Table of Contents

Introduction & Course Proceedings

DAY 1

a) The definition of political violence and language of "Terrorism" – Dr. Marie Breen

b) A (very) short history of "Terrorism" and summary of contemporary approaches – Dr. Marie Breen

c) Trends of terrorism – past and present – Mr. Abdul Basit

d) Causes of terrorism – Dr. Richard Jackson

e) Left wing terrorists groups and terrorists groups abusing religion in Turkey – Erkan Sezgin

DAY 2

a) Space of performative politics and terror in Pakistan – Dr. Daanish Mustafa

b) Religious terrorism (violent religious extremism) – Dr. Arshi Hashmi

c) Evolution of suicide terrorism: A case study of Pakistan – Dr. Khurram Iqbal

d) Lone actor terrorism – Dr. Leena Malkki

e) Survival of terrorist groups – Dr. Laura Dugan

f) Political Economy of Terrorism – Ms. Zoha Waseem

DAY 3

a) Strategy and communication – Dr. Neville Bolt

b) Strategic communications, narratives and counter-narratives – Dr. Anti Sillanpaa

c) Success from ISIL perspective – Mr. Cees de Wart

d) Terrorism database: usage, implications and challenges – Dr. Omi Hodwitz

e) Terrorism and counter-terrorism – Dr. Richard Jackson

f) Importance of 'soft' counter-terrorism challenges – winning the war of narratives – Dr. Moeed Yousuf

g) Working groups session

DAY 4

a) Analysing the terrorist threat-methods, tools, strategies and frameworks – Dr. Afzal Ashraf

b) Counter-terrorism, critical and Norwegian – Phd Candidate Sondre Lindahl

c) War on terrori – Pakistan's perspective and role of Pakistan army – Lt Gen. Khalid Rabbani (Rtd)

d) Countering online radicalisation – Mr. Craig Dunn

e) Negotiation in terrorist conflicts – Dr. Harmonie Toros

f) Rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremists – Dr. Alastair Reed

g) Working groups session

DAY 5

a) Countering terrorists financing (CTF) in UK – Mr. Shoaib Bajwa

b) Radicalization and counter/de-radicalisation – Mr. Afzal Ashraf

c) Terrorism and conflicts resolution – Dr. Harmonie Toros

d) Presentations by participants

Award/Closing Ceremony

a) Course summing up

b) Conclusion

c) Further Proceedings

COURSE DIRECTOR: Prof. Muhammad Feyyaz

Course Co-Director: Seemi Waheed, Course Assistant: Umbreen Omar

Course Rapporteur: Sadaf Bari

Introduction

While Pakistan is one of the worst hit by terrorism (some estimates put the number of lives lost to terrorism at 50,000 plus), no sustained scholarly effort seems to exist within Pakistan on understanding the phenomenon, let alone, on countering it and on resolving it. Recognizing this critical knowledge gap, the School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology took upon itself to initiate a structured course for "Understanding Terrorism and Counter-terrorism" last year on 19-23 January 2015.

The "Understanding, Managing and Resolution of Terrorism" course held in February this year was second in the series of yearly courses being held by the university in collaboration with the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). These courses are designed to explore the entire range of issues related to terrorism, coupled with approaches in managing and resolving it.

The aims and objectives of the course

- To examine the history and state of knowledge in terrorism studies
- To understand various dimensions of terrorism, its management and resolution
- To assess the ongoing and possible future threats of terrorism
- To underscore threats to and protection of critical infrastructure
- To discuss national and international perspectives and measures against terrorism
- To examine institutional and cognitive gaps regarding terrorism
- To develop proficiency in threat analysis, management and resolution strategies.

The second edition of the course held from 15-19 February 2016, was marked by the presence of more than a dozen instructors, hailing from overseas universities, think tanks and research and intelligence organizations. Many of these resource persons attended for the second time in two years. Pakistani scholars and experts also joined in to add to this enterprise of collaborative learning. Nearly 50 participants attended this course, most from the military—serving officers of the rank from Major General through to Lt. Colonels. Four police officers and two IB officers also attended, in addition to a few of our own university students, a student from La Trobe University, Melbourne Australia, and a Pakistani journalist.

At the inaugural ceremony, three prominent speakers, namely Lt. General Khalid Maqbool, former Governor Punjab, Lt. General Javed Hasan, former Rector, NSPP, and Dr. Richard Jackson, from the University of Otago New Zealand, provided their perspectives on the phenomenon of terrorism. The Rector UMT, then addressed the scholars and the participants with a brief overview of the obtaining environment and how geo-strategic currents are impacting, and often creating more complexities, to the phenomenon of terrorism around the globe. This set the stage for the five-day course that followed.

The course consisted of 26 lectures. All sessions were interactive and generated lively, and often, controversial debate.

DAY ONE

1. Lecture 1: THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND LANGUAGE OF "TERRORISM." The lecture was delivered by Professor Dr. Marie Breen-Smyth, Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security and Global Governance, McCormack Graduate School, University of Massachusetts, Boston.
2. Lecture 2: A (VERY) SHORT HISTORY OF 'TERRORISM' AND SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES. This lecture too was delivered by Professor Breen Smyth.
3. Lecture 3: TRENDS OF TERRORISM—PAST AND PRESENT: Resource Person: Mr. Abdul Basit, Associate Research Fellow (ARF), International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

4. Lecture 4: CAUSES OF TERRORISM: The speaker was Dr. Richard Jackson, from The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Otago, New Zealand.

5. Lecture 5: LEFT WING TERRORIST GROUPS AND TERRORIST GROUPS ABUSING RELIGION IN TURKEY: CASE STUDY OF DHKP/C AND HEZBOLLAH/ILİM: This lecture was delivered by Mr. Erkan Sezgin from the Trukish Police. He has been involved in dealing with the insurgent groups in Turkey and his discourse provided the Turkish perspective on terrorism.

DAY TWO

6. Lecture 6: SPACE OF PERFORMATIVE POLITICS AND TERROR IN PAKISTAN: Dr. Daanish Mustafa was the resource person for this discourse. He hails from Environment, Politics and Development Group, Department of Geography, King's College, London. Dr. Mustafa also helped conduct a group-based exercise wherein all participants were divided in six groups. Each of these six groups were mentored and supervised by the visiting overseas faculty.

7. Lecture 7: RELIGIOUS TERRORISM (VIOLENT RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM): Resource Person: Dr. Arshi Saleem Hashmi, Associate Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, National Defence University- Islamabad.

8. Lecture 8: EVOLUTION OF SUICIDE TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN: This lecture was delivered by Dr. Khuram Iqbal, Asst. Professor, National Defense University, Islamabad.

9. Lecture 9: LONE ACTOR TERRORISM: Dr. Leena Malkki was the Resource Person. She is a Research Director, University of Helsinki, Network for European Studies, Finland.

10. Lecture 10: SURVIVAL OF TERRORIST GROUPS: This lecture was delivered by Dr. Laura Dugan from the University of Maryland, USA.

11. Lecture 11: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM—REVISITING GREED, GRIEVANCE AND THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS: Ms. Zoha Waseem delivered this lecture. She is a Doctoral Candidate at King's College London.

12. Lecture 12: STRATEGY AND COMMUNICATION: Dr. Neville Bolt, from King's College London, Department of War Studies, was the Resource Person for this lecture.

13. Lecture 13: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES: Dr. Antti SillAnpää (Finland), who delivered this lecture, hails from the NATO StratCom COE, Operations Support Branch.

14. Lecture 14: SUCCESS FROM AN ISIL PERSPECTIVE: Mr. Cees de Waart, Strategic Intelligence Advisor, former NATO Intelligence Expert, from The Netherlands, delivered this unique piece. He took on the mantel of an ISIS operative and spoke from a terrorist's perspective, palyacting that role, based on his personal and professional interface with the terorists. The technique used by him is common among the military trainings across the world and fall within the ambit of "war gaming."

15. Lecture 15: TERRORISM DATABASES: USAGE, IMPLICATIONS, AND CHALLENGES: The Resource Person, Dr. Omi Hodwitz comes from START, The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs, the US Department of State.

16. Lecture 16: TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACADEMIC FIELD: The speaker was Dr. Richard Jackson, from The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of Otago, New Zealand.

17. Lecture 17: IMPORTANCE OF 'SOFT' COUNTER-TERRORISM CHALLENGES— WINNING THE WAR OF NARRATIVES: Dr. Moeed Yousuf delivered this lecture. He is Director, South Asia Programs, at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington. Dr. Moeed travelled to Pakistan only for the course.

18. Lecture 18: ANALYSING THE TERRORIST THREAT -METHODS, TOOLS, STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS: Resource Person: Dr. Afzal Ashraf, Visiting Fellow, Centre of Conflict, Security and Terrorism, Nottingham University, and

Consultant Fellow, International Diplomacy, Royal United Services Institute, (RUSI), UK .

19. Lecture 19: COUNTERTERRORISM. CRITICAL, AND NORWEGIAN: Sondre Lindahl made this presentation. He is a PhD candidate, at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand.

20. Lecture 20: WAR ON TERROR - PAKISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE AND ROLE OF PAKISTAN ARMY: Lecture delivered by Managing Director, Askri Welfare Trust, Lieutenant General Khalid Rabbani, HI (M) (Retired).

21. Lecture 21: COUNTERING ONLINE RADICALISATION: Lecturer Mr. Craig Dunn, Intelligence Consultant, (i-intelligence) based in Canada.

22. Lecture 22: NEGOTIATION AND TERRORIST CONFLICTS: Resource Person: Dr. Harmonie Toros, Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis, at the University of Kent, UK.

23. Lecture 23: REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISTS: This lecture was delivered by Dr. Alastair Reed, International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), The Hague, The Netherlands.

DAY FIVE:

24. Lecture 24: Countering Terrorist Financing (CTF) in UK: The lecture was delivered by Mr. Shoaib Bajwa, of SKB Global Consulting, Pakistan.

25. Lecture 25: RADICALIZATION AND COUNTER/DE-RADICALISATION: Resource Person: Dr. Afzal Ashraf, Visiting Fellow, Centre of Conflict, Security and Terrorism, Nottingham University, and Consultant Fellow, International Diplomacy, Royal United Services Institute, (RUSI), UK

26. Lecture 26: TERRORISM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: Resource Person: Dr. Harmonie Toros, Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis, at the University of Kent, UK.

Lecture 1:

THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND LANGUAGE OF "TERRORISM."

Dr. Marie Breen-Smyth,

Department of Conflict Resolution,

Human Security and Global Governance,

McCormack Graduate School, University of Massachusetts,

Boston

The definition of political violence and language of "terrorism"

The address by Dr Marie Breen starts with elaborating different concepts of political violence. The address starts by a question that is all violence, political? The answer is yes the speaker elaborates by saying that even the bullying at school is considered as political as by definition:

''Violence as a means of enforcing or resisting subordination and inscribing particular power relations''

So according to this concept when someone exerts the power over another we can say it is and all violence is political as all violence is about power.

Violence and the threat of violence are used to operationalize systems of subordination, namely race (and colonialism), gender (the subordination of women and the enforcement of heteronormativity) and socio-economic inequality (the enforcement of class privilege, economic elitism and poverty. These operate at intra and interpersonal, institutional, national and global levels.

She further reinforce the concept of political violence by quoting *Schmid and Jongman (2005) -* 109 definitions of 'terrorism' & even then there is no scholarly agreement on definitive characteristics of terrorism.

The key characteristics of the violent entails some basic elements like involved violent means (in 83% of definitions), 65% of the definitions states that violence aims to achieve political change of some kind. Furthermore, Violence in a number of ways is directed by influencing a wider audience than the target of attack (explicitly in 37.5% and implicitly in 51% of definitions).nevertheless the basic elements of violence involve means to bring some political changes and by attacking the masses to influence some other targeted audience.

The address by Dr. Maries to define terrorism however focuses on only one aspect as defining terrorism is not easy as it might seems because people define it as they see the world and there is no objective scientific view of terrorism, as in USA there are different meanings of terrorisms, UK might have its own there are different definitions all involves violence in them, it involves some political change

The concept of terrorism involves some debate about state and non state terrorism. The debate has grown to a point where the terrorism by non state actors as well as the state actors both has been brought under the light. However, there are still some sources e.g.US State Department, for whom the definitions of Terrorism specifies that is the sole prerogative of non-state actors. Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

1937 League of Nations Convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism (never entered into force) defined terrorism as acts directed against a state, causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to heads of state, those acting as heads of state, or their successors, their wives, husbands or persons holding public positions when the act is directed against them in their public capacity, so it is directed towards states and the elites in them. However there are number of example where the state has used the tactics of using violence against civilians to influence them.

Some definitions of terrorism include 'targeting civilians'. labelling and defining terrorism become important, who is terrorist? As Nelson Mandela was regarded as terrorist but later was the head of the state. so The concept has some contradicting views about the Groups who did not target civilians have been labelled 'terrorist' such as Umkhonto We Sizwe and the Irish

Republican Armya and those who kill large numbers of civilians are not always labelled 'terrorists' – e.g state operations in Northern Ireland, Syria, Gaza etc .

The concept of terrorism further explores the prospects of terrorism by investigating into the fact what actions comes under terrorism, does any opposition to state means terrorism, opposition to an oppressive regime, revolt against any foreign occupation, Anti-colonial Independence movement. So here the political dimension is present in labelling and defining the terrorism and terrorist.

Does terrorism has any international element. The new dimensions to the term terrorism are now incorporated like assisting terrorists or glorifying terrorism. see Epifanio, (2011); Gearty, (2005); Archick, 2010; Aldrich, (2009); De Goede, (2008); Orttung and Makarychev (2006).

In the UK 'non-violent extremism'. Institution of new 'counter-terrorism' practices – ('lawfare') such as targeted killing, torture, 'enhanced interrogation', detention without trial, rendition, 'a selective and suitably enabling set of malleable legal conventions ... legitimate the unleashing of military violence' alongside impunity for private military companies in the WOT.

This all leads to further complication of the issue that is counter terrorism are fulfilling its targets or not? Is cure worse than the disease or not?

