

Hofstede's Cultural Model, LMX and Pakistani Historic-socio-political Discourse: An Analytical Critique

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Abstract

This paper grounds its analytical historical discourse of Pakistani culture, society and leadership (political, social and economic) in Hofstede's model of national and organizational culture. It borrows from LMX theory of leadership which entails both transactional and transformational elements and applies it in the context of Pakistani leadership style. Since the founding ideology of Pakistan is the religion of Islam, the paper also undertakes a detailed account of Divine Commands based socio-economic Islamic precepts. It also presents some empirical evidence reflecting the present Pakistani cultural and societal values embedding both the culture and leadership style of the country. The paper challenges Hofstede's labeling of Pakistani culture as collectivistic and calls for future research on the 'Dark Side' of LMX practices prevalent in Pakistani discourse.

Keywords: Hofstede's Cultural Model, Discourse, Islamic Socio-Economic System, LMX

"Your worst leaders are those whom you hate and who hate you; whom you curse and who curse you...not as long as they establish Prayer among you..."
(Tradition of Prophet Muhammad SAW)

Introduction

Pakistan is considered an ideological state because it was formed on the basis of Islam which is the Muslim religion. It is, perhaps, because of lack of actual practice of the ideology that many Pakistanis themselves associate their identity and heritage with diverse and diverging sources. Some think they are the lineage of Indus Valley or Arab or Hindu Civilization whereas others grapple with their identity as being geographically defined in terms of South Asian, Central Asian or a part of the Middle East. Pakistan has about 180 million inhabitants (sixth largest population in the world) and is a nuclear state since 1998. The structure of Pakistani society shows a clear cleavage: its Western part is culturally inclined towards the Iranian and Afghan worlds whereas its Eastern half is sharply divided along the lines of caste, an imprint of being part of largely Hindu India for more than 10 centuries.¹

International economic, political and social writers dub Pakistan as "an intriguing paradox" exhibiting intensive involvement of donors and with scores of highly educated and achieving elite but underperforming on most social, political, health and education indicators.²

The local media has been beating the drum of corruption and injustice in all walks of Pakistani life for years. Some of them note with concern that the history of Pakistan is

¹ C. Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and its Origin* (ed.) (London: Anthem Press Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2004), 1-6.

² W. Easterly, "The Political Economy of Growth without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan", *Paper for the Analytic Narratives of Growth Project* (Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1999).

“(being) riddled with examples of corrupt politicians being rehabilitated. Ayub Khan disqualified politicians who were later placed in ministerial offices. Ghulam Ishaq Khan declared Asif Ali Zardari as the most corrupt man in one of his speeches and a few years later swore him in as a minister. Nawaz Sharif was charged with cases of loan defaults and tax evasion but later returned to power. Did we witness any political party challenge the election of Asif Ali Zardari as the president when everyone knew his past record? More recent,...in the political battlefield involving the next generation of politicians – as witnessed in the Ephedrine case against Ali Musa Gilani...(only saw him) won the NA-151 Multan by-elections.....It is time we accept that corruption and nepotism are now accepted as a part of (even the religious and) middle-class morality in Pakistan and are deeply entrenched at all levels of society and class hierarchy”.³

These observations lead to a natural question: why Pakistan has not been able to achieve political, economic and social justice in the society despite being richly endowed with natural and human resources? Is it a combination of its unique history, founding ideology and geography which explain its overall underperformance? Or is it because of the failure of leadership at all fronts? This paper is an attempt to explore these issues. This study is grounded in the well researched constructs of culture and leadership style which are utilized to assess the underpinning societal values of Pakistani culture and the leadership styles in the political, economic and social domains.

This paper is divided in six sections. The first section briefly surveys the literature available on Hofstede’s cultural model and leadership styles. Section two develops the main theory and proposition underpinning this paper. This theoretical development is carried out in the light of the cultural model and leadership style discussion undertaken in the first section. Section three briefly outlines the historic-socio-political discourse of Pakistan over the span of about a thousand years while section four expounds the economic and social model proposed by Islam through Quranic injunctions. This section is of special importance considering that Islam was the founding ideology of Pakistan. Section five summarizes the current state of political, economic and social status of Pakistan through the latest empirical evidence. The sixth and final section discusses the research methodology, analytical findings, limitations and some main future research implications of this research.

Section 1: Brief Literature Survey of Hofstede’s Cultural Model and Major Leadership Styles

It is true that human beings are extremely diverse and unique in all respects. Social scientists have however, attempted to predict an individual’s behavior taking into account the individual situation. Hofstede (1980), for example, assumes that we carry a certain stable and somewhat predictable mental programming which causes us to behave similarly in similar situations. These programs are not only both inherited and transferred through genes but also acquired over the lifetime of an individual. It is not possible to peep directly into the mental programs of others but one can infer them through the behaviors exhibited by individuals.⁴

Hofstede distinguishes three levels of human uniqueness in mental maps. According to him, the inherited or biologically operating systems of our mental maps are least unique

³ <http://tribune.com.pk>

⁴ T. Levitin, “Values”. In J.P. Robinson and P.R. Shaver (Eds.), *Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes* (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1973), 492.

or the most universal. The second level is the collective level of uniqueness which is shared among people belonging to a specific group. This level stems from the culture of a community, region or country. It is at this level that most of our mental programs are learned or acquired.⁵ The third level of mental programming, probably the product of interaction between the other two levels, is truly unique to each human being and manifests as his/her individual personality.⁶

Anthropologists define culture as a shared mental program that “consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols.....the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values”.⁷ Culture is therefore, collective mental programming through which we share our collective conditioning with members of our own community, region or nationality. Nation states are political units with their own and distinct history, institutions, governmental forms, legal systems, educational systems and relations between employers and laborers.⁸ It can be inferred from these statements that both culture and national identities are underpinned by shared and acquired mental programs or collective value systems.

If cultures represent collective individualities and given that individuals are liable to change and transitions in their life spans, the question arises why cultures remain relatively stable over long periods of time? Berry⁹ and Parsons¹⁰ attribute cultural stability to the interplay of ecological factors (geography, economy, demography, genetics, history, technology) and societal norms or value system of the majority leading to shaping, structuring and defining function of institutions like family patterns, education, religion, political structure, legislation and architecture. Since geography, genetics and history are by nature stable and societal value systems are also generally stable unless external influences like change in climate, trade conditions, wars and colonization (Hofstede, 1980: 1983) occur, cultures tend to remain stable over time.

⁵ E. Durkheim, *Les Regles de la Methode Sociologique* (1937 ed.) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1895), 107.

⁶ G. Hofstede, “Culture and Organizations”, *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?” *Organizational Dynamics AMACON*.

⁷ C. Kluckhohn, “The Study of Culture”, in D. Lerner and H.D. Lasswell (Eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1951), 86.

⁸ G. Hofstede, “Culture and Organizations”, *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?” *Organizational Dynamics AMACON*; G. Hofstede, “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories”, *Journal of International Business Studies*, vol. 14, (1983): 75-89; G. Hofstede, “National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences Among Nations”, *International Studies of Management and Organizations*, vol.13, no. 1-2 (1983): 46-74.

⁹ J.W. Berry, “An Ecological Approach to Cross-Cultural Psychology.” *Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie*, vol. 30, (1975): 51-84.

¹⁰ T. Parsons, *The Evolution of Societies*, ed. J. Toby (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 10.

Figure 1 summarizes this discussion.




Figure 1

Source: Culture and Organization by Geert Hofstede, *International Studies of Management & Organization*, Vol. 10, no.4, (1981):15-41.

