5. Fair made this observation in email correspondence while commenting on earlier version of this manuscript.
6. The largest network of madrassas in Pakistan is operated by the Deobandis, including the Darul Uloom Jamia Haqqania Akora Khattak, which has been dubbed the "University of Jihad". The JUI (F) and JUI-Sami (two factions of the Deobandi political parties) ran over 65% of all madrassas in Pakistan until 2007. For more details, see Feyyaz (2014).
7. The Indus Valley Civilisation, a Bronze Age civilisation, is counted among the three oldest world civilisations, the other two being Egypt and Mesopotamia. Situated in present-day Pakistan, parts of northwest India and eastern Afghanistan, it flourished along the banks of the Indus River. For further details, see McIntosh (2001).
8. For example, Article 20a of the Constitution bestows upon every citizen the right to profess, practice and propagate their own religion. However, the Pakistan Penal Code (sections 298 B & C) emphatically forbid Quadianis to call themselves Muslims, their worship place as Masjid and to preach or propagate their faith. Violation of these provisions can result in strict punitive penalties.
9. In 2000, acting Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, Justice Mian Nazir Akhtar, stated that "no one had authority to pardon blasphemy and that anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed on the spot, as a religious obligation". For more details, see Kamran (2012).
10. Nek Muhammad belonged to the Ahmed Zai Wazir tribe of South Waziristan. Maulvi Nazir succeeded him in June 2004, to lead the Waziri Taliban. Both were killed by drone attacks. Gul Bahadur is the dominant Taliban leader from the Uthman Zai tribe of North Waziristan. He is generally known for his pro-government stance. There have been unconfirmed reports of his killing by drone attack in January 2015.
11. The books included Hassan's *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror* (Abbas 2005), Haqqani's *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (2005) and Ayesha Jalal's *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia* (2008). The article was "Micro target, macro impact: the resolution of the Kashmir conflict as a key to shrinking Al-Qaeda's international terrorist network" published in *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Haleem 2004).
12. As known, there are four to five PhDs in terrorism studies in Pakistan, including Manzar Abbas Zaidi, Farhan Zahid, Khurram Iqbal and Mohammad Vaqas. There are many scholars who have obtained degrees with "terrorism" being part of their dissertation, but without investigating questions rooted in hard-core terrorism scholarship. A typical example is the PhD dissertation by Shabana Fayyaz (2010), *Pakistan Response Towards Terrorism: A Case Study of Musharraf Regime*. Despite the academic value of this study, the author would be reluctant to consider it part of the terrorism field.
13. Ahmed Rashid was an exception; his 2000 book, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, had earned global fame prior to the 9/11 attacks.
14. They include scholars like Hassan Abbas, Sadia Salman, Saba, Khaled Ahmad, Shabana Fayyaz, Muhammad Azam and Safdar Siyal. Others who are frequent writers who have a diversified interest but only occasionally engage in terrorism-related issues include Pervaiz

Nazir, Rubina Saigol, Irm Haleem, Ishtiaq Ahmad, SaminaYasin, Moeed Yousuf, Rabia Aslam, Hassan Askari and Ayesha Siddiqa.

15. This observation is based on a review of social science programmes posted on webpages of some of the major universities of Pakistan, including Punjab University, Quaid-e-Azam University, National Defence University, Karachi University, Peshawar University and others. Regrettably, terrorism-related modules taught as part of programmes like International Relations, Defence and Strategic Studies or Political Sciences contain mention of the word "terrorism" only generically, without attending to the deeper theoretical and empirical imperatives of the subject.

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