Different violent actors are termed as "terrorists" for example Political act, De-legitimizing move, Demonization of the actor, Permits the application of exceptional measures i.e. counter-terrorism operations rather than merely the ordinary criminal law, These are more often more far reaching and severe than those available under ordinary law. indictments against Charles Taylor included 'acts of terrorism' the legal basis for the charges against Taylor lay in the Geneva Conventions which contain no such specific crime, nor was it a recognised specific crime under the Tribunals or the Rome Statute.SCSL judgement was that 'the evidence is insufficient for a finding that the Accused's support for the invasion of Sierra Leone was undertaken pursuant to a common purpose to terrorise the population". Taylor's defence argued, successfully, that the charge of terrorism required three conditions:

1. The perpetration of a criminal act such as murder, or the threat of such an act;

2. The intent to spread fear in the population or coerce a national or international authority to act or refrain from acting in a particular way; and

3. A transnational element.

Karadžić is indicted (ICTY) *inter alia* on 'Acts of Violence the Primary Purpose of which is to Spread Terror among the Civilian Population, a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War'. Also charged with killings, but rendering the people of Sarajevo fearful for their lives is considered a war crime in and of itself. This terrorization allegedly served a political purpose: 'to secure concessions from the Bosnian government and the international community... and to obtain a resolution consistent with the objectives of the Bosnian Serbs.' (Cited in Glasius 2013: 8) .The Judgment is awaited in 2016

Lecture 2:

A (VERY) SHORT HISTORY OF 'TERRORISM' AND SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

Dr. Marie Breen-Smyth,

Department of Conflict Resolution,

Human Security and Global Governance,

McCormack Graduate School, University of Massachusetts,

Boston

The second lecture by Marie revolves around the history of terrorism and talks about Rappaport's four waves of terrorism. It talks about the an initial "Anarchist Wave" in 1880 that continued for some 40 years. Its successor, the "Anti-Colonial Wave" began in the 1920s, and by the 1960s had largely disappeared. The late 1960s witnessed the birth of the "New Left Wave," which dissipated largely in the 90s leaving a few groups still active in Sri Lanka, Spain, France,

Peru, and Columbia. The fourth or "Religious Wave" began in 1979, and, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors, it still going on. However the roots could be traced back to the AD Sicari Zealots.

The new concept of terrorism discussed by Walter Laqueur, Ashton B. Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow have argued for the concept of 'new terrorism' '*postmodern*' and '*catastrophic*'. Walter Laqueur : "*there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism*". Bruce Hoffman - 'new terrorist' "*represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat* than the more familiar 'traditional' terrorist groups. New terrorism" since the attacks on the US in 2001 involves different actors, motivations, aims, tactics and actions, compared to the 'old' concept of terrorism used in the mid twentieth century which is more lethal and dangerous. The implication is that the people working on this issue working before 2001 have to leave everything done before and start a new on the concept of terrorism.

This new terrorism has made ways to practice new methods of counter terrorism that have gone beyond exceptional counter terrorism measures. *Problem-solving orientation for Uncritical reproduction of anti-terrorist discourse. State centrism should be avoided as it might lead to biased results*, *Proliferation of material*, *Quality of research – lack of primary research (80% based on published documents)*, a lot of research has been *Acontextual which lacks the context that makes it difficult to research* , A lot of research *Atheoretical and Ahistoricity that is we don't learn from history , govt wants to react they want to be seen as protector of their own people e.g American exceptionalism, the research has to be partial and for that Clientalism and state sponsorship of researchhas to be avoided.Further compounding of uncritical and state centric focus*. There has been a *lack of 'other' oriented research, most of the researchers are from the state point of view however the other prospective needs to be understood* that can cause *Risk amplification as it might lead to provide justification for terrorism, It should also include all the Stakeholders including the state, suspect communities, victim. To give an unbiased answer researcher has to Avoid state-centrism the research has to be neutral - include 'other'-oriented research. Contextualize alongside other risks -> de-amplify moral panic about terrorism, undermine politics of fear.Interrogate (symbiotic) relationship between anti/counter-terrorism and terrorism* Address e.g. demonization, human rights erosion, state use of terror and the construction of suspect communities they should be safe guarded.

The features of a critical approach to define terrorism needs to include Subjectivity – include allegiances & subjectivity, it has to recognize the intellectual (polarizing) effects of working with violence (ways of knowing), Use privileges of scholarship to bring in marginalized and silenced voices.It needs to Contextualize in power relations at a local and global level. It has to avoid totalizing analyses of power. Critical evaluation of discourses of terrorism and methods of their reproduction has to be undertaken. The critical approach should also incorporate 'Do no harm' approach, It should take account of legal environment in which our work takes place also the Integrate analysis of universal organizing principles: race, gender and class. The analysis should have Multi-disciplinary Goal: eradicate of all forms of political terror as a method of achieving change or maintaining a status quo. International counter-terrorism protocols involves Proscription of armed groups, Travel bans , Freezing /seizing of assets, Institution of new offences such as assisting terrorists or glorifying terrorism, Rendition & extradition, 'Targeted' killing, 'Lawfare' (Dunlap, 2009; Grayson, 2012; Gregory, 2011) – where the law supports the waging of war .However the Lawfare may signal an intensification and shift in the relationship between war and law and hence can prevent peace as Peace processes prior to 2001 involved negotiations with representatives of armed groups (Northern Ireland 1998, Sri Lanka 2002, South Africa 1994 etc).

Effect on peace processes as posed by(Haspeslagh (2013)) are that the act of listing an armed group as a designated terrorist organisation – as an example of how international counterterrorist policy can impact on the possibility for third-party actors to engage with listed armed groups in the context of peace processes. the listing of armed groups as terrorist organisations is having serious consequences on the ability of third-party actors to engage with armed groups. It has affected both of the preconditions of access and trust, thereby narrowing the possibilities for third parties to effectively understand groups, influence them, affect their strategic calculation and train them in conflict resolution. The global proscription regime appears to be eroding in practice, with state third-party actors choosing to opt out of international proscription regimes. Doubts about the legality of third-party engagement are creating a new selective pressure on what types of conflict resolution activities are possible

International counterterrorism measures involves 'reducing the political space for peaceful engagement placing obstacles in the way of peacemakers seeking to engage with armed non-state groups'. 'listing an organisation as 'terrorist' potentially lengthens the path to non-violent politics' and 'peacemakers working directly with listed groups risk being labelled terrorist sympathisers. Peacemakers are also in danger of operating outside the law if they meet representatives of a listed group... even if it is to advocate peace.)' (Philipson, 2005:70).

Proscription facilitates war and Counterterrorism measures inhibit work to bring 'terrorists' back into the mainstream. The Removal of a group from a list not a solution, removal can embolden them in ways that damages the prospects for resolution. Proscription delegitimizing one of the parties to the negotiations as Indonesian government conducted a military offensive against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) "terrorists" in May 2003. This attack replicated the tactics of the GWOT in Iraq and led to the death and injury of many Achenese civilians. The point is elaborated by the speaker by giving SriLanka as an example that involved Framing the LTTE as terrorists and delegitimized the Tamil position. It included Six rounds of peace talks between 2002 -2003.A Conference prior to an international donor conference in Japan 2003 was to be held in Washington.LTTE as a proscribed organisation could not travel to the US to attend. LTTE viewed this as a violation of the principles agreed as underpinning the peace process, suspended the negotiations and declined to attend the Tokyo donor conference, thus ending negotiations.

Lecture 3:

Trends of Terrorism: *Present and Past*

Mr. Abdul Basit, Associate Research Fellow (ARF),

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR),

RSIS, Nanyang Technological University

Singapore

The session begins by elaborating on the nature of terrorism changed fundamentally and qualitatively, or just in degree and character? By mentioned the example of 911 by saying America intervened in Afghanistan Mullah Umer went to Quetta an Sheikh Usama was killed in Abbotabad. Americans when they withdrew we were left with a turmoil in Afghanistan, Initially they were fighting with Taliban and now they want to talk with talibans and the subject of the talk is still ambiguous.

The talk revolves around Characteristics of Contemporary Terroris and its relevant Theoretical Frameworks. Old vs. New Terrorism Theory. The session questions the labeling, names being given to all militant terrorist groups. Who gives them the name and labels. What is current context, evloution of the idea Has the nature of terrorism changed fundamentally and qualitatively, or just in degree and character? Is it conscious strategic choice of terrorist groups or part of the overall societal evolution? How can we understand the new trends in terrorism? What impact can be foreseen on counter-terrorism frameworks and future of terrorism?

The session asks a question when does a pyramid shift takes place and when, Pyramid shift is when you are presented with a new reality a reality that is beyond the existing theories to answer. When there is a shift from the existing to a new level of thinking.

 The speaker asks are we speculating any pyramid shift in terrorism its character and its concept. To answer these the speaker further explores other dimensions of terrorism and asks that has the nature of terrorism changed fundamentally and qualitatively, or just in degree and character? Is it conscious strategic choice of terrorist groups or part of the overall societal evolution has the terrorist change because the society has changed or has the society changed because of this terrorism? How can we understand the new trends in terrorism if the old theories are not enough

to answer these trends? What impact can be foreseen on counter-terrorism frameworks and future of terrorism?

Idea action dialect- Ideology is a set of ideas put in a framework that generates actions and actions generates more ideas.

In the old days we heard the term localized Islamic state called Emirate out by Afghan Taliban that led to more actions that evolved more ideas and a consequence we heard of a new version in 1998 through international Jihad Fatwa of global Jihad that fatwa gave birth to alqaeda version of jihad ism no we are hearing Caliphat, Emirate to Caliphat ,there is an interesting journey, New symbols themes new leaders have emerged, we talked about talbian but now we are talking bigger threat about the legacy as talibanism and we talked about Osama bin ladin and now we talk about bin ladin ism, Daiish ism, now we have new symbols so legacy lived on

Diff between Daish and Alqaeda

Diff is their *approach* otherwise they are ideologically twin, 1 believes in building Islamic caliphat in the end by building public opinion in your favor through your small victories and move to big objective of making Islamic state , Known as jihad tamkin was it was you weeken your enemy in the end you force him so much that you become some force to reckon.

As opposed to it Abu bakar beghdadi who came with jihad mikaea,his was ideological mentor was Abu Mukhtas, came up with an idea jihad mikaea, in which you work as a non state actor, nobody knows about you and are termed as non state actors and for this group the government have different set of rules, you are not a prisoner of war rather you are an enemy combatant. For such an enemy combatant they will create a state for themselves *Cliphat* with an idea of bikyah tamada which refers to ever living and ever expanding state, so when these forces expand in Iraq and state combat them there they will go to Syria and will create caliphate there when they are squeezed ther they will move to some other city of Iraq when you expand your state,

The recent events in Bangladesh, India, Maldives show that the new emerging terrorism is Mobilizied and radicalized in those pockets of societies which were immune to Al qaeda. A

video by the chief of Alqaeda has also reinforced that where the Alqaeda has failed the Islamic state of Iraq will successeed.so the idea action dialect persisits.

The context of terrorism we are looking at a contested leader ship of global jihadism between alqaeda and daish. There was never a split between movement of global jihadism, people in one way or the other submitted to the spiritual leadership of Osama bin Ladin after him Mullah Omer was considered to be the spiritual head between zawahri and Baghdadi a contest of leadership Contested Leadership of Global Jihadism : *Baghdadi vs Zawahri*

Relocated epicenter of Global Jihadism: *Af-Pak to Levant and Mesopotamia*

Expanded Battlefield: *Real World to Cyber Work, earlier it was used for marketing prpose but now the cyber work is used to train the terrorist e.g Jakarta attack the gterrorist never came to Iraq they lerned everything online. New Iconography of terrorism: new themes (hijrah, bayah), new symbols, new heroes*

In the 90s there was debate as the new attacks of terrorism were different from traditional ways of terrorirsm e.g Tokyo subway attack in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo

Oklahoma city bombing in 1995, Timothy McVeigh, Bombings of US embassies in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania, Al-Qaeda , USS Cole attack in 2000 in Yemen, Al-Qaeda, the new round of terrorism took place after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, and <u>Post 9/11 there was a Rise of IS</u> *after the*   Killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 *and* Elimination of AQ top leadership in drone attacks *after* Arab Spring in the Middle East where AQ looked irrelevant and with the advent of the Islamic State in June 2014 so this as a background the spread of terrorism geographically has

Geographically terrorism has spread ([Global Terrorism Index 2015](), p17)

❑ 93 countries witnessed terrorism in 2014 up from 88 in 2013

11 countries experienced more 500 terrorist attacks in 2014 compared to 5 countries in 2013.

- Cost of carrying out terrorist attacks continues to fall, while cost of reacting to, and recovering from terrorism continues to rise (The Soufan Group, 2015)

- Since 2000, deaths in terrorist incidents have increased nine-fold (Global Terrorism Index 2015, p 35) 80 percent rise in terrorism-related casualties in 2014 (32, 685) compared to 2013 (18,111) .Since 2001, 61,000 terrorist attacks have taken place leaving 140,000 people dead .Private citizens were the main target with 15,380 people dead compared to 5,647 in 2013

- Commando Style Urban Terrorist Attacks are the new terror spectacular (The Soufan Group, 2015

- Foreign Fighters: 25,000 to 30,000 total , 7,000 in the first six months of 2015

- Expansion of battlefield from real world to cyber world (University of Pennsylvania, 2015)

- "No center of gravity"
- "The medium is the message"

Characteristics of these terrorism turns out to be that it

- Focuses on territorial gains; *Daulah Islamiyah* (Foreign Affairs, 2015)

- Offers instant heroism; *you become an icon in no time*

- Shapeless threat (no single pattern fits in); *lines have been blurred*

- Unapologetically brutal; *public beheadings* (BBC, 2014)

- Morally existential; *ends justify the means*

- Fast paced; *information decentralization and dissemination* (J. M. Berger, 2015)

- Prefer inspiration over affiliation; *followers and subscribers* (The Soufan Group, 2015)

- Tech savvy and street smart (Brookings, 2015)

- Good knowledge of history and religion; *cherry pick*

Lecture 4:

CAUSES OF TERRORISM

Dr. Richard Jackson,

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,

University of Otago, New Zealand

Dr. Richard Jackson has done a founder work in critical approach strategies in terrorism. It starts by quoting the example of a young man who has all the prospects of leading a healthy life but decides to join a group of insurgency of mass resistance. It raises the question of context in the lieu of someone resisting the poverty, extreme violence, military intervention, it raises the question of state violence by different groups, it raises the question of psychology of individuals and agency that decides that they are not going to be passive but fight against, it raises the question of about moral judgements of community to resist about dehumanization, and urge to take more open minded approach for the situation they are facing.

First thing in terrorism is to study that what is terrorism? There are number of different views over the definition, however mostly still agree that terrorism is a strategy and should be treated as a separate kind of phenomena, which seems a little strange because it would be similar. If u decontextualized that strategy as   one military strategy, one terrorism phenomenon, spoke problem or as one terrorist phenomenon it can be inclusive with respect to all countries or the context of terrorism**.**

he talked about diagnostic analysis he suggests it is a complex phenomenon and we need to have a complexes view of how to understand not from one source but multiple source and not one way

to handle it but multidisciplinary approach to handle this phenomena from multiple sources and solve it from diff phenomena

Before addressing the terrorism there are some preliminary issues that need to be addressed people have already given medical analogy and persist that cause of the treatment depends on the diagnosis especially understanding terrorism and its causes that can help shaping the respond before finding the broad answer to this there is a tricky question about why most people do not turn to terrorism although the factors responsible for terrorism it is present everywhere. There certainly enough justice available, more weapons available in the world.