Hofstede pioneered the empirical studies of national cultures. His research spanned over 10 years (1967 – 1978) across 50 countries and involved data collection from 116,000 respondents. Four dimensions of culture emerged from this seminal initial study: individualism/collectivism, large or small power distance, strong or weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity (Hofstede, 1983: 1980). These four dimensions explain more than 50% of variance in the countries' mean scores.¹¹ His research proposed a framework for assessing national cultures in relation to organizational culture which he termed as the cultural dimensions theory.¹²

Cultures with large *power distance* legitimize high and low inequality and are characterized by a few inaccessible people at the top who are independent while the majority is totally dependent on them. The minority at the top considers the majority below as different kind of people. Power is the basic fabric around which societal norms are woven. People at the top are entitled to all privileges. The powerless majority is disunited but seeks all opportunities of replacing the powerful. An ordinary citizen is however powerless as compared with those in authority. Strong *uncertainty avoidance* means uncertainty of life is perceived as perpetual threat. High anxiety and stress are experienced across the culture where materialist attitude prevails. Tolerance towards the unconventional is generally low and need for consensus and amalgamation towards mainstream dominant thought discourse is strongly felt. As a result, the spirit of nationalism is very strong and search for absolute truths overarches societal norms. Low

¹¹ G. Hofstede, "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices and Theories", *Journal of International Business Studies*, vol. 14, (1983): 75-89; G. Hofstede, "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences Among Nations", *International Studies of Management and Organizations*, vol. 13, no. 1-2 (1983): 46-74.

¹² www.wikipedia.org.

individualism or high *collectivism* entails traditional extended family system with emotional dependence on organizations, institutions and clans which provide order and security in the society. Group decisions are respected and friendships reflect stable social relationships. In cultures scoring high on *masculinity*, men are assertive and in position of authority in all matters while women are nurturing and have little say in decision making of any kind. Gender roles are clearly differentiated and materialism prevails in the society. People are generally ambitious, hard working, achievement and ‘macho’ oriented.¹³ Hofstede’s survey places Pakistani culture along four dimensions in the following manner:

Individualism Index	Very Low (Rank 6-7)*
Power Distance Index	High** (Rank 22)
Uncertainty Index	Medium (26-27)
Masculinity Index	Medium (Rank 26-27)

Figure 2

Source: “The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices” by Geert Hofstede, *Journal of International Business Studies*, Vol. 14 (1983):75-89, & “National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences among Nations” by Geert Hofstede, *International Studies of Management & Organization*, Vol. 13, (1/2), (1983): 52.

*Ranks are allocated to all 50 countries involved in the study. 1 would denote the lowest while 50 the highest rank. ** Power Distance Index in spite of being ranked at 22 is considered high in case of Pakistan because of the graphical representations shown in the below mentioned Hofstede’s articles (author’s note).

Based on Hofstede’s findings, Pakistani culture would be captured by the following summary:

Connotations of Individualism – Collectivism Dimensions in Case of Pakistan

1. Extended family system
2. Presence of “we” consciousness
3. Identity based on collective social systems
4. Individual emotional dependence is institutional
5. Private life is pervaded by institutions, organizations and clans
6. Expertise, security, order and duty provided by clans
7. Belief in group decisions
8. Friendship flows from predetermined social relationships
9. Value standards different for social group members and non-members

¹³ G. Hofstede, “Culture and Organizations”, *International Studies of Management and Organization*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1980): 15-41; G. Hofstede, *Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (London; Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1980); G. Hofstede, “Motivation, Leadership and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?” *Organizational Dynamics* AMACON.

Connotations of the Power Distance Dimension in Case of Pakistan

1. Inequality in society is a norm
2. A few are independent and majority are dependent
3. Superiors and subordinates live in worlds of their own
4. Power legitimacy is irrelevant but is a basic fact of society
5. Stress on coercive and referent power
6. The underdog is to be blamed
7. Absence of trust in society
8. Latent conflict between the powerful and the powerless

Connotations of Uncertainty Avoidance Dimension in Case of Pakistan

1. Medium levels of anxiety and stress
2. Time is neither free nor money
3. Hard work is neither a virtue nor an urge
4. Sometimes aggressive behavior is tolerated and sometimes it is not
5. Conflict and competition is neither constructive nor to be avoided
6. No norms regarding dissent or consensus
7. Deviant behavior tolerated selectively
8. No age group is preferred
9. No generalized attitude towards risk taking, liberalism, conservatism, relativism, empiricism, search for absolute truth, law and order, and governance

Connotations of the Masculinity - Femininity Dimension in Case of Pakistan

1. Neither people nor money orientation
2. No clear preference for quality of life and environment or growth
3. No clear preference for service/achievement, intuition/rationality, sympathy for the unfortunate or achievers, leveling and excellence, steadiness and speed, and assertive and nurturing role demarcation between genders

Leadership Styles

The study of leadership has progressed from a simple description of leaders' traits to examining complexities of interaction between leaders and followers.¹⁴ Trait, behavioral or style, visionary or charismatic, contingency, emotional intelligence and competency schools of thought formulate the six main themes of leadership theories over the past seven decades or so.¹⁵ Leadership style approach has gained popularity since the 1940s. One branch of leadership research which has grown out of the style school is the framework of transactional/transformational leadership.¹⁶ Transactional leaders are primarily *task-focused*, having the ability to motivate people through contingent-reward

¹⁴ D. L. Athanasaw, "Leadership Styles as perceived by Career Senior Executives", *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 26. No. 10 & 11, (2003): 1207-1236.

¹⁵ V. Dulewicz & Higgs, "Design of a New Instrument to Assess Leadership Dimensions and Styles", *Henley Working Paper Series*, HWP 0311, (UK: Henley Management College, 2003); C.B. Handy, *Understanding Organizations* (London: Penguin Books, 1982); D.A. Partington, *Managing and Leading in J.R. Turner* (ed.), (people in Project Management. UK: Gower, 2003).

¹⁶ D. Vera and M. Crossan, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Learning", *Academy of Management Review*, vol. 40, (2004): 222-240.

exchanges.¹⁷ Transformational leaders on the other hand are *people-focused*,¹⁸ and are charismatic, inspirational, intellectually stimulating, and individually considerate.¹⁹ Transformational leaders are also termed empowering leaders because of their abilities such as leading by example, participative decision making, coaching, informing and showing concern for team members.²⁰

Leader-Member-Exchange (LMX) theory²¹ has been evolving for more than four decades.²² It has progressed from simple Vertical Dyad Linkage to involve more ‘mature leadership relationships’.²³ It is conceptually quite similar to Hersey and Blanchard’s situational leadership theory (SLT) which defines four leadership styles on two dimensions of task and people orientation: ‘telling’, ‘selling’, ‘and participating’ and ‘delegating’. The leadership style is aligned with the followers’ ‘maturity level’ depending whether they are unable (skills wise)/unwilling (low on motivation), unable/willing, able/unwilling or able/willing. The most suitable leadership style for followers low on maturity (unable/unwilling) is ‘Telling’ or directing.²⁴

LMX theory is embedded in three levels: leader, follower, and relationship. This view is in contrast to the traditional view of examining the three levels/facets differently. A question like ‘what is leadership’ would not only spell out the behavioral aspects of the leader but also his/her qualities which influence relationship between parties and also

¹⁷ J. Howell & Hall-Merenda, “The Ties that Bind: The Impact of Leader-member-exchange, Transformational and Transactional Leadership, and Distance on Predicting Follower Performance”, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, vol. 84 (1999): 680-694; D.I. Jung and B.J. Avolio, “Effects of Leadership Style and Followers: Cultural Orientation on Performance in Groups and Individual Task Conditions”, *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1999): 208-218.

¹⁸ R. Turner & R. Muller, R. “The Project Manager’s Leadership Style as a Success a Factor on Projects: literature review”, *Project Management Journal*, Vol. 36, no.1, (2005): 49-61.

¹⁹ Avolio, B.J., B.M. Bass, & D.I. Jung, “Re-examining the Components of Transformational and Transactional Leadership Using the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire”, *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 72, (1999): 441-462; S.A. Carless, “Assessing the Discriminant Validity of Transformational Leader Behavior as Measured by the MLQ”, *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 71, (1998): 353-358; D.N. Hartog, J.J. Muijen, & P.L. Koopman, “Transactional versus Transformational Leadership: An analysis of the MLQ”, *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 70, (1997): 19-34; N. Tichy, & M. DeVanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York: Wiley, 1990).

²⁰ A. Srivastava, K. M. Bartol, & E. A. Locke, “Empowering Leadership in Management Teams: Effects on Knowledge Sharing, Efficacy, and Performance”, *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 49, no. 6, (2006): 1239-1251.

²¹ G. B. Graen, & J. Cashman, “A Role-making Model of Leadership in Formal Organizations: A Developmental Approach, In J.G. Hunt & L.L. Larson (Eds.), *Leadership Frontiers*. (Kent, OH: Kent-State University Press, 1975), 143-166.

²² G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, “Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective”, *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

²³ G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, “The Transformation of Professionals into Self-managing and Partially self-Designing Contributions: Towards a Theory of Leader-making”, *Journal of Management Systems*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (1991): 49-54.

²⁴ P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources*, 1st edition, (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1969); P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *So You Want to Know Your Leadership Style?* (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1974); P. Hersey, & K. Blanchard, *Management of Organizational Behavior*, 6th edition, (NJ: Englewood Cliffs, Princeton-Hall, 1993).

his/her ability to influence the followers.²⁵ In other words, the crux of LMX theory is that effective leaders are able to develop mature leadership relationship with their followers.²⁶ These mature relationships develop over a period of time and demand practice of both transactional and transformational leadership traits and qualities. LMX 'begins as transactional social exchange and evolves into transformational social exchange'.²⁷ LMX theory is grounded in social exchange theory²⁸ and the 'mature relationships' mentioned above develop within a social milieu²⁹ and 'enhance subordinates' well-being and work performance'³⁰ by inducing sense of loyalty, thankfulness and inclusiveness in the members. This is where LMX is different from SLT which attempts mechanistically to fit leadership style with followers' maturity level without promising much about their development and enhancement. What posits LMX theory above other leadership theories is the observation that quality of relationships between leaders and members predict outcomes not only at individual but also at group and organizational levels.³¹

Because this paper has grounded the notion of culture in Hofstede's work it would be useful to see how Sadler & Hofstede³² relate leadership style with nationality and culture. In a study spanning 7 countries and surveying over 6000 employees, they found out the average leadership style among Japanese managers as 'sells', Australia, Germany and UK as 'consults', and Brazil and France as 'joins'. All the countries mentioned so far had very low scores on 'tells' style managers who make their own decisions independently without involving subordinates. The 'sell' style leaders make decisions independently but rather than just telling they persuade their subordinates to accept the decisions. The 'consults' style managers do not make decisions unless the problem is presented first to the group which is consulted while making decisions. Similarly the 'joins' style leaders delegate decision making to the group. The leader considers his or herself part of the group and generally these decisions reflect group consensus based on majority's opinion.

²⁵ B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

²⁶ G. B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "The Transformation of Professionals into Self-managing and Partially Self-Designing Contributions: Towards a Theory of Leader-making", *Journal of Management Systems*, Vol. 3, no. 3, (1991): 49-54

²⁷ R. M. Dienesch, & R. C. Liden, "Leader-member-exchange Model of Leadership: A Critique and Further Development", *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 11, (1986): 618-634; B. Graen, & M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-based Approach to Leadership: Development of leader-member Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level Multi-domain Perspective", *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, no. 2, (1995): 219-247.

²⁸ I. Portoghese, N. Galletta, & A. Battistelli, "The Effects of Work-family Conflict and Community Embeddedness on Employee Satisfaction: The Role of Leader-member Exchange", *International Journal of Business and Management*, Vol. 6, no. 4, (2011): 39-48.

²⁹ S. J. Wayne, L. M. Shore, & R. C. Liden, R.C. "Perceived Organizational Support and Leader-member-exchange: A Social Exchange Perspective", *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 40, (1997): 82-112.

³⁰ M. A. Hogg, R. Martin, O. Epitropaki, A. Mankad, A. Svensson, & K. Weeden, "Effective Leadership in Salient Groups: Revisiting leader-member-exchange Theory from the Perspective of the Social Identity Theory of Leadership", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, (2005). <http://psp.sagepub.com>

³¹ C. R. Gerstner, D. V. Day, "Meta-analytic Review of Leader-member-exchange Theory: Correlates and Construct Issues", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 82, no. 6, (1997): 827-844.

³² P. J. Sadler, & G. H. Hofstede, "Leadership styles: Perceptions of Employees of an International Company in Different Countries", *Mens en Onderneming*, Vol. 26, (1976): 43-63.

The above mentioned countries rank on the four cultural dimensions in the following manner:

Country/Leadership Style	Power Distance Rank	Uncertainty Avoidance Rank	Individualism Rank	Masculinity Rank
Japan (Sells)	21	44	29	44
Australia (Consults)	13	17	49	35
Germany (Consults)	11	23	36	42
UK (Consults)	11	6	48	42
Brazil (Joins)	39	30	25	25
France (Joins)	38	38	41	18

Figure 3

Source: "National Cultures in Four Dimensions: A Research-Based Theory of Cultural Differences among Nations" by Geert Hofstede, *International Studies of Management & Organization*, Vol. 13, (1/2), (1983): 52.

Section 2: Theory and Proposition Development

Based on the above discussion and Figure 1, 2 and 3, we will first of all explore Pakistani culture's ecological (mainly historical) factors, external influences and societal norms manifested as various indices compiled by global agencies. The Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership will emerge from this first step. It is assumed to be underpinned by Hofstede's four cultural dimensions which place Pakistani culture as highly collectivist, power distance oriented and moderate on the two other parameters.

Sadler & Hofstede's model of leadership is theorized to be linked with LMX theory. All the three styles - 'sells', 'consults' and 'joins' - entail mature relationships with subordinates where leaders are concerned with their well being, and social and psychological enhancement by inducing loyalty and inclusiveness in them. The three leadership styles therefore, also entail both transactional and transformational leadership styles. According to LMX theory, the relations between leaders and subordinates start as social transactions and later mature to an inspirational and transformational type of relationship. The 'tell' style of leadership however, does not entail any element of LMX theory and is conceptually quite similar to the 'telling' or 'directing' situational leadership which suits low on maturity or unable/unwilling followers according to Hersey and Blanchard's theory.

Figure 3 also reveals that 'consult' and 'join' styles are high on power distance index and individualism. All three styles are high on masculinity and on uncertainty avoidance (except 'consult' style). Pakistani culture is only unequivocally clear about individualism where it is very low. As for the other three dimensions, it does not show clear inclination to any extreme.

On the basis of the above theoretical relations, this study formulates the following proposition:

Proposition

Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership styles would be 'tell' ('Telling'/'Directing') in nature with little regard to developing mature transactional and transformational relations with the subordinates. Subordinates are assumed to be low in maturity in terms of being unable (low in skills) and unwilling (low in motivation).