Terrorism it is strategy of political conflict, similar anguishes one strategy against many, what one can choose .Terrorism is like ritual human behaviour, analyzing terrorism involves reliable data set that evaluate the causes of terrorism

Finally the last key question is about Objective of analyzing terrorism. Because it entails Politics of knowledge, as it imply interest, as certain incentives generates certain types of knowledge to justify certain type of violence e.g Military. Moreover is it possible as human being that is imbedded in a particular culture, historical background, and individual discourse, to objectively stand out and give the impartial truth about terrorism.

Then the next point he elaborates is on causality, Types of 'causes' including the remote, permissive and proximate causes, mono-causal versus multi-causal explanations grievance-versus opportunity-focused explanations, psychological versus sociological explanations, etc. which are probably the necessary but not sufficient conditions upon of The levels of analysis problem: system, states, groups or individuals. Situation where state inequality, oppression of political right of certain groups and goes on for a long time and that is not violence and something happens like killing of a student that triggers the eruption of whole thing and mobilizes the whole causes for terrorism

We can also think of mono-causal where there is only one cause but then there may be many reasons, sometimes multi causal that involves many factors the explanation involves grievance-versus opportunity structure sometime grieve but no opportunity to express themselves for

example when a country is in transition from authoritarian state to become a democratic state then these grievance gets the opportunity to express themselves through weapon.

Psychological vs social explanation level of analysis where the explanation to the important factor lie, is there any difference between international war on terror system vs cold war system at what level it vary and what are the particular times of state that cause and promote terrorism, then there are certain types of groups what are those groups or is it about individuals? There are lots of different levels to discuss terrorism.

Context and Generalization: one terrorism or many terrorisms? Is there one phenomenon about terrorism of there are multiple phenomenon of terrorisms? Is each an expression of terrorism is a product of a situation unique of context, historical or global, IRRI or in Indonesia, Columbia are the same phenomenon or they are same in the context. Human beings are free to do whatever they want or there are construed by the societies they grow up, religion families shall we be looking the causes there or regardless of the context.

The address elaborates on the prevalent myths about terrorism. Terrorism as a kind of exceptional, nonpolitical violence requiring a separate explanation from other forms of political conflict or forms of violence and its we look at the sociology of knowledge terrorism turns out be separate field because it used to be studied with insurgencies and studies political violence they were made separate because of the interest by the scholars that eventually called terrorism industry they wanted to have their own separate fields they wanted to make a separation between civil war political conflict, and categorization of terrorism was made as it is more evil form however the concept of terrorism entails that is a *strategy* that groups use one against many, every single group uses terrorism also endangers other forms of political activities writing statement propaganda joining other political parties it becomes a part of movement, so one or the other kind of strategy.

Poverty is also thought to be a cause of terrorism but it is found that mostly the terrorist at individual level are not the poor people of a society, they are sometimes educated than their peers and are a part of poverty can lead to grievances it can lead to humiliation sometimes poverty can also be an obstacle to terrorism as they are occupied in their own minimum level of survival that they don't bother about other objectives.

Are Terrorists are psychologically abnormal? That's another aspect that needs to be studied, a lot of studies say that there is not much evidence available that is the actual cause, and religious belief is major cause radicalization how religious a religious terrorism is? Fundamentalism can be both militant and peaceful, the context has to be understood, key belief structure secular and religious ideologies as secular states were also brutally violent, people can give up violence maintaining their extreme religious ideas, and acceptance of violence is the key to terrorism other than any other factor.

The political functions of these myths are also need to address. Fanatic religious groups and accept their existence demonized.

The search for macro-level factors correlated to terrorism ('root causes') – democracy, poverty, state failure, repression, education, for the most part findings are inconclusive and in many cases there are many strong correlation and causation among the variables. However grievances exist most of the cases, yet violence does not prevail everywhere, terrorism is confined in a few separate cases. Inconclusive findings, correlations not causality – grievances are everywhere while violence is not.

Subjugated knowledge – the macro-variables not investigated (eg, military intervention and occupation) a few studies focuses on the specific causes like drone strikes produces terrorism or external military intervention is creating violence in a particular country. But they are more particular and targeting on the macro causes however most of the studies don't investigate these macro variables.

Temporality and the importance of history and the structural contexts of violence needs to be understood and for that it needs to be analyzed that terrorists as situated, historical actors. there are different period of history in which under the colonial period terrorism would have been expressed differently.The broader links between direct, structural, and cultural violence and for that the social constitution of violence and broader cultures of violence.It entails other causes like poverty and hunger that cause more people to die every year than terrorism.

The causes of state terrorism state may include calculations, capabilities, institutional weakness, etc .

Now the most important question needs an answer that why do groups adopt violence, or why do individuals join violent groups? groups that are struggling they find they cannot confront directly but can use psychological war to terrify. At Meso-level terrorism could be a Social Movement Theory that has political opportunity structures as well as internal movement dynamics.

At the Micro-level it involves the Rational Actor Models for that individual beliefs and experiences and revenge are very important. The emotions are very vital tool to create any reaction in politics many cases terrorist attacks are very revengeful.

Political subjectivity and individual agency are involved and the International Brigades phenomenon, grievance narratives, cultures of resistance, beliefs in violence as empowerment , it is very important factor.As people feel empowerment when they use violence against their enemies. The effect of Iraq war were on radicalization on European base what turns out humiliating and oppressive that they found using violence was the only option for them for self projection.

> In conclusion we all need to have more Understanding over explanation approach– interpretive approach based on 'rich description' of multiple factors. The importance of context, history, complexity – avoiding simplistic generalizations, human beings as situated social actors and they are shaped by these factors. The importance of dynamic interaction and action-reaction cycles.The (frequently missing) *political* dimension of understanding the causes of terrorism as a strategy of contention it of political conflict. Finally Reflexivity and emancipator practice in the context of war on terror – avoiding harm but not assigning causality to specific groups or individuals as it might be hard than the fact so studying causes of terrorism without protectionism essentialism.

Lecture 5:

LEFT WING TERRORIST GROUPS AND TERRORIST GROUPS ABUSING RELIGION IN TURKEY: CASE STUDY OF DHKP/C AND HEZBOLLAH/İLİM:

Mr. Erkan Sezgin

Trukish Police

- The speaker talks about terrorism particularly in as in Turkey Left Wing Terrorist Organizations. The left wing terrorist groups include .DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front), MLKP (Marxist Leninist Communist Party), TKP/ML-Conference (Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist Leninist-Conference)

- Instead of **"**Islamic terrorism, Islamist terrorism, Jihadist terrorism etc." the term of **"TERRORISM ABUSING RELIGION" should be used and** instead of "Islamic terrorist, Jihadist terrorist" the term of **"TERRORIST/S ABUSING RELIGION"**will be used.

- Terrorist Organizations Abusing Religion should be distinguished from Separatist Terrorist Organizations.

- This study focuses on two ideologically different terrorist organizations, Hizbullah/ilim and the Revolutionary People's Freedom Party/Front (DHKP/C) terrorist groups and examines their Individuals' background characteristics, the factors that help them learn about terrorist groups (information sources), the motivational factors related to their decision making,The speaker further elaborates the Similarities and differences between two groups by first elaborating on Hizbullah and its origin by stating that it was established after the Iranian Revolution

- Hiizbullah aims at destroying the constitutional system to establish a theocratic state ruled by Sharia.As compared to other religious groups in Turkey Hezbollah is the most

violent. There is no connection with Lebanon Hezbollah. The basic ideology of Hiizbullah is to fight against the evil that rejects the rule of Allah.

- Violent attacks caused by Hizbullah during 1994 to 2013, alone resulted in 263 causalities out of which 91% are civilians and 8.45 are government officials

- Whereas DHKP/C is considered to be the most active left wing group in Turkey and Internationally recognized terrorist organization, It aims at establishing a new state based on ML ideology.It has Bombed more than twenty US and NATO military, commercial and cultural facilities and over the time suicide bombing has become their preferred method and most of their members live in European countries (i.e. Italy, Germany, Belgium and Holland).During 1994 to 2013 the voilent attacks caused by DHKP/C has resulted in 52 casualities which had 57% of governement officials in it.

- The author has discussed a Documents that constitute a kind of application form (Original hand- written, part of recruitment process). They contain detailed and self presented information. They were captured during police operations. 116 documents for DHKP/C and 186 documents for Hizbullah to analyze, making the sample size 302. The unit of analysis of this study is the individual terrorist.

Variables and coding

Dependent variable	Coding
Participation in terrorist group	Dummy (0=DHKP/C, 1=Turkish Hezbollah)
Background characteristics	**Coding**
Age	Interval/ratio
Gender	Dummy (0=Female, 1=Male)
Education level	Dummy (0=Middle sch. or lower, 1=High school, 2= Post High sch.
Economic condition	Dummy (0=Low, 1=Modest, 2=High)
Job status	Dummy (0=Working, 1=Unemployed, 2=Student
Marital status	Dummy (0=Not married, 1=Married)
Group affiliation	Dummy (0=No affil., 1=Affil. with legal gr., 2=Affil. with illegal gr.
Number of siblings	Interval/ratio
Prior detention	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Any active family member	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Any sympathetic family mem.	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Learning related	**Coding**
Friend/s	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Kinship	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Organizational activities	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Propaganda	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Motivational factors	**Coding**
Environmental factors	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Need to belong to a group	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Ideological/political affinity	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Negative life events	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Tactics/propag. of terrorists	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)
Other motivational factors	Dummy (0=No, 1=Yes)

The findings suggest that male to female propotion in both the groups has been low especially in Hizbullah which accounts only 0.5% of the females and 99.5% are the male however in DHKP/C has almost 32% of the females working in it out of the total propotion. whereas the economic conditions of the people working for both the groups suggest that 34.2% in DHKP/C are from poor background as opposed to 14.7% in Hizbullah in which 34.4% are from a high income group against 20% in DHKP/C. the job status tells that 54.9% are working and 37.9% are students whereas only 7.1% are unemployed.IN DHKP/C 47.4% are working and 38.8% are students and 14% are unemployed.

In DHKP/C 94.1% are unmarried as opposed to 65.9% in Hizbullah and the number of married people working for Hizbullah are 34.1% whereas in DHKP/C the number of married people are 6.1%. The mean age in Hizbullah is 19.47 whereas in DHKP/C the mean age is also 19.1. learning about the terrorist organization reveals that most of the people get to know about them through their friends, in Hezbollah about 32.8% people learned through their friends and 31%

through their kinships and 52% got to know about it through their activities about through propaganda, in DHKP/C

	DHKP/C (%)	Hizbullah (%)
Female	32.8	0.5
Male	67.2	99.5

All of this discussion now skims down to the motivational factors that leads to the participation in terrorist activities. A few of these factors might be as follows:

1) Environmental factors (family, friend, relative, neighbour)

A persons social structures can prove to be effective, which has been shown to pave the way for a person to support or be a part of terrorist organization.

2) Ideological/political closeness:

It is important to understand the contextual, conceptual, and semantic differences between two groups.

3) Need to belong to a group:A sense of belonging arises with the person and thus the probability of being astray rise.

4) Negative life events:

Although there are numerous negative life events reported by the sample, they are collapsed into seven general categories dissatisfaction/unhappiness in life is the most significant negative life event reported by almost two-thirds (64.5%) of Turkish Hezbollah members, while it is reported by only eight percent of DHKP/C members.

5) Tactics/propaganda of terrorists:

Both groups used home and village visits to promote the group and engender public awareness.

6) Other motivational factors:

These motivational factors may include, revenge, protection, desire to commit a suicide attack.

To conclude, law enforcement agencies should acknowledge that one of the most vital rules in countering violent extremism is winning the hearts and minds of individuals who are more susceptible to extreme views. Family factors (as facilitator for participation) should be taken into consideration in the policy making process. Countering radicalization requires joint effort of all other institutions including private and public. Governmental institutions, civil society, the media and the business community should work together to enhance the effectiveness of counter strategies.

Day 2

Lecture 6:

SPACE OF PERFORMATIVE POLITICS AND TERROR IN PAKISTAN:

Dr. Daanish Mustafa Environment

**Department of Geography, King's College,**

London

The first step is to define terrorism as an act of violence different from other acts of violence in that is directed towards a larger group, besides the casualties, causing destruction and annihilation. This means that you become a direct victim because of where you were while the attack itself yields the motivation of terrorists. This theatrical aspect of terrorism according to Hannah Arendt is similar to the theatrical aspect of politics.

The antidote of terrorism can be divided into following areas

- Counter terrorism : where you use military and law enforcement agencies to fight terrorism. While the war on terrorism has been criticized for being hypocritical, illegal and destroying the lives of innocents thus making them susceptible to the terrorists; policing has been preferred on the basis that it is legitimately more effective at preventing terrorism and catching the offenders.
- Address the Root cause by fighting poverty, providing education in areas which are a hub for producing terrorists and use media to attack these organizations. But the problem is that there has been no strong research to create a direct link between terrorism and poverty.
- Set up the foundation for politico- cultural reconstruction.

Next research was done on neighbourhoods in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad to calculate how vulnerable the area was to violence. The results are as follows

Vulnerabilities and Capacities Index (VCI) Scores by Neighbourhood

Key
- = Extremely Vulnerable
- = High Vulnerability
- = Moderate Vulnerability
- = Low Vulnerability
- = Resilient

Karachi: Civil Lines 55, Mansoor Nagar 58.5, Raes Amrohi 61, Christian Colony 66, AAG 70, Ghaziabad 59

Rawalpindi-Islamabad: Afghan Abadi 70, Arya Mohalla 53, Dokh Naju 61.5, Dokh Saidan 51, France Colony 58

AAG in Karachi and Afgan Abadi in Rawalpindi/Islamabad are areas with the highest score in the index. The next graph provides more harrowing results. In Afghan Abadi a high of 86% respondets admitted to being a victim of violence.

Have You Ever Been a Victim of Violence?

Next is the classification of violence as has been portrayed in the neighborhoods selected for study into infrastructural violence, disempowerment violence and spectacular violence. Violence in this case is indicative of a loss of power. While politics is the creation of worldliness and freedom, violence is politically null and void even anti political.

The presenter next describes The Geographies of Taliban terror in Swat. The Taliban described woman as imperfect able and thus curtailed public expressions of togetherness of the sexes. They created network of spies and this led to public beheadings.