Section 3: Pakistani Historic-Socio-Political Discourse

The Arabs and Indians have a long history of mutual contacts which dates back to the pre-Islamic period.³³ After Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sind in 711 AD, the political and business interaction between the two grew further. Qasim's brief rule of Sind was fair and just. Hindus were provided concessions which were reserved only for the People of the Book. They were exempted from military service and payment of *Zakah*. The civil administration was kept under the Hindus and their local system of justice through '*panchayat*' was also preserved. Qasim however, did commit certain excesses which the Muslim historians tolerate by granting benefit of doubt to him because of his young age. Hinduism did not allow sea excursions whereas Muslims, who were expert in voyages, helped build local trade and business. As a consequence, they were able to gain the support of Hindu Rajas of Malabar and Gujarat.³⁴

After Qasim, the Rajputs ruled Northern India till 980 when Subuktageen of Ghazni defeated Raja Jai Pal and his son Mahmood Ghazni established his rule in Lahore.³⁵ Mahmood³⁶ employed many Hindu officers and soldiers in his army. One of the most respectable Muslim scholars of this period was Alberuni who was quick to identify the cultural gulf between Hindus and Muslims.³⁷ The first autonomous Muslim ruler of India was Qutb-u-Din who was throned in 1206. Later rulers like Ghias-u-Din Balban and Ala-u-Din Khilji did take up some public projects like building of roads and provision of edibles to the common laity, but overall their rule is accused of being ferocious, merciless, prone to indulgence in luxuries³⁸, temple destruction, and robbing India of its wealth.³⁹ Two products of the early Islamic rulers of India had far reaching consequences

³³ Tara Chand, (trans. Muhammad Masood Ahmed) *Tamuden-i-Hind pur Islami Asraat (The Impact of Islam upon Indian Civilization)*, (Lahore: Majlis-i-Taruki-i-Adab, 2002), 138.

³⁴ S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabii aur Ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent: Mughal Era), (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1992), 20-21, 25-26, 47.

³⁵ M. Q. Farishta, (trans. Abdul Haye Khawja) *Tareekh-e-Farishta, Vol. I*, Sheikh Ghulam Ali & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. Publishers, n.d.,) 90-93.

³⁶ Mahmood used to invade India every winter, filled his treasure chest with spoils, and amused his men with full freedom to kill and returned each spring back to his capital richer than before. When he attacked the Indian city of Somnath, he is said to have killed all 50,000 of its inhabitants. In 1186, Ghauri invaded India and captured the city of Delhi, destroyed its temples, confiscated the wealth and established his Sultanate (Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage* (New York: Simon Suchester, 1935), 460-461).

³⁷ Sultan Mahmood Khilji was particularly fond of women. He assigned official designations to the women kept in his harem. So dear was the harem to the king that when one day he saw a mouse in the harem, he fixed a hefty amount of eatables (about 80 kg) to be placed daily near the place where the mouse was sighted [Farishta, Vol IV, (1991), 327].

³⁸ E. C. Sachau, (ed.) *Alberuni's India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws & Astrology of India About A.D. 1030* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2007), 52-59.

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³⁹ Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage*, (New York: Simon and Suchester, 1935), 460-461; M. Q. Farishta, (trans. Abdul Haye Khawja) *Tareekh-e-Farishta, Vol. IV*, (Lahore: Book Talk, 1991), 281-282, 316, 326-328, 332.

in shaping the history of the Sub-Continent. These were a new lingua franca in the form of Urdu, Sufism and mysticism, which spread quickly across the country.⁴⁰

The Mughal rule of India followed the Sultanate in the 16th century and lasted till the middle of the 19th century. Apart from constructing some grand mosques and a few architectural master pieces, large portion of their time (with the rare exception of Aurangzeb) was spent on court intrigues and luxuries.⁴¹ The colonial writers' representation of Mughal rule as an Islamic state where the ruling Muslims suppressed the Hindu majority is however misplaced.⁴² Mughal rule was despotic for both Muslims and Hindus alike. Hindu elites like the Rajput chiefs were inducted in large numbers in Mughal courts while the Muslim peasantry of Sind and Multan, and the Meos of Delhi were mercilessly killed by the imperial army.⁴³ Due to the secular mindset of the Mughals, especially that of Akbar,⁴⁴ a number of Hindu cultural and social traditions entered the Islamic discourse of the Sub-Continent. Cultural development at the expense of Islamic values and traditions ultimately weakened the military might and governance capabilities of the Mughals and from the early 18th century onwards, their grip on India loosened consistently.⁴⁵ By 1857 when the Muslims revolted against the British, the Mughal Empire was literally limited to the city of Delhi and its immediate suburbs and was ready for the British takeover.

After 1857, the British started perceiving Muslims as a real threat to their rule and dealt with them in the most ruthless manner.⁴⁶ British apprehensions were not limited to the context of India but were rooted in the long history of tension between the 'Crescent' and the 'Cross' during Christian crusades. After 1857, Syed Ahmed realized that the only way of survival left open for Indian Muslims was through their loyalty in politics to the British and modernism in their own institutions.⁴⁷ To meet this need, he set up two

⁴⁰ S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki muzhabi aur ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent: Mughal Era, 60, 90, 99, 102-107, 149, 467-468; Tara Chand, trans. Muhammad Masood Ahmed) Tamuden-i-Hind pur Islami Asraat (The Islamic Impact upon Indian Civilization), 165-168.

⁴¹ Jahangir the Mughal king of India writes in his biography: "I am an alcoholic since the age of 18. Currently I am 38. In the beginning I used to drink 20 glasses of wine a day. I now drink only to facilitate my digestive system" [Jahangir, (2004), 42]. He used to spend millions in celebrating the day of his crowning and hunted for weeks in the jungles (65, 87). His great-grandfather and the first Mughal ruler of India, Baber, was also a wine lover and writes about his excesses in his autobiography [Zaheeruddin Baber, (trans. Rasheed Akhtar Nadvi) *Tuzk-e-Babri* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2009), 166].

⁴² There were many non-Islamic court practices and imperial directives issued by the Mughal rulers. Emperor Humayun introduced the tradition of unveiling his face in public which he termed as *jalwa-i-qudus* or divine splendor. He also proclaimed to be *Padshah-i-Khilafat Panah* (Sovereign Defender of the Caliphate), *Padshah-i-A'ali* (the Exalted Sovereign), *Padshah-i-Alam* (the Sovereign of the World), *Shahinshah-i-Nasal-I Alam* (The Emperor of the entire Human Race). Later on Akbar came up with still more self-promoting claims like *Padshah-i-Islam* (King of Islam), *Imam-I 'Adil* (the Just Imam), *Mujtahid ul- 'Asr* (Jurist of the Age) and *Insan-i-Kamil* (the Perfect Man). In their attempt to appease the Hindus, the Mughal rulers prohibited cow slaughter and killing of peacocks along with abolishing the *jizyah* or tax on Hindus. The Muslim violators of these laws were subjected to strict punishments.

⁴³ I.A. Khan, "State in Mughal India: Re-Examining the Myths of a Counter-Vision", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 29, no. 1/2, (2001):16-45; S. Moosvi, "The Pre-Colonial State", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 33, no. 3/4, (2005): 40-53; R. D'souza, "Crisis before the Fall: Some Speculations on the Decline of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 30 no. 9/10, (2002): 3-30.

⁴⁴ Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Our Oriental Heritage*, 469.

⁴⁵ S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabi aur Ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent, 572-573, 600-601.

⁴⁶ A. H. Hali, (trans. K.H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews). *Hayat-i-Javed* (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat, 1979), 49.

⁴⁷ S. M. Ikram, Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki Muzhabi aur Ilmi Tareekh Ahed-e-Mughlia (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent, 294.

schools in the cities of Muradabad and Ghazipur. In 1864, he founded the Scientific Society which was the first learned body in Northern India. He also started publishing two journals, *The Aligarh Institute Gazette* and *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq* with the sub-title *Mohammedan Social Reformer*. These efforts were directed at bringing moderation in the Muslim attitude towards the West and Western knowledge.⁴⁸ He attempted to change the Muslim stance of opposition towards the British to that of acquiescence and participation, and to alter the British government's policy of suppression of Muslims⁴⁹ to one of paternalism. After 1885 when the Indian National Congress was formed, Syed started emphasizing Muslim political separatism.⁵⁰ He could foresee that in India there was no equality in terms of education between Hindus and Muslims and therefore any conferment of democratic privileges would mean exclusive enjoyment by a few.⁵¹ His fears were not unfounded. With the start of the British Raj, Hindus displaced Muslims in administration of the country. They started embracing British education with fervor and held firmly to the opportunity of becoming minor government officials who played as second fiddle to the ruling elite. The Islamic schools, in a bid to save their religious identity, became strictly jurisprudence oriented. Gradually, Muslim interest in the gentlemanly etiquettes or *adabs* eroded and Islamic schools became synonymous with rigidity and inflexibility.⁵²

When All India Muslim League was formed in 1906, it used Syed's arguments about the need for separate representation and educational regeneration for Muslims. The League justified its opposition to the Caliphate Movement of the 1920s and invoked Syed's legacy to attain legitimacy for its pro-British stance. Syed Ahmed was a realist who had seen vast sections of the Muslim aristocracy being either obliterated or utterly impoverished. He saw how passionately the Christian missionaries⁵³ were spreading hatred against Islam and its Prophet (SAW). He could foresee that the British might not be challenged through emotions and *fatwas* alone and thus the only option left for Indian Muslims was to reshape and refashion their lives or else be prepared for extinction at the hands of the British Raj and the majority Hindus⁵⁴. It can be said in retrospect that Syed Ahmed was the first Muslim to propound the 'two-nation' idea which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Syed Ahmed prepared the Indian Muslims first through the Scientific Society at Ghazipur and later through Aligarh University. He inculcated in them an Islamic spirit based on Islamic history and rationality derived from

⁴⁸ M.M. Sharif, (eds.) *A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. II* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1983), 1581.

⁴⁹ Suppression of Muslims through the Western colonial powers, especially the British, was quite common up until the 20th century. One of the most commonly used tools for this purpose was setting up of the church missionary schools. These schools not only made their appearance in India but in other parts of the Islamic world as well. The Church Missionary Society (CMS), for example, arrived in Sudan in 1899. They could however, gain only one Muslim convert during 60 years of their work (Sharkey, 2002).

⁵⁰ K. Ahmed, *Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask: Facts About Great Men We Don't Want to Know* (Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt.) Ltd., 2004), 99.

⁵¹ M. I. Chaghatai, (ed.), *Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan 1817-1898: A Prominent Muslim Politician & Educationist*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005), 25-26, 78, 85, 347-348; A. Ahmed, (trans. Jameel Jalbi) *Bar-e-Sagheer mein Islami Jadeediat (Islamic Modernity in Sub-Continent)*, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 2006), 59-62.

⁵² T. Zeldin, *An Intimate History of Humanity* (London: Vintage Books, 1998), 266-267.

⁵³ M.M. Sharif, (eds.) *A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol. II*, 1590.

⁵⁴ The evangelical missionaries in India, the utilitarianism and rationalism of James Mill and Lord Macaulay were however not the only reasons for India's colonization. The support of local *zamindars* (landlords), merchants, farmers and the gentry, all provided capital and support for the East India Company [Mansoor Moaddel, *The Origins of Islamic Modernism in India, Egypt and Iran* (2001); Hasan "Indeneous Cooperation and the Birth of a Colonial City Calcutta: c. 1698-1750", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol.26, no.1 (1992) & 1993; Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707)*, 335].

Western philosophy.⁵⁵ This synthesis of spirit and reason, which happened first at individual level, soon spread across the Muslims of India at a collective level.⁵⁶

Muhammad Iqbal also saw through the shortfalls of following blindly the Western Modernist philosophy and the politics of Hindu majority. He argued that “A purely psychological method...cannot explain religious passion as a form of knowledge (and that) it is bound to fail in the case of our newer psychologists such as Sigmund Freud) as it did in the case of Locke and Hume”.⁵⁷ His animosity for both Western materialism and Eastern hollow religiosity shaped his philosophic thoughts.⁵⁸ His integrative approach presented a fresh mystic version of philosophy which provided the Indian Muslims with a much needed spirit to squarely face British imperialism and Hindu nationalism. Following the legacy of Syed Ahmed, Iqbal’s philosophy and poetry along with the shrewd diplomacy of the All India Muslim League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah, succeeded in carving a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. In 1947, India was partitioned and a new state, Pakistan, appeared on the world map.

It is ironic that Pakistan, which was created under the banner of the ‘two-nation’ theory, could never mould its populace into one nation. According to some of its critics, it could never even mould itself into a working state let alone a nation.⁵⁹ It is probably because for a country which was created on the basis of the ‘two-nation theory’, where religion and religion related social and cultural discourse was the only real difference between the two nations, “Islam was quickly marginalized from the main debates in Pakistani politics”⁶⁰ The Independence Movement for Pakistan under the All India Muslim League was operated in the most democratic and constitutional manner. But after independence, the failure of politicians to mould the populace into a nation, paved the way for the bureaucracy and army to rule the country for more than half of its total life span to date.⁶¹

Apart from despotic, corrupt and spiritless rule, inconsistent foreign policy, failure to maintain law and order, and provide justice to the masses, Akbar S Ahmed (1998) provides a ‘pendulum swing theory’ to explain the inherent tensions of South Asian Islam in general and Pakistani Islam in particular. His theory provides two contrasting models of Muslim leadership in Pakistani society. He bases these models, called model A and B, on the characteristics of Mughal ruler Aurangzeb and his son Dara Shikoh respectively.

⁵⁵ S. M. Ikram, *Rood-i-Kausar: Islami Hindu-Pakistan ki muzhabi aur ilmi Tareekh ahed-e-Mughlia* (Religious and Intellectual History of Islamic Sub-Continent), 84.

⁵⁶ M. I. Chaghatai, (ed.), *Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan 1817-1898: A Prominent Muslim Politician & Educationist*, 23, 193-194, 264-265; A. Ahmed, (trans. Jameel Jalbi) *Bar-e-Sagheer mein Islami Jadeediat* (Islamic Modernity in Sub-Continent), 85-88.

⁵⁷ M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 30.

⁵⁸ M.M. Sharif, (eds.) *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. II, 1630.

⁵⁹ J. Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009), 484.

⁶⁰ According to Samad, “With hindsight it becomes clear that there were two strands present in the decolonization process. Two imagined communities were forged: one distinct, based on Indian nationalism, and the other more ethereal, formed around Islam.....The Muslim League leadership in Pakistan was convinced for various reasons that the country, and they themselves, could survive politically only if a strong center was established. But they went about this task in an authoritarian way. The result was that the fragile unity which had been created by Muslim nationalism was broken up and strong centrifugal forces re-emerged in reaction to the efforts at centralization.....Thus the tension between centripetal (provincial) and centrifugal (central) forces was a continuous theme in South Asian Muslim politics which contributed to political instability” [Y.Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937-1958* (Karachi: Oxford University Press,1995)8-11.]

⁶¹ M. Asher, & U. Muhammad, *Pakistan ki Siyasi Jamateen (Political Parties of Pakistan)*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 12-13.