The so called religious right is basically misogynistic, anti culture, with ideologies based on distortions of history and draw support from technically trained professionals. To counter them what is required is for a public realm where individuals reveal who and what they are and they are a part of polis in its diversity.

What has thus caused a problem in our society is a dominant tragic outlook affirming a titanic struggle between good and evil. So to end terrorist violence we have to reject complete systemic solutions- the me against the system logic.

Lecture 7:

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM (VIOLENT RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Dr. Arshi Saleem Hashmi,

Associate Professor,

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies,

National Defence University- Islamabad

Marxist view of religion as False Consciousness was challenged by sociologists who instead portrayed religious institutions as expressions of class and power struggle.

The Appropriate term Violent Religious extremism or Militant approach terrorism is a process of radicalization which is the predominant model for violence in the world. While nationalism and ideology remain as potent catalysts for extremist behavior, religious violence has become a central issue for global community.

An explanation of various researchers reveals varied ideas on religious terrorism. While some study the tension between theological philosophy and ethical values, others blame it on actors who are quite ignorant of their own traditions.

The challenge with religious terrorism is to understand it has other goals besides hastening the end of times and usher in an anticipated new world. Secondly distinguish religious terrorism from traditional more secular counterparts.

Traditional terrorism can be divided into the Left (who declined post cold war), Right winged (Klu Klux, Neo Nazis) and the Ethnic Separatist(IRA which is a religious-ethnic group with non-religious goals).

By contrast an example of a religious ethnic group with religious goals is Hamas. Thus religious terrorism is the propensity to absolutize and to project images of cosmic war. It occurs with social tensions at the moment of history. Religious terrorists use sacred texts and historic examples to attain the ultimate aim which is religiously formulated while the immediate objective will often be almost purely political.

The present day terrorists are modern day modern manifestations of historical traditions of extremism within the world's major faiths. Most religious texts have passages that can be selectively interpreted to encourage extremist intolerance

On the other hand there are non violent organizations with extremist tendencies which achieve their ends by means other than terrorism but need to be checked. Examples include the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ul Tahir.

Religious terrorism has the Following Goals:

- Apocalyptic Terrorism which is cataclysmic destruction to people, property, and the environment with the hope of fomenting the end of time and ushering in religious promises of a new world. Examples of this includes Gush Emunium in Israel and the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.
- Creation of Religious Government: The goal is most commonly associated with militant Islamic groups and their desire to establish governments run by Shari'a law but the desire to create a religious government also exists in other traditions. Muslim example of this is the Taliban while in Christianity it is the Christian Identity Movement.

- Terrorism and Religious Cleansing: Religious terrorists also aim to eradicate "infidels"—the unfaithful within their tradition or in other religions—in order to create a religiously pure state. Examples of this are the LeT and Shiv Sena.

These groups are not necessarily led by a cleric, imam, alim, rabbi or swami. It could be self appointed or a charismatic figure from outside the clergy or religious clerics. Their targets are of two types. Either tactical targets which serve specific, earthly goals to create a religious , target the workings of the state, including attacks on heads of state and government officials. Or Symbolic Targets those operates on an abstract level and tend to be specific to religious goals and objectives to attack "culture," values and norms that do not conform to the religious ideals of the terrorist group.

In Pakistan constitutional umbrella was provided to religion in the 1973 Constitution to provide ideological direction to the country but instead made religion a political force and paved the way for Islamist groups to maintain influence in centre and throughout. While religions role in politics increased immensely after Soviet War and Kashmir conflict became a religious struggle at the same time, religious extremism promoted illiberal conceptions of democracy through exploitation of religion in politics by religo-political parties that weakened the political rights and civil liberties of religious minorities. Although in theory religious philosophy and political violence may not necessarily have a link, in practice, however, there seems to be strong connection between the doctrine and the politics in contemporary religio-political situation in Pakistan. South Asia is unique in the sense that religious revivalism was initiated by the religious majority. In Pakistan society appears indifferent about the nature of religiosity but there is a great deal of confusion and it can only be removed if officially steps are taken to de-radicalize the society through curriculum reforms. The question here is if terrorism is growing due to misinterpretation and misinformation of religion, why it is being done. The Ulema are required to clarify and explain the true meaning of Jihad. Thus deliberate social engineering is required from moderate urban civil society which is the only visible social force that can fight the religious orthodoxy. Perts

Some of the reforms suggested are as follows

- Theology must be taught at most educational institutions to produce experts in the subject
- Madrassas reform are much needed

- Moderate sunni leaders are required to prevent the next generation from being brainwashed by the strict doctrines.

When religious extremism use asymmetrical tactics, cell-based networks, indiscriminate attacks against soft targets, and the threatened use of high-yield weapons technologies, their agendas and grievances will receive extensive attention and their adversaries will be sorely challenged to defeat them. It is therefore reasonable to presume that religious terrorists will practice this strategy for the near future. These groups are countered by treating them as criminals and by using law enforcement to monitor and punish their actions. By using law enforcement agencies the goal is to minimize the group's publicity and de-legitimate their actions. Coming back to these groups leaders they do not possess bona fide qualities such as religious education or clerical training

In conclusion it is important to pay attention to what religious terrorists attack, because these targets offer important clues for the groups' goals, which in turn affect the type of countermeasures employed.

Lecture 8:

EVOLUTION OF SUICIDE TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN:

Dr. Khuram Iqbal,

Asst. Professor,

National Defense University, Islamabad.

Mr. Khurram Iqbal presents on the Evolution of Suicide terrorism: A case Study of Pakistan. He starts with a graph to show the country's worst hit by a suicide attack.

Countries Worst-hit by Suicide Attacks

The above table shows that Pakistan ranks third when it comes to countries worst hit by Suicide Attack. From its inception Pakistan has experienced militancy in some way. From 1947-54 it was the militancy in Kashmir and Waziristan while the 80's bought the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and with it International Jihad. But post 9/11 intervention of Allies in Afghanistan has bought a new breed of fighters and emergence of suicide attacks in Pakistan.

The next table shows the Geographic distribution of Suicide attacks across Pakistan with the maximum number of attacks in NWFP. City wise Swat was hit 5 times while Rawalpindi, Mir Ali, Tank and Peshawar were a close second with 4 attacks.

The presenter next defines the evolution of suicide attacks from literature, and basis it on the following five phenomenons

- Papes and Feldman influential explanation for the prevalence of suicide attacks is the idea that foreign occupation causes Nationalism which is the key force motivating this phenomenon.

- Attran, Goodwin and Hoffman deduce that Islamic fundamentalism can also motivate suicide terrorism.
- Hassan and Crenshaw attribute the phenomenal spread of suicide bombing to the effectiveness of this particular tactic
- While Pakistan LEA's believe that revenge is the most important reason. But this does not explain the significant number of suicide bombers from Punjab and other areas unaffected by military operations
- International leaders like George W Bush and Dalai Lama believe that Poverty is the fundamental reason for suicide bombing

The presenter next conducts his research based on the above five hypothesis

His research concludes that while Al Qaeda is numerically less prominent but has the highest number of profile attacks involving foreign bombers. Tehrik e Taliban has been responsible for 78% of attacks with the maximum number of civilian attacks. But it is Laksahr e Jhangvi which first used Sectarian Attacks and female bombers.

The average Pakistani Bomber is a male Pakistani with an age of 18 who is single, semi illiterate and comes from a disadvantaged economic conditions.

From research findings the motivation for suicide attacks is vengeance, effectiveness and anti Americanism.

In conclusion the author feels that "suicide terrorism is caused by multiple factors with perceived effectiveness, vengeance, poverty and religious fundamentalism playing a varying role at the individual, organizational and environmental levels." "Nationalism and resistance to foreign occupation appears as the least relevant factors behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan."

The way forward for the future researchers is to explore links between religiosity and support for suicide terrorism. There is a need for reducing collateral damages in counter terrorism operations with enhanced regional and global collaboration especially in sustaining current Afghan Policy.

Lecture 9:

LONE ACTOR TERRORISM:

Dr. Leena Malkki

Research Director, University of Helsinki,

Network for European Studies, Finland.

The speaker Leena Malkki Of the Presentation Lone actor terrorism has been studying terrorism since the 90's where her specialization is the study of terrorism in Europe.

The above diagram shows the impact of terrorism in the world and although the threat of structured terrorism is low in Finland, Ms. Malki points out the threat of lone terrorism is rising. So in this presentation the speaker focuses on the threat of lone terrorism, the studies and research that have been done to understand this phenomenon and the resulting conclusion from these studies.

The phenomenon goes under different names but simply it can be said to be autonomously acting individual or small groups operating in isolation from organized network.

The first example is of the Unabomber who was motivated by his own views and opposed the modern technology and industrialization. Thomas Friedman described them as Super empowered individuals. Another flag under which these individuals operate is that of SIMAD or single individual massively destructive. The threat is worst in these cases as these individuals may use weapons of mass destruction.

The next important step is to define the three different contests in which the lone terrorist comes out.

The first, very prevalent debate looks at the issue from the counterterrorist point of view.It highlights how the changes in society, internet in particular makes it easier to plan an attack. This thus makes it difficult to prevent this attack. This phenomenon has been well explained by Jeffrey Simons who defines this kind of terrorist as The "Leaderless Terrorists."

The second debate "New Organizational Possibilities Discourse" is a kind of mirror of the first one and highlits also the key role of internet and social media.These new methods are making organization and recruitment possible for terrorist groups. The first, very prevalent debate looks at the issue from the counterterrorist point of view. Al Qaeda and leaderless jihad are prime examples of this.

Lone Terrorist have occured as a response to tightening countermeasures in the west. So instead of even trying to form groups, individual action is preferred. Thus according to Louis Beam The Leaderless Resistance is a child of necessity. An example of this is terrorist Anders Breivik who operated alone and saw himself as a warrior in the fight against Islam but was clearly inspired by counterjihaddist ideas.

The research on Lone actor Terrorism attempts to usely build databases of lone actor attacks or their perperators which is based on media sources.

Examples of lone terrorist who acted alone but came from wider extremist Islamist milleui are Muhammad Bouvyeri who murdered the controversial Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh and Richard Reid "the Shoebomber" who attempted to detonate a bomb in flight.

The presenter next distinguishes between a solo offender and Lone offender. While a solo Offender initiates, plans, prepares for and executes the attack without (direct) assistance from

any other Person; The Lone Offender initiates, plans, prepares for and executes the attack with (direct) assistance from one or two other people. The lone actor is normally an older male with a history of mental health problems and ideologically he is traditional especially far right . The attacks by these lone actors are rare but becoming common, using mostly firearms and appear to be more common in the United states.

The presenter concludes that this is not a uniform phenomeon but rather a mix of different kind of cases that do not have much in common. Grouping them all together makes sense only from the counterterrorist imagination's point of view. Genuine Lone actors are extremely rare and difficult to prevent. But what unites all the terrorists discussed in this presentation is the new communication technology; the reality of today's world which is interconnected in real time and much more extensively than before, thanks to internet and social media.

Lecture 10:

SURVIVAL OF TERRORIST GROUPS:

Dr. Laura Dugan

University of Maryland, USA.

The presenter Laura Dugan starts the presentation with the foremost question of what we know about group failures from literature. Cronin in his seminal work concludes that groups fail because of a variety of reasons like organizational issue, reduction of popular support or merely they transition into another form of violence. While on the other hand Bloomberg and others feel that

a.) transnational groups survive if they are older and are either based in Sub Sahara or populous states or countries with rising GDP
b.) Larger rebellious groups that diversify their tactics survive longer.

A large number of researchers also feel that those groups that target civilians prolong the conflict but this is in itself a self defeating tactic.

The presenter next moves to the paper "Why do some Terrorist Groups Endure by Young & Dugan. They believe that an important characteristic influences longevity: competition among groups.

To explain this characteristic the presenter gives three hypothesis

a.) Outbidding Hypothesis; Which says that groups that operate in a more competitive environment are more likely to fail.
b.) Top Dog groups Hypotheisis: The groups that are more violent, experienced and thus potentially drawing more resources have an advantage in the market are the top dogs and they are less likely to fail than their competition.
c.) Interactive Hypothesis : As the number of terrorist groups increase, the less likely the Top Dogs are to fail compared to other groups.

To study these hypothesis Young and Dugan conducted a study. They too failure as the dependant variable and the independent variables were the three hypothesis : Competitive environment, top Dog and Interaction.

The results were as follows

Figure 3. Probability that a Group Fails Conditional on the Number of Competitors

This figure shows that when competition is low, each type of group has a probability of failing of around 0.60. However, as competition increases, the probability that a Top Dog organization fails drops dramatically, while that probability increases for all other groups.

The next question that the presenter brings is what does all this mean for Pakistan. In Pakistan between the periods of 1970 & 2014, 20 % attacks were attributed to terrorist groups and 80 % were unattributed. Between the same period 63% terrorist groups were short lived while 37 % had been active for long. An example of this is that in 2014, 45 attacks were carried by three different short lived groups. . This accounts for a small percentage as during the same time period short lived groups just carried out 6 % of the terrorist attacks while long lived carried a whopping 94% of the attacks.

The following table shows the longest active group in Pakistan

Rank	Group	Days Active	Years Active	Total Incidents	Fatality Rate
1	Pakistani People's Party (PPP)	8,183	90-12	8	0.22
2	Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)	6,768	92-10	9	0.63
3	Sipah-I-Mohammed	6,379	96-14	7	2.37
4	Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	5,587	90-06	17	3.59
5	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	5,525	96-11	36	33.75
6	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	4,354	90-02	170	17.62
7	Al Zulfikar	4,086	81-92	7	1.08
8	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	3,616	76-86	3	2.27
9	Al-Qa`ida	3,489	02-11	21	18.00
10	Taliban	3,320	05-14	54	16.10

The above table indicates that PPP is the longest active group while MQM is the group with the highest incident rate.

The next table shows the groups with the most attacks in Pakistan

Rank	Group	Total Incidents	Attacks per Year	Days Active	Years Active	Fatality Rate
1	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	1,041	130.13	2564	07-14	629.88
2	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	198	24.75	2628	07-14	19.88
3	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	170	13.08	4354	90-02	17.62
4	lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)	72	24.00	1061	12-14	92.33
5	Baloch liberation Front (BlF)	70	23.33	1077	12-14	36.67
6	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	63	9.00	2528	05-11	19.86
7	lashkar-e-Jhangvi	62	20.67	1002	12-14	191.33
8	United Baloch Army (UBA)	59	14.75	1144	11-14	29.50
9	Baloch liberation Army (BlA)	58	19.33	1078	11-14	36.00
10	Taliban	54	5.40	3320	05-14	16.10

This table shows that Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan had the maximum attacks by any group as well as the highest number of attacks in an year with a fatality rate of 629.88.