- The characteristics of Model A (Aurangzeb) include an orthodox view of legalist Islam, emphasis on *Ummah*, discouragement of all forms of art, support for clergy and *ulema*, rejection of Sufism and, keeping Quran and Sunnah as the basis of the societal fabric.
- Model B (*Dara Shikoh*), on the other hand, seeks eclectic Islam, universalistic humanity, encouragement of art, anti-clergy attitude, Sufism, *Upanishads/Bhagavad-Gita* type mysticism and, free mixing of Muslims with non-Muslims in all societal matters.⁶²
- He also identifies a third category of secular Muslims or Model C, which developed as a direct consequence to Western colonialism.
- To him the fourth category of Muslim Model D, which is highly secular and totally committed to modernism in its Western shape and typified by Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, is however absent from Pakistani discourse⁶³.

He draws genealogical lines from the socio-political Muslim crisis of the 17th century to Pakistani discourse of present times. For model A, these lines emanate from Aurangzeb (17th C) and through Shah Waliullah (18th C), Syed Ahmed Barelvi (19th C) and, Maulana Maudoodi (20th C) reach Zia-ul-Haq in the late 1970s. For model B the sequence is from Dara Shikoh (17th C) to Wali (18th C) to Mirza Ghalib (19th C) to Z.A. Bhutto in 1960s. For Model C, the line travels from Syed Ahmad (19th C) to M.A. Jinnah (20th C) to Ayub Khan in the 1950s.

The above mentioned analysis of South Asian Muslims is fully manifested by three parallel but divergent educational systems operating in Pakistan. They have resulted in fragmenting Pakistani society in three totally divergent social strata which live in their own worlds, have little contact with one another, and have very different career options and life opportunities available to them. These three education systems include religious education imparted at *deeni madaris*, oriental-styled Urdu medium education and purely Western-styled English medium education. This thoughtless education system is probably a major contributor in creating confusion, turbulence and chaos in Pakistani society.⁶⁴

Section 4: Islamic Economic and Social Model

It is important to note that contrary to general perception, the Prophet of Islam (SAW) did not bring a new religion. His message was the same as that of all the Prophets preceding him. The difference was that he brought a *Din* or a complete code of life which encompassed all religious, moral, social, political, legislative, economic, epistemological, and secular or mundane day-to-day issues of human life and society.⁶⁵

Since Pakistan was created on the ideology of Islam, it is imperative that some discussion of the Islamic societal model be undertaken. The societal discourse of Islam is based on its economic model.

⁶² Samad, 9-19.

⁶³ This may not be true after 9 years rule of Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) in Pakistan. His 'enlightened moderation' was probably firmly rooted in the modernism of Mustafa Kemal. He writes in his book about his formative years spent in Turkey: "With the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal had saved Turkey from balkanization and modernized it by dragging it out of dogma and obscurantism". His intense love for Western cultural products started in Turkey (Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 19-24).

⁶⁴ N. Yazdani, "Faith & reason: A Synthesis in Pakistani Society", *Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, (2009): 33-43.

⁶⁵ Syed Abul Aala Mawdudi, *Quran ki Chaar Bunyadi Istalaheen (The Four Foundational Terms of Quran)*, (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008), 102-108.

The earliest known Islamic economic work is that of al-Shaybani (d. 804) which shows that earning a livelihood is not merely permitted but a compulsion upon the Muslims. Another point which this work brings home is that money earned through commerce or crafts is more pleasing in God's eyes than money received from the government for civil or military services. Abu'l Fadl Ja'far's *Kitab al-Ishara ila mahasin al-tijara (Indications of the Merits of Commerce)* which was written in 11th or 12th century is a far more practical discussion on economics as compared to Plato's *Politics* or Aristotle's doctrine of the golden mean.⁶⁶

Islamic economics is based on Quranic commands. The Islamic economic system subscribes to the idea that the ownership of all natural resources and means of production belongs to Allah. It is He who allows man to use and exploit them for his benefit.⁶⁷ The Quran declares it a lie if a man describes a certain thing as lawful or unlawful according to man-made standards.⁶⁸ Within the limits imposed by the Quran, the right of holding private property is recognized in Islam.⁶⁹ The Quran in its own spirit does not promote communism or Western-style capitalism. Natural inequality is described as the "outcome of His wise apportionment, issuing from His own dispensation".⁷⁰ There is no attempt to level up this natural inequality by a 'dead' equality⁷¹ which was attempted through communism. The Quran however, ordains that wealth be acquired through lawful means only. The Quran cites examples of the unlawful means of acquiring wealth which include usurping property⁷², bribery⁷³, breaching trust⁷⁴, misappropriation⁷⁵, stealing⁷⁶, spreading of indecent products/services⁷⁷, prostitution⁷⁸, gambling and lottery⁷⁹, and above all, usury or interest.⁸⁰

Islam abolishes the distinction between the material and the spiritual, and fuses these two aspects in its economic system as well. It was enjoined, for example, that those who undertake the *Hajj* journey and engage in trade should not be molested.⁸¹ The Quran also declares the earning of livelihood as God's blessing and thus transforms a purely material activity into a religious virtue. The main aim of Islamic economy is to root out *fasad*, literally meaning 'rottenness', 'spoiled-ness', 'corruption', 'decay', 'wickedness', 'immorality', and 'wrongness' from society. As opposed to rationality-based success, it was the understanding of the Quran which led the early Muslims to conquer the resources of earth and build a rich civilization.⁸² Islam prohibits all sources of unjustified enrichment and economic exploitation. *Riba* (usury/interest) is a sin under Islamic law for this very reason. It is considered such a major sin in Islam that even those hired to write

⁶⁶ Bernard Lewis, *Islam, from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople* (USA: Chicago University Press, 1974), 98.

⁶⁷ Al Qur'an, 2:29, 7:10; 13:3; 14:32-33.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 9:87.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2:275, 279; 282-283; 4:2,4,7,20,24,29; 5:38; 6:141.

⁷⁰ M.M. Sharif, (eds.) *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. I, 179-180.

⁷¹ Al Qur'an, 4:165; 17:21; 34:39.

⁷² Ibid., 2:188

⁷³ Ibid., 2:188

⁷⁴ Ibid., 2:283

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3:161

⁷⁶ Ibid., 5:41

⁷⁷ Ibid., 24:19

⁷⁸ Ibid., 24:33

⁷⁹ Ibid., 5:93

⁸⁰ Al Qur'an, 2:275.

⁸¹ Ibid., 5:2

⁸² Khan, 1994, 15.

the contract (involving interest or interest-based transactions) or who witness (and thus confirm) the contract are a party to this sin.⁸³

The spending of wealth in Allah's way or *Zakah* is not a mere act of piety in Islam. It is elevated as the third among the five basic pillars of Islam. It is mentioned 37 times in the Quran with the twofold purpose of purifying the individual self as well as for the good of society. It is not only a kind of tax but also an act of worship like praying and fasting. Accordingly the Prophet (SAW) fixed a maximum allowable limit in respect of different kinds of wealth.⁸⁴

The above discussion can be summarized by focusing on the following Quranic Verses:

*“As for those who devour interest, they behave as the one whom Satan has confounded with his touch. Seized in this state they say: ‘Buying and selling is but a kind of interest, even though Allah has made buying and selling lawful, and interest unlawful.Allah deprives interest of all blessings, whereas He blesses charity with growth”*⁸⁵

Why interest has been declared as Satanic is simply because it breeds inequalities, selfishness, miserliness and callousness in society. Charity on the other hand, has the opposite effect and creates the societal values of egalitarianism, large-heartedness, generosity, compassion for others and magnanimity. But the Pakistani banking system like that of any other country is based on interest. The business class which takes loans on interest toil day and night not only to sustain their businesses but also to feed the financiers who, apart from loaning the finance, do not shed a drop of sweat but get a fixed and guaranteed income. This is social injustice at its very worst because the financiers are becoming richer at the expense of someone who is trying his best to earn an income which is not fixed and not guaranteed. That is why those lending money on interest are “at once guilty of ungratefulness to God (because they did not spend their surplus in charity), and blatantly unjust, cruel and wicked”.⁸⁶

Verse 4:59 of the Quran which Commands “Believer! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are invested with authority; and then if you were to dispute among yourselves about anything refer to Allah and the Messenger.....” is considered the “cornerstone of the entire religious, social and political structure of Islam, and the very first clause of the constitution of an Islam state”. This verse establishes the line of hierarchy to be followed by the believers till the Day of Judgment. The hierarchy entails unconditional loyalty to Allah, the Prophet (SAW) along with obedience to intellectual, political, administrative, judicial and regional leaders of the community. The obedience to the third line of hierarchy is however, contingent on two conditions that they should themselves be believers and obedient to Allah and the Prophet (SAW). Bowing to any authority other than Allah and the Prophet (SAW) is considered as following *taghut* or the satanic authority.⁸⁷

⁸³ M. U. Chapra, *Islam and Economic Development: A Strategy for Development with Justice and Stability* (Islamabad: International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Islamic Research Institute, Islamic Research Institute Press, 1993).