The next table shows the most active groups per year in Pakistan

Rank	Group	Attacks per Year	Days Active	Years Active	Total Incidents	Fatality Rate
1	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	130.13	2,564	07-14	1,041	629.88
2	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	24.75	2,628	07-14	198	19.88

3	lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)	24.00	1,061	12-14	72	92.33
4	Baloch liberation Front (BlF)	23.33	1,077	12-14	70	36.67
5	lashkar-e-Jhangvi	20.67	1,002	12-14	62	191.33
6	Baloch liberation Army (BlA)	19.33	1,078	12-14	58	36.00
7	United Baloch Army (UBA)	14.75	1,144	11-14	59	29.50
8	Sindhu Desh liberation Army (SDlA)	14.67	899	12-14	44	4.00
9	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	13.08	4,354	90-02	170	17.62
10	Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)	11.67	912	09-11	35	15.33

As in the table before Tehrik e Taliban has the maximum number of attacks thus making it the most lethal group in Pakistan.

The presenter next bring the Outbidding Hypothesis to study the Top Dog in Pakistan.

The table below shows the top dog by year.

Year	Group	Primary Country	Year	Group	Primary Country
1975	National Awami Party* (1)	Pakistan	1998	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan
1976	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Lebanon	1999	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan
1978	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Lebanon	2000	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan

1981	Al Zulfikar	Pakistan	2001	Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	Pakistan
1982	Al Zulfikar	Pakistan	2002	Al-Qa`ida	Afghanistan
1983	Iraqi Mujahideen* (4)	Pakistan	2003	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan
1984	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front* (1)	India	2004	Al-Qa`ida	Afghanistan
1986	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Lebanon	2005	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Pakistan
1988	Soldiers of Truth* (1)	Belgium	2006	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Pakistan
1989	Freedom Party* (1)	Pakistan	2007	Taliban (Pakistan)	Pakistan
s1990	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	2008	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
1991	Al Zulfikar	Pakistan	2009	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
1992	Pakistani People's Party (PPP)	Pakistan	2010	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
1994	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	2011	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
1995	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	2012	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
1996	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	2013	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan

1997	Pakistani People's Party (PPP)	Pakistan	2014	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan

The table shows by years the top dogs. In the 90's the Top dogs were the MQM but in more recent years majority of the attacks are attributed to Tehrik I Taliban.

The author concludes that data from Pakistan Supports Young & Dugan Hypothsis

a.) Outbidding : the idea that terror group fails in a more competitive environment. In Pakistan 63% of the groups were short lived, , most of which operated when competition was highest
b.) Top Dogs: they are less likely to fail than competitiors. Most of the Top Dogs were long lived and and all short lived Top Dogs operated before rise in Terrorism.
c.) Interactive : The top Dogs were strongest during periods of high competition when short lived groups were also operating. This suggests that high competition works well for top dog but not for others.

The presenter concludes with the example of TTP which emerged when 13 groups united with their main agenda to supposedly kill rival leaders. But despite disagreements, in fighting and emergence of TTP offshoots it persisted. The Top Dog theory does matter but it is not as simple as the three hypothesis suggests.

Lecture 11:

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM—REVISITING GREED, GRIEVANCE AND THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS:

Ms. Zoha Waseem

King's College London.

To understand the political economy of terrorism there is a need to revisit the literature on Greed vs grievance debate & the Crime terror Nexus

In Berdal & Malone 2000 compilation of essays the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts is studied. Keen describes them as war economies where there is a continued incentive for violence. Duffied on the other hand argues that though globalization can lead to economic and political convergence it can also encourage new and durable forms of disparity, instability, and complexity. This can thus be called the durable disorder interpretation of globalization. Collier believes that civil wars create economic opportunities for some groups that benefit from it and thus opportunism thrives on conflict. Ballentine and Nitzsche in their paper believe that where conflicts are motivated by a mix of political, security, ethnic and economic factors, curtailing resources flow to combatants may weaken their military capacity but not their resolve to continue fighting. Thus combatants prefer protracted war to peace. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) believe that societies can be more prone to conflict because preferences for rebellion are unusually strong or because constraints on rebellion are unusually weak – the former being aligned with grievance and the latter with greed. These variables are important to establish because a potential rebel group might have grievances that align with rebellion, but if they are in a state with excessive constraints on rebellion there is little chance at success. Overall, Collier and Hoeffler's study drew multiple conclusions in support of the greed model. In the 2007 paper by Murshed & Tadjeoddin (2007) they argue that presence of greed or grievance is not sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict but the institutional breakdown which is described as the failure of social contract. This degradation is likely in the context of poverty and growth failure. Zartman (2011) believes that greed argument is uninteresting while Muhammad Feyyaz (2011) believes that greed grievance balance shifts over time.

Shelley & Picarreli (2002) in their article on the organized crime terrorism nexus believe that although transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups often adopt similar methods, they are inherently striving for divergent ends. Crime is primarily an economically driven enterprise, while terrorism remains rooted in political pursuits. Louise Shelley (2005) on the other hand believes that there is the unholy trinity between terrorism, transnational crimes and corruption. Tamara Makarenko (2005) believes that criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other's successes and failures thus creating a Crime Terror Continuum. And lastly Peng wang (2010) believes that we cannot solve this centuries problem by using last centuries methods.

The most interesting explanation of how Organized Crime converges into Terrorism is given in the following Diagram by Makarenko, Tamara (2005)

Figure 3.2: The Crime Terror Continuum

The presenter next delves into the organized crime nexus in Karachi. Karachi is a port, commercial trade and finance centre with an estimated 230 billion of shadow economy. Corruption occurs in form of port harbor smuggling. They engage in land mafia and trafficking of Iranian oil and also indulge in target killings. There are six key holders in Karachi's militant economy which includes ordinary criminals, political militant wings, Militants from Afghan War, Post 9/11 foreign fighters, Pakistani Taliban and self proclaimed jihadists.

The presenter than does a case study of two groups that deal in greed driven crime terror nexus in Karachi: the Lyari gangs and Pakistani Taliban.

The Lyari gang deals in gang violence, smuggling and drugs while having political patronage. Their main business is Lyarri Tax which are for passes and access to Port and money is channeled abroad through hawala. Research has identified potential links to SSP and BLO.

Pakistani Taliban on the other hand are implanting into sympathetic Pashtun areas and basically deal in extortion. They have been eliminating competition engaging in turf wars and establishing ties with local sectarian militants. They have established Sharia justice and hiring target killers. They also do kidnappings for ransom and bank robberies.

To develop an effective Counter terrorism policy the following three models are suggested

- Authoritarian Model (2015) : This model requires greater use of force including strong internal security forces through aggressive intelligence collction. There is strict censorship and hyper nationalism and less likely to be any concessions to terrorists

- Democratic Model(2015) : this calls for lesser use of force and there is legitimacy through improved governance. This reduces grievances
- Democratic Model (John Murray): This additionally calls for community policing

In Conclusion the presenter concludes that political economy of terrorism is likely to keep on evolving. Firstly there is a need to revisit the greed grievance debate in local and regional contexts and secondly a deeper understanding of crime terror nexus is required.

Day 3

Lecture 12:

STRATEGY AND COMMUNICATION:

Dr. Neville Bolt, from King's College London,

Department of War Studies

Terrorism is word weaving to the fabric of national, regional and politics. Terrorism should be understood as an act of strategic communication in the politics .Put the discussion back in to the context of international ground strategies that state, state proxies and state challenges all are engaging. Most people on the planet experienced act of terror through the eye of a camera and medium of the screen.

Today propaganda of the deed uses the weight of media against itself to dominate the space of public discourse. The typical age of imagery transforms of the strategic capacity of violent images so the propaganda of the deed of propaganda of the world. Namely terrorist act has become a center strategic operating concept in contemporary insurgency.

When we look at the pic we attach meaning to them and the process is we work on pictures as pictures work on us.

In following diagram, 2 images of terrorism is explicably tied.

Both images are iconic they project beyond the local and address the higher moral issues that stand at test of time. The jihad is the execution of this tragic and horrific. The child is equally tragic and horrific but the constructed esthetic of the execution plant to a set of understanding with which we are now familiar. It seems intellectually and even emotionally more containable.

Captures the lifeless body of a kid, this paradox is disturbing. This is the most suppressive act of communication and the fact of consequence. The execution is directly tied to ideology which make a more meaningful image. It strikes of the heart of liberals.

The second image evokes the feelings of the emptiness in a conflict.

When we look at the effect of terror as strategic communication which has to fix on the most explicitly violent and premeditative form of messages the visual retrace of propaganda of their deed active terror court so the impact of one message campaign has within the spectrum of multi sets of messages.

Former British military chief gave remarks when he argued that new horse to tank moment Electronic stream is now the new north Germen play. Media is no more the guest inside the battle space rather all conflict is played out inside the global media space. This all is globally connected.

According to General Valery Gerasimov in Military-Industrial Kurier 2013 'The very "rules of war" have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their

effectiveness. The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.

In North Africa, we witnessed the use of technologies for influencing state structures and the population with the help of information networks. It is necessary to perfect activities in the information space, including the defence of our own objects.'

Lecture 13:

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES:

Dr. Antti SillAnpää (Finland),

NATO StratCom

COE, Operations Support Branch

Mrs. Dr. Antti SillAnpaa from NATO StratCom COE, operations support branch presented on "Strategic Communications, Narratives and Counter-Narratives". She briefed the audience about communication and strategic communications in particular while also sharing case studies from Russia and Daesh.

She shared that communication is an activity or process of expressing ideas and feelings or of giving people information. Various methods of sending information include telephones, radio, computers, etc. or roads and railways. Nowadays social media is helping a great deal and has given communication a new dimension.

Sharing about "Strategic Communications", she mentioned some critical points that are mentioned below:

- integral part of any political and/or military decision-making process
- leadership driven process, focused on enhancing the ability to articulate the narratives, themes and messages to the target audiences

- mind-set that information can be used to achieve political and military objectives
- coordination of information disciplines to achieve the desired objectives

She concluded by discussing some actions that we need to take against adversary campaigns:

- Be consistent from narratives to messaging

- Do not be a part of adversarial information campaign – choose terminology

- Study your target audiences and own vulnerabilities

- Messenger can make the difference

- Promote media literacy, good media, education, awareness

- Share information and best practices with partners

Lecture 14:

SUCCESS FROM AN ISIL PERSPECTIVE:

Mr. Cees de Waart,

Strategic Intelligence Advisor,

former NATO Intelligence Expert,

Netherlands,

The presenter discuss the SUCCES from The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also know as Daesh, ISIL or simply Islamic State) perspective.

During his military career he was trained to analyse the Group Of Soviet Forces Germany, the Western front of the Soviet Union. And in this training they were thought to "THINK RED" – that is: to Know their Tactics, Strategy, Doctrines and Ideology, BUT foremost we were Thinking like the Enemy.

During the last 25 years of his career as Intelligence Officer he utilised this Think like the Enemy, to follow the new rise of Extremism, starting with How the Afghan Mujahedeen operated against the Russian occupation force, and from there forward.

It is important to understand that during this presentation he will speak as the ISIL spokesman

Over 40 years ago the United States and some allies were engaged in a long and difficult war in Vietnam. QUOTE" Giap later told the US, at first he thought the US had a strategy. "We had one, he said, It was PEOPLESWAR. But your US strategy was helicopter tactics, And it is very difficult to defeat a sound strategy with tactics".

This episode from Vietnam suggests that military tactics had no potential to defeat the Peoples War Strategy of Vietnam. One lesson here is that it is essential to measure the success of one's strategy on how it impacts what the enemy is doing.

He further explained what we believe are ISISL measures of success. To make it clear he spoke from their perspective.

From the perspective of ISIL: We have a strategies, Do You? We seek to advance our Cause, which is Offensive; you seek to defeat our cause which is defensive. Your reactionary tactics against our offensive strategy cannot succeed.

ISIL Measures of Success

- Spread the Ideology

- Promoting identity of the *Ummah*: defining enemies

- Ensure perpetual fighting

- Obeying obligation to fight, not necessarily winning battles

- Institutionalizing a culture of martyrdom

- Establish pride, brotherhood, unity

These can be seen as our measures of success. If we can accomplish these, we are successful. While you measure battles won, leaders killed and money transfer stopped. We are focused on The People. Like in Vietnam you can win your battles, but we are also successful and winning and expanding.

The spread of Ideology is the foundation of our effort. There is no doubt about the rapid growth in the spreading of our ideas in many languages across the world. In Iraq and Syria, we are transforming societies. We communicate to tailored audiences like youth, women and even deaf. We seek to achieve our objectives with Tweets, Social Media and Memory sticks. We believe we are mostly uncontested in our fight for ideas.

In nearly Two years we have established over 34 media organisations distributing in formation in multiple languages reaching people in all corners of the world. Twitter has been exceptional useful…One western analysis suggested there are 40.000 tweets a day by our supporters. Social media is one of the main contributing factors for the rapid acceptance of our state around the world.

We seek to UNITE people behind our Ideology which we have had tremendous success doing…From Iraq to Algeria to Indonesia. The United Nations says people from 100 nations support our cause. ..is this the most widely supported coalition in modern history.

At the same time we define and separate enemies. You may call it sectarian conflict and even genocide, but this is mortal conflict and we are eliminating those who oppose us.

Understand this: WE are dividing the world between us and them.

You fight to win battles and try to establish peace. We live with the understanding that fighting will never stops. We believe the "Victorious sect" will fight until the "End of Days" We are waiting for you in Dabiq. We are actually preparing future generations to carry-on the fight. As the Mujahidin of the Islamic State continue our march against the forces of Kufr (non believe) There is a new generation waiting these are the children of the Ummah of Jihad, the generation raised in the lands of Malahim (fierce battles) and nurtured under the shade of Sharia. We are creating our own munitions production capabilities. Fighting and conduct of unconventional

strikes is how we wear down your economies and societies. It is only a matter of time before you will become exhausted or demoralised.

In operational theatres like Iraq, we take the initiative and seize an area. After this, the government and its Iranian and coalition allies prepare a major operation, dropping bombs, by doing so destroying their own economic infrastructure and alienating the people. While they conduct an operation to to regain territory, we strike elsewhere. You are like a wounded elephant lashing out. As we expand, if we can Gain and Hold, terrain we will bring justice, services and education. What do you bring when you enter in our lands?

When fighting continues to spread, we believe we are winning.

As we published in our magazine, we are fighting until the end of the world. This is exciting for young peole – they want to be part of history.