⁸⁴ M.M. Sharif, (eds.) *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. I, 178-188; M. Al-Buraey, *Administrative Development an Islamic Perspective* (KPI: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 180-189.

⁸⁵ Al Qur'an, 2: 275-276.

⁸⁶ From interpretation of Surah al-Baqarah of the Quran. [S. A. A. Mawdudi, (translated and edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari). *Towards understanding the Quran: Abridged version of Tafhim al-Quran* (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1988), 217-219]

⁸⁷ From interpretation of Surah Al-Nisa of the Quran. [S. A. A. Mawdudi, (translated and edited by Zafar Ishaq Ansari). *Towards understanding the Quran: Abridged version of Tafhim al-Quran*, 50-53)]

Section 5: The State of Pakistani Society: Some Empirical Reflections

To fully discuss and explore as to how many of the above Islamic injunctions are followed in true letter and spirit in Pakistan is beyond the scope of this paper. Some statistics capturing the state of social justice and leadership (religious, economic, political and social governance) in Pakistan are however presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Human Development Index (HDI) 2011	0.504 (among the 'very low' in the world)
HDI Rank 2011	145 out of 187 countries
Gender Inequality Index 2011	0.537
Gender Inequality Rank 2011	115 out of 147 countries
Population below poverty line 2010	30%
Income Inequality Gini Index	30.6 (2007-08)
Budget Deficit	-6.2% of GDP 2010
Public Debt	50.2% of GDP 2009 50.6% of GDP 2010
Exports	\$ 21.46 billion (2010)
Imports	\$ 32.88 billion (2010)
Trade Deficit	\$ 11.42 billion (2010)
External Debt	\$ 53.6 billion (2009) \$ 56.12 billion (2010)
Pakistani rupees per US dollar	60.35 (2006) 60.62 (2007) 70.64 (2008) 81.71 (2009) 85.27 (2010)
Global Corruption Barometer over the past 3 years	Increased by 77%
Bribe Payers Index (how do the country institutions behave abroad)	Pakistan is no way near the top 30 countries which include Asian countries like Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Indonesia and China

Source: <http://undp.org>, <http://hdr.undp.org>, <http://www.indexmundi.com> and <http://www.transparency.org>

Section 6: Discussion

Research Methodology

This paper borrows from the epistemologies of Constructionism and Objectivism. It presents historic discourse of Pakistani culture and constructs the analytical findings based on the discourse. It is empiricist in the sense because it uses Hofstede's cultural research model which is purely empirical in nature. It also relies on empirical evidence reflecting the current economic and social indicators of Pakistan. The paper employs historical research and secondary data analysis as the main research methodologies.

Analytical Findings

The Prophet's (SAW) leadership and political model was firmly rooted in the Divine revelations of the Quran⁸⁸ which commanded him to "strive", to be "firm", to "endure" the fierce persecution, to "repel evil with the good", to avoid "arrogance, pride and conceit", to have no fear of dying in the cause of faith, to maintain "equity" and "fairness" in all matters of life and, to be "merciful" and humble to others.⁸⁹ The Prophet's (SAW) implementation of the Quranic revelations in establishing the state at Medina left an integrated political model for Muslims to follow. He entered into pledges and agreements, fought wars and led expeditions, formed alliances and governed, changed society and culture, imposed taxes, dispensed justice and created institutions and collective systems by strictly adhering to the Divine-commands of the Quran⁹⁰. The transformational aspect of the Prophet's (SAW) leadership is derived from his preached morality which changed the moral values of his followers. "Fear of Allah and of the Last Judgment, kindness and equity, compassion and mercy, generosity, self-restraint, sincerity, and moral fellowship among the believers became the new bases of conduct".⁹¹

This form of leadership was based on a strong 'group feel' which Ibn Khaldun, in his ground-breaking work *Muqaddimah* (originally written in 1377) describes as *asabiyah*.⁹² It was this Arabic *asabiyah* which ignited the great civilization and high culture in Baghdad and Andalusia.

Muslim rulers in the Sub-Continent broke away with that *asabiyah* very soon after the first Muslim rulership was established. It is no historical secret that the Royal Courts became known for intrigues, luxuries and excesses of Sultans, Khiljis, Ghaznis and especially the Mughals, in place of simple, egalitarian but effective Caliphate. They are dealt with in some detail in the historic discourse section of this paper. How close was Indian Muslim rule to that of Prophet (SAW), the Rightly Guided Caliphs and some of the later Caliphs in Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties again openly shows glaring contrasts between how the Islamic rulers of Baghdad and Andalusia differed in their leadership approach from the Muslim rulers of the Sub-Continent.

⁸⁸ For details refer to Quranic verses: 25:52, 66:9, 5:8, 10:109, 4:64, 41:34, 8:199, 31:18, 93:10-11, 3:158 (Murad, 2005, 27-32).

⁸⁹ Abdul Majid Daryabadi, *Tafsir-ul-Quran: Translation and Commentary of the Holy Quran, Vol. I, II, III & IV*, Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 1991), Vol. I, 278, 408; Vol. II, 253, 313; Vol. III, 382, 417; Vol. IV, 119, 510.

⁹⁰ The social system of the Prophet ((SAW) based on the concept of Ummah, is traced back to the first meeting at *Aqabah* in the early days of year 622 while he was still in Mecca. This was followed by the First Pledge of *Aqabah* called Women's Pledge, because it was agreed not to wage war. There were 12 individuals present who pledged with the Prophet (SAW) not to indulge in idolatry, stealing, adultery, infanticide, fabrications, and not to disobey the orders of the Prophet (SAW). By the time the Second Pledge took place the Prophet (SAW), under Divine-commands, changed the terms and conditions because now the Muslims were given permission to wage war. The treaty of al-Hudaybiyyah was negotiated by the Prophet (SAW) with the Quraysh in year 628 and apparently fostered a military and political triumph for the Quraysh. Later the treaty exposed the weaknesses in the leadership of the Quraysh who had suffered a diplomatic defeat by according a status of equality to Medina through the treaty. From the beginning the Prophet ((SAW) built a dual character in the very core of the Islamic society. On the one hand it was chieftaincy which gradually became a state and an empire while at the same time it was a religious community. [Hishaam, *Seerat un Nabi Kamil*, (trans. Maulana Abdul Jaleel Siddiqui and Maulana Ghulam Rasool Mehar) Vol. I, 481-482, 489-490, 504, 562; Vol. II, 368; Tibri, *Tareekh-e-Tibri*, Vol. II, 91, 96, 233, 246, 255; Watson, *Ideas: A History from Fire to Freud*, 354; Ahmad, *Muhammad and His Constitutional Character*, v, 257; Siddiqi, *Organization of Government under the Holy Prophet (SAW)*, 15-49; Eaton, *Islam and the Destiny of Man*, 112-125]

⁹¹ E. V. Donzel, *Islamic Desk Reference: Compiled from The Encyclopedia of Islam* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1994).