What future do you offer for young people?

What history can you promise that they will be part of?

While we seek to win battles. This is not a measure of success for us. That does not mean we want to be effective. However we believe the moment the fighters pick up a weapon it is where success occurs. Simply put: we believe we will not be held accountable for results of the battle, but rather for whether we are following the Right Path. When individuals make the choice, success is achieved.

We motivate people by our example, not necessarily individual charismatic leadership. The surge in fighters willing to lay down their lives from across the globe is our success. We often publish photos, of martyrs smiling in death. Each of these heroes has a story for their relatives and communications. They are the example. Martyrdom is victory.

Wilayats are spreading throughout the theatre, and more provinces will be included. The point I want to make here is that we are far beyond al-Sham or the Levant. Your efforts to make the difference by calling us names such as DAESH are feeble and, quite honestly, embarrassing – do you really think this make a difference? Look at the evidence. Since you started calling us DAESH we have only grown in strength.

Finally our ideology has been around for a long time and has has long-term leadership to direct us. We believe in our cause, have an objective, doctrine, a plan and strategy.

What do you?

Do you have a strategy? Let me ask you…Who is leading your effort to defeat us?

Who is your leader that can think like us and create an offensive strategy to be effective?

The West is claiming they are on the winning hand by measuring ground we hold and lost. We say after advancing we need to consolidate, regroup and reconstitute.Yes we need to give up some areas, but we had time on our side to implement Sharia and to enforce it, we even made bold statements with the forces in place.

To retake the cities we can defend with far less people than those who attack us, moreover THEY will destruct their own infrastructure and homes in the effort to regain the ground.By doing so setting conditions favourable for us in the future.

The West is claiming they are on the winning hand by measuring ground we hold and lost. We say after advancing we need to consolidate, regroup and reconstitute.Yes we need to give up some areas, but we had time on our side to implement Sharia and to enforce it, we even made bold statements with the forces in place.

To retake the cities we can defend with far less people than those who attack us, moreover THEY will destruct their own infrastructure and homes in the effort to regain the ground.By doing so setting conditions favourable for us in the future.

Before I close, let me make it very clear again, I was presenting the success story as the Spokesman of ISIS.

To do so is very unusual and normally not done and if we do we call it "Red teaming" approach.

What it does reflect however is the difficulties and challenges many analysts have in analysing the threat we face.

But that's the focus of the next speaker.

Lecture 15:

TERRORISM DATABASES: USAGE, IMPLICATIONS, AND CHALLENGES:

Dr. Omi Hodwitz

START,

US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's Office of University Programs,

US Department of State.

Mrs. Omi Hodwitz from Understanding, Managing, and Resolution of Terrorism Training Course Lahore, Pakistan presented on Usage, Implication and Challenges of Terrorism Data bases. She discussed about that what are Terrorism Databases and how are they available for usage and the challenges they pose.

Some of the prominent data bases include BAAD, JJATT, CPOST- SAD, ASN etc. Data bases can be an open source, private, text or incident based. She further discussed the characteristics of each data base in order to draw a comparison of each one of them and how are they used for attacks.

11,552 incidents have taken place in Pakistan from 1970 till 2013 and use of weapon has also increased with every passing year in the country.

In order to reach to an exact number of attacks, it is imperative to understand the data base and determine which one is best for the research question.

Lecture 16:

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ACADEMIC FIELD:

Dr. Richard Jackson,

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,

University of Otago, New Zealand

Mr. RICHARD JACKSON from The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (The University of Otago) New Zealand presented on Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Assessment of the Academic Field, Research Assessment:

He highlighted the origins of terrorism studies in counter-insurgency studies, state security-academic linkages, consolidation of the academic field after 1970s, the impact of 11 September 2001, and the current state of the field – achievements, gaps and limitations.

He shared that there is a lack of progress on a consensus definition of terrorism. It may be described as a strategy of contention in conflict. He also discussed that how danger and risk should be assessed, what are the types of analysis conducted for this purpose, the lack of literature and robust studies in this area, and current scenario in Pakistan.

Lecture 17:

 IMPORTANCE OF 'SOFT' COUNTER-TERRORISM CHALLENGES—WINNING THE WAR OF NARRATIVES:

Dr. Moeed Yousuf

Director, South Asia Programs,

United States Institute of Peace, Washington

Moeed Yousuf in his research has stressed on the importance of soft counter terrorism and the challenges that come along with it but the most important part out of it all is to win the war of narratives. He has emphasized the importance of relevant conclusion that is drawn from the global research. The conclusion that the global research has drawn is that any state unable to win the narrative war has also failed to pacify 'mass terrorism' successfully. Therefore, losing is not an option, by all means the state must dismantle terrorist organisations and win the terror war. Narratives are the one of the key drivers of youth perceptions because as shown by the studies that focus on online recruitments it is important to have the youth side with the state rather against it. The state's role is crucial in every case study.

Decoding the militant narrative is the first step towards understand the global narrative. The entire matrix of militant narrative is to misinterpret and misrepresent religion and promote extremist ideologies. This is the reason why having youth with the state plays an important role. The anti-American rhetoric is another key factor that has been in full swing by the militant narratives along the distance between the state and the civil society itself.

Now, the message that they bring is pretty hefty. The message that they bring is that Jihad is an obligation; our state is delegitimized and thus we have the right to declare jihad. We are not against the Pakistani state and people but the Pak. Army is a western proxy and thus a legitimate target. Your state can't provide you food, water, electricity, an Islamic system, etc. Khilafat needs to be the touchstone of the system, it should be replaced by capitalism.

The following diagram depicts the response of state against militant views:

Militants	State
• Violence justified through religion	• State shies away from challenging narrative apart from generic statements
• Anti-Americanism	• State reinforces the militants' narrative
• State-society disconnect	• State does not have answers to governance critique • Divided house among political parties benefits militants

Polarization of education also plays a significant role in determining the role of soft counter terrorism. In this affair, perceptions of the youth are the most important thing.

Public sector schools account for 70 percent of the enrolment; the setup is in an advanced state of decline. Public school students are more tolerant but do lend greater support to jihad than the elite school cadres. The reason may be because of lack of ideological support towards the state and having a clear line of definition of what is right and what is wrong. Whereas, elite private schools provide high quality education but are reserved for the rich students of elite schools consider themselves superior and show high level of disdain for the 'other'. Perhaps this is one of the major reasons why students from the public schools show support for the extremist ideologies simply because of finances. Madrassahs produce cadres who are misfits for mainstream society. The reason that they are misfit is because they are being driven into a wrong and a dark corner. They are being told that Islam and death associated with Islam is "only" about life here after. Though true, but Quran never for once has mentioned to forget about the world and only focus on life here after. In doing so taking or moving towards a wrong step is eminent.

Madrassah students exhibit an ultra-conservative outlook; jihad is looked upon favorably. They tend to redeem their worldly affairs with lies told to them.

Youth perceptions are framed with the help of polarizing education. This polarizing is further supported by:

1) High level of support for Sharia
2) Evidence of exclusionary and intolerant belief systems
3) Not all violence is the same
4) Terrorism in Pakistan bad; but jihad elsewhere?
5) Us versus them world view for U.S.
6) Not as much for India
7) Highly despondent about their future and highly distrusting of the 'state'

With this in mind now the million dollar question is "what to do"? As discussed above the game starts with understanding the narrative, so once the narrative has been understood then the next step is to challenge that narrative. Militants have been using media and social media as a support to impart their ideologies, therefore it is vital to stop them as much as possible from using these platforms. In second, comes religion. As we are already aware of the fact that religion is used in the name of terrorism therefore, it is important to take a firm stance against extremist ideologies. It can be dealt with in the following ways:

1) Moderate religious voices most relevant
2) A comprehensive package aimed at media saturation
3) Dedicated air time to these voices
4) Don't challenge; just state the 'truth'
5) Dedicated school tours: Civics in religion
6) Mandate physical interaction among children from the three school systems/and across provinces

The narrative of Us vs Them needs to be changed because we simply can't challenge the militants on this if 80 % of Pakistanis see the U.S. negatively. The issue of misgovernance must

be handled with care with respect to radicalisation. Rather than portraying the negative aspects of the government positive ones needs to be upheld. Pakistan should be focused to ensure that more success stories are made and further more they must believe that there is always room for improvements.

Apart from all that we still need basic information regarding the entire scenario. Lack of profiling data means that we don't know enough which can become a real problem in the later stage because we must know who we are dealing with. Unless we attack the head of the serpent things won't work out. Profiling will tell you role of education/ poverty/narrative, etc. Deep dive studies needed to unpack these dynamics.

Day FOUR

Lecture 18:

ANALYSING THE TERRORIST THREAT -METHODS, TOOLS, STRATEGIES AND FRAMEWORKS:

Dr. Afzal Ashraf, Visiting Fellow,

Centre of Conflict, Security and Terrorism,

Nottingham University, and Consultant Fellow, International Diplomacy,

Royal United Services Institute, (RUSI), UK .

The presenter 'Afzal Ashraf' talks about a very broad topic 'Analyzing the Terrorist Threat - Methods, Tools, Strategies and Frameworks'. The lecture starts with a very complex diagram .

Changing Security & Intelligence Environment
Diseases, Cyber Info warfare, CBRN

This is deliberately a complex slide. The intelligence environment has hugely changed over the last 25 years. Many people consider cyber info welfare, CBRN nuclear issues as a disease. According to this diagram we have pre code war era which called bipolar state era, state centric environment and we are working in pre organization. ISI has really grown up in state environment. The other era is unipolar or multi centric in which there is military and police, Counter terrorism, Counter Narratives, Organization crime and illegal militants. In many cases all of these are linked with the context of counter terrorism. There are two worlds developed and underdeveloped and there is a flow of cultural dominance military intervention from the developed world to the under devolved world. In the above diagram there are customs, defense, border controls, intelligence, policing and security. A state should have a structure to work together otherwise it exposed itself to unnecessary risks. All of these reflect the multiplicity of work and level of interactions in the context of Counter Terrorism.

According to UNESCO (2000) "... the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs".

The main causes of the problems are as follow;

• Analysts lack exposure to the environment. They tend to work in comfortable offices, usually in their home country, and know little about the culture and mood of the environment in which their assessments are based.

• Analysts are often restricted to information from conventional intelligence gathering. They are increasingly using open source internet information but they are not making much use of other on-the-ground sources such as NGOs, Private military contractors, development agencies and International bodies and so on.

• Analysts are working along narrow, functional line (e.g. one analyst covers governance, another studies narcotics trafficking, a third looks at insurgent networks, etc) – This doesn't work.

• Leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts to serve in the Stability Operations Information Centers. These will be among the most challenging and rewarding jobs an analyst could tackle.

The highly complex environment in Afghanistan requires an adaptive way of thinking and operating. However, the United States must constantly change our way of operating and thinking if we are to win.

Al-Qaida and Daesh have been unsuccessful because they have failed to understand the Western culture.

Conventional Threat and Intelligence

- Systems & Culture Optimised for Interstate Threats
- Still not Adapted for New World Order
  - Arab Spring
  - CT/COIN − AQ + ISIS

We would be looking at Country A and B : while dealing with a state centric environment the areas of concentration are doctrine, plans and capabilities with national intelligence.

CT Institutions Context

It shows a complex environment with number of self-structures and number of different groups . In self-structured environment with number of different groups the interstate issues cannot be ignored and they all work together.

In institutional context there is intelligence (civil & military) which work with other organizations like diplomacy, customs, police, Armed force, immigration border, legal & penal system . In that context they got global partners.

CT Information Fusion

Fusion is a very important issue in today's world it needs international cooperation . Interagency fusion is a big cultural issue and agencies are speaking in the context of the west trusting Intelligence structure. There is a need of valuable research and information.

An interesting feature of the current war on Terror is that there is now more intelligence potentially available through prisoners and detainees than in any former counterterrorism operation. However, exploitation of this intelligence is woefully poor. The reasons are various, including structural. Prisoners are often controlled by or in the care of special military or penal units. Security services have at best occasional visiting rights. Prison guards are rarely trained to any sophisticated level of cultural sensitivity or in interrogation needs. We know from the Korean War that different groups of people respond to interrogation in different ways. For example, Korean torture and brainwashing techniques were quite effective with US prisoners. They were significantly less effective with British prisoners and virtually ineffective with Turkish prisoners. An understanding of culture is therefore essential to designing an effective interrogation technique for any particular group.

It seems that we have not given this area enough thought. After all, what is the best way to learn about motivations of a suicide bomber than to interrogate the few failed suicide bombers that we have in our possession? Here the Security services do not so much need to reform themselves but to push reform in other organisations, particularly in those responsible for prisoner handling. Traditionally some of the least well-educated and competent people are allocated to this task. In Iraq a senior American official at a detention centre believed he had foreign fighters in custody

from Spain. Upon investigation, it turned out that these individuals had come from Syria and that the official believed Damascus to be in Spain!

The Issues and Responses

- Analysts lack exposure to environment

- Restricted to information from conventional intelligence

  - Not making much use of other on-the-ground sources

- Working along narrow, functional lines

- Select best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts

- Be open to sources.

  - Develop skills to exploit them

Need to :

- Broaden sources of information

- Information fusion capability

  - Develop trust-based relationships

- Broaden Analytical Skills

- Develop good (Strategic) Assessment Capability

  - To support a broader government response

- Agile operational and tactical support

Lecture 19:

COUNTERTERRORISM. CRITICAL, AND NORWEGIAN:

Sondre Lindahl

National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,

University of Otago, New Zealand.

Sondre Lindahl has voiced the picture of the Norwegian counter-terrorism experience and has also stressed upon some critical approach to counter-terrorism. Before processing any further it is important to be aware of the very basic definition of counter-terrorism. According to Crelinsten (2009) *countering terrorism is intimately related to the understanding the nature of the terrorist phenomenon and how it fits into the wider security environment. How we conceive of terrorism to a great extent how we go about countering it and what resources money, manpower, institutional framework time horizon-we devote to the effort.*

There are four principles on which an ideal type of counter-terrorism is based. Number one, "Dare To Know", this approach assumes that regardless of the cost it can work logically because it *assumes* that it will work. This part of the assumption needs to be reassessed and re-examined. But before that we also should be aware of the very basic definition of terrorism. Terrorism can be defined as the use of unauthorized and violent means to enforce either extreme religious ideologies or it is done solely for political aims. It is vital to consider those assumptions and ideas that have been cast out and bring them into the play. Another assumption on which this principle operates is regarding the utility of violence in counter-terrorism. The ethos of this entire structure is to examine whether these assumptions are correct or not.

It is imperative to understand that in order to reach the end the means should be consistent as well. This means that whatever the changes occur there should be consistency with respect to

change itself. There should not be any uncertainty or an inviolable connection between the means and ends. Because ultimately, the end is dependent upon the means itself. When it comes to action the net result is often said to be an effect of that action but what if an action is done to control an existing effect already? As they say, actions speak louder than words. Therefore, at the end of the day these are some of a few sound positions as to why offensive military actions should be rejected.

Now, let us take a look at the Norwegian Domestic Counter-Terrorism measure. Do note that Norway is among the top 5 happiest and the most peaceful countries on the planet. Pre 9/11 there were no disturbances and therefore, there was no anti or counter terrorism cell or any sort of teams. But that changed as 9/11 (attack on twin tower) happened and the world as we knew began to change on a completely whole new level. Immediately after 9/11 Norwegians mobilized themselves and introduced 4 packages in the preceding years. 2001, 2005, 2008 and 2013 were the important years as they defined the direction of Norwegians with respect to terrorism. It included criminalizing terrorism and its financing, increased and easy surveillance, banning recruitment and criminal offense to train and finally any sort of link with the terrorists or aiding them in anyway would be charged as well. The biggest of all came in 2015 where the Norwegians proposed to ban the participation in any sort of armed conflict.

Anders Behring Breivik a renounced name of a Norwegian terrorist who committed an act of terrorism in Oslo killing 8 people amongst 2009 injured. The second in the series included the massacre of 69 people, mostly youth. The immediate response of the Norwegians was something that one should accept from a nation that is sovereign and is proud of itself. Massive rallies occurred across Norway for blood donations, peace concerts were held, democracy was held as a charter and more openness was induced. Breivik was given the normal trial under the legal system of Norway. Now that we know that an act of Terrorism has been committed on the Norwegian soil and certain response came as a result of that terrorist attack so what could have been the aftermath of all this? Emphasis on stronger and better quality of surveillance and counter radicalization, the Norwegian police was given rights to carry weapons, police and intelligence services were given an increased mandate in order to ensure the safety of the Norwegians.

Let us now take a look at the international response to such terrorist threats and then compare them with the Norwegian response. The international response to counter terrorism lead to an increased peace diplomacy after the end of cold war. In this aspect peace diplomacy was held as mantra. There was a need a strong sense of justification to strengthen the role of UN in peace process and to make UN itself well-functioning.

It is important to distinguish between global and national terrorism. National terrorism should be seen as asymmetrical conflict, or unfinished state-building. Threefold value of asymmetric diplomacy:

1) It can assist in understanding the political rationale of specific groups

2) By allowing groups to take part and experience a political process they can understand that political engagement is the best way to achieve political objectives

3) One should effectively communicate the need for the group to cease its terrorist activities

A strong sense of leadership, dialogue and negotiation might pave the way for terrorist acts that are committed on national scale. There should be support efforts to restructure the state to ensure that all parts of society are included, because this way the counter-terrorism response will be more efficient and effective. The international community has to be willing to negotiate with terrorists, because only by doing this can they have enough credibility to insist that governments in conflicts should engage in negotiation.

The lessons that can be drawn from the Norwegian experience includes:

a) Engagement in peace diplomacy have greatly shaped Norway's Counter-Terrorism.
b) There are a lot of ways to approach counter-terrorism, let alone the US approach.
c) A clear connection is made between the deep politics and terrorism.

From the Norwegian experience we can conclude that the US war on terror has alternates and not just one way to around about it. Conflict resolution and peace diplomacy can be more suitable to prevent terrorism and if not prevent then at least mitigate it to the lowest of levels.

Counterterrorism should start with a «dare to know» approach to knowledge, and respect the means/ends consistency.

Lecture 20:

WAR ON TERROR - PAKISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE AND ROLE OF PAKISTAN ARMY:

Lieutenant General Khalid Rabbani, HI (M) (Retired).

Managing Director, Askri Welfare Trust,

The root of terrorism in Pakistan emerged and rose when Soviet Union landed in Afghanistan. This gave Afghan people an immediate entrance to Pakistan, unfortunately Pakistan's government at that time was not institutionally strong to make sure how many people were entering Pakistan without proper documentation. And when it was all over, many did not return back to their homes. Things went haywire when US landed in Afghanistan once again and this now instead of fighting against US, Pakistan decided to be an ally. This allegiance between Pakistan and Afghanistan radicalized the sentiments of the migrants that were living in Pakistan and the rest up till now is all too well known. As, a result of this biasness the region became a flashpoint paradox between the trio, namely, USA, Pakistan and Taliban. Apart from this extremism and militancy around the globe was on rise as well and thus, emerged as a global threat not only to the victim countries but to those as well who were even remotely related to the trio activities.

Soon terrorism became a daily "activity" in Pakistan and thousands of lives were being lost on monthly basis. Apart, from this United States took matters into her own hands as well by using

Drones to target the militants. Instead of using skills, dialogue and enforcement methods Pakistan relied on foreign factor which soon proved to be a setback. In the later stages Pakistan army geared up and started to do crack down operations on the terrorists residing within the walls of Pakistan. The results are astounding along the weaponry power that the militants had which can be seen as follows:

Weapons and Equipment

Small arms recovered run in hundreds

Ammunition & Rocket Manufacturing Factory

Terrorist had obtained capability to manufacture ammunition and rockets locally

And so on the list of weapons discovered are numerous. An interesting part along this is that not only factories, arms and ammunition was taken into account but terrorist hideouts were also discovered. Deep dug tunnels that were used as a way of transportation from one place to another were also discovered. In all of this political crossfire both soldiers and civilian lives were lost, accounting up to 66,000. Along this, the war on terror had social ramifications as well. In simple terms it means that there were set backs to social development as well. These ramifications can be seen in the following figure:

Reasons for Lack of Development

Absence or lack of infrastructure

Informal nature of economy

Absence of state institutions

Governments content with status quo

Recourse to informal means

No benefits seen investing in FATA

Arms manufacturing & illegal selling
smuggling, narco-trade
Migration to settled areas

But soon as normalization became a norm things started to look well for the areas that were affected by terrorism. Social development came in full swing, schools, houses, hospitals and all the entire social infrastructure was being resumed. Apart from this, the only way to counter terrorism or radicalization is de-radicalization. Pakistan army took great measures to resolve this issue as well which can be seen in the following diagram:

De-radicalization Programme

Progm	Loc	No of Progms	Re-intg	Status
Mishal	Paithom, Swat	12	882	Func
Sabaoon	Malakand	6	190	Func
Heila	Tank	3	138	Func
Nawa-e-Sahar	Bajaur	4	163	Func
Rastoon	Barikot, Swat	5	520	Closed
Feast (Females)	Sparley, Swat	1	110	Closed
Zarghoona	Swat	1	8	Closed
Ghalanai	Mohmand	1	32	Closed

Since 2009, 9 x facilities remained engaged in de-radicalisation efforts. Presently, *4 x facilities are functional*

Total 2043 x individuals re-intgrated through 33x DREPs

Total of 2043 individuals de-radicalized
15 x individuals suspected of return to militancy (0.32%)

With all these happenings the million dollar question is that what is the way forward now? The way forward is to reach down to the root of terrorism and lash it out from there. Government should take extreme measures of military counter measures and become efficient in response while strengthening the police department. Places which are marked as terrorist hideouts should be demolished and the terrorists should either be capture interrogated or sent into oblivion.

Lecture 21:

 COUNTERING ONLINE RADICALISATION:

Lecturer Mr. Craig Dunn, Intelligence Consultant, (i-intelligence)

Canada

Craig Dunn has presented an interesting case on radicalisation. The radicalisation he has targeted is something of utmost importance as it deals with the usage of latest social websites to recruit personals. Some of the most famous and used social media web sites include Twitter, YouTube and Facebook.

Countering online radicalisation needs increased and efficient surveillance by the state. Monitoring day to day internet usage of almost every individual is not a child's play. There are a few course of actions that are available to counter online radicalisation and they are mentioned as follows:

1) Legislation
2) Hacking
3) Surveillance/Site Monitoring
4) Network mapping and analysis
5) HUMINT
6) Developing and delivering alternative or counter-narratives

Using the keyword Wilāyat Khurāsān = خراسان ولايٜ ت many screen shots have been taken in order to confirm the support for the keyword. Screen shots have been taken from YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. Along this, individual profiles have also been shown for support.

There are some serious constraints on Open Source Intelligence (ONIST) with respect to Pakistan and relatively rest of the world where privacy is a major issue. There is no legal framework or any strong laws which can be can protect privacy in Pakistan. Although the constitution of Pakistan does include the clause in article 14(1) and 19 to protect freedom of speech and dignity of individuals. Like Pakistan, European Union (EU) and its constitutional law

strongly advocates protection of individuals and their privacy. Pakistan is a signatory of Universal Declaration on Human Rights, where article 12 strongly dictates that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy. In 2012 EU proposed Data Directive which dictates that Data transfers to a third country can only occur if that country provides 'an adequate level of protection' and appropriate safeguards.

An important question that needs to be asked is that where should OSINT fit in lifecycle? This can be seen clearly in the following diagram:

Preserve or Delete → Plan

Search

Authorize

Collect

Process

Analyse

Use and Distribute

Now, some attempts have been made in order to counter online propaganda and radicalisam. We need to realise that online radicalisation is a tool that is used widely by strong terrorists organisations to recruit people and trick them into believing and dying for a cause that is all but an illusion. In this retrospect Cognitive Biases plays a very potent role. Cognitive Biases basically means tendencies to think in certain ways that can lead to systematic deviations from a

standard of rationality or good judgment, and are often studied in psychology and behavioral economics. This impulse has been depicted in the following diagram:

With this in mind certain attempts have been made in order to counter online radicalisation. One of the many attempts mainly include US trying to straighten out its policies that is widely misunderstood. It should be duly noted that before the US intervention the negative factor remained at 40% but after words the number doubled to 80%. The lessons that can be drawn from this are as follows:

1) Governments are bad messengers
2) Power of in-group bias
3) Problems with emotionally flamed rhetoric
4) Need ways to get around the spiral of silence

Lecture 22:

NEGOTIATION AND TERRORIST CONFLICTS:

Dr. Harmonie Toros,

Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis,

University of Kent, UK

Negotiations with terrorists seems really odd and unfathomable, reason being the complexities of maintaining superiority over the other party. As United States clearly dictates that it does not negotiate with terrorists. The most interesting part in all of it is that should negotiating with terrorist's presents a plausible case or not.

In this retrospect there are two school of thoughts who have presented their views on whether one "should" negotiate with terrorists or if one "can" negotiate with terrorists? According to Fisher and Ury the negotiations with terrorists basically depends on the "Best Alternates to Negotiated Agreement". Consider this like "Game Theory" as in Economics, you keep trying to push for the best possible option. Negotiations with terrorists does not mean that there won't be alternatives to the deal that has already been struck, there is always room for improvisation. Similarly, according to Zartman there is some sort of "duality" that runs both ways, for state and the insurgents. The nature of this duality is based upon Tactical Question, i.e. whether to engage in a negotiation or not and if so then with whom?

Now, there are two important questions that needs to answered, number one why should there be a negotiation and number two why there should "not" be a negotiation. One of the reasons that states are hesitant to negotiate with terrorists is that in doing so they are indirectly sending a message of accepting the capabilities and the threat posed by such terrorist organisations. It can also act counter to the expectations of the state in the sense that what if it inspires more violence because now the insurgents know that the state recognizes them as a potential threat and will listen to their demands. One of the most important scenarios in this terrorist conflict is regarding "negotiating with whom"? As an example, the American serial House of Cards presents the exact

same thing where the terrorists get an edge over the entire lower lobby and therefore are able to get the President of United States on the line. Also, the "uncertainty factor" is in swing as well because in either case you might not know if the designated person actually represents the position or not. So these reservations might lead either the terrorist organization or the state to be hesitant to negotiate unless there is no other way out (which is rarely the case), because ultimately in the end it is all about maintaining or attaining maximum possible edge over the other.

Just like there are several reasons as to why the state should not engage in a dialogue, there are arguments that stress the importance of a dialogue or a negotiation. These reasons include such as transformation of a society in the sense to prepare the nation for any potential threat and act as one. It also includes to strengthen the moderates in order to eradicate and isolate violent fractions. It can also lead to a ceasefire, only in the case if the threat is internal rather than external. Internal threats can be mitigated with the help of counter intelligence, whereas, the external threat remains more or less a vacuum. One of the most important aspect of doing a negotiation is that it can buy the state time, time that can either be used to locate and put an end to the story or it can also be used to regroup and reassess the entire situation.

The case of Northern Ireland has been taken in order to assess and see whether the specifics above mentioned hold true or not. And if they do then what are and similarly vice versa. In order to understand the entire paradigm it is important to understand and assess historical, socio economic and military context.

Now, let us take a look at the actors that play a vital role for the case of Northern Ireland, they are as follows:

1) Unionists
2) Loyalists
3) Nationalists
4) USA
5) Irish Government
6) Republicans
7) British

These are the seven actors that constitute almost the entire ethos of Northern Ireland and how it operates. Let us also take a look at the talk settings in a manner. These talks are constitutional party talks with the exception of the Republicans. It can be seen as follows:

Constitutional party talks (excluding republicans)	Republicans – Nationalists (Hume-Adams)	Irish Gov't – Republicans
British Gov't – Irish Gov't	United States – Irish Gov't	British Gov't- Loyalist
	1994 & 1997 Ceasefires	

The case has embedded the possibilities of success, failures and possibilities with respect to Al-Qaida and ISIS. There is a difference of agendas on how they operate which means that one size fits all policy will not work. It may happen that negotiation can be success or at least reach to a point where there can be a level of satisfaction for the state with ISIS instead of Al-Qaida and

similarly vice versa. All that discussion that has been done in the previous paragraphs becomes limpid in these two cases.

Now, there are both setbacks/drawbacks and strengths. Drawbacks include the marginalization of non-violent actors such as Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland. Legalisation of violence which is used as a mean of voice can prove to be dangerous. The dwindling situation can have some serious implication for both sides. Whereas, one of the biggest and the most successful strength has been the reduction in violence and conflict transformation as a result of negotiation. Had there been no negotiation the success rates would have plummeted. Similarly, as a result of success there have been rise in the cost of non-engagement.

Sum 6

<center>Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremists</center>

Lecture 23:
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISTS:

Dr. Alastair Reed, International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT),

Hague, Netherlands.

Mr. Dr. Alastair Reed from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, (ICCT) presented on "Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist".

He describes that The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism is an independent think and provide multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism.

ICCT's work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights related aspects of counter-terrorism. The major

project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims' voices.

He gave a brief introduction on Rehabilitation and Reintegration and then shared evaluation of Dutch Integration Program.