⁹² Ibn-e-Khaldun, (trans. Franz Rosenthal) (ed. & abridged: N.J. Dawood), *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History: The Classic Islamic History of the World* (USA: Princeton University Press, 2005), 300-350

It is important to note that Islamic and Muslim leadership styles have always differed. In the Sub-Continent, Islamic leadership never got going. The rulers were legally Muslims but allowed all sorts of excesses. They gave undue concessions to Hindu and later to Sikh Rajas and Maharajas to extend their own rule. While the West was awakening from the Dark Ages and Islamic Civilization was at its zenith, the Muslim rulers of India were busy extending their self-interests and practically failed to deliver any good to the general public. There were hardly any scientific, philosophical and religious developments in about 10 centuries of Muslim rule in India. Most of the much exalted Sufis of that era also allowed free intermixing of non-Islamic rituals, myths and superstitious practices in Islam to win over the hearts of the Hindu majority. A closer look at these practices and tactics and those adopted by the current rulers of Pakistan show many similarities. The most noticeable among them being total disregard of Islamic injunctions-based socio-political system, eagerness to appease and adopt secular Indian and Western support, granting concessions to them on unilateral basis, plundering the country's resources and befooling the public under different disguises.

From the above discussion, it seems quite probable that the real motive for the demand of Pakistan was to secure a separate piece of land for Muslims and not for the rule of Islam. If that is untrue, then the Objective Resolution of 1948 and later the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1973 would not have just 'used' the word Islam and Islamic Republic of Pakistan without even trying to implement any facet of Islamic social, political and economic system.

Even the apparently Islamic regime of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) only relied on cosmetic Islamic changes like broadcasting the five *Adhan* live on daily basis, telecasting *Shabeena* Nights live on TV, reciting verses from the Holy Quran in PIA flights, and establishing *Majlis-i-Shura* from among the same political, social and religious elite which had ruled the country since its inception. Was any practical and concrete measure undertaken to enforce Islamic socio-political and economic system in the country? Was interest not rampant in Pakistan even in those days? Did not Zia-ul-Haq's reliance and alliance with America in the Afghan war opened floodgates of millions of Afghan refugees, drug and gun culture and political destruction of Karachi at the hands of ethnic-minded politics? History stands witness to the aftermath of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war and the nation is still dearly paying for its consequences through internal strife and thousands of lives laid in the senseless war on terror.

Moving to Hofstede's three levels of mental programming: genetic, group and cultural, leaves us with an important question to answer: what has Pakistan acquired as its collective cultural model in the context of its history of leadership? The most prominent feature of Pakistani governance at political, social, economic or religious levels is that an elitist minority has always ruled the hapless majority. From President and Prime Minister Houses to National Assemblies, Senates, Provincial Assemblies, local *Panchayat*, judicial system, education and health sector, and local communities down to the individual family levels, this has been the rule of thumb to lead in Pakistan. Our extended family systems and collective identities are the imprints of the caste system which still plagues our democratic process because votes are casted on *biratheri* and *zaat* rather than on ideological basis. What we get in our assemblies are not the brightest brains of Pakistan but the most influential elite who hold the economic jugular veins of the poor belonging to their constituencies. Our 'we' consciousness cannot be compared with that of Japan who rose from the ruins of World War II to become one of the strongest economies of the world. We believe in group decisions not because we practice

participative decision making but because there is no choice for a group but to bow to the decisions of the elite. Be it a ruthless father merrily murdering his daughter because she married on her own and deprived him of some more potential acres of land or a *Nambardar*, *Vadeera*, SHO, MPA or MNA, our people have no choice but to accept the decisions of the leaders who have no regard for their followers' development in any way. This is not the collectivistic and egalitarian society of Islam but is an amalgamate of conformists who do not dare object to any decision imposed on them or else they are further marginalized, kidnapped, tortured or brutally killed. This is what collectivism means in the context of a Pakistan. Hofstede's analysis fails to make such contextual distinctions and therefore should not be generalized across cultures with the same validity and reliability.

One look at the cultural model of Figure 1 clearly shows how our historic discourse has shaped our societal values and their ill consequences which are briefly captured in Table 1. Pakistan's low ranking in human development, economic underperformance and top rankings in corruption and bribery do not just reflect a governance failure but failure of a nation as a whole. Three of the external influences on the Muslim rulers of the Sub-Continent are especially noteworthy: wars, trade and scientific discoveries. During the Muslim rule, the Sub-Continent faced numerous external threats in the form of wars. Trade became the instrument of introducing colonialism whereas no major scientific breakthroughs occurring in the rest of the world could pave its way to India. Science and technology was a by-product of British colonial rule and which probably helped breed the local mindset (especially of Muslims) that technology and machinery along with technical and scientific education is to be acquired from the West. This is an important observation because in the case of Pakistan the same mindset still prevails and perhaps explains our failure to export value added products to other countries.

The paper has already dealt with the historical discourse underpinning the creation of Pakistan in detail. Suffice is to say that it was a very brief period during which the All India Muslim League brought the Muslims under one banner and this fragile unity soon became fragmented after the creation of Pakistan. The overall leadership style however remained largely unchanged and gave birth to the societal norm of disregarding and marginalizing Islam from mainstream politics and education system which resulted in a disjointed nation with a 'fragmented' collectivism centered on the narrow and myopic notions of provincialism, ethnicity and sectarianism. This form of collectivism was no less materialistic, utilitarian and selfish than the much criticized Western individualism. The resulting political, educational, legislative and other institutions were therefore never strengthened but served as means by the ruling elite to achieve their motives. This pattern has prevailed in the Pakistani society right from the top to the bottom.

In the light of above discussion, our starting propositions that Pakistani social, organizational and political leadership styles are 'Telling'/'Directing' in nature with little regard to developing mature transactional and transformational relations with the subordinates who are assumed to be low in maturity in terms of being unable and unwilling seem to be fully supported. This is because subordinates or voters have failed to choose leaders with long term vision and commitment to the cause of Islam and betterment of Pakistan. They have got those leaders elected who can solve their immediate personal problems like getting their son a job or bailing out a criminal relative from the jail. No mature relationship building between leaders and followers in the sense promoted by LMX seems to have developed across the Pakistani society.

But the dark side of transactional, transformational and LMX in terms of 'mature' relations based on materialistic give-and-take philosophy have definitely developed in Pakistan or else corruption would not have reached every level of society and across all sectors including public and private institutions and organizations. Politically supported criminal mafias and the cult-like religious factions have no doubt established transactional and transformational relations with their followers. It is in this darker sense that LMX is fully operational within the collectivistic and yet fragmented cultural context of Pakistan.

Limitations

The most salient limitation of this study is the obvious mismatch between historical account of nearly 10 centuries and the very cross-sectional nature of data depicting some of the societal indicators of Pakistan. It should have been more fitting if the empirical indicators were tracked from 1947 to show how progressively they have deteriorated, especially during the last decade or so. Some statistical techniques like time series and trend analyses of that longitudinal data would have provided much richer insight supporting the main thesis of this study. Similarly application of quantitative techniques employed for comparing the social and economic indicators of Pakistan with other Islamic and South Asian countries could have shed more light on the peculiarities of the Pakistani discourse.

Future Research Implications

The single most important future research implication of this study is to repeat Hofstede's cultural dimension research in contemporary Pakistan. It seems plausible to assume that power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity scores would have undergone a big change for the worse. Another interesting research implication could be multilevel and cross-sectoral ethnographic studies dissecting the dark side of leader-member relations in Pakistani society.

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