Some of the points for re-integrating foreign fighters are given below:

- Denmark Aarhus model: focus on disengagement and rehabilitation
- "We're not stigmatizing [returnees] or excluding them. Instead, we tell them that we can help them get an education, get a job, re-enter society"
- Voluntary psychological counseling, help to get employment and education, assigned mentor
- Multi-agency cooperation: Police, intelligence and social services

Sharing about the Dutch Integration Program, he explained that it was a Partnership between the Dutch Counter-terrorism coordinator (NCTV) and Dutch Probation service (RN). The program had three objectives:

- To reduce recidivism through specialized re-socialization and aftercare

- Expand ability to monitor such offenders after release

- To form a prevention-focused addition to the government's counterterrorism toolkit.

5 detainees either convicted for terrorism offences or suspected of involvement were chosen for this. Results are given below:

- 2 left for Syria and have been killed in combat

- 1 is successfully resettled, pursuing higher education and has disavowed his previously held convictions

- 1 has stuck to parole conditions but has had problems readjusting to family life. Shows no signs of deradicalisation – but clams to no longer see the use of violence in the Netherlands as justified.

- 1 appears not to have been an extremist as initially suspected.

- None had yet completed the reintegration process or cognitive interventions intended for deradicalisation.

Day 5

Lecture 24:

Countering Terrorist Financing (CTF) in UK:

 Shoaib Bajwa,

SKB Global Consulting, Pakistan

Mr. Shoaib Bajwa from S K B Global Consulting presented on "Countering Terrorist Financing (CTF) in UK". He discussed about what is TF (Terrorist Financing), How it is currently used, Terrorist Financial Management System and Emerging Methods for TF etc.

  He shared that CTF is the process of limiting terror groups' to raise funds, access to economic resources and its free movement. CTF is also the term used to describe the measures taken by governments, regulatory authorities and financial institutes/banks to prevent terrorists gaining financial support, usually via the passing and application of relevant legislation, guidelines and putting preventive controls in place.

Some of the objectives are given below:

- Lack of funds can have a direct effect on the ability of terrorist organisations and individuals to operate and to mount attacks.

- The attacks in Paris were not only well planned and coordinated, but also well financed. In order to prevent such atrocities happening again terrorists' access to money must be limited.

- Terrorist attacks have historically not required great levels of funding, but money raised in one country could also be used to fund terrorism in other countries.

He also shared the use of terrorist finances and their management system. That is described below:

Financial documents from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the predecessor organization to ISIL, shows that AQI used advanced financial management practices to manage revenue sources and expenses efficiently through a specialized financing function. At the same time, it also provided an infrastructure for revenue sharing between AQI sub-units to maintain efficient and resilient capability across its area of operations in Iraq. Financial records seized by US military forces show that AQI administrative emirs made extensive use of tracking spreadsheets, expense reports, and standardized financial accounting reports. AQI used a levy system on financing wherein local groups and cells transferred acquired revenue to "brigade" and "sector" level administrative emirs, who then passed on the funds to a provincial level administrative emir, who disbursed funds to sector-level general emirs for the financial needs of their sector after all revenue was accounted for.

More recently, public information related to the US military operation against regional ISIL oil and finance head, Abu Sayyaf, reportedly highlights that ISIL has continued AQI's past use of advanced systems of financial management. (Source: Canada from open sources)

He concluded that UK claims to be at the forefront of the war against terror from government and financial services industry perspective, yet its approach to CTF has been criticized recently for failing to maintain the standards necessary to effectively prevent the funding of terror within this UK and internationally. Terrorist groups use a variety of sophisticated and unsophisticated means to finance their activities, and many of these can be addressed through more intelligence sharing and partnership arrangement with banks, other financial institutes and government

agencies. Financial institutes are required to enhance their CTF monitoring systems, governance structure and source adequate human resource to better manage terrorist financing risk. Government and enforcement agencies are required to think out of the box and work on CTF strategies with an entrepreneurial mindset. Expertise to develop sophisticated risk models to identify potential terrorist financing behavior is required globally.

Lecture 25:

RADICALIZATION AND COUNTER/DE-RADICALISATION:

> **Dr. Afzal Ashraf, Visiting Fellow,**
>
> **Centre of Conflict, Security and Terrorism,**
>
> **Nottingham University, and Consultant Fellow,**
>
> **International Diplomacy, Royal United Services Institute, (RUSI), UK**

Dr. Afzal Ashraf has delineated a very important concern with radicalisation and that is counter/de-radicalisation. In order to counter radicalisation one must first understand what radicalisation is. We should be aware of the Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and what leads to these violent actions. There are four set stages by which at the end of the day violent actions and radicalisation can mitigate, these includes:

1) De-radicalisation
2) Disengagement
3) Rehabilitation
4) Reintegration

Even though we do have a theoretical framework to follow but it comes with strings attached. There are certain challenges that we need to face before achieving the desired results. As

mentioned above dealing with radicalisation is not an easy thing to do, reason being it differs in meaning for individuals. The reason it differs in meaning for individuals is because it depends upon social, personal, ideological and material circumstances. It also depends upon both local and international circumstances, and this is why the difference in meaning and understanding. Another important issue that probably revolves around the above mentioned concerns is regarding its understanding, even though a fair amount of research has been done but despite that understanding issues still persists. We need to clearly understand the CVE and take serious actions to mitigate it as soon as possible. We also need to understand the line of difference between violent and radicalisation. The following diagram depicts the entire case:

Theories of change which can act as an alternative are represented in the following diagram:

Theories of Change - An Alternative

Grievances Justice (A'dl)

Need for National Focus

Religious Influence
Family Background
Community Influence
Personality and Trauma

Belief in Success Of Movement

Need for International Focus

Current Prevent Focus

Royal United Services Institute

RUSI www.rusi.org

With these circuits in mind it is equally important to understand the radicalisation trends. Online radicalisation and recruitment is popular in this era therefore, it would be safe to assume that when it comes to pulling the person to the other side of the bridge families, background, social groups and religion all of these do not matter. This means the winder the appeal the better. The most heard rhetoric is about the word "New World Order". This word has been embedded with secret societies that work in America and is often considered as a symbol of Satan that can often be found on a dollar note. And the only way to combat this satanic idea is via "Jihad". After all there is nothing better than creating a state of panic whether through local media or online. These things are classified as "conspiracy theories".

These radical trends have continued to grow and the processes upon which they try to mind wash is simply amazing. The biggest narrative that these terrorists groups has is to simply target or appeal to a person's dark side, appeal to his or her insecurities and in return offer them

something upon which their mind is forced to think to act upon. That "alternate way" is something they could redeem themselves, and so it is told like that. Some of these alternate ways include:

1) Self-Validation; by taking part in noble action to help others
2) Sense of Belonging; to a group for those in search of identity
3) Thrill of Adventure; through armed struggle for young men
4) Sex Appeal; Opportunity to marry 'exciting' young men for dull young women

As mentioned above that there are certain principles upon which the CVE is designed these includes:

1) The objective of CVE is to identify and address behaviours leading to violent extremism
2) A fair amount of research with relevance needs to be done
3) Clear strategic objective with monitoring and evaluation
4) To ensure success
5) To shape future interventions

Now, that we know how to handle the radical conditions it is also important to assess and address the conditions. These violent behaviours can be addressed via education, community policing, strengthening civil society and inter-faith dialogue. All of these course of actions will help bring awareness among the pupil.

Though we have discussed the principles upon which CVE should be based but let us now discuss its aims as well as follows:

1) Persuading people to reject radical ideas, mainly it can be done via educational awareness
2) Getting people to move off radical paths, trying to stop radicals from using excessive media platforms.
3) People making a fundamental cognitive shift, challenging cognitive bias and replacing it with optimism.
4) Rejecting violence as a methodology
5) Disengaging from radical group activity

6) Re-engaging positively with society, the relationship between the state and the civil society.

Now, let us discuss some of the counter terrorism strategies with respect to European Union (EU). EU takes four fundamental strategies to target and combat radicalisation. Respond and prepare for and minimize the consequences of a successful attack. Protect citizens and infrastructure, and reduce vulnerability to attack. Pursue terrorists and bring them to justice, and build local capacity to undertake this. Prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment.

We have talked in order to counter radicalisation, de-radicalisation is needed, so, how do we bring it? The first step is to identify the cause, the cause by which a person became radicalized. If you know the cause then you are in a position to evaluate the damage and can also determine whether the process is irreversible or not. And lastly, the role of the government plays a very potent role because it will help to counter illicit activities by the terrorists. Countries like Iraq, Singapore and Saudi Arabia have taken some extra steps in order to counter radicalisation. These steps include education, vocational training, religious dialogue, reintegration into the society and involving family members to participate in order to uphold the cultural norms of a certain society.

One of the most factor on which radicalisation spurs is religion. Therefore, the most important initiative to reform and counter radicalisation is to engage with religion and introduce religious reforms. It should be kept in mind that religion constructivism is more tilted towards conducive behaviour rather than ideological one. Works best in programs run by non-Muslim or secular countries, for example Singapore and USA.

Lecture 26:

TERRORISM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

Dr. Harmonie Toros,

Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis,

University of Kent, UK

The study on terrorism and conflict resolution begins with the basic ethos of weakening and the end of terrorism. The end of terrorism has been portrayed as a two Way Street i.e. the very logic of the word "End" has been given two different directions or aspects.

According to one school of thought (Crenshaw) the demise of terrorism can have three stages as follows:

1) *Organisational Disintegration*: In this light terrorists or terrorist's campaigns can be forced to lose their coherence with the passage of time. As soon the coherence is lost then comes the next step of the end of terrorism and that is disintegration. By disintegration it can mean either separation or total loss of mobility and the loss of active mobility of terrorists and their nefarious plans.

2) *Physical Defeat by The State*: Perhaps the most ruthless and the most imitative form of policy that is adopted by strong states or organisations such as United States and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) is "Action on Ground". This action on ground includes the movement of military assets and intelligence to defeat terrorism and if not defeat then at least to maximize damages.

3) *Group Abandons Terrorist Violence*: This seems to be an interesting way of ending the power of terrorists but despite being interesting this sort of play is very hard to play. Reason being that terrorists are ready to die for the cause they believe in, this means that there must be a strong sense of ideology or an idea behind this radical impulse. As it is

widely accepted that you can kill a person but not an idea, and this why groups abandoning terrorists violence is a hard play.

The second school of thought (Gurr/Ross) have laid down two more prospective by which terrorism can be ended, they are as follows:

1) *Pre-emption and Deterrence*: The idea is more or less related to the direct physical action by the state with the exception that the state can either opt for a preemptive war or the course of deterrence. By preemptive war/strike it means to engage in the act of war in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived threat. While deterrence can come in handy by maintaining enormous amount of military power and pressure, and due to this pressure the terrorists refrain from taking a step forward.

2) *Burnout or Backlash:* Terrorists groups or organisations cannot gain momentum or gain support on their own, they need some political support as well. So, the idea is to the attack that political support that acts as a backbone both financially and general support.

Having a brief idea about how can terrorism be ended, it is imperative to ask one very important question and that question is, is terrorism a tactic used in a conflict or are conflicts the background to terrorism? Mindanao encompasses the large island of Mindanao plus smaller islands in the southern Philippines.

By looking at the dimensions of Mindanao it can be seen that this part of the state was a victim of several ongoing conflicts, which are as follows:

a) Basic human rights denial, if so then was it an identity crisis?
b) Conflict based on religion between Muslims and Catholics
c) Due to lack of resources and the conflict caused by this issue?
d) Acts of local terrorism against the government?
e) The ongoing happens were all part of War on Terror?

This brings us to the fine line between Terrorism and Conflict. Terrorism is committed in the name of an ideology or an idea, and the top of the charts is "Islamic Terrorism". The wave of Islamic terrorism has been outstanding since long and has become an important issue to solve as it possess threat to the sovereign states, namely USA the most. In the heat of 9/11 attack on Twin

Tower United States was under complete threat which galvanized the entire world. The strength of Al-Qaida was remarkable as they were able to penetrate the most powerful nation on earth. United States fought hard to protect its freedom and democracy and those who empathized with USA became its allies against this transgression. Contrary to terrorism conflict is sort of cultural and can be classified as "Disagreement" to amend an existing law or something that is more of a tradition. Also, it should be noted that a conflict majority of the times is within the state and its actors. Mostly, it is a conflict based upon identity.

The final stage is to determine that what does terrorism and conflict lead to. Terrorism results directly in the form of counter-terrorism, i.e. to act against or opposite to the agendas of Terrorists. Counter-Terrorism can be done via Military, Law, Police and Counter-radicalization. The purpose of counter-terrorism is to stop or reduce any form of terrorism against the "State".

On contrary, a conflict can be solved via resolutions and peace talks. The essence of a conflict reduction is to reduce any sort of damages caused by either neighbouring states or parties within the state.

Day 5 – 23 January 2015
Group presentations

The aim of this exercise was to help the course participants apply theoretical knowledge to practical situations. Each group presented counter-terrorism strategies for about 20 minutes for the national government targeting the previously chosen terrorist group. In a nearly two hours long session, exhaustive discussions were held including the critique by course director and cross questions from the audience.

CONCLUSION:

The course concluded with six presentations by the six working groups of the participants, each attempting to analyze the phenomenon of terrorism and responses to it from a different perspective in the light of learning from the course. The Director of the Course, Prof. Muhammad Feyyaz gave a brief summary view of the course, its objectives, and how far the course was able to achieve them. Two prominent speakers, Dr. Afzal Ashraf from UK, and Dr. Richard Jackson from New Zealand expressed their impressions of the course and commended the UMT initiative. In the end, the Rector, University of Management and Technology, Dr. Hasan Sohaib Murad, individually distributed the certificates among all the course participants. The course concluded with a closing address by the Rector which highlighted the global intricacies of terrorism and the need to look at it through an objective, unbiased and transparent lens.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS:

1. "Understanding Terrorism…" courses are a signature initiative of the UMT School of Governance and Society, which holds this event in collaboration with the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI). The School plans to hold this course every year on a regular basis. The course has seen expansion in terms of the themes, the number of scholars as well as the number and variety of participants within the first two years. For the next year, 2017, the scale of the course is envisaged to be even larger than for 2015 and 2016.

2. To complement this effort, and building on the expertise acquired from these courses, the UMT School of Governance and Society is planning to launch of a new fully fledged program, namely, Terrorism Studies, approved by the UMT Academic Council (AC) in its 18th meeting in March 2015. This program can be launched in Fall 2016, provided sufficient funding as well as a secure premises is available, preferably in the Lahore Cantonment, along with provision of suitably qualified faculty.